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ABSTRACT 
This thesis defines and extends the psychological concept of ‘decision inertia’: the 
redundant deliberation of choice for no positive gain. The concept was developed 
following observation in the real-world that emergency incidents were most often 
criticised, not because of poor decision making, but because actions simply failed. It 
is argued, therefore, that the need to develop a psychological understanding to 
explain the relationship between stimulus and non-response is of conceptual 
importance. Rather than avoid a choice, decision inertia is crucially associated with a 
strong desire to take action yet, for reasons that will be discussed in this thesis, 
action fundamentally fails. A Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) approach was 
followed to investigate decision making in the real-world context of emergency 
response environments. A mixed methods approach was used to qualitatively 
interview command level decision makers and then explore decision making in an 
empirical simulation setting. Two key findings emerged from the data: (i) the 
relationship between uncertainty and decision inertia appeared to be mediated by the 
anticipation of negative consequences associated with both action and inaction; and 
(ii) the context of extreme environments can exacerbate these effects by making 
(usually adaptive) cognitive processing styles (i.e. approach goals; cognitive 
flexibility) inappropriate. Implications with regards to both the conceptual 
importance of decision inertia and more practical advice for decision making in 
extreme emergency contexts is provided. 
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PREFACE 
The preface to this thesis will describe some of the lessons and reflections that I 
have taken away following the four years that I have spent researching and writing 
this PhD thesis. My initial interest in this topic area developed from reflections in the 
real world that major incidents are often derailed by the inability to make decisions. 
Although I was aware of the challenges associated with emergency response 
domains, I was interested to see how these challenges interacted with the psychology 
of decision making; specifically with regards to decision inertia. This presented a 
challenge in itself, as I needed to gain access to a group of incredibly valued and 
important people who must crucially also be willing to get involved with research. 
Yet to my surprise, after initial groundwork to develop relationships, I was met with 
a cohort of emergency response commanders who were willing and eager to 
collaborate. Indeed, the incidents that were described in the interviews that were 
conducted for this thesis were more detailed and introspective than I could have 
imagined. I am honoured that I was provided with the opportunity to listen to the 
experiences of these heroic men and women first-hand.  Furthermore, commanders 
showed a great enthusiasm to continue their professional development and to learn 
about the psychology of decision making, which made it a hugely rewarding process. 
This provides a positive outlook for the use of psychology to help train decision 
making in emergency service contexts and the potential for further collaboration in 
the future. 
This thesis stresses the important concept of ‘resilience’. As is echoed 
throughout this thesis, emergency incidents are inherently complex, dangerous and 
high-stakes. Not only is there a high level of risk for the public, but for the 
emergency responders themselves. Before they even arrive, commanders are faced 
with a demanding situation over which they have little initial control. The training to 
enable commanders to develop a resilient response to emergencies is essential in 
order to facilitate expertise and increase awareness of appropriate goal orientations 
and cognitive processing styles. As will be recommended, a greater understanding of 
roles and responsibilities across a decentralised network of emergency response 
teams could facilitate decision making. Indeed, the desire of the government’s Joint 
Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) to develop ‘joint’ decision 
making during emergencies, defined by collective and mutual agreement, is not 
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necessarily the most adaptive way to facilitate inter-agency working. Instead, based 
on findings from this thesis and the wider literature, it is suggested that a focus on 
developing an understanding of the nuanced differences in skills and capabilities 
between agencies is more appropriate. A decentralised approach to emergency 
responding would create a resilient network to enshrine expertise.  
A key personal reflection on this thesis steps outside of the domain of pure 
psychology and reflects a contextual, and somewhat political, observation. A key 
motivator during my time as a PhD researcher has been to ground my data in the 
context of the real-world environment, and to listen to what emergency response 
commanders had to say. As such, it was important to pay great attention to the topics 
that commanders wished to talk about. As with all NDM projects this is perhaps 
what makes them one of the most exciting and rewarding research pathways to 
undertake. It would be remittent of me not to mention a major theme that was 
identified in Chapter 5; a theme that not only contributes to the inherent complexity 
already acknowledged in the emergency domain, but one that also limits the basic 
resilience of the emergency services to respond: the negative impact that budget cuts 
and austerity have had on the ability to respond. Although a discussion of this may 
be more aligned to a thesis on politics, the impact that such cuts have had on the 
psychology of emergency responding is plain to see. Commanders described how 
budget cuts had exacerbated endogenous challenges by stripping resources and 
creating added pressure with regards to financial expense, and further inhibited 
exogenous team processing by increasing competition and blurring professional 
boundaries. Moreover, the psychological strain this is having on emergency service 
workers both in terms of their own mental wellbeing and on their ability to make 
decisions when trading-off these hugely aversive factors is startling.  
The UK is currently in a state of crisis with the emergency services. Budget cuts 
have rapidly diminished resilience within the UK to respond to crisis incidents. The 
importance of the emergency services is clear: they are the foundation to a resilient 
society upon whom we rely on the most in times of need. The commanders who lead 
these teams are fallible human beings and the complexity of the emergency incident 
environment makes decision making challenging. Evidence from this thesis suggests 
that decision making is most at risk, not due to choice outcomes, but due to the 
inability to make a choice at all. This arises due to the process of decision inertia, the 
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redundant deliberation of options for no positive gain, which appears to be 
associated to goal conflict when considering multiple alternatives, and is exacerbated 
by the anticipation of negative outcomes, including those linked to the salient impact 
of budget cuts and austerity. Yet this pessimistic outlook is not inevitable and steps 
can be made to reduce inert processing. First and foremost by investing in an 
emergency service that embraces expertise. By empowering response agencies to 
work, not jointly, but collectively through collaborative expertise and by training 
commanders to develop cognitive processing strategies to facilitate decisive action. 
It is hoped that the publication of research to identify the importance of resilience 
will help to protect the emergency services and provide a psychological safety net 
against future emergencies. 
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Chapter 1: The conceptual importance of the psychology of inaction: an 
overview of what is known and the questions that remain 
1.1 Introduction 
The Boxing Day Tsunami (2004), the Haiti Earthquake (2010) and the 
widespread and repeated flooding disasters that have hit the UK in recent years; all 
extremely diverse and emotionally salient emergencies that have one thing in 
common: the failure of authorities to take timely action (Grunewald, Binder & 
Georges, 2010; National Audit Office, 2006; PEDU, 2012; UNICEF, 2008). This 
thesis makes a novel contribution to psychological theory by extending upon the 
limited research on the psychology of doing nothing. Specifically, it will explore this 
concept within the domain of extreme decision making and the emergency services. 
It will describe why individuals sometimes fail to take action, despite their desire to 
make a choice, by investigating the psychological phenomenon of ‘decision inertia’. 
Decision inertia is a cognitively active process that involves the continual, yet 
fundamentally redundant, deliberation on a choice for no positive gain. It is distinct 
from decision avoidance, whereby individuals are motivated to disengage with the 
decision process by choosing to defer or ignore it, as decision makers intend to make 
a decision through the constant reassessment of the problem. The concept of inertia 
has developed over a number of years, based on anecdotal evidence and research 
working within the domain of critical incident decision making at the Centre for 
Critical and Major Incident Psychology, University of Liverpool. This thesis seeks to 
further define the concept of decision inertia through research. 
Data was collected from representatives of the UK Emergency Services; namely 
the Police Service (PS), Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) and Ambulance Service 
(AS). The types of decisions that were of interest to research were those at risk of 
deliberation. As such, ‘command’ level participants were sought (i.e. those who have 
responsibilities to take ‘charge’ at an incident) because their decisions are strategic, 
high-stakes, involve multiple contributory factors and have the potential for creating 
a long-term impact that can far outlast the decision event. For example, the choices 
made by Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield at the Hillsborough Football 
stadium disaster in 1989, where 96 Liverpool Football Club fans were crushed to 
death, are still being unpicked in court 26 years later. Command-level choices are 
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also compounded by the social setting, as commanders often operate within multi-
agency environments involving coordination with other ‘blue lights’, local or 
national authorities. This adds further social complexity to decision making as 
commanders must not only consider their own intra-team goals but also those of 
inter-team members, which at times may be contradictory. The theoretical aim of this 
thesis was to expand the psychological understanding of decision inertia. The 
introductory chapter will firstly outline the psychological literature that has informed 
this research. It will:  
(i) Define decision making 
(ii) Describe the history of decision making research by outlining: 
a. The progression of early decision making research from prescriptive 
to more descriptive models 
b. The distinction between two modern approaches to research: 
decision-making research (largely prescriptive with a focus on right 
and wrong decisions); and problem-solving research (largely 
descriptive with a focus on how choice problems are cognitively 
processed) 
(iii) Focus on the research domain of interest: the challenges to decision 
making in extreme environments 
(iv) Provide a description of the research context: the UK emergency services 
 
1.2 Defining decision making 
1.2.1 What is decision making? 
Decision making is the process of choosing an action in order to achieve a goal 
in an uncertain environment (Hastie, 2001). It is a psychological process that links 
cognition and emotion as individuals use both emotional and rational weights to help 
guide the decision process (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000). People make 
hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions each day, ranging from small, everyday 
decisions with small and short-term consequences (e.g. decision to have cereal for 
breakfast) to more complex choices with large and long-lasting implications (e.g. 
decision to get married). Decisions can vary depending upon their social context: 
such as individual decisions within organisational or work domain (e.g. a doctor’s 
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diagnosis of a patient) or involve joint or team-based choice where decision making 
autonomy is shared (e.g. marketing team’s decision on when to launch a new 
product). The goal of any choice is to select an option that is most appropriate for 
dealing with the situation at hand. Importantly, a decision is not a preference to act 
in a certain way, but the commitment to implement a specific action. Preferences can 
influence the generation of certain options and reflect a general tendency or 
likelihood to favour a certain option, but they are not rigid or certain and may be 
traded-off against other salient and relevant factors of the choice context. For 
example, someone hosting a dinner party may prefer to cook meat and thus have a 
tendency to consider meat-based dishes, however, if they had invited a vegetarian 
guest to dinner then then preference-based choice options would be overruled and 
the decision maker must consider wider options to align with the requirements of the 
decision task. A decision is thus more than an intention to take a particular option or 
course of action; a decision is the final cognitive commitment to behaviourally 
execute a choice that aligns with one’s, often multi-layered and competing, goals. 
1.2.2 The decision making process 
Most of the decision making models that are outlined in the psychological 
literature follow a relatively similar process path. Generally, decision makers will try 
to understand the situation and build situation awareness, they will then generate 
and/or identify their available options that are relevant to the decision task, whilst 
further attempting to evaluate the appropriateness of these options relevant to their 
goals, and finally they will select and execute their final choice (Fellows, 2004; van 
den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). For example, a person who is seeking to buy a 
house will first gather their general information about the housing market (situation 
awareness), they will then identify their potential options that are relevant to their 
requirements (i.e. available houses) and generate additional options to accommodate 
contingencies (e.g. wait save a larger deposit to get a bigger property), options will 
then be evaluated according to the house buyers’ salient goals (i.e. affordability of 
property, number of bedrooms) and a final decision made on action (i.e. buy 
property or postpone to save a larger deposit). Although this process may not 
necessarily follow a linear structure, with iterative updates and revaluation along the 
way, most decision making will involve situation assessment, option generation and 
evaluation and final action. 
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In describing this process in more detail, situation assessments are derived 
through ‘sensemaking’ (Schatz, Dolletski-Lazer & Colombo, 2011): the interaction 
between sensation (i.e. the detection of external stimuli based on innate abilities such 
as eyesight; Baddeley, Hitch & Allen, 2009) and perception (i.e. the adaptable and 
dynamic skills an individual holds in interpreting sensations to make conclusions 
about the environment; Smith, 2002). Sensemaking (and subsequent situation 
awareness) differs between individuals based upon their innate perceptual abilities 
and interaction with the skills they have for perceiving relevant cues and 
information. For example, someone who is deaf may be unable to hear a 
conversation, yet have perceptual skills in lip reading. This would mean that they 
continue to make sense of their environment through the interaction between 
sensation and perception, despite limitations in innate abilities. Establishing one’s 
awareness of the situation is thus the first step in the decision making process; yet it 
may vary greatly based upon the innate abilities and developed skills of different 
individuals. 
The second phase of decision making, option generation and evaluation, may 
also differ between individuals. This is due to the use of different analytic techniques 
and cognitive processing styles. When faced with a decision, individuals generally 
tend to use on of two types of processing styles: using analytic and structured 
evaluation of options (e.g. follow a sub-decision check list), or more intuitive 
techniques (Jenkins, Stanton, Salmon, Walker & Rafferty, 2009). Research on 
cognitive processing and the evaluation of options has paid a great deal of focus to 
the study of expertise. For example, the recognition primed decision making (RPD) 
model describes how individuals who are experienced in a decision domain can 
intuitively recognise the situation based upon subtle cues within a learned 
environment (Baber, Fulthorpe, & Houghton, 2010; Klein, 1998). This enables 
experts to expedite the decision making process as they can almost automatically 
generate and select the most appropriate option without the need for systematic and 
conscious evaluation of the situation (Klein, Wolf, Militellio & Zsambok, 1995). 
Indeed, whereas the decision making processes has been described in a relatively 
linear way, it appears that experts use their adept skills in sensemaking to take rapid 
actions and expedite the decision process. Experts are excellent sensemakers due to 
their advanced perceptual abilities, which enable them to make rapid decisions based 
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upon scarce perceptual knowledge (Gobet & Chassy, 2008; 2009). Indeed, experts 
can ‘leap’ or ‘shunt’ along the decision making process, whereas novices take more 
time to follow a linear and analytic decision making pathway (Jenkins, et al., 2009). 
Once a decision maker has successfully progressed through situation assessment, 
plan formulation and option evaluation, they must then commit to their choice 
through behavioural execution.  
1.3 History of decision making research 
Traditionally, decision making research can be split into two types: (i) research 
that seeks to provide descriptive models that explain the process of decision making; 
and (ii) research that seeks to provide prescriptive models that identify the 
requirements for good decision making under normative standards (Katsikopoulos & 
Lan, 2011). Both approaches have helped psychologists to describe the general 
process of decision making and, as will be discussed, have converged over recent 
years to inform more pluralistic approaches. This next section will outline the early 
psychological research, which took a largely prescriptive approach in identifying the 
conditions under which decision making deviated from rational and normative 
standards. It will then introduce more pluralistic and recent research, which is 
oriented more favourably towards descriptive ideologies in order to not only identify 
the conditions under which rationality is flawed, but further to describe the cognitive 
processes associated with adaptive choice. 
1.3.1 Early psychological research on decision making 
One of the earliest psychological theories on decision making was the purely 
rational and prescriptive model of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). According to EUT, decision makers consistently seek to 
maximise their utility (i.e. outcomes) and will try to achieve this via the rational 
calculation of their expected (i.e. anticipated) utility. A rational decision maker will 
always be able to pick the optimum option providing that they select an option that 
will lead to the greatest expected utility/gain; a principle which has been readily 
applied to economics (Kahneman, 2003). EUT governs that rational choices are 
governed by six axioms, which ensure optimal decision making (Plous, 1993). They 
are: (i) the hierarchical ordering of alternatives (so that they may pick the best), (ii) 
identification of dominance (so that they pick the most dominant option), (iii) the 
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principle of cancellation (they will only compare alternatives on differing attributes), 
(iv) applying rules of transitivity (an awareness that if A>B, B>C, then A>C), (v) 
using continuity (will select an optimising gamble over a sure gain); and (vi) 
maintaining invariance (they remain unaffected by framing effects). In extending this 
model, Savage (1954) added a subjective component (i.e. Subjective Expected 
Utility Theory), which allowed for rational decision making in the absence of 
objective probability by incorporating subjective judgements as weights in decision 
making. Fundamentally, utility theories assume that decision making will be 
optimised by using rational cognitive processing styles. 
Although prescriptive models are useful for identifying ideal decision making 
when operating in objective environments whereby the ability to calculate outcomes 
is available, decision making in the real-world rarely offers this opportunity (Baron, 
2008; Simon, 1956). As such, the ecological validity of prescriptive decision making 
models that identify how decisions ought to be made is limited. It has been found 
that people often violate many of the rational principles identified by utility theories 
when making choices in uncertain contexts (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).Although rational models may facilitate decision making in non-time 
pressured and low complexity environments, when decision making is ambiguous 
then individuals will try and reduce the need for cognitive processing by using, for 
example, cognitive heuristics and biases, which can degrade decision outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, people regularly violate the 
‘cancellation principle’ (i.e. one should only compare options on differing attributes) 
when given real-world choices and compare different options on equivocal attributes 
(Allias, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961). Furthermore, decision makers rarely hold consistent 
hierarchal ordering of options as they are often unstable and altered according to 
dynamic and changing preferences during the decision process (Tversky, Slovic & 
Kahneman, 1990). Thus, prescriptive decision making theories may be useful for 
understanding logical and rational processes, but have limited application to 
understanding how people actually make decisions in the real-world (Baron, 2008; 
Simon, 1956).  
In response to the criticisms levelled at prescriptive models, Simon (1956) 
combined descriptive and prescriptive approaches. He acknowledged that real-world 
choices were often flawed and sought to describe the cognitive processes that led to 
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deviations from prescriptive standards (Katsikopoulos & Lan, 2011). His theory of 
bounded rationality acknowledged that pure rationality of choice is generally 
unobtainable in the real-world due to both environmental and cognitive constraints in 
human cognition. For example, the presence of time pressure (an environmental 
stressor) can alter the way an individual will cognitively processes their choice. 
When placed under time pressure, individuals tend to avoid the analytic (and slower 
time) evaluation of options, as they need to adapt to time pressure and take fast 
action (Alison, Doran, Long, Power & Humphrey, 2013; Kocher & Sutter, 2006). 
Time pressure further tends to limit the amount of information that individuals 
consider at one time due to constraints on working memory capacity (Galotti, 2007). 
Individuals use limited processing strategies such as satisficing (select option which 
satisfies most important needs), elimination-by-aspects (eliminate options until only 
one left), and adequacy criterion (choose first option to fill criteria) in order to cope 
with the additional cognitive load contributed to time pressure (Alison, Doran et al., 
2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1956). Thus, despite the prescriptive 
relevance of rational decision making models to further the understanding of how 
decision making can be optimised, their descriptive ecological validity to real-world 
decision making is limited as decision making is so often bounded by cognitive 
constraints. 
In extending Simon’s work, Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1984) looked more 
specifically at how individuals adapt their cognitive processing in order to try and 
cope with environmental and cognitive constraints, concluding that humans are 
relatively poor decision makers who often use biased, poor or faulty judgements. 
They developed a model of ‘Prospect Theory’, which outlines how individuals tend 
to ignore decision outcomes when they are faced with a risky choice (thus violating 
the principles of EUT), and instead use irrational cognitive biases that focus on 
avoiding the emotionally salient and negative impact of losing (Kahneman, 2003). 
For example, loss aversion describes the overwhelming preference to take high-risk 
gambles in order to avoid loss completely, than to suffer a certain but smaller loss, 
even when the normative option is the latter (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Similarly, the sunk-cost effect describes how individuals tend to irrationally continue 
their investment into a revealing inferior endeavour (e.g. stocks) rather than cut their 
losses, due to the negative emotions associated with having wasted previously 
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invested resources (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Dawes, 1988). It appears that people use 
cognitive biases in order to avoid the more systematic processing of information by 
basing their decisions, not on anticipated outcomes, but on general biased 
preferences for certain types of options. 
In addition to cognitive biases, people also tend to use irrational heuristics (i.e. 
simple adaptable rules to reduce systematic processing of choice and speed up the 
decision process) when making decisions under environmental and cognitive 
constraints (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; Reimer, Mata & Stoecklin, 2004). The 
‘availability’ heuristic describes how individuals tend to assume that when 
something is easy to retrieve from memory then it is frequently occurring (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1979). It is linked to the ‘recency effect’, which describes how 
recently encoded information is more easily retrieved in memory; creating an 
irrational assumption of increased prevalence (Hertwig, Pachur & Kurzenhauser, 
2005). Likewise the ‘representative’ heuristic describes how people tend to assume 
high commonality between options that are prototypically similar to one another 
(Kellogg, 1995) and is often linked to confirmation bias, whereby individuals seek 
out information to confirm their (irrational) assumptions rather than discover 
objective truths (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). The use of heuristics has been found 
to increase in situations that are time pressured (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), 
ambiguous (Souchon, Cabagno, Traclet et al, 2009) and cognitively overloading 
(Renkl, Hilbert & Schworm, 2008). As with cognitive biases, they override more 
analytic and rational decision processing and can lead to extremely poor choice 
outcomes (DiBonaventura & Chapman, 2008).  
Although research on heuristics and biases takes a largely negative approach in 
exploring deviations from ideal and poor decision making, heuristic processing can 
also facilitate adaptive choice (Gigerenzer, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Oppenheimer, 2004). This more ecological approach to human cognition extends and 
criticises the narrow scope of previous research on heuristics (Gigerenzer, 1996) and 
suggests that environmental factors can influence cognitive processing in a positive 
way (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010) by triggering the use of ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics 
(Gigerenzer 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002). Heuristics can be usefully applied 
to aid the rapid (and accurate) processing of limited information (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007). For example, both the fast and frugal recognition heuristic and 
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the biased availability heuristic share a mutual assumption that individuals tend to 
select options that are most salient in memory when choosing between alternatives 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Yet, whereas the 
heuristic and biases approach would suggest that this process is biased, the fast a 
frugal approach suggests that recognition is both useful and appropriate and can lead 
to accurate choices (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The use of fast and frugal 
cognitive shortcuts can help individuals to cope with environmental stressors (such 
as time pressure) as they provide time-efficient strategies such as ‘take the best’ or 
‘satisficing’ (Alison, Doran, et al., 2013; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007). Indeed, experts often use accurate intuitive strategies that enable 
efficient decision making despite environmental constraints (Gobet & Chassy, 2008; 
2009; Klein, 1998; Jenkins et al., 2009). It is important to note however that ‘fast and 
frugal’ heuristics may thus be contingent upon a level of expertise in the decision 
domain in order to be effective (Richter & Spath, 2006).  
Decision making research has thus progressed through a number of paradigm 
shifts. It has developed from the study of idealistic models of pure rationality and 
expected utility and acknowledged that real-world information processing is often 
constrained by environmental and cognitive limitations. Such constraints cause 
decision makers to limit their analytic processing by using cognitive biases and 
heuristic shortcuts. Although these short-cuts can reduce cognitive load on the 
decision maker, they also risk the increase of decision error, especially when 
operating in complex environments. Positively, however, more recent research has 
highlighted how ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics may also aid adaptive and efficient 
decision making, especially when the decision maker has expertise in the decision 
domain. This chapter will now discuss more recent advances in decision making 
research. It will identify two approaches to decision making research by 
distinguishing between ‘decision making research’, which takes a largely 
prescriptive approach to identify the conditions under which individuals make good 
or bad choices, and ‘problem solving research’, which takes a more descriptive 
approach in exploring how individuals solve problems in the real-world (Patel, 
Kaufman & Arocha, 2002). 
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1.3.2 Two modern approaches to research: ‘decision making’ versus 
‘problem solving’ paradigms 
According to Patel et al., (2002), psychologists who are interested in the study of 
choice behaviour can be divided into two types: those interested in ‘decision making’ 
and those interested in ‘problem solving’. Decision making researchers take a largely 
prescriptive approach as they seek to identify the conditions under which individuals 
may deviate from normative standards (i.e. focus on how decisions ought to be 
made); whereas problem solving researchers take a more descriptive approach to 
understand the cognitive processes that people use to solve whole decision problems 
(i.e. focus on the process of a decision rather than the outcome) (Patel, et al., 2002). 
Research on cognitive biases and heuristics (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) are 
examples of decision making research as researchers seek to test the conditions under 
which decision makers deviate from normative standards, offering the potential to 
improve choice via interventions (Chapman & Elstein, 2000). For example, Poon, 
Koheler and Buehler (2014) found that people use irrational heuristic judgements to 
estimate the likelihood that they will undertake positive behaviours such as giving 
blood, consistently underestimating situational barriers to action (e.g. too busy), and 
overestimating the likelihood that they will commit to their intentions, even when 
interventions were put in place to make situational barriers more salient. Decision 
making research explores the conditions under which individuals may deviate from 
normative or rational decision making standards: it focusses on the outcome of 
choice.  
Alternatively, problem solving research is less concerned with the outcome of 
choice (i.e. whether the individual gave blood or not) and instead seeks to understand 
the process that individuals undertake when deciding whether to give blood or not. 
Rather than focus on discrete decision tasks in closed-choice environments, it 
explores the cognitive processes that individuals use when faced with wide and 
dynamic choice problem. For example, whereas decision making researchers utilise 
methodologies such as vignettes and decision problems that present a specific and 
singular decision with discrete options (e.g. will you give blood or not?), problem 
solving researchers use real-world methodologies to present more open and 
deliberative decision making problems from which individuals may generate their 
own solutions (e.g. There is a shortage of blood donation in your local area. How 
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will you solve this problem?). The presentation of problems, rather than discrete 
decision tasks, thus facilitates a more descriptive model of how individuals (and 
teams) process problems in the real-world.  
As this thesis sought to investigate the concept of decision inertia in the real-
world, it can be classified within the problem-solving approach to research. 
Specifically, research was inspired by the ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (NDM) 
framework, which seeks to understand how people operate and cope with decision 
problems within specialised and real-world decision making domains (see Chapter 2 
for further details). For example, NDM studies have been used to identify how elite 
sport athletes are able to manage their time under conditions of fatigue and stress 
(Macquet & Skalej, 2015), and how information technology may (or may not) be 
usefully applied to facilitate military pararescue (Millitello, Sushereba, Branlat, Bean 
& Finmore, 2015). Rather than focus on prescriptive discussions on ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ decision making, NDM seeks to understand choice implementation ‘in the 
wild’ (Gore, Banks, Millward & Kyraikidou, 2006; McAndrew & Gore, 2015). It is 
interested in how people solve problems in the real-world, which may in turn provide 
insights into how one may train their decision making or develop technology that 
could facilitate problem solving (Millitello et al., 2015). An example of how NDM 
has facilitated problem solving in the real-world is in the identification the 
importance of ‘macrocognition’ in team settings (Hutchins & Kendall, 2011). A 
focus on macrocognition, as opposed to discrete cognitive functions (e.g. attention, 
memory), facilitates the study of problem-solving as it offers a wider perspective on 
how people solve problems and make decisions in the real-world. This descriptive, 
problem-solving approach aligns with the scope of this thesis: to explore how 
commanders within the emergency services solve decision problems that arise during 
real-world major emergencies. This chapter will now provide a more detailed 
description of the research domain being studied in this thesis: problem solving in 
extreme environments. 
1.4 Problem solving in extreme environments 
Emergency incidents are extreme environments: contexts in which individuals 
and teams must make judgements whilst operating under rapidly changing and 
uncertain conditions (Militello, et al., 2015). Examples of extreme environments may 
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include survival in arctic weather, military activity in warzones or firefighting in a 
burning building. They test an individual’s ability to perform by limiting their 
cognitive functioning capacities whilst stretching their physical, psychological and 
interpersonal skills (Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011). Decision making in such 
environments is crucial to ensure that all those involved can survive these extremes; 
yet evidence from the real-world indicates that decision making within these settings 
is not always appropriate. For example, a report commissioned by the UK Cabinet 
Office, which examined 32 major incidents that occurred in the UK in the 1980s, 90s 
and 00s, identified how failures to take action were linked to poor decision making 
and impeded ‘interoperability’, defined as “the extent to which organisations can 
work together coherently as a matter of course” (p. 8, Pollock, 2013). Furthermore, 
when analysing the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan’s Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission emphasized how “delays in taking action 
contributed to the inappropriate response seen during the accident” (p.38, 
Kurokawa, 2012). Thus, the failure to take action when operating in extreme 
environments is hugely detrimental, yet exceptionally prevalent during emergency 
response disasters (Alison, Power, van den Heuvel, Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 
2015). Importantly, real-world reports do not contribute failures to deviations from 
correct decision making in extreme environments, but on the timeliness of action and 
the failures of emergency responders to take any action at all. As the physical 
challenges associated with extreme environments are not related to cognition, this 
chapter will discuss how psychological (i.e. uncertainty) and interpersonal (i.e. team) 
skills may be stretched in such domains (Orasanu & Liberman, 2011). 
1.4.1 Challenges to psychological skills in extreme environments: the role 
of uncertainty 
Decision making in emergency response settings is inherently uncertain (Alison 
& Crego, 2007). Uncertainty is defined as “a sense of doubt that blocks or delays 
action” (p.150, Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). It is a subjective experience that results 
from trying to process missing, unreliable, conflicting or complex information 
(Klein, 1998) and is associated with having an inadequate understanding of the 
situation, incomplete information and difficulty in differentiating between options 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Uncertainty is linked to the perception of risk (Bernstein, 
1998) and can derail the decision making process, causing individuals and teams to 
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defer choice and/or focus on redundant information that will not inform their choice 
(Alison, et al., 2015; van den Heuvel, et al., 2012). Indeed, individuals often try and 
cope with uncertainty by using more intuitive processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002). Instead of rationally processing their choice, they use intuitive ‘cognitive 
biases’ (i.e. innate preferences for certain options) and inappropriate ‘heuristics’ (i.e. 
simple decision rules/formulas) that degrade the decision outcome (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979). As extreme environments are rapidly changing and dynamic 
events that are inherently uncertain (Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011), it is important 
that steps are taken to try and reduce uncertainty and enable decision makers to 
process the task environment. The impact of uncertainty on decision making in 
extreme environments is a key focus of NDM in order to generate an understanding 
of the cognitive processes that may be used to overcome ambiguous effects (Alison, 
et al., 2015; Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011).  
Positively, a large body of NDM research has identified how skilled (or 
‘expert’) decision makers are able to utilise accurate intuitive processing based upon 
adaptive cognitive shortcuts that have been learned via repeated practice of decision 
making within the decision domain (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). For example, a 
study on police decision making describes how police tend to cope with uncertainty 
by using adaptive cognitive shortcuts associated to the RAWFS heuristic; namely by 
Reducing uncertainty via information search, using Assumption-based reasoning to 
fill information gaps, Weighing pros and cons to compare options, Forestalling in 
preparation for worst case scenarios, and Suppressing uncertainty to prevent its 
negative effects (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2014). 
Experts also use Reflection-in-action (Schon, 1983) as an uncertainty reducing 
coping mechanism in order to heuristically self-monitor and iteratively update their 
understanding of an ongoing problem incident (van den Heuvel, et al., 2014). As 
discussed earlier, the RPD model also describes how experts can rapidly and 
intuitively respond to crises via expert recognition based on implicit cognition 
(Klein, 1998) and further research has described how experts are able to expedite the 
decision making process in complex and uncertain environments by ‘leaps’ and 
‘shunts’ along the decision process (Jenkins et al., 2009). Thus, although decision 
making in extreme environments may be inherently uncertain, it is possible that 
training to facilitate the development of accurate intuitive expertise and / or 
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technology to expedite analytic processing may overcome these negative effects 
(Millitello et al., 2015). 
However, importantly, the sole focus on uncertainty reduction in extreme 
environments may not always be the best strategy for improving decision making. 
As discussed, decision inertia describes how decision makers in extreme 
environments try to irrationally reduce uncertainty via the redundant deliberation of 
information, despite there being low or no probability of further useful information 
arising. This implies that an over-focus on uncertainty reduction in extreme settings 
may inadvertently worsen decision making. Indeed, decision inertia is an inverse 
heuristic process linked to the failure to take action as a result of increased cognitive 
deliberation; decision makers irrationally focus on reducing uncertainty as opposed 
to implementing choice. This raises an important question on whether technological 
developments to reduce uncertainty in extreme environments are appropriate. 
Indeed, Millitello et al., (2015) suggested that the time-pressured nature of extreme 
environments meant that technology to reduce uncertainty was not always desirable, 
nor appropriate. An overemphasis on uncertainty reduction may distract individuals 
from the more pressing requirement to make decisions in good time. Thus, it is 
possible that interventions that focus on the psychological processes associated with 
expertise may be more appropriate than the development of technology to reduce 
uncertainty in extreme environments.   
1.4.2 Challenges to interpersonal skills in extreme environments: the role 
of teams 
Extreme environments not only test the psychological skills of decision makers, 
but further place great pressure on interpersonal skills when operating in teams 
(Orasanu & Lierberman, 2011). By their very nature, extreme environments 
commonly involve team-based choice. For example, decision making during 
emergency incidents will involve decision making at various intra-team levels 
(within each agency) and collective decision making at the inter-team levels 
(between agencies). As outlined above, uncertainty can derail decision making at the 
psychological level due to information complexities in the problem domain (Alison, 
et al., 2015; van den Heuvel, et al., 2012). Thus, uncertainty associated with the 
decision task will further permeate team-based processing. A study exploring the 
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impact of uncertainty in high-stakes emergency response teams found that team-
based uncertainty was more common than uncertainty associated to the task (Alison, 
Power, van den Heuvel & Waring, 2014); 75% of uncertainty was contributed to 
social and team management problems (exogenous uncertainty) compared to just 
25% contributed to the task environment (endogenous uncertainty). This suggests 
that, although situational complexities can impede decision making, that uncertainty 
related to social complexities within the decision making team can have a greater 
negative impact on overall uncertainty. 
In order to try and improve team coordination during emergency incidents, it has 
been suggested that decision making may improve if team members and sub-teams 
were more ‘interoperable’ (Pollock, 2013). Joint-coordination and ‘interoperability’ 
are both key features of emergency response command teams (House, Power & 
Alison, 2014). It is based on the assumption that extreme emergency environments 
require a collaborative response from different agencies as the required knowledge to 
respond to the incident moves beyond an individual emergency response agency 
(von Lubitz, Beakley & Patricelli, 2008). For example, the response to a major 
bridge collapse would require close collaboration between all three blue light 
services in order to police the incident, rescue casualties and treat patients. Yet 
interoperability is often limited in the real-world as team members and sub-teams fail 
to understand the roles, responsibilities, goals and intentions of other team members 
(Perry & Wears, 2011; Pollock, 2013). This can lead to inter-team coordination 
failures as team members are unaware of one another’s skills and so operate in silos. 
Team decision making effectiveness is reduced when there is a poor understanding 
of distributed roles and responsibilities across the team network; a lack of knowledge 
about one another’s roles can induce erroneous expectations about other team 
members’ capabilities and responsibilities to perform certain tasks (Alison, et al., 
2014). Not only may this impede task completion due to assumptions that other team 
members are responsible, but it can also lead to competition between team members 
who may try and contend for dominance or primacy over the decision task (Brehmer, 
1987). A lack of awareness on one’s own and other’s place in the multi-team system 
can degrade team decision making in extreme environments by adding to 
uncertainty. 
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The valence of interpersonal relationships and trust in multi-team settings can 
also influence the experience of uncertainty in extreme environments. Trust is the 
shared assumption by two individuals / organisations that the advice provided by 
another is reliable (Rotter, 1980). Trust can improve decision making in high-risk 
settings by enabling faster decisions and actions (Das & Teng, 2004). Trust in team 
settings is beneficial as it encourages positive self-regulation practices and 
commitment to collective goals (Bishop, Scott & Burroughs, 2000; Millward, Banks 
& Riga, 2010). When collective strategic goals are explicitly outlined in multi-team 
settings, then it facilitates cohesive action towards a shared ideal, which can increase 
collective action (Alison, et al., 2015). Yet, when individuals are uncertain about 
whether they can trust other team members then this can negatively impact upon 
team coordination. Poor trust can increase cognitive load on the individual as they 
try and take on additional tasks in place of the distrusted other, which increases 
cognitive load in an already demanding setting (Alison, et al., 2014). For example, if 
a commander lacks trust in a member of their command support team, they may 
overload themselves by taking on additional tasks, or inappropriately overload other 
members of their team by giving them additional tasks. The ability to build trust in 
emergency response settings is also limited, as inter-team members may rarely 
operate with one another on a regular basis. Trust in such settings must develop at a 
temporary level, based upon cognitive trust in another’s ability to perform their role 
(McAllister, 1995; Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). Both trust and role 
understanding are positively related to one another (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001) and help 
to facilitate interpersonal skills in extreme environments. The remainder of this 
introductory chapter will seek to more specifically outline the extreme environment 
in which research for this thesis was conducted: emergency responding. 
1.5 Emergency response decision making 
This chapter has so far provided a general overview of the available literature on 
decision making; specifically within the context of extreme environments. It has 
outlined general decision making theory and described the progressive paradigm 
shift from prescriptive models of rationality and expected utility theory (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) to the more descriptive models of bounded 
cognition (Simon, 1956), heuristics and biases (Kahneman  & Tversky, 1979), fast 
and frugal heuristic shortcuts (Gigerenzer, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; 
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Oppenheimer, 2004) and expertise (Klein, 1998). It has distinguished between two 
modern-day approaches to research: (i) ‘decision making research’, which focuses 
on the circumstances under which individuals deviate from normative standards (i.e. 
heuristics, biases); and (ii) ‘problem solving research’, which takes a wider approach 
to describe the cognitive processes related to real-world reasoning (Patel et al., 
2002). More specifically, it has identified a relatively new frontier of problem 
solving research: cognitive processing in extreme environments (Militello, et al., 
2015; Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011). Thus, as this thesis utilises NDM methods to 
explore problem solving in the real-world, extreme environment of UK emergency 
responding, it is important to now describe the organisational characteristics of this 
specialised environment. 
1.5.1 Emergency responding in the UK 
According to the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), an emergency is defined as 
any event, situation, or act of war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to 
human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom. An 
emergency is classed as a major incident if it’s “impact cannot be handled within 
routine service arrangements” (p. 12, Department of Health, 2005). According to 
the Department of Health (2005), it can arise due to the following scenarios: (i) big 
bang (serious accident/explosion); (ii) rising tide (developing infectious 
disease/staffing crisis); (iii) cloud on the horizon (serious threat developing 
elsewhere with need to prepare); (iv) headline news (public/media alarm); (v) 
internal incidents (fire, equipment failure); (vi) release of chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear or explosive materials (CBRNE); (vii) mass casualties; or (viii) 
pre-planned major even (demonstrations, sports). Major incidents require the 
implementation of special procedures that involve representatives from two or more 
of the emergency services. They are characterised by the potential for mass casualty, 
crowds, demanding public enquires (both media and general public), and/or 
coordinated response and organisation of emergency services and supporting 
organisations (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004).  Between 1966 and 1996, there was 
on average between 3-4 major incidents occurring in the UK every year (Mackway-
Jones, 2005). Recent examples of major incidents in the UK include the mass-
shootings in Cumbria by lone gunman Derrick Bird (Chesterman, 2011) and the 
widespread flooding that hit parts of Somerset and the wider UK coastal regions in 
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2013/14 (Morris, 2014). Major incidents may arise suddenly and require a short 
active ‘response’ phase (e.g. pursuit of Derrick Bird) or be more long-term and 
continue over the course of many weeks and months (e.g. flooding). 
When an emergency occurs in the UK, it is the responsibility of ‘Category one’ 
responders to assess the overall risk of the incident, plan a response and deal with the 
emergency (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004). Category one responders include local 
authorities (local councils), emergency services (police and fire) and health services 
(ambulance, hospital). Category two responders are also required to be involved in 
incident response, but hold a more secondary role and whose level of involvement 
depends upon the specific characteristics of the incident. Category two responders 
include utilities (electricity, gas, water), transport (airport, harbour, trains), and 
health and safety (health and safety executive). Both category one and two 
responders must work together in response to an unfolding major incident and are 
responsible for the assessment, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery to 
an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2013). In addition, the military may also be called 
upon as a last resort; known as Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) (Salmon, 
Stanton, Jenkins & Walker, 2011).  
A major incident can be declared by any category one or two responder if they 
deem that an incident requires multi-agency liaison and extends beyond the 
capabilities of the initial response agency. For example, the Fire and Rescue Incident 
Command Manual states that: “major incidents may place considerable demands on 
the resources of the responding organisations, with consequent disruption of day to 
day activities, and they may have long-term implications for a community or the 
environment” (p.16, Fire Service Manual, 2008). Although the declaration of a 
major incident is usually undertaken by one of the three ‘blue lights’ services (i.e. 
PS, FRS, AS), non-blue lights agencies (e.g. hospitals) can also declare a major 
incident and state of emergency. For example, a number of hospitals in the UK have 
recently declared major incidents due to their inability to cope with increasing 
demands and pressure on the NHS (Siddique, Bucks, Kirk, Meikle & Campbell, 
2015).  
When a major incident is declared, it triggers the establishment of a number of 
command silos that help to structure the emergency response. The command 
19 
 
structure that is used in the UK is known as Integrated Emergency Management 
(IEM) (Salmon et al. 2011). The IEM approach outlines a hierarchical command 
from strategic (overall executive command) to tactical (take charge at the scene) to 
operational (provide main operational response at scene) command levels (DOH, 
2005). Up until the recent government-led ‘Joint Emergency Services 
Interoperability Programme’ (JESIP), which sought to make emergency responding 
more cohesive, these three levels were referred to as gold (strategic), silver (tactical) 
and bronze (operational) command (JESIP Doctrine, 2013; Salmon et al. 2011). It is 
worth noting that, as data was collected during the transition period of this change in 
terminology, the majority of interviews and quotations used in this thesis refer to the 
previous bronze, silver, gold system as opposed to the new operational, tactical, 
strategic terminology (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: Integrated Emergency Management System 
At the lowest command level, ‘operational’ commanders from the three blue 
lights agencies are those located at the emergency incident scene. They have 
responsibilities to “control and deploy the resources of their respective service 
within a functional or geographical area and implement direction provided by the 
Tactical Commander” (p.17, JESIP Doctrine, 2013). Depending upon the nature of 
the incident, there may be multiple operational commanders in charge of multiple 
sub-teams located in different areas or undertaking different functional roles at any 
one incident. The second level of command is ‘tactical command’. There is typically 
only one tactical commander from each agency represented at the ‘tactical 
coordinating group’ (TCG) and it will involve representatives from all category one 
agencies, and those relevant from category two. They can be located either on or off-
scene depending upon the nature of the incident. For example, a single contained 
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scene may benefit from having tactical commanders on site, whereas a multi-scene 
incident with wider impact may be more suited to hosting the TCG at a remote 
control room. Tactical commanders are responsible for “consideration of effective 
joint working with other services and other factors such as access to 
communications systems” (p.17, JESIP Doctrine, 2013) and are the conduit between 
the operational actions being conducted on-scene and the strategic directives that are 
outlined by the ‘strategic coordinating group’ (SCG). Finally, the SCG consists of 
strategic commanders (usually ‘Chief’ officers or very senior representatives) from 
both category one and two responders who are “responsible for formulating the 
strategy for the incident” (p.18, JESIP Doctrine, 2013).Their role is to collectively 
determine the: (i) aims and objectives of response; (ii) policy framework; (iii) 
respond to information from tactical commanders (e.g. required increased resources); 
(iv) respond to media and public communication; and (v) plan for recovery following 
incident (Ministry of Defence, 2007). Although the police often take charge of the 
SCG, there is no overall executive authority (Salmon et al. 2011); thus decision 
making and successful response to multi-agency emergencies is governed by the 
ability of these strategic commanders to work as a team, and show effective 
interoperability.   
1.5.2 Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) 
The UK government’s JESIP initiative aims to increase joint working between 
the three blue lights services in the UK. Interoperability is defined as “the extent to 
which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine” (p.2, 
JESIP Doctrine, 2013). It is based on the assumption that increased interoperability 
will facilitate more effective emergency responding. The Pollock report (2013), 
which surveyed 32 major incidents that occurred in the UK over the past 3 decades, 
identified how failures in effective interoperable and multi-agency coordination led 
to serious delays in responding. It recommended that improvements in four 
organisational areas may overcome these effects, which were: (i) cohesive doctrine 
and organisation; (ii) better operational communications; (iii) shared situational 
awareness; and (iv) increased joint training and exercising (Pollock, 2013). The 
JESIP initiative launched alongside training that was provided to all three blue lights 
agencies that sought to improve five areas where joint standards and operating 
procedures could facilitate response: (i) co-location on scene; (ii) communication of 
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timely, relevant and clear information; (iii) co-ordination by integrating response; 
(iv) joint understanding of risk; and (v) focussing on establishing a shared situational 
awareness of the evolving incident (JESIP Doctrine, 2013). This will be achieved 
through training that emphasises the use of ‘acronym-free’ communications and the 
use of the ‘joint decision making model’ (JDM) to facilitate shared situational 
awareness and risk perception (Figure 1.2). The JDM was not explicitly tested in this 
thesis and so detail about this model will not be discussed. However, in brief, it’s 
purpose is to facilitate joint working, by encouraging all agencies to progress 
through a shared model of information gathering, risk and strategy assessment, 
powers and policy consideration, identification of options and contingencies, and 
action execution; all whilst continually and iteratively considering how this interacts 
with shared goals to work together, save lives and reduce harm (JESIP, 2013). 
 
Figure 1.2: Joint Decision Making Model (adapted from JESIP Doctrine, 
2013) 
It is important to acknowledge that increased interoperability may be appealing 
in theory, but it does not necessarily mean that it will improve decision making in 
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practice. A recent systematic review on the potential hurdles to interoperability in the 
UK emergency services highlighted the paradox between the joint desires to foster 
more horizontal and joint working practices whilst maintaining a vertical integrated 
emergency management system across operational, tactical and strategic levels 
(House, et al., 2013). In other words, all three agencies continue to use hierarchical 
within-agency command structures whilst paradoxically increasing pressure to make 
joint and collective decisions between-agencies. This contradictory command 
structure has proved ineffective in other organisations such as healthcare due to the 
inconsistency between normal working practices, which use vertical hierarchical 
structures, and the novelty of using less practiced horizontal coordinated systems 
(Perry & Wears, 2011). Furthermore, complete interoperability, whereby all 
information is shared and interdependent, during a major incident response is 
unrealistic due to time and cognitive constraints in extreme environments (Bharosa, 
Lee & Janssen, 2010) as the need for fast action may supersede the time it would 
take to share information.  
Alternatively, a decentralised approach to interoperability, which enshrines 
autonomy and expertise within each agency, may be more appropriate (House et al., 
2013). Decentralised networks that maintain harmonious multi-team coordination are 
central to macrocognition, as both individuals and sub-teams within the wider 
network have specifically designated tasks and roles that collectively produce 
efficient behaviour (Hutchins & Kendall, 2011). Rather than a desire for joint 
decision making, it is perhaps more appropriate to facilitate decentralised networks 
that are characterised by clear role understanding, cohesive goals, interpersonal trust 
and designated autonomy based on relevant expertise. As the research for this thesis 
was conducted during the initial introduction of JESIP (i.e., 2012-2014), it provides 
an intriguing insight into how these changes were perceived by those decision 
makers it directly affects.  
1.6 Thesis aims 
This chapter has discussed the psychological foundation to this thesis. The main 
goal of this thesis was to explore the concept of decision inertia; focussing on the 
psychology of doing nothing within extreme emergency incident environments. 
Research was conducted using a descriptive approach to problem-solving that 
23 
 
utilised NDM methods. Findings were derived from an emergent, ground-up 
approach to data analysis, rather than using top-down theoretical assumptions. It 
presents a detailed discussion on how motivations and goal orientations and the 
experience of uncertainty interact with choice implementation in multi-agency 
settings. An overview of the main goals and findings of each chapter will now be 
provided. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the methodological approach to this thesis. It 
defines what ‘real-world’ research is and describes the philosophical basis to NDM. 
It identifies a number of key challenges to real-world research that were identified 
during data collection. Specifically, these were challenges related to: (i) data access 
(building and sustaining trusted relationships with practitioners); (ii) data collection 
(distinguishing between practitioner needs, academic aims and collective goals); and 
(iii) data analysis (deriving informed and useful conclusions from ‘messy’ data sets). 
It describes data collection and analyses techniques that were used in this thesis by 
outlining the ‘Critical Decision Method’ (CDM) as a type of ‘Cognitive Task 
Analysis’ (CTA), and outlines how modern technology, such as NVivo, can facilitate 
the qualitative data analysis process. 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion on the concept of decision inertia 
and failures to act. It outlines how although there is a plethora of research exploring 
the cognitive processes associated with choice implementation, that there has been a 
relative paucity of research on the cognitive processing linked to inaction. As this 
topic is relatively novel it used the ‘Critical Interpretive Synthesis’ procedure: a 
literature review technique that seeks to generate theoretical insight on novel 
concepts. Three types of action failure are discussed: ‘decision avoidance’ - the 
active avoidance of choice as individuals opt to disengage with choice, ‘decision 
inertia’ – the passive avoidance of choice through redundant and persistent effortful 
deliberation between options, and ‘implementation failure’ – the behavioural 
manifestation of inaction by failure to execute action despite cognitive commitment. 
It also identifies six theoretical antecedents that may increase the likelihood of 
inaction: (i) task ambiguity; (ii) social ambiguity; (iii) inexperience in the decision 
domain; (iv) negative affect; (v) indecisive personalities; and (vi) avoidant goals and 
motivation. The results of this synthesis provided the theoretical foundation upon 
which subsequent data chapters were based.  
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Chapter 4 is the first of two chapters that sought to qualitatively explore the key 
challenges to command level decision making in the emergency services. CDM – a 
type of CTA that uses retrospective recall to investigate the cognitive processing of 
complex choices – was used to interview n=31 command level decision makers from 
the Police Service (n=12), Fire and Rescue Service (n=15) and Ambulance Service 
(n=4). Interview transcripts were analysed using an inductive grounded theory 
approach to contribute to the theoretical understanding of decision inertia. It emerged 
that a salient challenge to command level decision making was when commanders 
were required to trade-off competing goals; namely approach motivated goals to 
‘save life’ against avoidance motivated goals to ‘prevent further harm’. Goal conflict 
arose as commanders were anxious to avoid potential negative consequences, both in 
the short-term and long-term. Furthermore, negative consequences directly competed 
with one another, as they were associated to both causing harm through action 
(commission) and harm through inaction (omission); leading to redundant cognitive 
deliberation. Goal conflict arose at individual levels and social team-levels. 
Recommendations for overcoming these effects through self-awareness and multi-
agency training are discussed. 
Chapter 5 sought to investigate how different types of uncertainty may interact 
with decision inertia in emergency incident contexts. A grounded theory approach 
was once again used to explore the CDM interview transcripts, yet this time with a 
focus on uncertainty. Support was found for the endogenous-exogenous taxonomy of 
uncertainty in complex team environments (Alison, et al., 2015). Endogenous 
uncertainties (relating to the situational characteristics of the emergency incident) 
were derived from: (i) lacking, ambiguous or too much information; (ii) unreliable or 
unavailable resources; (iii) time pressure; (iv) social management issues (public and 
media); and (v) adapting to and coping with budget cuts and austerity. Exogenous 
uncertainties (associated with team processing) were derived from: (i) 
communication problems regarding insufficient updating and miscommunication; 
(ii) poor role understanding, both in terms of own obligations and erroneous 
expectations on other agencies’ roles; (iii) trust issues associated with distrust, 
mistrust and a trust paradox; and (iv) competitiveness within the command 
environment due to competing and conflicting goals. Implications for reducing 
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exogenous uncertainty by improving team processes, in order to reduce the effects of 
endogenous factors, are discussed. 
Chapter 6 presents data that was collected from an immersive, multi-agency 
simulation conducted using the ‘Hydra’ simulation system. This chapter took a 
mixed-methods approach to empirically test some of the conclusions derived from 
Chapter 4 relating to goals and motivation. In order to supplement the recent 
classroom training of emergency response agencies, the simulation was of a 
‘Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) at a busy city centre train station, 
where n=50 experienced commanders from the three blue lights services were split 
into 13 multi-agency teams, who each completed the same scenario. Participants 
were required to ‘log’ their decisions during the simulation in a time-stamped 
computer system. They also completed a questionnaire after they finished the 
simulation. It was found that respondents identified six key goals during the incident, 
of which three were coded as being approach oriented (save life, establish situation 
awareness, locate/neutralise threat) and three as avoidance oriented (protect wider 
public from harm; protect emergency responders from harm; prepare for post-
incident inquiries). Analyses between agencies indicated that different agencies 
prioritised different goals, despite perceiving (via Likert ranking) that goals between 
agencies were consistent. Teams whose members predominantly stated approach 
goals logged faster decisions during the initial phases of the simulation, but this 
effect reversed later into the incident as they took longer to make decisions than 
avoidance oriented teams. It is suggested that although approach goals may facilitate 
action early on in the incident, that they become maladaptive to decision makers later 
in the incident, as commanders struggled to trade-off multiple competing tasks that 
had arisen during the course of the incident. The implications for the usefulness of 
approach goals in emergency incident contexts are discussed. 
Chapter 7 provides empirical investigation of the relationship between the 
experience of uncertainty and decision making using the questionnaire data collected 
from the MTFA simulation. A principal component analysis of latent variables 
exploring the experiential reasons for delay identified three reasons for delay: (i) task 
uncertainty; (ii) outcome uncertainty; and (iii) reflective uncertainty. Of these, 
outcome uncertainty was rated significantly higher than both other types of 
uncertainty. This chapter was also interested in how different cognitive processing 
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styles may interact with the experience of uncertainty. The questionnaire measured 
cognitive processing by including two measures: Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) 
(Kruglanski et al., 1993) and Cognitive Flexibility (CF) (Denis & Vander Wal, 
2010). No significant effects were found between the experience of uncertainty and 
NFC; however CF did interact. The ‘control’ subscale of the CF inventory (which 
measures how much ‘control’ one perceives over difficult situations) was positively 
related to task and retrospective uncertainty; those high on control gave lower ratings 
of task and retrospective uncertainty. However, interestingly, the ‘alternatives’ 
subscale of the CF inventory (which measures the ability to consider multiple 
alternative solutions to difficult problems) was associated with increased outcome 
uncertainty. It is suggested that CF associated to alternatives may be maladaptive 
when operating in time-pressured and complex environments that demand quick 
solutions. Implications associated to the functional usefulness of CF when operating 
in complex and time pressured situations is discussed. 
Chapter 8 is the final concluding chapter to this thesis. It provides a summary of 
the findings presented in this thesis. It provides a tabulated description to outline 
how the theoretical antecedents to inertia, which were identified in Chapter 3, were 
explored in subsequent data chapters alongside results. This discussion chapter 
fundamentally identifies two main conclusions from the data. Firstly, it identifies 
how the relationship between stimulus and non-response appears to be mediated by 
the anticipation of negative consequences. Commanders were found to anticipate 
potential negative consequences both as a result of taking action and also for not 
taking action. This led to salient goal conflict and derailed choice via the redundant 
deliberation on whether to take action or not. Secondly, it identifies the importance 
of how the characteristics of the decision making context may moderate the 
usefulness of cognitive processing strategies. Both approach goals and scoring high 
on cognitive flexibility seemed to impede choice when the context was time-
pressured and complex. This finding has important implications for training in 
extreme environments whereby traditionally adaptive cognitive processing styles 
may be inappropriate. It finally outlines the methodological and research 
implications of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: A methodological framework for researching in real-world settings 
2.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this thesis was to explore the concept of decision inertia. It 
has identified how, despite the plethora of research exploring the relationship 
between stimulus and response, a relative paucity of research has been conducted to 
investigate the relationship between stimulus and non-response. This has been 
identified most saliently within the context of emergency responding, where 
numerous real-world reports have highlighted how decision making during 
emergencies derails when emergency response commanders fail to take any action in 
response to the emergency incident (e.g. Grunewald, Binder & Georges, 2010; 
National Audit Office, 2006; PEDU, 2012; UNICEF, 2008). This thesis sought to 
further understand why actions failed, through the investigation of decision inertia.  
The research focus of this thesis is thus heavily grounded in real-world data. This 
chapter will describe the methodological framework that was used to facilitate 
psychological research in the real-world. This chapter is split into four sections that 
will: 
(i) Outline three main methodological challenges to research in real-world 
settings (derived from the literature and the experience of data collection 
for this thesis) relating to:  
a. Data access 
b. Data design and collection 
c. Data analysis 
(ii) Describe how the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) paradigm offers 
an innovative and progressive way to conduct research in real-world 
settings; specifically by describing two methods utilised in this thesis: 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) and the Critical Decision Method 
(CDM).  
(iii) Explore the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative data analysis 
techniques. 
(iv) Discuss how modern technology (i.e. NVivo) can facilitate the qualitative 
data analysis process. 
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2.2 Three methodological challenges to research in naturalistic, real-world 
environments 
Prior to a more detailed critique of the chosen methodology for this thesis, it is 
important to firstly outline three methodological challenges that are characteristic of 
research in real-world settings. These conclusions are based on lessons learnt from 
the literature in culmination with the experience of collecting and analysing data for 
this thesis. Challenges have been themed into three areas: (i) gaining access to real-
world data (i.e. building and sustaining practitioner-researcher relationships); (ii) 
designing and collecting real-world data (i.e. distinguishing between researcher and 
practitioner goals); and (iii) analysing real-world data (i.e. ensuring real-world value 
of findings). Although these three challenges are described separately, they are by no 
means discrete and can interact with one another. The advice presented in this 
section to overcome these challenges helped to facilitate data collection for this 
thesis and offers practical guidance for other real-world researchers. 
2.2.1 Challenges with data access: building and sustaining trusted 
relationships with practitioners 
Research in real-world settings is contingent upon having access to data and/or 
participants who work within the domain of interest (e.g. emergency service 
commanders). Unlike traditional psychological research, which derives its strength 
from its predictability and the capacity to extend findings to the wider population, 
research in specialised, real-world domains prides itself on its ability to provide 
detailed and rich descriptions about the psychology of a specific group of people 
with common interests, experience, skills or traits. Traditional psychology seeks to 
collect data from large sample sizes to increase the ‘power’ and ‘representativeness’ 
of findings to the general population; although as most research tends to be 
conducted in universities, and is thus often weighted heavily towards student 
samples, the realistic generalisation of such findings has been questioned (Demerouti 
& Rispens, 2014). Comparatively, real-world research seeks to collect data from 
small and select samples to generate rich and in-depth conclusions. Real-world 
research is contingent upon access to specific individuals and so there is an 
imperative need to build, establish and sustain trusted and accessible relationships 
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between researchers and practitioners; an initial challenge to real-world research 
projects. 
The data collected for this thesis required privileged access to Police, Fire and 
Rescue and Ambulance Service commanders who were recruited via an existing 
relationship between the University of Liverpool and the emergency services in the 
local area. Many real-world research teams involve practitioners who are interested 
in studying their own work domain. For example, clinical psychologists interested in 
research may hold dual roles acting as both a physician and a researcher when 
treating patients (Thompson & Russo, 2012). Likewise, educators interested in 
trialling new pedagogic practices may engage in ‘active research’ with their students 
(Locke, Alcorn & O’Neill, 2013). Researching in one’s own work domain makes 
access to participants easier as the researchers are already experts in their research-
domain with ready and available participants; however it can also create a number of 
ethical problems. For example, research in clinical settings risks a diffusion of 
priorities between patient care and the collection of scientifically interesting data 
(Thompson & Russo, 2012), and the ‘consent’ of students in pedagogic research is 
threated as they are often unaware of the manipulation of their teaching (Locke, et 
al., 2013).  
An alternative way to conduct real-world research, which was used for this 
thesis, involves collaboration between practitioners and external academics. 
Collaborative teams are useful as they help to better distinguish between research 
goals and general work goals of ‘the practitioner’. This can help to reduce some of 
the ethical concerns associated with purely practitioner-based real-world research, as 
it helps to clarify the difference between normal work behaviour and activity for 
research. Having both practitioners and researchers involved in a project can clarify 
research goals by separating academic aims (e.g. to extend scientific knowledge), 
practitioner aims (e.g. to provide training for practitioners) and mutually beneficial 
aims (e.g. to generate scientifically grounded, useful recommendations to facilitate 
performance).  
Despite the reciprocal benefits of such relationships, academic-practitioner 
relationships are difficult to develop. They can take a very long time to build over a 
course of weeks, months and years. As such, a lot of preliminary work is required 
prior to data collection in order to test and build connections (Steinheider, 
Wuestewald, Boyatzis & Kroutter, 2012). Collaborative research is the result of trust 
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building between both researchers and practitioners, often based upon past 
successful collaborations (Tillyer, Tillyer, McCluskey, Cancino, Todaro & 
McKinnon, 2014). For example, prior to data collection for this thesis, many hours 
were spent working closely with practitioners from the three blue lights services; 
attending training events and ‘ride-alongs’ and chatting informally during downtime. 
There was also an existing relationship between the emergency services and the 
University of Liverpool as a result of past successful research collaborations (e.g. 
van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012; van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2014) and 
the input that psychologists within the department had provided at various strategic 
workshops and training events. The existence of an evidenced, mutually beneficial 
relationship enabled privileged access to an incredibly rare sample of participants. 
For example, 31 command level participants agreed to take time out of their 
demanding schedules to participate in 2 hour long cognitive interviews. The 
participants’ themselves did not gain any obvious direct benefits from participating 
(e.g. payment, work credit), but based on their experiences in the past (either 
vicariously or directly), they were enthusiastic to participate in work that can benefit 
working practices within their organisation. 
In addition to facilitating access to data, relationship building can also help to 
develop a more informed understanding of the context of real-world data. 
Researchers who immerse themselves in the research domain of interest whilst 
building relationships can improve their understanding of the work domain, which 
may help them to develop more informed research questions and make useful 
changes in their data collection design (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2008). For 
example, during relationship building for this thesis, it was noted that participants 
used a lot of agency-specific terminology. The researcher realised that they needed 
to develop a greater understanding of this language prior to data collection. This was 
in order to feed relevant terminology into the design of interviews by, for example, 
using agency-specific terminology when conducting interviews with different agency 
representatives (e.g., ‘NDM’ when describing the Police ‘National Decision-making 
Model’; ‘SRT’ to describe the ‘Search and Rescue Team’ to the Fire and Rescue 
Service; ‘HART’ when referring to the ‘Hazardous Area Response Team’ members 
with the Ambulance Service). The use of domain-specific language during 
interviews helped to establish a relationship with practitioners, as they did not feel 
the need to restrict their discussion to non-specialist vocabulary and thus described 
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incidents more freely (Pfadenhauer, 2009). An awareness of terminology further 
helped during the semantic coding of interviews during data analysis. Therefore, an 
integral element to research in real-world settings is to immerse oneself in the world 
of the practitioner, in order to build trusted relationships with practitioners to 
facilitate greater access to data and a more informed understanding. 
2.2.2 Challenges to designing and collecting data: distinguishing between 
practitioner needs, academic aims and collective goals 
Data collection in real-world settings has both great strengths and inherent 
weaknesses. Positively, the ability to collect data from real-world incidents or during 
highly immersive live or simulated training exercises means that the ecological 
validity of findings is incredibly powerful. The use of detailed interviews with 
experts and the ability for the researcher to immerse themselves in the practitioner’s 
world facilitates the development of quasi-expertise in the domain of interest 
(Pfadenhauer, 2009). This allows findings to contribute to psychological research 
whilst maintaining a useful real-world impact. For example, feedback from the data 
collected in this thesis will be fed into a presentation, which will be presented to the 
emergency services with detailed recommendations on the lessons that have been 
learnt.  
Although collaborative research may overcome some the ethical challenges 
associated to being both a researcher and a practitioner (Locke et al., 2013; 
Thompson & Russo, 2012), confusion may still arise in identifying ‘research goals’ 
(i.e. academic findings), ‘practitioner goals’ (i.e. applied recommendations and/or 
training) and ‘collective goals’ (i.e. mutual benefits). When researchers wear ‘too 
many hats’ in trying to achieve multiple research goals it can confuse the focus of 
research (Seider, Davis & Gardner, 2007). For example, the ‘Hydra’ simulation that 
was developed for this thesis was designed to facilitate training of emergency 
response commanders by exposing them to multi-agency decision making in 
response to a ‘Maundering Terrorist Firearms Attack’ (MTFA). The scenario was 
developed through collaboration between the researcher for this thesis and training 
facilitators from each agency. Although this increased the realism and ability to input 
useful decision problems as identified by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), it also 
created difficulties in trying to meet both research and training needs. For example, 
research goals involved the desire to keep injects relatively consistent and stable 
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across groups in order to facilitate quantitative statistical comparisons, whereas 
training goals sought flexibility in the provision of information in response to 
individual training needs. This can cause tension during the design and facilitation of 
data collection as there is no clear dominant goal. If these tensions are not addressed 
during the initial design of a research study, practitioners will feel frustrated as they 
perceive little benefit from engaging in research, whilst researchers feel that their 
recommendations are being ignored (Rosenbaum, 2010).  
To reduce goal conflict during real-world data collection, it is important to 
identify common goals between practitioners and researchers. This is an important 
first step during data collection design as it provides an opportunity to input 
mechanisms to overcome any future issues that may arise. Early and clear 
communication about collective goals can help to close the gap between academic 
and practitioner perspectives, and even help to shape conclusions through 
collaborative theorising (Tillyer et al., 2014). Indeed, the simulation presented in this 
thesis was designed following close collaboration with training representatives from 
the three blue lights services. Prior to data collection, the research team identified 
that the scenario needed to remain relatively consistent across training groups in 
order to meet research requirements, whilst it also needed to offer a level of 
flexibility to challenge the training requirements of different individuals. The 
communication of these goals allowed a compromise to be reached, whereby nine 
key injects in the scenario remained linear across groups, however SMEs from each 
agency attended each simulation event to provide additional, dynamic information in 
response to training needs during the course of the simulation (see Chapters 6 and 7 
for more detail). This enabled research to meet both practitioner and research aims 
by anticipating and adapting to potential conflicts of interest ahead of time, in order 
to ensure that ‘quality’ data was collected (Glaser & Laudel, 2009). 
2.2.3 Challenges to data analysis: deriving informed and useful 
conclusions from ‘messy’ data 
Data analysis can also be challenging for real-world researchers as data sets are 
far more diverse than those collected from traditional lab-based settings. Data 
collected in real-world settings is varied and diverse, including field notes, audio and 
video recordings, questionnaires and interviews. It can be derived from a variety of 
settings, including live exercises, simulations, interviews, and at times, during real-
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world operations. This enhances the depth of data and further offers the opportunity 
to triangulate findings using flexible research tools; however it also means that initial 
data sets are often ‘messy’ and diverse as tight experimental control is not possible, 
nor desirable. Thus, a final key challenge to conducting real-world research relates to 
problems associated with analysing complex and large data sets.  
Qualitative analyses are commonly utilised to make sense of data collected from 
real-world settings. It can be used to analyse spoken and/or written text, along with 
observations and field notes collected from naturalistic settings (Reavey, 2011). A 
more detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative analyses will 
be outlined later in this chapter, but in short, although it has strengths in providing 
depth and meaning to findings, it is, rightly or wrong, often perceived as less 
scientific than more objective, quantitative techniques (Malterud, 2001). Although a 
number of methodological papers have sought to highlight the strengths of 
qualitative analyses by outlining criteria (e.g. rigor, sincerity, credibility etc.) for 
‘excellent’ qualitative research (Tracy, 2010), there continues to be a lack of explicit 
and coherent information on how to analyse qualitative data sets (Malterud, 2001). 
Indeed the consideration of data analysis is often disregarded until large and 
voluminous data sets have been acquired, leaving researchers confused and 
overwhelmed with how to make sense of the data (Liamputtong, 2009). Furthermore, 
the qualitative methods that are available are often poorly or wrongly described and 
rarely distinguished between (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). More recently, there has 
been an increase in the publication of qualitative research (Carrera-Fernandez, et al., 
2014) and increased criticism of quantitative research for creating artificial 
objectivity that ignores the subjective influence of the researcher’s interest and prior 
knowledge (Parker, 2004). However, as the methodological focus on qualitative data 
analysis has only gained momentum over the past few years, the challenge for how 
to analyse real-world data sets remains. 
One way of overcoming the challenges associated with real-world data is to 
triangulate analyses. This involves combining data from different sources in order to 
strengthen conclusions (Parker, 2004). For example, this thesis collected exploratory 
data by conducting cognitive interviews with experienced emergency response 
commanders, and further supplemented findings through the use of more 
confirmatory analyses of data collected from a controlled MTFA simulation 
exercise. This allowed for triangulation of data as it was possible to test the findings 
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generated from the qualitative analyses of interviews, through a more controlled 
quantitative analysis of data collected from the simulation questionnaires. The key 
themes that emerged from the interviews relating to goal orientations and uncertainty 
were analysed in more statistical detail via the distribution of questionnaires 
following the simulation. This helped to strengthen conclusions by offering a way to 
test interaction effects (e.g. how did goal orientations interact with delaying 
behaviour?). The convergence of these different approaches to analysis is useful for 
enabling the generation of theoretical conclusions from real-world data (Hammond, 
1996) and represents a shift in methodological focus in favour of progressive and 
hybrid practices to improve the understanding of psychological phenomena 
(Katsikopoulos & Lan, 2011). Furthermore, using ‘messy’ data may actually 
strengthen the impact of findings as the researcher is able to more fully immerse 
themselves and understand the myriad of variables that influence human behaviour 
in the real-world, using diverse, reflexive, meaningful and specific analysis 
techniques (Harre, 2004). Thus, although the analysis of real-world data may be 
challenging, providing that the researcher makes informed considerations on how to 
analyse data during the early design and collection phases, then it is possible to 
derive great strengths from researching within rich and naturalistic settings 
(Liamputtong, 2009).  
2.2.4 Conclusions on the typical challenges to applied research 
This chapter has outlined some of the key methodological challenges associated 
with real-world research related to data access, data design and collection and data 
analysis. By providing worked examples from the data that was collected in this 
thesis, it has provided an indication of how these methodological challenges may be 
overcome. In order to address these challenges more fully, the next section of this 
methodology will focus more specifically on the methodological paradigm upon 
which this thesis was based: Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). 
2.3 Naturalistic decision making (NDM) research 
The second part of this chapter will describe the methodological paradigm that 
this thesis followed: Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). It will describe how 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) can facilitate the collection of real-world data, and 
specifically describe the Critical Decision Method (CDM) interview technique that 
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was used to interview commanders from the emergency services. NDM seeks to 
understand the cognitive processes associated with choice implementation ‘in the 
wild’ (Gore, Banks, Millward, & Kyriakidou, 2006; McAndrew & Gore, 2013). 
Rather than impose artificially constrained experimental methodologies on research, 
NDM emphasises the importance of context, domain specific expertise and 
macrocognition (i.e. complete cognition) in team-based environments (Stanton, 
Wong, Gore, Sevdalis, & Strub, 2011). An overreliance on ecologically invalid lab 
based settings is inappropriate for problem solving research (Schneider & Shanteau, 
2003) as the real-world is characterised by ill-structured problems, uncertainty, 
poorly defined goals, multiple feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple 
players and conflict between personal ideals and contextual requirements (Orasanu 
& Connolly, 1993). For instace, the influence of social interaction on team-based 
choice cannot be replicated in randomised experiments with participants who are 
unknown to one another. NDM strives to achieve meaningful, grounded and detailed 
conclusions by acknowledging the importance of personal experience (Klein, 2008) 
and social dynamics (Allwood & Hedekin, 2005).  
NDM is based on the assumption that cognitive processing in the real-world 
varies, situation assessment is critical, mental imagery is important, the decision 
making context must be specified, decision making is dynamic, and research should 
focus on how decision makers actually function rather than how they ought to 
function (Lipshitz, 1993). Researchers must be flexible and open-minded when 
exploring their data, which in turn facilitates the management of large and ‘messy’ 
data sets to enable the discovery of novel or previously missed psychological 
phenomena. For example, analysis of observational data in the real world has 
facilitated a greater understanding of how human behaviour progresses over time and 
interrelates with social relationships (Faraone & Dorfman, 1997; O’Connor, 1999). 
The ‘cognitive interviewing technique’ has helped to improve knowledge on the 
cognitive processes associated with expertise and ‘Recognition Primed Decision 
Making’ (Klein, 1998; 2008). Klein (1998; 2008) utilised flexible NDM methods to 
discover how expert firefighters did not compare options to find the best response 
when faced with difficult decisions, but instead evaluated options in rapid singular 
succession to find one that was good enough. NDM methods have been used 
successfully with the emergency services, and are an appropriate paradigm to follow. 
Furthermore, as NDM methods are flexible and so allow researchers to develop and 
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test theories during the course of data collection, by for example, asking interviewees 
about developing theories as they emerge, this facilitated the generation of theory 
during the initial interviews that were conducted for this thesis. 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) is the key method used by NDM researchers to 
“systematically identify key cognitive drivers” (p.4; Crandall, et al., 2006) that 
influence decision making in naturalistic settings. It is an approach to real-world 
research that has been successfully applied to a variety of domains including the 
military (Cannon-Bowers, Bowers, Stout, Ricci & Hildabrand, 2013; Drury & 
Darling, 2007), aviation (Keller, Leiden & Small, 2003), intelligence analysis 
(Tecuci, Boicu, Ayers & Cammons, 2005) and emergency service response 
(Prasanna, Yang & King, 2009; Wong, Sallis & O’Hare, 1997). CTA is systematic 
approach to facilitate research on the expertise and ‘macrocognition’ (i.e. expertise 
in natural contexts) that individuals use to solve problems in cognitively complex, 
dynamic and uncertain environments (Gordon, 1995). It focuses on context rich 
descriptions of decision processes rather than decision outcomes (Zsambok, 1997). 
Importantly, CTA is an approach to research that includes a variety of different 
methods. The ‘Critical Decision Method’ (CDM) interview technique is a one type 
of CTA method used to collect rich and detailed data on the cognitive processes used 
by experts when responding to challenging events (Crandall, et al., 2008).  
A primary goal of CTA is to develop an understanding of an experts’ mental 
models, perceptual skills (including subtle cues), sense of typicality, routines and 
declarative knowledge (Klein & Militello, 2004), whilst ensuring that findings have 
applied value to practitioners (Klein, Calderwood & McGregor, 1989). As this thesis 
sought to explore the concept of decision inertia in emergency response settings, the 
CTA process was an appropriate approach to follow. CTA moves beyond description 
of the steps required to perform a task and towards a greater understanding of the 
knowledge, skills and strategies used by experts (Klein & Militello, 2001). The CTA 
researcher is encouraged to immerse themselves in the practitioners’ world, creating 
an alternative mode of enquiry to laboratory-based research that often fails to 
embrace data source complexity (Gore, et al., 2006). CTA is ‘cognitive’ as its focus 
is on thinking and reasoning; it is concerned with ‘tasks’ as it is interested in the 
desired outcome of thought processing; and it is a type of ‘analysis’ that seeks 
understanding for how the component parts of cognition relate with task outcome 
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(Crandall, et al., 2006). This chapter will briefly outline the three key phases to 
conducting a CTA. 
2.3.1 Phase one: Knowledge Elicitation (i.e. What do people know? How 
do they know it?) 
The first phase to conducting a CTA is ‘knowledge elicitation’. This is when the 
researcher identifies the type of data that will be collected from participants 
(Crandall, et al., 2006). For example, is the research interested in eliciting knowledge 
through interviews, observations or questionnaires, and will data focus on 
descriptions of complex procedures or challenges to decision making? The 
knowledge elicitation phase starts during study design, as the researcher considers 
the type of data they are interested in and the most appropriate methods they can use 
to access this data. For example, a researcher interested in understanding how 
emergency department doctors expertly adapt to unanticipated medical emergencies 
would learn little from interviewing inexperienced medical students in the 
emergency department, or experienced doctors working on general wards. 
Knowledge elicitation is central to early CTA planning. Table 2.1 outlines the 
‘framing questions’ (Crandall, et al., 2006) and answers that were used to develop 
knowledge elicitation aims for this thesis. 
Table 2.1: Framing questions to guide the aims of knowledge elicitation 
Framing Question Answer 
1) What issue or need do 
you plan to address? 
To explore the potential causes to decision inertia in 
emergency response contexts. 
2) What will you deliver 
at the end of the 
project? 
An outline of the main impediments to strategic 
decision making and contributory causes to decision 
inertia, with recommendations for how to overcome 
them. 
3) What sorts of people 
can tell you about this 
issue? 
Experienced commanders from the Police, Fire and 
Rescue and Ambulance services, who are qualified to 
command at ‘tactical’ (or ‘silver’) level and upwards. 
4) What aspects of 
expertise or types of 
cognition do you need 
to know about? 
The cognitive barriers to decision making that 
participants’ have found difficult to deal with in the 
past, along with the expert knowledge/techniques they 
used to cope with them. 
5) What type of situation 
will tell you the most 
about the issue you are 
exploring? 
Incidents that are high-stakes, complex, and with 
irreversible challenging consequences. 
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Once the aim of knowledge elicitation is established, it’s important to identify 
the process that could achieve these aims. Once more, self-reflective questions can 
help to facilitate this process (Crandall, et al., 2006). Specifically, researchers should 
think the data content that they are interested in (i.e. retrospective recall, real-time 
verbalisation or hypothetical scenarios; simulated or realistic incidents; easy or 
challenging events) and what data collection method is therefore most suitable (i.e. 
interviews, self-report, observation, think-aloud). Table 2.2 outlines the questions 
and answers that helped guide the knowledge elicitation process for this thesis’ two 
main CTA studies.  
Table 2.2: How the planning for ‘knowledge elicitation’ was structured in this 
thesis 
Research Question (RQ) Data Collection Data Content 
RQ1: What are the main 
challenges to decision making as 
experienced by command level 
decision makers in the emergency 
services? 
Interview (Critical 
Decision Method) 
Retrospective  
Realistic 
Challenging 
RQ2: Are the challenges to 
decision making as identified by 
RQ1 evident during a real-time 
simulation exercise involving 
command level decision makers 
from the emergency services? 
Self-report 
(Questionnaires 
about simulated 
exercise) 
Real-time  
Simulated 
Challenging 
 
2.3.2 Phase two: Data Analysis (i.e. structuring the data, identifying 
findings, discovering meaning) 
Data analysis is the second phase to a CTA study. This is where the researcher 
starts to structure, identify themes and discover the meaning from their data 
(Crandall, et al., 2006). Analyses in CTA projects are predominantly qualitative and 
can include techniques such as thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006); grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1965); and content analysis (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). As 
traditional qualitative techniques tend to focus on social processing, it is important 
that the CTA researcher does not lose their focus on cognition (Crandall, et al., 
2006). The data analysis phase of a CTA includes preparing the data for analysis (i.e. 
transcribing data); data structuring and initial coding (i.e. annotate transcripts; 
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catalogue nodes); discovering meaning (i.e. refine codes; identify themes); and 
finally linking findings (i.e. link to relevant theories; relate to practitioner) (Crandall, 
et al., 2006; Liamputtong, 2009). Depending upon the focus of the research 
questions identified in phase one, analyses will follow a structured approach to test 
for existing theories (i.e. deductive) or an explorative approach to discover emergent 
themes (i.e. inductive) (Wong, 2003). This thesis sought to develop a theoretical 
understanding of the main challenges to emergency commanding that may contribute 
to decision inertia; thus it favoured an inductive grounded theory approach to 
analysis, which is discussed in more detail below.  
2.3.3 Phase three: Knowledge Representation (i.e. displaying data, 
presenting findings, communicating meaning) 
Knowledge representation is the final phase to a CTA. It describes the means by 
which the researcher communicates their findings to the wider academic and 
practitioner communities. It is central to CTA, as a key strength to NDM research is 
that it can provide practitioner-based recommendations (Wong, 2003). The 
inherently qualitative nature of CTA projects means that there are often voluminous 
and text-heavy descriptions of cognitions and behaviour that are derived from the 
data. It is contingent upon the skills of the researcher to reduce and clearly convey 
the main message to be learnt from the CTA project (Liamputtong, 2006). For 
example, the translation of findings in the current thesis into visual models was 
important to translate dense and text-heavy chapters. Possible ways to present CTA 
data include the use of narratives that describe the story of how knowledge is 
derived; chronologies to communicate the structure of knowledge through time; or 
decision requirements tables to show the elements that interact with specific 
decisions (Crandall et al., 2006). Another popular method for knowledge 
representation is the use of concept maps. This involves the presentation of different 
‘concepts’ in node format, which can then be visually linked to one another in order 
to explain the relationship between different concepts (Crandall, et al., 2006). Indeed 
concept maps can be used during earlier data analyses phases in order to facilitate the 
structuring of data into themes and codes (Bazerley & Jackson, 2013). Thus, as a 
whole, the CTA method facilitates the collection of data from real-world 
environments as it offers a systematic and scientific framework to structure a 
research project whilst, importantly, maintaining a context-rich and meaningful 
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approach to conveying real-world findings. In order to provide a worked example of 
how CTA can facilitate real-world research, a detailed description of the CDM 
interview protocol that was used for this thesis will now be discussed.  
2.4 The Critical Decision Method (CDM) interview  
The third part of this chapter will outline the CDM interview protocol that was 
used to collect data from interviews with emergency response commanders. This will 
provide a worked example of the strengths of the CTA approach in providing rich 
methodologies to collect detailed data on cognitive processing in the real-world. As 
outlined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the primary aim of this thesis was to improve the 
understanding of the challenges to command level decision making in the emergency 
services. There was little previous literature that addressed this question, so it was 
decided that an exploratory and inductive approach to research was most appropriate. 
This was in order to develop a foundation of knowledge to explore the problem in 
more (statistical) detail at RQ2 (Bogner, Littig & Menz, 2009).  
Qualitative, semi-structured interviewing was the chosen approach as it 
facilitates the discovery of new conceptual and theoretical knowledge about the life 
experiences of the interviewee (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). This was instead 
of more structured interviewing, whereby questions are pre-determined, linear and 
rigid, as it allows the researcher flexibility to engage and probe participants. 
Furthermore, a fully-unstructured interview style, which involves ethnographic 
observation of participants and the taking of field notes (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 
2006), was impractical, as incidents are unknown ahead of time and so access to 
commanders during large scale incidents could not be predicted, and unethical, as the 
researcher may disrupt the ability for the commander to respond. Furthermore, as 
this thesis was interested in understanding decision making barriers at a cognitive 
level, it is unlikely that interviewing in structured or fully-unstructured contexts 
would produce the desired descriptive detail due to the reduced opportunity for 
cognitive probing.  
It was also decided that individual interviews (i.e. one participant at a time) were 
most appropriate for data collection, as they can generate detailed and personal 
insights into decision making. Focus groups were avoided as, although they are more 
time-efficient than individual interviews and may offer diversity in the trade-off of 
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opinions between focus group members, the sensitive nature of asking commanders 
about their personal struggles meant that commanders would be unlikely to discuss 
their problems openly (Hollander, 2004). Individual interview contexts however can 
facilitate open discussion about sensitive issues in a non-judgemental and relatively 
anonymous environment (Lambert & Loiselle, 2008). Although not possible during 
the current thesis due to access and time constraints, it has been suggested that 
supplementing individual interviews with subsequent focus groups may triangulate 
and strengthen findings to test the theoretical models that have been derived 
(Lambert & Loiselle, 2008). 
Thus, a series of individual, semi-structured interviews with command level 
decision makers from the three ‘blue lights’ services were required in order to 
address RQ1. It was important to specifically target experienced commanders (as 
opposed to novices) as ‘expert interviews’ are useful for creating rich real-world 
descriptions about novel or under-researched topics (Bogner & Menz, 2009). Experts 
not only possess knowledge about their domain, but they also have the metacognitive 
ability to describe their knowledge in an analytic and reflective manner (Klein & 
Militello, 2004). Thus interviewing experienced commanders (judged by their 
qualification as a ‘tactical/silver’ commander) was deemed an important requirement 
for RQ1 as “talking to experts in the exploratory phase of a project is more efficient 
and concentrated method of gathering data than, for instance, participatory 
observation or systematic quantitative surveys” (p. 2; Bogner, Littig & Menz, 2009).   
A CDM interview aims to “identify the knowledge requirements, expertise and 
goal structures involved in performing a decision maker’s work” (p.327, Wong, 
2003) by exploring high stakes decision making (e.g. Wong & Blandford, 2001; 
O’Hare, Wiggins, Williams & Wong, 1998), whilst generating applicable 
recommendations from conclusions (Crandall, et al., 2006). It is a method used to 
facilitate the CTA approach as it is useful for exploring cognitions in the real-world. 
The procedure for conducting a CDM interview involves the retrospective recall of 
experts about a challenging decision making incident that they have experienced in 
the past (Wong, 2003). This involves the multi-pass retrospection of an incident in 
which the decision maker felt that their cognitive processing was challenged 
(Hoffman, Crandall & Klein, 2008) via four ‘sweeps’ (i.e., phases) of the interview 
(i.e. incident identification, timeline verification, deepening probes, ‘what if?’ 
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probes). Each interview ‘sweep’ is designed to deepen the cognitive understanding 
of the challenging incident (Hoffman, et al., 2008) by progressing the interviewee 
through initial rapport building to general recall, cognitive reflection and dynamic 
flexible thinking.  
A key requirement for researchers conducting CDM interviews is that they are 
familiar with the specifics of the research domain (e.g. terminology, work processes) 
that they are exploring (Crandall, et al., 2006). The interviewer should strive to 
achieve ‘quasi-expert’ status by increasing their understanding of the expert’s 
domain (Pfadenhauer, 2009). For example, the author of the current thesis spent over 
a year prior to interviewing commanders immersing themselves in the work 
environments of the three blue lights services by reading policy documents, 
attending training events and establishing informal interpersonal networks with 
experts. Not only does a researcher’s familiarity in the research domain enhance 
planning during the knowledge elicitation phase of a CTA and knowledge 
representation during the interpretation of results, but it can also help data collection 
as the interviewee feels more able to discuss their cognitions in an informed yet non-
competitive environment (Trinczek, 2009). The interviewer must be well versed with 
the design and type of questions that will be used during their interviews to be able 
to probe the responses of interviewees, without deviating too much or losing control 
of the research area of interest (Hoffman, Crandal & Klein, 2006). Table 2.3 outlines 
the interview protocol used for the CDM interviews of this thesis. Furthermore, as 
was the case with the present data collection, the use of a second interviewer during 
interviews is useful as it allows the primary interviewer to establish their quasi-
expert relationship by focusing on rapport building over note taking throughout each 
sweep of the interview (Hoffman, et al., 2006). Each sweep of the CDM protocol 
followed for this thesis will now be outlined in more detail. 
2.4.1 Sweep one: Incident identification 
The first sweep of a CDM interview involves the identification and description 
of an event that is relevant to the research question. For example, the current thesis 
was interested in exploring the main challenges to emergency response decision 
making that may contribute to decision inertia. All participants received the 
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following description at the start of their interview in order to help identify a suitable 
incident: 
“In this interview I will ask you about your experience as a command level 
decision maker. In a minute I am going to ask you about a difficult decision that you 
made in the past. We will work together to pick a suitable decision and then draw up 
a timeline leading up to your choice. I will then ask some more specific questions 
about your decision to help me understand it in more detail and to help support your 
recall. Please take as much time as you need to respond and feel free to use the pen 
and paper provided to reflect or sketch something at any time during the interview.” 
It was important that participants identified an incident that went beyond 
procedural knowledge in order to discover the cognitive components required for 
expert decision making (Hoffman, et al., 2008). Indeed this is one of the key 
strengths of the CDM method as it helps to access unique and specialised knowledge 
held by the expert with regards to the cognitive processing of challenging events. 
Two key requirements for incident identification are that the expert was the decision 
maker during the incident (i.e. first person narrative) and that their actions directly 
impacted upon the outcome of the incident (Crandall, et al., 2006). It is important 
that during this process that the researcher allows for silence and to restate criteria 
should the interviewee stray off-topic by using a priori defined prompts outlined on 
their interview protocol (Appendix One). Examples from the current researched 
included clarification that it should be an “especially challenging” incident with 
“high consequences” that would be “very difficult to reverse” once the decision was 
made. The ability to assist interviewees in identifying relevant decision challenges is 
a key skill for CTA data collection, which develops over time as the interviewer 
becomes more skilled at using the CDM technique (Crandall, et al., 2006). 
Once a suitable incident has been identified and agreed upon by both the 
interviewer and the expert, then the interviewee will provide a narrative walkthrough 
of the incident from start to finish without interruption from the interviewer (the first 
sweep of incident recall). The researcher should listen for pauses and intonation to 
help them identify key aspects of the narrative. They must also develop confidence 
to re-focus the interviewee with gentle probes if they begin to drift off topic. At the 
end of this sweep, it is recommended to check for ‘pre-starts’ (i.e. did anything 
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happen before this incident?) and ‘second endings’ (i.e. what happened after the 
event?) to ensure a full and informed narrative (Crandall, et al., 2006). During this 
process the primary interviewer takes detailed notes about the incident to prepare for 
the ‘retelling’ of the narrative in sweep two. It was found during the current research 
that it was useful for the second interviewer to engage visually with the interviewee 
as the primary interviewer took notes during sweep one. This appeared to encourage 
the interviewee to continue talking despite a lack of eye contact from the primary 
interviewer, who needed to take their own notes during this time to prepare for 
sweep two: timeline verification. 
2.4.2 Sweep two: Timeline verification 
The second sweep of a CDM interview involves timeline verification via the 
process of ‘incident retelling’. This is when the primary interviewer describes the 
narrative to the incident back to the interviewee with reference to notes that they 
have recorded. It is useful to mirror the terminology used by the expert during their 
initial telling of the incident, to help establish a ‘quasi-expert’ status (Pfadenhauer, 
2009). During this second sweep, the expert is encouraged to correct any errors made 
by the interviewer and to add any missing details that come to mind. For the current 
thesis, timeline verification was found to take much longer than the initial open 
description of the incident due to the volume of extra information provided by 
participants once they thought more deeply about the incident. After a common 
understanding of the incident is established, both participant and interviewer work 
together to construct a timeline of the event to prepare for the third sweep: deepening 
probes. For the present thesis, the interviewee was asked to draw a timeline of their 
chosen incident on an A3 piece of paper. They were asked to identify the ‘critical 
turning points’ of the incident in chronological order. To help guide this process, 
interviewees were told to imagine that they were writing a script for a ‘Hollywood 
film’ about their incident and so they needed to include all the key points. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that timelines can be constructed using tools 
such as post-it notes, which can be moved around if the interviewee wants to reorder 
the sequencing of events (Wong, 2003). 
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2.4.3 Sweep three: Deepening probes 
Sweep three involves the progressive deepening of the incident by focussing 
attention on the critical points that were identified during timeline verification. The 
expert is asked to talk through the narrative of the incident again, but this time they 
are guided by the interviewer who uses ‘cognitive probes’ (i.e. questions) to ask for 
more details (Table 2.3). Cognitive probes are the questions that the interviewer has 
prepared prior to the interview, which are used to deepen the analysis of expert 
problem solving. Not all probes will be used in every interview, nor is the researcher 
limited to probes on their list as they can create additional ones guided by their 
curiosity at that time of the interview. Probes tend to include questions about the 
presence or absence of cues; the meaning of cues; the expectations about the 
situation; the goals/actions considered; the options being evaluated; and the 
uncertainties experienced by the decision maker (Crandall, et al., 2006; O’Hare et 
al., 1998). A full list of cognitive probes used in this thesis is outlined in Table 2.3. 
They were grouped into six categories: basis of choice; goals; information and cues; 
influence of uncertainty; decision barriers; and decision strategy. They were inspired 
by other CDM interviews available from the literature (e.g. O’Hare et al., 1998) and 
adapted to include probes that were specific to the research question (i.e. decision 
challenges). 
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Table 2.3: Probes used in ‘sweep three’ of the CDM interview 
 
 
DEEPENING 
INSTRUCTIONS: Now I want to go through the incident again but this time we want to look at 
it in a little bit more detail. I’m going to guide you with some questions 
PROBE TOPIC PROBE 
Basis of choice Why did you select/reject this course of action? 
 What did you believe the consequences of your choice may be? 
 What were these beliefs based upon? 
 How did you feel when making this decision? 
Were you following any standard rules or operating procedures? 
 Had you been trained to deal with this type of event? 
 What specific training or experience helped you make this choice? 
 Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
Did you consider any other courses of action? 
Goals What were your specific goals or objectives? 
What was the most important priority for you at this point in time? 
Information and 
Cues 
How did you know that you needed to make the decision?  
 How did you know when to make the decision? 
What information did you use in making your decision? 
 What were you looking at? 
What did you do with the information you had? 
 Did you use all the information you had available to you? 
 What was the most important piece of information you used? 
Where did you get this information?  
 Did you seek guidance from someone else at this point? 
 How did you know to trust the information? 
Was there any additional information that you would have liked? 
Influence of 
uncertainty 
Were you uncertain about either the reliability or the relevance of the 
information that you had available? 
Decision barriers In your opinion what were the biggest barriers to your decision making on 
that day? 
Were there any organisational or social barriers which made your decision 
more difficult? 
 Within your own organisation? 
 From external organisations? 
Did complexity or uncertainty in the decision making environment make 
your decision making difficult? 
 At any point did you find it difficult to process the information you 
had? 
 Were you uncertain about the appropriateness of your decision? 
Were you expecting to have to make this type of decision during the 
incident? 
 How long did it take to reach the decision? 
 Did you feel time pressured at all? 
Decision strategy Did you try and avoid making this decision at any point? 
What types of actions did you take to try and make this decision? 
 Do you think that you could develop any rules which could assist 
another person to make this decision successfully? 
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2.4.4 Sweep four: ‘What if?’ Probes 
The final sweep of the CDM interview shifts the expert’s focus away from what 
actually happened during the incident and orients their thinking on hypothetical 
‘what if?’ questions. The purpose of this phase is to generate a more analytic 
consideration of the situation from the perspective of the expert; specifically in terms 
of what might have happened under different circumstances (Crandall et al., 2006). 
This final phase is especially useful for NDM research as it can help to generate 
practical recommendations derived from collective expert knowledge across 
interviews. For example, experts in the current studies were asked three key 
questions in this final sweep: (i) how they believed a novice may have behaved 
differently; (ii) what they would do differently if they responded again with 
hindsight; and (iii) what top tips they would give to someone faced with a similar 
challenging incident. Expert insight into these questions can help to generate applied 
recommendations from the research. It also helps guide analysis of data, as it 
identifies the aspects of the incident that the expert perceived to be most important.  
2.4.5 Summary of the CDM interview technique 
This chapter has thus far outlined the main aims of this thesis and the 
methodology that was followed to achieve these aims. Specifically, it sought to 
collect real-world data on the cognitive processing of emergency services 
commanders to further the conceptual understanding of why actions may fail in 
extreme emergency environments. The thesis was inspired by the NDM paradigm as 
it sought to explore decision making ‘in the wild’ by unpacking the cognitive 
processing of experts in domain-specific environments, and took a CTA approach to 
the design, collection and analysis of data, as it offered a useful scientific framework 
to facilitate ecologically valid yet informed and precise data from naturalistic 
environments. More specifically, the CDM interview protocol was utilised as it 
specifically focused on experts’ recall of real-world experiences about challenging 
decision making events, whilst maintaining focus on the cognitive processes that 
helped, or hindered, choice implementation. Thus, not only does this approach create 
great strengths in presenting real-world data with applied value to practitioners, but it 
further ensured that scientific rigor was maintained to contribute to psychological 
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theory. The data analysis technique used to interpret the data will now be discussed 
in more detail, by providing a detailed discussion on qualitative analyses. 
2.5 Qualitative data analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is appropriate for a research project whereby “the 
researcher trusts textual data more than numerical data and analyses this data in its 
textual form instead of transforming it into numbers for analysis, with the objective 
of understanding the meaning of human action” (p.22, Carrera-Fernandez , et al., 
2014). It is complimentary to the NDM paradigm as it helps the researcher to 
understand psychological phenomena from the perspective of those who have 
experienced them (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Qualitative methods can transform 
large and voluminous data sets into insightful and meaningful conclusions 
(Liamputtong, 2009). Such methods can facilitate the data analysis and knowledge 
representation phases in CTA projects that consist of large and ‘messy’ data sets. 
Qualitative research has a rich history as some of the earliest psychologists including 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), arguably the first ‘psychologist’ (Bringmann, Balance 
& Evans, 1975), sought to understand human psychology through the subjectivity of 
people (Marecek, 2003). Yet, with the advent of more mathematical and 
computerised procedures for quantitative research, it fell out of favour with 
mainstream psychology (Rennie, Watson & Monteiro, 2002). It is only since the 
early 1990s that interest in qualitative research has resurged (Carrera-Fernandez, et 
al., 2014), with more publications in mainstream journals (Madill & Gogh, 2008).  
2.5.1 Different qualitative analysis techniques 
There are a range of different epistemological perspectives and approaches to 
conducting qualitative analyses (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Madill and Gough (2008) 
outline how data can be collected from a variety of sources including interview data 
(e.g. telephone, face to face), collaborative data (e.g. role playing, Delphi groups), 
naturally-occurring data (e.g. diaries, archival data), observational data (e.g. field 
notes, recordings) and structured data (e.g. protocols, vignettes). It is most 
commonly associated with transcribed and textual data from audio- and/or video-
recorded interviews (i.e. CDM interviews), focus groups, communications ‘in vivo’ 
and questionnaires (Reavey, 2011). The general process of analysing textual data 
involves four steps: (i) initial reading of transcripts; (ii) early coding of transcripts; 
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(iii) refinement of codes (possibly into higher order ‘themes’); and (iv) creating a 
theoretical argument by linking codes and themes together (Liamputtong, 2009). 
Generally, coding is either inductive, whereby the researcher derives codes 
based on ‘bottom-up’ analyses of the text, or deductive, whereby the text is coded 
‘top-down’ in line with prior theories or coding dictionaries (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
The type of coding differs depending upon the end-goals of the project. It may 
involve discursive analysis (i.e. focus on how discourse shapes social/cognitive 
processing); thematic analysis (i.e. inductive or ‘bottom-up’); structured analysis (i.e. 
deductive or ‘top-down’); or instrumental analysis (i.e. specific philosophical 
approach to data) (Madill & Gough, 2008). For example, ‘discourse analysis’ is a 
discursive method that explores how the language used by individuals interacts with 
social concepts (Liamputtong, 2009); whereas ‘narrative analysis’ is an instrumental 
method that focuses on how individuals construct stories that convey meaning to 
others (Liamputtong, 2009). One of the most popular qualitative analysis techniques 
is structured ‘content analysis’, whereby the researcher uses a coding dictionary to 
establish frequency counts of different codes that can be subjected to subsequent 
statistical analyses (Carrera-Fernandez, et al., 2014; Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Also 
common is ‘thematic analysis’, which uses both inductive and deductive processes to 
provide a rich description of data themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Grounded theory (GT) is similar to thematic analysis, but in addition to 
describing the data it also aims to generate theoretical conclusions (Glaser & Strauss, 
1965; Lo, 2014). As this thesis sought to explore the novel concept of decision 
inertia in emergency response domains (Table 2.1) and because research on this 
topic was limited, an inductive GT approach was chosen. GT was developed during 
the evolution of scientific thought on symbolic interactionism (i.e. a theory of human 
behaviour that describes how an individual’s sense of self is defined by and altered 
their social interactions with society) (Annells, 1996) and assumes that humans 
interact with the world via symbolic interactions, the most obvious way being 
through language (Sarantakos, 1993). It assumes that a person’s language can be 
coded to identify their ideas and thoughts about a concept (i.e. the challenges to 
command), which can contribute to a theoretical model of human interaction with 
the social world (Amsteus, 2014).  
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The process for conducting GT analyses involves coding textual data (i.e. 
creating descriptive categories of the data); theoretical sampling (i.e. sourcing data 
from theoretically relevant sources); and memoing (i.e. keeping an audit of ideas 
during analysis). This should be performed whilst maintaining awareness of the 
theoretical sensitivity of conclusions (i.e. thinking about the data in theoretical 
terms); engaging in constant comparison of the data (i.e. constantly contrasting the 
data against itself); and identifying the point of saturation (i.e. when to develop a 
final explanatory theory). It is important that researchers self-monitor their progress 
during qualitative data analyses to ensure that their conclusions remain grounded in 
the data (Mueser and Nagel, 2009) and that they remain flexible during coding to 
adapt to novel findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Liamputtong, 2009). GT researchers 
explore how an individual conveys meaning through language about a certain topic 
(i.e. challenges to emergency response) and look for commonly occurring patterns 
between participants that can contribute to theory. Thematic analysis follows a 
similar inductive process to GT (i.e. transcript, annotate, code, refine codes, organise 
codes and themes) (Lo, 2014); however, whereas GT aims to create a final 
theoretical model of the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1965), thematic analysis seeks to 
provide a detailed descriptive account that does not extend beyond the data set being 
explored. As the aim of this thesis was to use inductive techniques, but with the 
fundamental goal of developing theoretical hypotheses that could be tested at RQ2, 
then GT was deemed the most appropriate method for analysing the interview data.  
2.5.2 Limitations of qualitative research 
Despite the strengths of qualitative analyses for facilitating an exploratory 
understanding of real-world data, there are a number of limitations that must be 
acknowledged. There is a poor distinction between the different types of qualitative 
analyses, which can cause confusion amongst researchers (Bryant, 2002; Lo, 2014). 
It is not uncommon to find published papers that mislabel the qualitative 
methodology that has been used, with ‘grounded theory’ and ‘thematic analysis’ 
most often confused (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Ironically, the celebrated ‘flexibility’ 
of qualitative methods has inadvertently contributed to the incoherence of these 
methods as research mix methodological approaches (Holloway & Todres, 2003). As 
a result, qualitative data is commonly perceived as less scientific than more 
stringently defined quantitative techniques (Crandall, et al., 2006; Laubschagne, 
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2003). For example, different researchers can generate different conclusions about 
the same data set depending upon their ability, experience and research focus, which 
suggests subjectivity and bias in analyses (Glӓser & Laudel, 2009). The variability in 
research conclusions deviates from traditional positivist approaches to psychology 
that treat objectivity, validity and reliability of results as benchmarks for research 
quality (Parker, 2008). Furthermore, as qualitative research is often time consuming 
and labour intensive, then these contributing negative factors can detract potential 
researchers from using qualitative methods (Hoffman, 1987).  
Yet there has been a growing methodological interest in qualitative analyses 
over recent years. There has been an exponential increase in the number of 
qualitative publications in psychology journals; increasing from just 12 papers in 
1990 to 529 in 2010 (Carrera-Fernandez, et al., 2014; Madill & Gough, 2008). 
Interest in the use of interviewing has grown, as traditional quantified techniques 
tend to reduce behaviour and cognitive processing to numerical values that arguably 
strip the data of its meaning (Bogner & Menz, 2002). Indeed, when research seeks to 
establish a rich understanding of the experienced cognitions and true psychology of 
individuals, such as NDM, it would seem that the “whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts” (p.108; Crandall, et al., 2006). Parker (2004) suggests that psychology 
should cut its philosophical ties to ‘science’ and instead draw strength from its 
flexible approach and ability to facilitate interdisciplinary work. Rather than trying to 
replicate science, psychology is perhaps better defined as the lynchpin that links 
science and human behaviour. Harre (2004) goes further to argue that qualitative 
analyses are in fact more scientific than quantitative methods as they are reflexive, 
meaningful and specific to the research topic. Furthermore, as researchers are people 
themselves, it has been questioned whether the claim of true objectivity is even 
possible, as every researcher will bring along their own ‘deductive’ research qualities 
that informs their analyses (Malterud, 2001). 
2.5.3 Conclusions on qualitative data analyses 
Qualitative approaches to data analysis are thus useful for providing rich, 
contextualised and in-depth conclusions on the psychological experience of 
individuals. A number of authors have attempted to outline more stringent 
descriptions and criteria for conducting qualitative research to improve the clarity in 
this methodological approach (e.g. Liamputtong, 2009; Lo, 2014; Morrow, 2005; 
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Tracy, 2010; Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Furthermore, a number of recent papers have 
attempted to clarify the distinction between specific qualitative methods by outlining 
frameworks to facilitate analysis (e.g. Braun & Clarke, 2006; Carrera-Fernandez, et 
al., 2014; Liamputtong, 2009). Tracy (2010) outlines eight markers of good quality 
qualitative research by ensuring research has: (i) a worthy topic; (ii) rich rigor; (iii) 
sincerity; (iv) credibility; (v) resonance; (vi) a significant contribution; (vii) ethics; 
and (viii) meaningful coherence. Furthermore, Malterud (2001) defines relevance, 
validity and reflexivity as essential standards to ensure qualitative research quality. 
Qualitative conclusions can be bolstered by triangulating research to test conclusions 
in more quantitative and experimental settings (Madill & Gough, 2008; Parker, 
2004). Indeed a mixed methods approach was used in the current thesis by 
embracing both qualitative CDM analyses (Chapters 4 & 5) coupled with more 
stringent quantitative assessment of questionnaires following the MTFA simulation 
(Chapters 6 & 7). The fourth and final section of this chapter will describe how 
advancements in technology can further enhance qualitative data analyses, via the 
use of NVivo. 
2.6 Computer tools to facilitate qualitative data analyses: NVivo 
NVivo is a computer package that can facilitate the analysis of qualitative data 
(Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). It enables the researcher to deal with voluminous, text-
heavy and cognitively demanding data sets as it allows for data to be stored, updated 
and changed in electronic folders (Liamputtong, 2009; Yuen & Richards, 1994). 
NVivo does not conduct data analysis for the researcher, unlike statistical computer 
packages such as SPSS, but offers an organisational package that can assist the 
researcher with coding and categorising the data (Liamputtong, 2009). For example, 
the interviews for this thesis produced over 494,000 transcribed words. Although not 
impossible, hand coding such a large data set would have been very demanding on 
the researcher who would have to manually search between interview transcripts 
when referencing common themes. NVivo facilitates electronic search of transcripts, 
which is much faster and lessens demands on the researcher. Although NVivo is 
primarily used to analyse interview transcripts, it can also facilitate the analysis of 
other types of qualitative data including picture files and audio files (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013; Reavey 2011). The remaining section of this chapter will detail how 
53 
 
NVivo was utilised to facilitate the GT analysis of CDM interview transcripts in this 
thesis. 
2.6.1 Creating a project in NVivo: Preparing data for analysis 
The first step in qualitative data analysis involves preparing the data for analysis 
(e.g. transcribing). When using NVivo, this means creating a ‘data project’. A data 
project is a computerised file in which all information about the project will be 
stored; much like a folder on a desktop computer. Not only does it store raw data and 
subsequent sorting and analyses, but it can also include documents that can help 
audit the research process. For example, it is recommended that researchers who use 
NVivo create an electronic ‘journal’, which is stored within the data project (Bazeley 
& Jackson, 2013). This acts an electronic notebook where the researcher can 
document their thoughts, reflections and actions during the analysis process. It serves 
as a useful audit trail that the researcher can return to when self-monitoring and 
grounding their theoretical understanding of the data  (Liamputtong, 2009; Mueser 
and Nagel, 2009). It also provides an appropriate place to store ‘memos’ that 
enhance the ‘theoretical sensitivity’ of GT analyses (Amsteus, 2014). During data 
preparation in NVivo, the researcher can also transcribe data from audio to written 
format. This can be done within NVivo itself or by importing a typed transcript from 
Microsoft Word. A total of n=31 interviews were transcribed in this thesis, which 
totalled to 51 hours, 18 minutes and 34 seconds of audio files with a mean length 
interview of 1 hour, 39 minutes and 18 seconds. During initial transcription for data 
preparation, the researcher made notes on preliminary emergent themes in 
preparation for GT analysis and coding.  
2.6.2 Coding in NVivo: Creating nodes 
Once data has been effectively prepared and organised (i.e. transcribed), it is 
then possible to begin coding the data. NVivo does not code the data for the 
researcher, but instead helps to organise codes electronically (Liamputtong, 2009). 
Codes are referred to as ‘nodes’ in NVivo, which the researcher can create, edit, 
delete or merge at any point during the analysis process. This was hugely 
advantageous during the GT analyses performed for this thesis, as it facilitated 
flexibility when identifying emergent themes. For the current thesis, each transcript 
was coded one at a time within NVivo; when an utterance within a transcript seemed 
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relevant and interesting (i.e. related to decision inertia), the relevant text was 
highlighted in the document and a ‘new node’ was created. Whenever a ‘new node’ 
was created, it was named with an identifiable label (e.g. ‘lack of information’) and a 
‘description’ of the node’s meaning was added to the file. The description box 
helped facilitate ‘constant comparison’ as a part of the GT process, as it was then 
possible to see how different nodes related to one another later in the analysis 
process. Once a ‘node’ has been created, subsequent text could be quickly coded into 
the node by highlighting the text and then dragging and dropping it into the node 
folder. It was also possible to review node content at any point during analysis by 
opening the node folder, which contained all the text that had been placed under that 
code. As nodes were stored electronically, it was possible to create a huge volume of 
nodes that allowed for wide and diverse coding. It also enabled multiple coding of 
the same portion of text into multiple nodes when required. 
2.6.3 Refining codes in NVivo: Parent nodes 
Once the initial coding of transcripts was completed, the next phase of GT 
involves the refinement of nodes through constant comparison (Amsteus, 2014). In 
NVivo this process involved the creation of ‘parent nodes’. Parent nodes are top 
level themes under which relevant codes are stored. Parent nodes effectively act as 
‘themes’ in GT analyses, which are broken down into further ‘sub-themes’ and 
‘codes’. The creation of ‘parent nodes’ (i.e. themes) facilitates the early 
consideration of the final theoretical argument; a fundamental aim of GT. NVivo is 
especially useful for inductive analysis, as the researcher may create ‘miscellaneous' 
parent nodes under which to store emerging and unusual themes for later analysis. 
For example, the researcher of this thesis was able to code data relating to both goal 
orientation (Chapter 4) and uncertainty (Chapter 5) at the same time by creating 
separate parent nodes that focussed on each of these specific areas. 
2.6.4 Knowledge Representation: Concept maps 
In addition to facilitating the analysis of qualitative data, NVivo can also assist 
with knowledge representation via the creation of visual models. Depending upon 
research requirements, NVivo can produce basic frequency data with reference to 
both textual data and coding. For instance, it is possible to generate ‘word trees’ that 
identify the words in the transcripts are commonly linked to one another. NVivo can 
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also visually display the most common nodes within the data set. It is also possible 
to tag interviews (e.g. Fire and Rescue interviews; Police interviews; Ambulance 
interviews) and produce frequency data to compare trends across data sets. There is 
also a wide range of graphic and visualisation tools that can be utilised to build 
concept maps; a recommended format for CTA knowledge representation (Crandall, 
et al., 2006). Thus, NVivo is an example of a useful technology that can facilitate 
qualitative research by enabling researchers to explore large data sets in a robust and 
systematic fashion. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described a number of methodological issues that are relevant 
to this thesis. Firstly, it provided an overview of the key methodological challenges 
associated with real-world research relating to: (i) access to real-world data; (ii) 
designing and collecting real-world data; and (iii) analysing real-world data. It then 
described how the NDM paradigm offered a useful and scientific solution to research 
in real-world settings, with a specific focus on CTA. It provided an overview of how 
CTA facilitated three phases of psychological research, from knowledge elicitation 
to data analysis and knowledge representation, and specifically outlined the CDM 
interview technique that was used. The strengths and weaknesses of qualitative data 
analyses was explored, followed by a more detailed description of GT as the chosen 
qualitative analysis technique used to analyse interview data in this thesis, to 
generate an emergent model of the cognitive processes associated to decision inertia 
in emergency service contexts. In sum, there are three criteria that must be met in 
order to fulfil the requirements of a CTA project: (i) it must lead to a new discovery; 
(ii) this discovery must be sufficiently communicated to the end users; and (iii) the 
communication of discovery must have an impact and be put into action (Klein & 
Militello, 2001). The methods used in this thesis seek to achieve these goals by: (i) 
discovering the causes to decision inertia in emergency incident contexts; (ii) 
communicating these findings through the chapters of this thesis; and (iii) outlining 
key recommendations for how command level decision making might be improved. 
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Chapter 3: Commitment issues: A taxonomic classification of decision inertia 
and failures to act 
3.1  Abstract 
When presented with a set of options, people sometimes fail to act. This is 
especially prevalent when decisions are made in high-stake, high-risk contexts. This 
chapter argues that although it is important to understand why, how and when people 
do make decisions, it is also important to understand why, how and when they do 
not. This examination of ‘non behaviour’ is in contrast to the plethora of research 
that has widely focussed on the outcomes (and quality) of decision implementation. 
This chapter presents the results of a ‘critical interpretive synthesis’ of the literature, 
a specific type of literature review that seeks to incorporate both quantitative and 
qualitative research papers to help interpret new and novel theories (Dixon-woods et 
al., 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Flemming, 2009). It identifies three ways one may fail to 
act. ‘Decision avoidance’ is the active avoidance of choice, as individuals 
consciously opt to disengage with choice. This contrasts with ‘decision inertia’ - the 
passive avoidance of choice through redundant and persistent effortful deliberation 
between options. ‘Implementation failure’ is the behavioural manifestation of 
inaction by failure to execute action despite cognitive commitment (i.e. selecting an 
option). It incorporates antecedents that may contribute in explaining the causes of 
inaction. The taxonomic classification of ‘non decision making’ represented in this 
chapter is the first of its kind to describe different variations of failures to act and 
provides the foundation for which subsequent data chapters for this thesis were 
based. 
3.2 Introduction 
3.2.1 Defining decision inertia 
A decision is a commitment to a course of action that is taken in order to achieve 
a desired goal (Yates, 2003). However, in uncertain and pressurised environments, 
decision makers often fail to commit to and implement action either in time or at all 
(van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). This is especially the case when 
responding to emergency incidents and major disasters. For example, the emergency 
response to the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 was criticised due to delays in 
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providing the relatives of missing people with information about their loved ones 
(National Audit Office, 2006); following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, 
the response was criticised for being too slow due to weak humanitarian leadership 
(Grunewald, Binder & Georges, 2010) and poor prioritisation of relevant information 
(Patrick, 2011); and uncertainty concerning roles and responsibilities and a lack of 
leadership were blamed for causing delays in the response to widespread flooding in 
the UK in 2012 (PEDU, 2012). Indeed failures to act can arise, not only when 
incidents are constrained by temporal pressures, but further when the stakes or 
consequences are high and the situation is complex; for example, the widely reported 
and tragic death of the toddler ‘Baby P’ in 2007 in the UK was blamed on the failure 
of social care workers to properly consider and act upon the information they had 
regarding his abuse (Campbell, Jones & Brindle, 2008); and the government has 
been criticised for failing to take action and ignoring social moral issues when they 
are perceived to be low on the political agenda (McKee, 2011). Consider also the 
decision faced by President Obama and the United States Government with the 
eruption and escalation of violence in Syria:  
“Do nothing, and a humanitarian disaster envelops the region. 
Intervene militarily, and risk opening Pandora’s box and wading 
into another quagmire like Iraq. Send aid to the rebels, and watch it 
end up in the hands of extremists. Continue with diplomacy, and run 
head first into a Russian veto. None of these approaches offered 
much hope of success”. 
Clinton (2014, p.461) 
Failures to act can arise due to antecedents associated with the situational 
characteristics of the decision environment, such as time pressure and complexity, or 
can further be a product of exogenous factors associated with the experience and 
traits of the decision maker and/or the decision making team (Alison, Power, van den 
Heuvel & Waring, 2014). People fail to act when faced with a range of decision 
contexts; from personal decisions about whether to buy a house; to organisationally 
relevant decisions across domains as diverse as emergency response (whether to 
commit a crew of fire fighters into an unstable, collapsed building) or retail (whether 
to invest money in opening another 40 supermarkets based on current income 
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expenditure models). Rather than commit to a choice, individuals delay their 
decision as they redundantly deliberate over their options (Eyre, Alison, McLean & 
Crego, 2008). This could involve deliberation on decision outcomes in the present, 
concerning which option is best or which is least worse (Parker & Schrift, 2011), or 
involve the anticipated potential negative consequences of future outcomes (Beeler 
& Hunton, 1997) such as being held to account for making a wrong decision 
(Mamhidir, Kihlgren & Sorlie, 2007) or experiencing salient aversive emotions such 
as regret (Ritov & Baron, 1995).  
The research on failures to act is sparse; yet its conceptual importance and real 
world impact is not insignificant. It is distinct from the literature on cognitive biases 
and heuristics as it is not concerned with wrong or irrational judgements, but rather 
with the failure of individuals to reach choice conclusions. The paucity of research 
that has been conducted has primarily focussed on tight experimental settings in 
relatively low-stake decision making contexts, such as looking at why consumers 
may defer or avoid purchasing decisions in hypothetical decision scenarios (e.g. 
Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz & Simonson, 2007; Parker & Schrift, 2011; White & 
Hoffrage. 2009); and is often methodologically questionable due to limited efforts to 
extrapolate the differences between, for example, avoiding choice and the decision to 
say ‘no’ (Huber, 1995). The application of these findings to the real world is 
questionable, as studies rarely account for the vast number of confounding variables 
that influence real-life decisions and are external to the decision problem (Anderson, 
2005). For example, decision studies tend to assume that when a decision maker 
considers past negative experiences or anticipated consequences in their choice, then 
their decision making is ‘biased’; yet this may actually be a very rationalised process 
reflecting how an individual has ‘learned from past mistakes’ (Tykocinski & 
Ortmann, 2011). Scholars must extend the conceptual validity of research on 
decision making by asking why implementation failure occurs. It is not enough to 
only explore the reasons why and under what conditions individuals behave (decide) 
with regards to given stimuli, but we must also find out why people may respond to 
stimuli by not behaving (indecision). 
 
 
59 
 
3.2.2 What is known about non-decision making? 
Anderson (2003) was one of the first authors to discuss the importance of 
failures to act in his detailed review of decision avoidance. He defined decision 
avoidance as ‘a tendency to avoid making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an 
easy way out that involves no action or no change’ (p. 139) and described its 
antecedents as deriving from both emotional and rational roots. The concept of 
choice avoidance was furthered van den Heuvel et al (2012), who identified that, in 
team based settings, actions failed not only as teams sought to avoid making their 
choice, but also because they failed to translate cognitive choices into the 
behavioural implementation of action. Research on inaction in organisational 
management has also found that organisations may fail to act by choice deferral, or 
by simply failing to reach a choice conclusion (Brooks, 2011).  
The taxonomy presented in this chapter extends previous works. Specifically, it 
aims to: (i) conceptually define and describe the different ways one may ‘fail to act’; 
and (ii) present theoretical antecedents, derived from the literature, that may help 
explain these failures in cognitive processing. Crucially, it considers why action may 
fail, even when people are motivated to make a choice, yet for reasons that will be 
discussed, fail to translate that motivation into action. This chapter presents three 
types of action failure: (i) ‘Decision avoidance’ - a maladaptive cognitive process 
whereby the decision maker actively avoids thinking about whether to commit to 
action (e.g. “I choose not decide for the time being”); (ii) ‘Decision inertia’ - a 
maladaptive cognitive process whereby the decision maker passively avoids choice 
as they are distracted by cognitive conflict (e.g. “I am still thinking about whether I 
will commit to, refuse or avoid this choice); (iii) ‘Implementation failure’ - the third 
type of avoidance, which reflects the maladaptive behavioural process whereby the 
decision maker fails to translate their choice into action (e.g. “I have made my choice 
but efforts to execute / implement this choice have failed”). All three describe 
behavioural inhibition, yet, crucially, the motivation behind each form of inaction 
differs. Some are avoiding their choice by deciding to ignore it, whilst others are still 
deliberating their choice; and others have made their choice but failed to execute it. 
The significant contribution of this chapter is to encourage psychological enquiry 
into the action failure phenomenon by helping to better define the concept of action 
failures. 
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3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Aims and Scope 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a theoretical foundation to this thesis. It 
extends the conceptual validity of research into decision making; specifically by 
considering the reasons why people fail to act (decide) in response to a given 
stimulus. It presents a detailed review of the literature, using a methodology that is 
specifically oriented towards the generation of theory by maintaining a flexible 
approach. The ‘critical interpretive synthesis’ (CIS) literature review process was 
chosen as, although less well known and mainly derived from health research, it is 
specifically designed to explore new and novel concepts, by synthesising both 
quantitative and qualitative literature and, importantly, interpreting findings through 
a theoretical lens (Dixon-woods et al., 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Flemming, 2009). This 
process helped to produce the resultant taxonomic classification of failures to act. 
3.3.2 Procedure 
A five step CIS process was followed in order to assemble the relevant literature 
on the psychology of inaction, whilst generating a theoretical knowledge synthesis to 
explain this phenomenon. A detailed description of this procedure is provided in 
Table 3.1. The CIS method ‘is sensitised to the kinds of processes involved in a 
conventional systematic review, whilst drawing on a distinctively qualitative 
tradition of inquiry’ (p. 9, Dixon-Woods et al., 2006a). It helps the researcher to 
interpret the literature through a theoretical lens and, perhaps most importantly and 
in contrast to traditional literature review methodologies, allows for the inclusion of 
both quantitative and qualitative papers. By incorporating qualitative research, which 
is more interpretative and theoretical by nature, the researcher is able to focus less on 
what is already known about a concept, and instead develop new insight on what 
remains unknown; enabling the generation and construction of novel theory. The CIS 
procedure is flexible, and researchers can adapt the ordering of the five step process 
in response to accumulated findings; for example, using referencing chaining to 
discover new literature. This differs to more traditional aggregative review formats 
(e.g. systematic reviews, meta-analyses), that involve inflexible procedures with 
strict inclusion and exclusion criteria (Flemming, 2009); and encourages adaptation 
to both aggregative quantitative research and interpretive qualitative research. Thus 
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although Table 3.1 helps describe the general procedure followed in this chapter, the 
order of these steps is not linear.  
Table 3.1: A five step critical interpretive synthesis procedure 
Steps (1-5) Action 
1) Define the review 
question 
 Establish a holistic and broad question on your 
topic 
 Treat the question as a compass rather than an 
anchor by iteratively refining it as you progress 
2) Search and sample the 
literature 
 Establish initial search terms 
 Use multiple literature sources (electronic, 
reference chaining, unpublished work) 
 Be ‘selective’ rather than ‘sensitive’ in order to 
focus on the phenomena 
 Sampling should be both purposeful (relevant to 
phenomena) and theoretical (relevant to theory) 
3) Appraise the literature 
and extract recurring 
concepts 
 Use a data extraction form (see Appendix for 
example) to appraise papers 
 Critique each paper’s theoretical relevance 
 Identify recurring concepts 
4) Synthesise appraisals  List all concepts found in the literature 
 Refine list by synthesising related concepts 
 Establish a set of new synthetic constructs 
which help to group, explain and distinguish the 
phenomenon 
5) Create theoretical 
model 
 Generate a synthesising argument of your topic 
(e.g. theoretical taxonomy)  
 
3.3.3 Search criteria 
An online search of the DISCOVER database was conducted between the 
months of April and October 2013. Reference chaining was performed from the 
papers that were identified in the online search, and in the subsequent months 
leading up to the final write-up of this chapter in June 2015. Keywords were drawn 
from Anderson’s (2003) rational-emotional model of decision avoidance as this was 
a seminal paper of interest. Keywords included ‘decision inertia’; ‘decision 
avoidance’; ‘implementation failure’; ‘choice deferral’; ‘sunk-cost effect’; ‘omission 
bias’; and ‘inaction inertia’. Inclusion criteria for papers were kept wide but selective 
in order to synthesise the available literature on failures to act across topic domains. 
Papers that described failures to make or implement choice and decision avoidance 
mechanisms were of particular interest. Papers that discussed choices that were high 
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consequence and irreversible (or very difficult to reverse) were also valued. Papers 
were excluded if they focussed on procedural or non-human decision making as 
these were not seen to represent high stakes or high consequence decision making 
involving cognitive deliberation. It is worth noting that a literature review will 
inevitably miss areas of research, as there may be specialised areas of research that 
are not identified within the chosen search terms. Yet this chapter did not aim to 
provide a complete and final taxonomy of action failure. Instead it hoped to provide 
a theoretical foundation upon which to build further psychological enquiry, and thus 
this is an acknowledged and anticipated limitation. 
3.4 Results 
A total of 329 papers were identified from the initial search. After reading the 
abstract of each paper, 106 papers were selected for full review (Table 3.2). Full 
review involved systematically reading the paper in its entirety and using the data 
extraction form (Appendix Two). There is no standardised data extraction template 
currently available for this type of analysis and so a format was generated for this 
chapter. Other researchers are encouraged to use this template to facilitate their own 
CIS literature reviews, and to systematically document general reading. The data 
extraction form detailed each paper’s reference; aims; method; key findings; second 
order constructs (i.e. psychological terms); and their fit to the synthesising argument 
(i.e. theoretical model). An example of the layout of this table can be seen in the 
Appendices (Appendix Two). 
Table 3.2: Frequency details of all papers identified and selected for review 
Search terms Number of 
papers found 
Full papers 
reviewed 
“Decision inertia” OR “Decision avoidance” 31 6 
“Implementation failure” AND “Decision 
making” 
10 2 
“Choice deferral” AND “Decision making” 46 13 
“Sunk cost effect” AND “Decision making” 72 15 
“Omission bias” AND “Decision making” 95 28 
“Inaction inertia” AND “Decision making” 75 17 
Grey literature  25 
Total: 329  106 
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3.4.1 Outlining the model 
3.4.1.1 What decision types is the model interested in? 
By combining the experience of the researcher along with what is known in the 
literature on errors in decision making, this chapter sought to explore papers on the 
challenges to decision making. It is worth noting that although this chapter presents 
findings derived from the CIS, it was also heavily influenced by the ethnographic 
experience of the researcher and her supervisor who has researched high-stakes 
decision making for almost two decades. As a result, the strengths of this review lie 
not only in reporting the available literature, but also in the expert knowledge of the 
psychologists who have observed this phenomenon over the many years that they 
have worked in close collaboration with high stakes decision making practitioners, 
who commonly refer to and have experienced action failures and inertia. This 
combination of experience and literature resulted in a taxonomy that classifies the 
avoidance of decisions into three categories; namely that people will avoid 
challenging decisions by intent (decision avoidance); through cognitive conflict 
(decision inertia); or through behavioural difficulties in manifesting action 
(implementation failure). A ‘challenging decision context’ was defined according to 
Orasanu and Connelly’s (1993) definition, as ill-structured; uncertain and dynamic; 
poorly defined and/or competing goals; action and/or feedback loops; time stress; 
high stakes; multiple players; and with organisational goals and norms. Of course 
decisions that result in action failure will not always have all eight ‘challenging’ 
characteristics present (Orasanu & Connelly, 1993), but they do all represent 
decisions with large and irreversible (or at least very difficult to reverse) 
consequences for the decision maker once they have made their choice.  
Fundamentally, the types of decisions of interest are those that are high-stakes, with 
hard, if not impossible to calculate short, medium and long-term consequences that 
make decision making difficult. 
3.4.1.2 What does the model include? 
This chapter not only identifies the different types of action failure (avoidance; 
inertia; implementation failure), but also describes the antecedent reasons for why 
action may fail (Figure 3.1). Decision making incorporates the consideration of a 
whole range of factors external to the decision task (e.g. personal circumstances), 
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and thus when exploring decision making outside of the tight control of the 
laboratory it is important to consider these elements (Huber, 1995). Results will now 
be discussed in full, by firstly defining each of the three types of action failure. 
 
Figure 3.1: A Taxonomy of Action Failure  
 
3.5 A model of action failure 
3.5.1 Decision avoidance 
Decision avoidance is ‘the tendency to avoid making a choice by postponing it 
or seeking an easy way out that involves no action or no change’ (Anderson, 2003: 
p.139). It is a decision in itself, as the individual opts to disengage with decision 
processing rather than evaluate their choice. For example, in the context of 
emergency response to a multi-car road traffic collision, the commander of an 
ambulance team may decide to avoid (or postpone) their choice on which casualty to 
prioritise as they believe there is no point thinking about it until they receive further 
information from their crews. The commander has decided to avoid their choice for 
the time being. According to Anderson’s (2003) original definition, decision 
avoidance is operationalised in three ways: by maintaining the ‘status quo’ (i.e. “I 
will go along with the majority”); by ‘choice deferral’ (i.e. “I will postpone my 
Types of inaction 
Decision avoidance Decision inertia Implementation Failure 
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choice for now and wait and see what happens”); or by ‘omission’ (i.e. “I will not 
think about this choice”). Decision avoidance is fundamentally driven by a 
motivation to avoid cognitive processing. It is the decision to avoid making a 
decision for the time being. 
Individuals are motivated to avoid approaching a stimulus (i.e. decision) if they 
associate it with negative (anticipated) affect (Elliot, 2006). Motivation is central to 
emotional regulation (Elliot, Eder & Harmon-Jones, 2013) and acts as the driving 
force that energises and translates cognitions into directed action. This means that 
when faced with challenging decisions associated with (potential) negative affect, 
cognitive and affective processes interact to motivate the individual to either 
approach or avoid the difficult choice. The mere presence of salient (positive or 
negative) emotions can reduce the likelihood of action as decision makers refuse to 
accept trade-off between equally attractive (or unattractive) or highly valued (or 
devalued) options (Dhar, 1997; Tanner, 2009); thereby avoiding cognitive 
deliberation. Once an individual is motivated to avoid a stimulus (or choice), then 
additional stressors in the environment such as time pressure can further degrade 
decision making (Roskes, Alliot, Nijstad & De Dreu, 2013); when decisions are hard 
to avoid, negative emotions increase and choice is perceived as more complex 
(Mamhidir, et al., 2007). Thus the interaction between negative affect and 
complexity can stimulate avoidant motivations. 
Avoidance motivation is caused by stressors in the decision environment that are 
linked to negative emotions. For example, regret has been associated with ‘inaction 
inertia’ in consumer choice contexts, whereby individuals are biased against taking 
action, due to negative emotional salience anchored to ‘missed opportunities’ 
(Sevdalis, Harvey & Yip, 2006). Avoidance arises due to the increased demands on 
the systematic processing of the decision maker, which can have especially large 
negative impacts when the decision task requires insight and creativity (Sligte, De 
Dreu & Nijstad, 2011). This is important for high-stakes decision making, as the 
context of such choices will be novel and require creative and dynamic thought. Not 
only can avoidance arise as a product of negative stimuli; but it can also occur as a 
stable trait-based characteristic (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013). This 
suggests that stressors act to both cause and exacerbate avoidance tendencies in 
decision making, and that certain individuals may be intrinsically avoidant. Thus, 
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decision avoidance occurs when individuals are motivated to avoid making a choice 
due to the experienced and/or anticipated negative affect that is associated with the 
choice. It fundamentally represents the desire to disengage and avoid a choice by 
deferring/postponing the choice or by completely omitting it from further cognitive 
deliberation.  
3.5.2 Decision inertia 
Decision inertia is the most psychologically interesting type of failure to act as it 
is associated with internal cognitive conflict. It is defined as the redundant cognitive 
deliberation of choice for no positive gain (for an example see Alison, Power, van 
den Heuvel, Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 2015). What makes inertia distinct from 
avoidance is that the decision maker continues to think about the choice, rather than 
choosing to ignore it. It differs from the adaptive process of sensemaking as, 
paradoxically, cognitive processing will not help the decision maker in reaching a 
choice as there is little or no more information available. The decision maker is 
cognitively inert as they are fixated on a trajectory of continual revaluation and 
assessment of the situation in order to try and trade-off salient competing options, 
goals and anticipated potential consequences. As is the case with decision avoidance, 
inertia is likely when the decision environment is characterised by complexity 
(Kopylov, 2009), competing options and preferences (Roswarsky & Murray, 2006) 
and salient negative affect (Dhar, 1997). Yet rather deciding to avoid choice, 
individuals continue to deliberate over their options. They continue to try and resolve 
their decision, even when no more useful information is available.  
Once again it is possible to turn to the literature on motivation to further develop 
this concept. As outlined, individuals are motivated to avoid stimuli when they are 
associated with negative affect and/or cognitions (Elliot, 2006). A unique feature of 
inertia is that individuals fail to act, not as they are motivated to disengage and avoid 
a choice, but because they are motivated to avoid loss (Corr & McNaughton, 2012). 
Inertia is not driven by adaptive approach motivations (i.e. energising behaviour 
towards positive stimuli), but instead reflects internal cognitive dissonance as 
individuals try to select the ‘least worst’ potentially negative outcome. Interestingly, 
‘least worst’ avoidance motivations have been associated with increased action as 
individuals tend to over-react and take precautionary action as they would rather be 
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‘better safe than sorry’; for example, Dekay, Patino-Echeverri and Fischbeck (2009) 
found individuals favoured action to close a hypothetical major airport due to 
weather risk rather than keep it open. Importantly however, these forced choice 
contexts are rare in the real-world, as decision makers are seldom bounded by ‘now 
or never’ forced choice contexts. Indeed the manager of a real airport may 
continually delay their choice as they seek and hope for further information to make 
their decision easier, and in doing so pass an unanticipated point of no return where 
action is no longer possible. Fundamentally, the likelihood of action results from the 
interaction between a desire to avoid potential anticipated negative consequences, 
the anticipated potential for further information and the practical characteristics of 
the choice context. 
Avoidance motivation has been further unpacked by Corr, DeYoung and 
McNaughton (2013) who identified two avoidance systems: one relating to active 
avoidance whereby the decision maker takes action to escape a negative stimulus; 
and the other relating to passive avoidance whereby the decision maker shows 
behavioural inhibition due to goal conflict. This chapter suggests that decision 
avoidance reflects active avoidance motivation as decision makers seek to escape the 
choice context by deciding to avoid (or postpone) their choice for the time being; 
compared to decision inertia that can be linked to passive avoidance and behavioural 
inhibition due to goal conflict and cognitive deliberation (Corr et al., 2013). This 
creates potential for further research at the neurobiological level as passive and 
active avoidance have been associated with activation in different regions of the 
brain (Gray, 1990). Passive avoidance is associated with the Behavioural Inhibition 
System (BIS) and associated anxiety whereas active avoidance is associated with 
panic and activation of the Fight, Flight System (FFS) (Corr et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, activation of the BIS has been linked to the behavioural economics 
concept of ‘loss aversion’ (i.e. the disproportionate desire to avoid losses) (Corr & 
McNaughton, 2012). Loss aversion is associated with poor decision making as the 
overwhelming desire to avoid loss distracts decision makers from more rational 
processing of choice (Kahneman, 2003), by focussing on anticipated negative 
emotions (e.g. regret) and difficulties in objectively trading off options and/or values 
(Tyocinski, Pittman & Tuttle, 1995). Arguably, decision inertia may reflect a 
maladaptive cognitive processing strategy that is rooted in passive avoidance 
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motivations, which are associated with loss aversion and activation of the BIS. This 
offers an exciting possibility for research to see how observational evidence of 
inertia in, for example, multi-agency command meetings, interacts with 
physiological measures associated with motivational drives and neurobiological 
activity in the brain. 
The difference between avoidance and inertia may further be explained by 
perceived distance (both physical and psychological) of negative stimuli or threats. It 
has been found that stimulation of the FFS and active avoidance tends to arise when 
individuals perceive threatening stimuli/consequences to be either physically or 
temporally imminent; whereas activation of the BIS and passive avoidance is more 
likely when threats are perceived to be more distant in space or time (Corr, 2013). 
This means that a key difference between inaction via decision avoidance compared 
to decision inertia may be linked to the perceived proximal or temporal distance of 
anticipated negative stimuli. Specifically, decision avoidance may be more likely 
when potential negative consequences are seen to be nearby or imminent, whereas 
decision inertia would be more likely when negative consequences are more distant.  
Interestingly, people from individualist (i.e. Western) cultures, who tend to 
focus on short-term goals are more likely to avoid choice, whereas those from 
collectivist cultures look further into the future and are more likely to take action 
(Carmona, Iyer & Reckers, 2011). This links with findings on emergency response 
decision making, as those who were not guided by wider strategic goals (i.e. long-
term thinking, bigger picture) were more likely to fail or coordinate action (Alison et 
al., 2015). It is worth noting the inconsistencies between behavioural and 
neurobiological data, as behaviourist studies suggest long-term goals facilitate action 
(Alison et al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2011); whereas neurobiological research 
suggests distant goals activate the BIS and thus induce cognitive goal conflict and 
deliberation (Corr, 2013). These differences may be moderated by the decision 
making context, for example; strategic decisions that require more deliberate and 
slow-time thinking may be facilitated by distant thinking; whereas more time 
pressured sub-tasks are distracted by distant focus. It is important to extrapolate 
these findings to help develop the conceptual validity of decision avoidance and 
inertia. It is suggested that that the limited previous decision making literature on 
failures to act has collapsed both inertia and avoidance into one general concept of 
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avoidance, whereas the motivational literature has made progress in distinguishing 
the different types of avoidance. This chapter combines these efforts to extend the 
understanding of general avoidance further.  
3.5.3 Implementation failure 
A final form of action failure is termed ‘implementation failure’. This type of 
‘non decision’ is distinct from avoidance and inertia as it reflects the behavioural 
manifestation of action failure, as opposed to the cognitive processing associated 
with action failure. It describes the situation where a decision maker has cognitively 
committed to action and made a choice, but fails to execute / implement it at a 
behavioural level. For example an individual may decide to quit their job, but never 
find the right moment to tell their boss; or a police commander may decide to host an 
on-scene multi-agency meeting, but the message doesn’t get passed on to relevant 
others. Dhar (1997) found that a lack of time pressure can cause ‘action inertia’ 
whereby decision makers fail to execute plans. In multi-agency emergency response 
command teams it was found that  lack of time pressure increased redundant 
information seeking and distracted from adaptive discussions on action (Alison, et 
al., 2015). As such, implementation failure is not so much a psychological cause of 
action failure, but describes a coordination breakdown between cognitive 
commitment to a choice and behavioural action at the individual or team level.  
The main area of research that has thus far explored implementation failures is 
research within the domain of organisational psychology. Poor team structure, a lack 
of organisational cohesion and ineffective team management all derail plan 
execution (Decker, Durand, Mayfield, McCormack, Skinner & Perdue, 2012; Taleai 
& Mansourian, 2008). Research exploring high-stakes police team decision making 
found that action can fail despite cognitive commitment to a choice by the collective 
team due to poor coordination and communication (van den Heuvel et al., 2012). 
Although less attention will be paid to this third form of action failure, as it is a 
product of poor behavioural management rather than psychological processing, it is 
important to acknowledge it as a type of action failure, especially as it has been 
found to occur in high-stakes and strategic decision making teams (Decker et al., 
2012; Taleai & Mansourian, 2008; van den Heuvel et al., 2012). 
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3.6 Why does action fail?  
This chapter has identified six antecedent factors that may contribute the 
likelihood of inaction. Namely, action fails when decision making is challenged by 
factors including: (i) situation uncertainty; (ii) social uncertainty; (iii) inexperience in 
the decision domain; (iv) negative affect; (v) indecisive personalities; and (vi) 
avoidant goals and motivations (Figure 3.1). To recap, decision making is the 
process of selecting an action that can facilitate the achievement of a goal in an 
uncertain environment (Hastie, 2001). The aim of decision making is to select the 
option that is most appropriate for solving the decision problem in line with 
associated goals. Most decision process models suggest a general pattern of 
identifying or generating potential options, deliberating on the appropriateness of 
these options and then deciding upon and implementing a choice (Fellows, 2004; van 
den Heuvel et al., 2012). Decision making fails when individuals struggle to follow 
this process. This chapter will now explore six main causes that seemed to contribute 
to decision derailments. Each antecedent may influence inaction directly, or interact 
with one another to contribute to action failure. 
3.6.1 Task Ambiguity 
Choices are made more difficult when the problem environment is characterised 
with a variety of synonyms that refer to ambiguity. This can occur when there is high 
similarity between options, when information about options is ambiguous and when 
an individual is unsure of their threshold of acceptable choice (Chen, Ma & Pethtel, 
2011; White & Hoffrage, 2009). Individuals will try to adapt their cognitive 
processing in order to reduce cognitive load and lessen the demands of mental 
accounting (White & Hoffrage, 2009). Typically, ambiguity increases when the 
decision environment is high risk (Bond & Nolan, 2011; Decker, et al., 2012; van 
Putten, Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 2007) and complex (Huber, 1995; Patrick, 
Lancellotti & Hagvedt, 2009); with a high number of poorly defined options 
(Brooks, 2011; Dhar, 1997; Roswarski & Murray, 2006; Tversky & Shafir, 1992); 
and potential negative and irreversible outcomes (Asch, Baron, Hershey et al., 1994; 
Patrick, Lancellotti & Demello, 2009; Tykocinski & Israel, 2006; Zeelenberg, van 
Dijk, Manstead & van der Pligt, 2000). For example, a commander’s situational 
awareness at a road traffic collision will be inhibited if there were unknown numbers 
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of casualties with unknown injuries, and if there was a lack of information over 
whether specialist equipment would arrive in time. A lack of information on the 
decision problem has been associated with implementation failure in organisational 
team settings (Taleai & Mansourian, 2008), and time pressure can degrade decision 
quality as decision makers perceive the decision challenge to be more difficult 
(Kozup & Creyer, 2006). 
Task ambiguity therefore derails choice because it limits the decision maker’s 
ability to make sense of the situation and prospectively model future states (Klein, 
Snowdon, & Pin, 2007; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; van den Heuvel, et al., 2012). An 
accurate understanding of the situation is vital to effective decision making, as the 
decision maker’s understanding of the choice environment informs the way that they 
will process their choice and their ability to anticipate consequences associated with 
different options and courses of action. The visualisation of future states is an 
important influence on behaviour. For example, parents were found to irrationally 
avoid vaccinating their child when they were unable to visualise positive future 
consequences but instead anticipated uncontrollable and irreversible risk (Bond & 
Nolan, 2011). In managerial decision making, it has been found that perceived 
uncertainty and risk caused implementation failure as managers would rather 
withdraw from choice commitment than take risky action (Brooks, 2011; Decker et 
al., 2012). Task ambiguity can increase the perception of risk and increase the 
anticipation of (faulty) negative outcomes. Indeed, task ambiguity is related to 
‘endogenous’ uncertainty, which is a product of unknowns associated with the 
decision problem, and has been found to derail decision making in high-consequence 
environments (e.g. Police hostage negotiation; Alison, at al., 2014). Endogenous 
(task) uncertainty stops action as decision makers lack confidence in their 
assessment of the situation and thus are unwilling to take (potentially) risky action. 
3.6.2 Social Ambiguity 
Alison et al (2014) found that uncertainty in high-stakes environments not only 
emerged from task ambiguity, but was also linked to the social and team 
environment. They termed this ‘exogenous’ uncertainty, and found (in their study on 
Police hostage negotiation training) that it was three times more prevalent than 
‘endogenous’ uncertainty, and qualitatively associated to poor role understanding 
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and trust (Alison et al., 2014). Social ambiguity thus contributes to overall 
uncertainty in high-stakes environments. Real-world choices are rarely taken without 
other relevant decision makers or advisors. Indeed, ‘organizations that rely heavily 
on decisions made by groups may have an in-built tendency to inertia and resist 
change’ (p.251, White, Hafenbradl, Hoffrafe, Reisen & Woike, 2011). For example, 
Police, Fire and Ambulance commanders must make decisions as a coordinated team 
to facilitate effective emergency response by relying on information from others, 
whose role in providing that information must be trusted and unambiguous. The 
mere presence of social others creates social ambiguity and uncertainty, as 
individuals will erroneously deliberate on their choice whilst monitoring the choices 
of others (van Harreveld, van der Pligt & Nordgren, 2008). Individuals experience 
more regret when comparing themselves to disliked social referents (Kumar, 2004), 
which may increase anticipated risk and failures to act. Furthermore, a study found 
that when teams were presented with a task, then 50% chose to defer their choice, 
compared to only a tenth of individual decision makers (White, et al., 2011). The 
concept of ‘implementation failure’ is a key barrier to organisational decision 
making, as even when a choice has been made, the execution of action can fail at a 
behavioural level due to poor team structure (Decker et al., 2012; Taleai & 
Mansourian, 2008). 
A culture of mistrust can derail action as individuals waste their time 
considering the integrity of social others, rather than focussing on the task at hand 
(Alison et al., 2015; Bond & Nolan, 2011; Mamhidir, et al., 2007). Poor trust reduces 
information sharing and the willingness to accept advice from others (Bond & 
Nolan, 2011; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Leifer & Mills, 1996). Inaction further arises 
when one expects to receive feedback on their decisions (Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 
1997) due to the salience of anticipated loss (Crotty & Thompson, 2009), the 
anticipation of blame (Eyre, et al., 2008; Zeelenberg, et al., 2000), and the perceived 
inability to personally justify choice (Beeler & Hunton, 1997; Brooks, 2011; Dhar, 
1997; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998). As such, when individuals mistrust their team 
members, who they rely upon for essential information to inform their choices, then 
they will feel more exposed and less willing to act (Mamhidir, et al., 2007). Social 
uncertainty relating to mistrust prevents action as individuals focus their attention 
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towards assessing the trustworthiness of advice/information, rather than the decision 
task.  
Confusion about one’s own and others’ social roles also degrades action and 
contributes to social uncertainty in team settings (Alison et al., 2014). Team 
decisions involve a variety of individuals who each have different roles, 
responsibilities and experience in the decision domain (Nohrstedt, 2000). However, 
when individuals misunderstand their own role and hold erroneous expectations 
about the responsibilities of others, then this can degrade trust and increase 
frustration (Rake & Nja, 2009). Decision making is impeded when there is a poor 
understanding of role distribution (House, Power and Alison, 2014; Alison et al., 
2014) or a lack of general organisational structure (Decker et al., 2012; Taleai & 
Mansourian, 2008). Poor interpositional knowledge, when one is unsure of how they 
fit into the social environment, reduces action as team members are reluctant to take 
responsibility for decisions that they do not perceive as their own (Budescu & 
Rantilla, 2000; Decker et al., 2012; Taleai & Mansourian, 2008). Role ambiguity 
makes decision makers both unwilling and unaware of their own and others’ 
responsibility and ability to implement a choice. Understanding other team 
members’ roles is important, as it has been found that when decision makers imagine 
themselves in another’s role then decision making improves (Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, 
Fagerlin & Ubel, 2006). Thus, social ambiguity appears to be related to the increased 
likelihood of inaction. 
3.6.3 Inexperience in the decision domain 
It has been well documented across a number of studies that domain-specific 
experience facilitates decision making (Klein, Calderwood & Clinton-Cirocco, 
1986). The more experience an individual has, the less likely they are to perceive 
risk or experience dread associated with choice (Bond & Nolan, 2011). Experience 
enables decision makers to efficiently process their choice even when the task is 
complex (Bornstein, Emler & Chapman, 1999; Braverman & Blumenthal-Barby, 
2012). This is because they have relevant task-specific knowledge which reduces 
cognitive bias, which is more important for decision effectiveness than general 
knowledge associated with intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2008). Experts use ‘gut 
instinct’ and intuitive knowledge (Klein, et al., 1986); relying upon accurate implicit 
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and explicit ‘recognition primed’ mental models, developed through repeated 
exposure in the choice environment, to help guide their choice (Klein, 2008; 
Roswarski & Murray, 2006). Rather than having to analytically process choice in a 
demanding decision environment, experienced decision makers can cope with 
increased task demands as they use intuitive and learned responses.  
Experts are also able to recognise when they do not know how to respond 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). This is important for the concept of inertia; rather than 
redundantly deliberate over a choice, an expert is able to recognise the need to adapt 
their decision strategy (e.g. adapt to attribute-based satisficing strategies when the 
situation is unfamiliar and/or time pressured). Inexperienced decision makers may be 
more at risk of decision inertia as they continue to use highly selective search 
strategies resulting in the redundant and inefficient deliberation of options. Indeed, 
Police officers, who were asked to investigate a fictitious case, were found to adapt 
their decision making when placed under time pressure by using more time efficient 
satisficing strategies when generating hypotheses (Alison, Doran, Long, Power & 
Humphrey, 2013). Thus experience within the decision domain can assist intuitive 
knowledge, reduce uncertainty and increase action implementation; thus arguably a 
lack of experience may contribute to increased action failure. 
3.6.4 Negative affect 
When faced with a difficult choice, individuals experience negative emotions 
(e.g. anxiety at having to make a choice) and also anticipate the potential for 
negative affect in the future (e.g. anticipated regret following a choice). The 
‘rational-emotional’ decision making model (Anderson, 2003) suggests that 
individuals consider both rational costs and benefits (e.g. objective monetary gain), 
and more subjective and emotional factors. In other words, individuals will rationally 
avoid choice if they anticipate potential negative affect. Indeed, emotions that are 
associated with the failure to take action (via avoidance, inertia or implementation 
failure) include: disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 2000); uncertainty (Bond & 
Nolan, 2011; Kopylov, 2009; Ritov & Baron, 1995; van den Heuvel, et al., 2012; 
van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; White & Hoffrage, 2009; Yen & Chuang, 2008); 
doubt (van den Ven, Gilovich & Zeelenberg, 2010); fear (Coleman, 2010; Eyre et al., 
2008); and regret (Arkes, Kung & Hutzel, 2002; Kumar, 2004; Tykocinski, & 
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Pittman, 1998). Individuals tend to overestimate the intensity of future emotions 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) and so the thought of loss is stronger than the experience 
of loss. This suggests that the anticipation of negative feelings is more likely to 
induce avoidant processing than the experience of negative emotions. 
Fundamentally, when people experience or anticipate negative emotions, then they 
will adapt their cognitive processing to try and reduce or avoid negative emotions. 
The experience of negative affect may thus distract decision makers from the 
cognitive processing of choice, increasing the likelihood of action failure.  
3.6.5 Personality 
Personality research has identified how certain individuals may possess certain 
traits that can influence the way that they make decisions (Brooks, 2011). For 
example, when asked to choose between options in a given decision task, trait 
‘indecisive’ individuals tend to use maladaptive cognitive processing styles that 
systematically compare all alternatives whilst utilising extremely high thresholds of 
acceptance (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). They fail to take action as they use 
alternative-based search patterns to try and find the perfect option (i.e. are any of 
these options good enough?). Alternatively ‘decisive’ individuals tend to favour 
more adaptive attribute-based search patterns in order to select a compromise option 
from those that are available (i.e. which option is the best?). Trait indecisiveness not 
only influences individual choice, but has been associated with implementation 
failure in organisational team settings (Brooks, 2011). Likewise, high scores on 
personality measures such as ‘state-orientation’ (i.e. focus on negative emotions; 
ruminate on past) as opposed to ‘action-orientation’ (i.e. focus on present task) are 
associated with increased inertia and redundant deliberation (van Putten, Zeelenberg 
& van Dijk, 2009), and those high on ‘need to compare’ (i.e. need to engage in social 
comparisons with others) often fail to make decisions as they experience increased 
regret due to constant social comparison (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2005).  
Other traits associated with failures to act include: ‘desire for control’ (i.e. need 
to maintain control over decision outcomes: Thomas, Buboltz, Teague & Seeman, 
2011); ‘outcome sensitivity’ (i.e. motivated to avoid post-decisional feedback: 
Dholakia, Gopinath & Bagozzi, 2005); ‘neuroticism’ (Wong, Yik & Kwong, 2006); 
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and trait ‘avoidance’ (versus approach) motivations (Corr, et al., 2013; Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011). Generally, the types of personalities that are affiliated to inaction 
reflect poor cognitive flexibility, as they are unable to adapt to the time demands of 
the problem environment (Roskes et al., 2013). Fundamentally, personality traits that 
are associated with inaction tend to be linked to salient negative affect and anxiety, 
which increases cognitive load and reduces the ability for the decision maker to 
focus on task-relevant goals.  
3.6.6 Avoidant goals and motivation 
A final factor that may increase the likelihood of action failure is associated to 
the type of goal that the decision maker is using to guide their choice. Goals 
influences the way that an individual will cognitively process their choice 
environment, and so will influence the likelihood of whether they will take action or 
not. It is suggested that when decision makers seek to avoid potential negative 
outcomes, then they are less likely to take action. One type of goal that may derail 
choice implementation is the goal to ‘maximise’ one’s outcomes. When individuals 
seek to ‘maximise’ outcomes, they tend to use ‘alternative-based’ cognitive 
processing to judge if any options are good enough (Parker & Schrift, 2011). 
Although maximising strategies may be appropriate for when decisions are non-time 
bounded and/or have the potential to be deferred; the effectiveness of maximising 
goals reduces when decisions are needed quickly. Selective goals will increase a 
decision maker’s tendency to focus on subjectively meaningful attributes and raises 
their overall threshold of acceptance (Parker & Schrift, 2011); thus maximising goals 
may increase the likelihood of choice deferral and inaction.  
When individuals seek to maximise outcomes then they are more likely to avoid 
or postpone their choice as they await better options. Individuals who score highly 
on measures of trait ‘indecisiveness’ chronically seek to maximise their outcomes 
and favour alternative-based processing styles (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007; van 
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005). Indeed, when individuals deliberate on a choice, they are 
less satisfied if they do make a choice and tend to doubt their options more, which 
could exacerbate decision delays (Ritov, 2006; van den Ven, et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, when individuals use minimum thresholds or satisficing strategies (i.e. 
select first option which meets threshold) then they are more likely to take action as 
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they select the first available option to meet their minimal requirements (Dhar, 1997; 
White & Hoffrage, 2009). They tend to adopt an ‘attribute-based’ processing styles 
(Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007), which involves consideration of which option is the 
best and is appropriate for when decisions need to be made quickly and cannot be 
deferred. Thus the use of alternative-based search strategies may be characteristic of 
decision inertia as the decision maker tries to maximise their choice; yet this 
paradoxically inhibits action as no further useful information is available. Instead of 
ignoring the decision, they ignore the fact that no more information is available to 
help them make that choice.  
In addition to the negative effect of ‘maximising’ goals, it is also suggested that 
‘avoidance’ goals will impede action (Elliot, 2006). Generally, when individuals are 
motivated to avoid loss, then they are less likely to take action due to the fear of 
potential negative consequences (Corr & McNaughton, 2012). Individuals seek to 
avoid negative outcomes and so will avoid choices that can cause negative affect. 
Alternatively, approach goals (i.e. when one seeks to achieve positive outcomes) 
have been associated to increased action (Elliot, 2006). However, it is possible that 
approach goals (i.e. when one is oriented towards achieving positive outcomes) may 
negatively interact with decision making if individuals are faced with mutual 
attractive options. When individuals have to trade-off mutually attractive and 
competing goals, they will try and avoid making a choice (Karlsson, Juliusson, 
Grankvist & Garling, 2002). Rather than avoid choice because of anticipated 
negative outcomes, choice is avoided as the decision maker is unable to differentiate 
between options and justify their choice (Dhar, 1997; Novemsky, et al., 2007). This 
could be linked to ‘maximising’ goals, which also derail behaviour due to the 
inability to effectively compare options (Parker & Schrift, 2011). Fundamentally, it 
appears that different types of goals influence the use of different cognitive 
processing styles; both avoidant and maximising goals seem to limit the ability to 
make a decision.  
3.7 Discussion 
This chapter has presented a taxonomic classification of failures to act (Figure 
3.1). It defines three types of action failures (decision avoidance; decision inertia; 
implementation failure) and proposes a number of (theoretical) antecedents that may 
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contribute to the likelihood of action failure. Decision avoidance is the intention to 
defer and avoid thinking about a choice for the time being. Decision inertia is the 
continual, yet fundamentally redundant, cognitive deliberation on a choice for no 
cognitive gain. Implementation failure is failure to translate cognitive commitment to 
choice into behavioural action. All three produce the same categorical outcome: a 
failure to act / non-decision. However, the subjective experience and motivation of 
the decision maker are psychologically distinct. Importantly, this chapter avoided 
outlining any hypothetical causal relationships between antecedents and inaction 
types as significantly more research is required in order to build further insight on 
this concept. The predominant focus of decision making research to date has focused 
on researching the frequency, quality and rationale governing actions. The research 
on failures to act is still in its infancy. This chapter is an important step in enhancing 
the concept validity of the research that will be outlined in this thesis. 
3.7.1 Implications: Measuring the absence of behaviour 
The central aim of this chapter was to convey the importance of researching 
failures to act as ‘more is missed by not doing than not knowing’ (p.28, Byrnes, 
2011). Despite a multitude of real-world, high-stakes emergencies evidencing how 
inertia, delays and failures to act severely limited the responses to major disasters, 
such as the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 (National Audit Office, 2005) and the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010 (Patrick, 2011), the psychological interest in this phenomenon is 
limited. It is important to address this gap, by exploring the methodological 
implications for researching the absence of behaviour (specifically, the concept of 
‘non decisions’). The reader is referred to Chapter 2 for a full discussion on the 
different methodologies used to research action failure in this thesis, but this chapter 
will provide a brief overview.  
One fruitful method that has been used to explore novel decision making 
concepts in the past is the qualitative assessment of decision making. Indeed, 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) and semi-structured interview protocols such as the 
Critical Decision Method (CDM), which aim to identify the knowledge 
requirements, expertise and goal structures involved in a decision maker’s work 
(Wong, 2003), can help to unpack the psychological experience of the decision 
maker (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman, Crandall & Klein, 2008). 
Passive Choice Deferral 
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Although CTAs have predominantly been used to explore the cognitive processing 
associated with performing domain-specific tasks, this chapter argues that they can 
also be used to explore the reasons why individuals may not take action. The use of 
‘what if’ probes, which encourage the interviewee to consider hypothetical choice, 
are already employed in CTA interview (Crandall et al., 2008). They could be used 
to help understand why individuals may or may not have acted when faced with a 
tough decision by considering alternatives (e.g. ‘what do you think would have 
happed if you had taken action?’). Furthermore, as CTA interviews are oriented 
towards interviewing experts in a given field, and as experts are self-aware with 
regards to when they do not know what to do (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), then 
interviewing a large cohort of experts about ‘challenging’ decisions could help 
generate an understanding of the common antecedents that induced action failures. 
CDM interviews were thus used to help unpack the specific concept of decision 
inertia in this thesis, with results discussed fully in Chapters 4 and 5.  
From an empirical perspective, it may also be possible to measure the absence of 
behaviour through controlled experiments. It would be possible to manipulate the 
decision environment to see if inaction could be caused by, for example, increasing 
social ambiguity. The time taken to make decisions may provide a useful dependent 
variable to measure decision inertia, by comparing how fast an individual or team 
responded to a decision problem. It may also be useful to design experiments to 
more fully extrapolate the differences between causes of decision inertia, decision 
avoidance and implementation failures. It is possible that, as previous research has 
treated ‘decision avoidance’ as a unitary concept, then some studies that report 
findings on ‘decision avoidance’ are actually measuring decision avoidance. The 
distinction in this taxonomy could be used to replicate and reassess past findings to 
strengthen the construct validity of research on failures to act. This thesis aimed to 
explore failures to act more closely by investigating the challenges to decision 
making in multi-agency, emergency command team settings. Chapters 6 and 7 
outline more empirical data collection on action failures during an immersive 
simulated exercise. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
The psychological process associated with not making a decision is as 
conceptually important as the psychological processes associated with making a 
decision. Yet the research exploring failures to act is sparse. This chapter used the 
CIS method to analyse the available literature on this concept and identified three 
conceptually distinct types of failures to act: decision avoidance; decision inertia; 
and implementation failure. Distinguishing between different types of failures to act 
is not only important for the construct validity of the psychology of absent 
behaviour, but has practical implications in offering recommendations for how one 
may improve the likelihood of action. There are both conceptual and methodological 
challenges for researching the absence of behaviour; yet the benefits for tackling 
these challenges to facilitate psychological discovery far outweigh them. Over the 
years, psychologists have developed expertise in helping us to understand the linkage 
between the environment, behaviour and human cognition by experimenting on and 
observing the relationship between stimulus and response. But there has been far less 
attention paid to understanding and explaining the relationship between stimulus and 
non-response. This chapter has taken the first steps in identifying and highlighting 
this gap and offered brief methodological advice on how one may investigate 
inaction. Fundamentally, it has aimed to engender psychological enquiry so that we 
can more fully understand not only why people make decisions, but importantly 
why, at times, actions can fail. 
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Chapter 4: ‘Save life’ versus ‘Prevent further harm’: How decision inertia 
results from conflict between approach-avoidance goals and anticipated 
negative consequences 
4.1 Abstract 
An initial step in data collection for this thesis was to explore the challenges to 
‘blue light’ (i.e. Police Service, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service) 
command level decision making. This was to develop an understanding of the factors 
that may contribute to decision inertia. The Critical Decision Method (CDM) 
interview technique was used to identify the knowledge requirements, expertise and 
goal structures involved in emergency response commanding by asking commanders 
to recall a ‘challenging’ incident they had responded to in the past (Wong, 2003; see 
Chapter 2). Specifically, this chapter explored how different types of goals interacted 
with the ability to make decisions. It emerged, through Grounded Theory (GT) 
coding, that commanders struggled to make decisions when they had to trade-off 
competing goals. This tended to be due to conflict between approach goals to ‘save 
life’, which motivated commanders to take action in order to achieve positive 
outcomes, against avoidant goals to ‘prevent further harm’, which motivated 
commanders to avoid potential short- and long-term negative consequences. 
Interestingly, anticipated negative consequences were linked to anxiety for both 
causing harm by commission (action) and causing harm by omission (inaction). This 
led to goal conflict between the anticipated negative consequences for action and 
inaction; inducing decision inertia. Goal conflict arose at both the individual 
(psychological) level and the team (social) level. It is recommended that training to 
extrapolate the distinction between approach and avoidance goals may reduce these 
negative effects. 
4.2 Introduction 
Decision making in the emergency services is heavily influenced by goals. For 
example, the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme’ (JESIP) Joint 
Doctrine outlines the primary goals of the emergency services to collectively ‘save 
life’ and ‘reduce harm’ (JESIP Joint Doctrine, 2013). According to ‘goal-setting 
theory’ (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002), the setting of specific, hard goals leads to 
increased task performance than more abstract goals such as to ‘do one’s best’. Goals 
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help to motivate behaviour by creating an emotional desire to successfully achieve 
one’s goal (Locke & Latham, 2006). Goals are linked to motivation, as when 
individuals expect to receive feedback on their goal-relevant performance they will 
try harder to achieve their goals (Rainey, 2003). Yet, despite the advantages of goal-
setting in organisational contexts, its usefulness in the domain of extreme decision 
making has been less explored. Research has suggested that when police officers 
expect to receive feedback on their decisions in high-risk settings, this can derail 
performance as they focus on self-preservation (Waring, Alison, Cunningham & 
Whitfield, 2012). Furthermore, when operating in multi-team environments, 
egocentric individual goal-setting can degrade interdependent performance 
(Kleingeld, Mierlo & Arends, 2011). This suggests that the impact of goal-setting in 
extreme environments, characterised by extreme psychological and interpersonal 
pressures (Orasanu & Liberman, 2011), requires further investigation. 
This chapter will explore how goal-setting interacts with the decision making in 
extreme emergency response environments. Specifically, it will identify whether 
different types of goals may increase or decrease the likelihood of decision inertia 
and redundant deliberation. Rather than focus on specific goals of the emergency 
services (such as ‘save life’ or ‘rescue casualty’), it will attempt to code goals at the 
psychological level so that findings have application to other extreme environments. 
Furthermore, as this chapter is interested in understanding how different goals may 
increase or decrease the likelihood of behaviour, the literature reviewed in this 
introduction will focus on the difference between ‘approach’ goals (to take action) 
and ‘avoidance’ goals (to avoid action). Thus, the aims of this chapter are as follows: 
(i) Outline the importance of goal-setting in emergency environments  
(ii) Introduce the concept of approach and avoidance goals and distinguish 
between two models: 
a. Behavioural model – which identifies the conditions under which one 
may physically (or psychologically) approach or avoid a stimulus 
b. Functional model – which identifies the conditions under which one 
may strategically approach or avoid a stimulus 
(iii) Focus the literature on avoidant goals due to their hypothesised 
relationship with decision inertia 
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(iv) Present qualitative findings on the perceived interaction between goals 
and decision making in emergency response contexts 
(v) Discuss results with reference to the literature and provide 
recommendations  
4.2.1 Goal-setting in emergency environments 
Goals are important for guiding decision making in extreme environments. They 
help to orient behaviour around a desired outcome and to motivate the responder to 
put effort into achieving that outcome (Locke & Latham, 2006). The motivation to 
achieve a certain goals is crucial, and is thought to represent the link between 
emotions and goals (Elliot, 2006). Specifically, motivation serves to: (i) energise or 
direct behaviour; (ii) causes psychological or physiological movement or change; 
(iii) creates movement towards or away from a positive or negative stimulus; (iv) 
links positive and negative emotions; and (v) involves concrete and psychological 
stimuli (Elliot, 2006). For example, a commander responding to a large scale road 
traffic collision (concrete stimulus) may be energised to make a decision 
(psychological movement) in order to reach a positive goal (free casualty), which 
induces positive emotions (relief). Goals can be concrete (e.g. free casualty) or 
abstract (e.g. successful response) and related to the present (e.g. incident related 
consequences) or anticipated to arise in the future (e.g. post-incident consequences) 
(Eder & Hommel, 2013). Motivation translates goals into action by inspiring the 
individual to invest their efforts towards goal achievement. It is important that goal-
setting in emergency response settings serves to motivate individuals to achieve a 
successful resolution and inspires them to take action. As this chapter sought to 
understand why actions sometimes fail (and thus ‘save life’ goals are not met), it was 
important to qualitatively identify the different types of goals that commanders may 
be using, which may negatively interact with action. 
4.2.2 Distinguishing between approach and avoidance goals 
The data presented in this chapter was generated from qualitative interviews 
with commanders from the emergency services. Specifically, it was interested in 
exploring how different goals may facilitate or inhibit action, it is important to 
explore the psychological literature on ‘approach and avoidance’ goals. Approach 
and avoidance goals influence the tendencies of an individual to either strive to take 
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positive action and move towards a positive stimulus (approach) or try to avoid 
negative effects by moving away from a negative stimulus (avoidance) (Bossuyt, 
Moors & De Houwer, 2014; Elliot, 2006; Elliot, Eder & Harmon-Jones, 2013; Gray 
& McNaughton, 2000). Generally, when an individual experiences positive emotions 
they are motivated to approach action; whereas negative emotions are linked to 
avoidance (Elliot, 2006). From the perspective of goal-setting theory, this suggests 
that performance goals may be categorised into two types: those focussed on 
approach to take positive action (e.g. ‘save life’) and those focussed on avoidance to 
avoid further harm (e.g. ‘reduce harm’). It is important to explore how these two 
different types of goals interact with behaviour in emergency response settings. 
Prior to discussing approach-avoidance goals in more detail, it is important to 
outline an important, yet somewhat confusing, issue in the literature on motivation. 
Some researchers describe avoidant behaviour with reference to functional goals 
(Bossuyt et al., 2014; Corr et al., 2013), whereas others define avoidance as the 
physical (or psychological) movement away from an aversive stimulus (Berkowitz & 
Harmon-Jones, 2004; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013). In other words, 
shouting at someone to make them go away may be considered as avoidant 
behaviour by those using functional models; however those who take a more 
behavioural perspective may perceive shouting as approach behaviour as it involves 
movement towards the stimulus. To explain these different perspectives, it is 
possible that these variances are due to the different types of decision making they 
discuss, with the functional approach addressing whole problem solving, which may 
involve multiple choices and so is guided by more strategic thinking (e.g. how to 
respond to an emergency incident), and the behavioural approach addressing 
reactions to specific stimuli / decision events (e.g. whether to enter a burning 
building or not). As this chapter sought to extend the understanding on the 
challenges associated with commanding the response to dynamic emergency 
incidents, its theoretical scope aligns with the functional perspective.  
4.2.2.1 Behavioural perspective on approach and avoidance 
The behavioural perspective on approach and avoidance explores the conditions 
under which an individual may physically, or psychologically, approach or avoid a 
given stimulus. It is suggested that the experience of positive emotions activates 
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approach behaviour; whereas negative emotions activate avoidant behaviour (Carver 
& White, 1994). People are motivated to engage with positive stimuli and avoid 
negative stimuli. Unlike the functional perspective, which distinguishes between the 
setting of approach or avoidance goals (e.g. to ‘save life’ or to ‘avoid harm’), the 
behavioural perspective distinguishes between approach or avoidance behaviour. 
Indeed, neurobiological research has helped to identify different areas of the brain 
that may be activated when one is motivated to use approach or avoidance behaviour 
(Gray, 1990). It is suggested that motivation is housed in the septo-hippocampul 
region of the brain (Gray, 1990). Namely, the Behavioural Approach System (BAS) 
motivates the individual to move towards the stimulus and the Behavioural 
Inhibition System (BIS) motivates the individual to move away from the stimulus 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2002). It has been found that the tendency to show approach 
or avoidance behaviours may be linked to individual differences in chronic 
activation of these areas (Carver & White, 2004). Furthermore, at the subconscious 
level, certain stimuli in the environment may activate these brain areas leading to 
associated behaviours (Gray & McNaughton, 2002). As this chapter is interested in 
the relationship between approach and avoidance goals as opposed to neurobiology, 
there will be no further discussion of this concept. However it is useful to highlight 
this distinction between approach-avoidance behaviour and approach-avoidance 
goals. 
4.2.2.2 Functional perspective on approach and avoidance goals 
The approach / avoidance distinction has also been applied to goal setting. 
Research on student performance has found that setting goals to succeed in an exam 
(approach goal) can have a greater positive impact on performance than the goals to 
avoid failure (avoidance goal) (Darnon, Butera, Mugny & Hulleman, 2009). 
Approach goals facilitate performance; whereas avoidance goals disrupt it. This 
thesis sought to explore the challenges to decision making that may be associated 
with failures to act; specifically with reference to redundant deliberation and 
decision inertia. Thus, it was important to see whether holding avoidant goals (e.g. 
‘stop further harm’) may impede performance. Would setting (or holding) avoidant 
goals impede decision making? And how does this link to behaviour? 
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As mentioned previously, there is semantic confusion in the literature on 
approach and avoidance due to a poor distinction between functional goals (i.e. to 
remove/escape/get rid of the stimulus) and behaviour (i.e. to create psychological or 
physical distance). Although an individual may hold functional approach goals to, 
for example, ‘save life’, this does not necessarily mean that active behaviour is 
required to achieve this goal. Likewise, functionally avoidant goals do not 
necessarily lead to avoidant behaviour; sometimes approach behaviours can achieve 
avoidance end-goals (Bossuyt et al., 2014). For example, when someone is faced 
with a threatening situation that they seek to avoid, this may be achieved by 
displaying aggressive active behaviour such as shouting at someone to get rid of 
them (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Carver, 2004). The characteristics of the 
problem environment influence which type of behaviour is most appropriate.  
Similarly, it has been found that when individuals experience a (negative) temporary 
loss of control in a situation, then this can increase approach behaviours as 
individuals seek to (functionally) avoid negative outcomes by regaining control and 
taking positive action (Greenaway, Storrs, Philipp, Louis, Hornsey & Vohs, 2015; 
Sedek, Kofta & Tyszka, 1993). This suggests that individuals took active behaviour 
(i.e. to regain control) in order to achieve avoidant goals (i.e. to avoid losing 
control). In the context of emergency responding, this may imply that initial chaos in 
an incident would galvanise commanders to take action in order to avoid negative 
consequences via action. However, it was also found that when situations were 
overly complex and characterised by prolonged loss of control, then individuals shift 
to avoidant behaviours due to learned helplessness and a fear of further loss (Sedek 
et al., 1993). Thus, prolonged loss of control could derail choice as commanders feel 
helpless and so try to avoid further negative consequences via inaction. It is 
important to investigate this relationship more closely, to see how goals interact with 
behaviour in complex emergency incidents.  
4.2.3 Avoidant processing in extreme environments 
As this thesis aimed to explore the concept of decision inertia; it was predicted 
that avoidant goals may contribute to the failures to act. This is because, rather than 
focus on taking positive action to resolve the emergency incident, it was 
hypothesised that avoidant goals would distract emergency responders by overly 
focussing on anticipated negative outcomes. In extending the research on approach 
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and avoidance goals, Corr, DeYoung and McNaughton (2013) distinguish between 
two types of avoidance: active avoidance and passive avoidance. In line with 
previous models, they acknowledged that functionally avoidant goals can lead to 
both approach and avoidant behaviour, and defined this concept as ‘active 
avoidance’. In addition, they described how ‘passive avoidance’ can arise during 
decision making due to behavioural inhibition as a result of goal conflict (Corr et al., 
2013). When people ‘actively’ avoid choice, they seek a way to avoid the stimulus 
either by moving towards or away from it. Passive avoidance on the other hand 
describes avoidance, without intent, due to behavioural inhibition as a result of goal 
conflict. It is suggested that ‘passive avoidance’ offers a fruitful explanation of 
decision inertia, as individuals passively avoid taking action due to internal goal 
conflict. Likewise, active avoidance of choice can explain pure decision avoidance, 
as individuals seek to escape the decision context. It is anticipated that, as emergency 
settings are characterised by competing and complex goals (Orasanu & Connolly, 
1993), then passive avoidance (i.e. decision inertia) would be highly prevalent.  
It has been suggested that the inability to trade-off competing goals may be as a 
result of loss aversion: a cognitive bias that describes the innate desire to avoid 
losses due to the negative (and disproportionate) emotional impact of losing 
(Kahneman, 2003). Passive avoidance may arise as a result of loss aversion, as 
individuals seek to avoid taking action that induces loss (Corr et al., 2013). 
Commanders might ‘passively avoid’ action because they struggle to trade off 
conflicting goals, priorities and options. This could further be exacerbated by the 
multi-agency context, which is often characterised by conflicting inter-team goals 
(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Millward, Banks & 
Riga, 2010). Similarly, passive avoidance may be a result of ‘omission bias’, 
whereby individuals irrationally perceive the potential for greater harm as a result of 
taking action (commission) than not taking action (omission) (Inman & Zeelenberg, 
2002). Commanders passively avoid choice as they try to trade off anticipated 
negative consequences associated with both action and inaction. Indeed, omission 
bias is especially salient when making morally challenging decisions (such as the life 
or death situations in an emergency context) as individuals tend to favour 
deontological protected values that require no action (‘I will do no harm to anyone’) 
to, more rational, consequentialist values that require action (‘I will harm one to save 
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many’) for fear of blame (Bartels & Medin, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1995). Thus, a 
challenge to emergency responding may be the trade-off between mutually 
competing anticipated negative consequences as a product of both taking action (e.g. 
make situation worse) and not taking action (e.g. allow further harm to happen). It is 
expected that passive avoidance as a result of various cognitive conflicts will be a 
key cause of decision inertia and an important concept to explore. 
4.2.4 Summary and chapter aims 
This chapter was interested in the interaction between different types of goals 
and their impact on the ability for emergency response commanders to make 
decisions in complex environments. It identified the importance of goal-setting to 
help guide decision making, but identified how goal-setting in extreme environments 
is less well understood due to the complexities of the environment. It introduced the 
approach-avoidance distinction on goals and identified the difference between 
functional goals and associated behaviour. It then focussed discussions on avoidance 
motivation and identified the concept of ‘passive avoidance’; which creates 
behavioural inhibition as a result of goal conflict. This chapter took an exploratory 
approach in order to inductively identify the different types of goals used by 
emergency responders during decision making, and to identify how they may 
facilitate or inhibit behaviour. It is anticipated that ‘passive avoidance’ is associated 
with decision inertia; as commanders struggle to take action due to goal-conflict 
between competing avoidant goals. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
Data was collected from n=31 command level decision makers from the three 
blue lights services: the Police Service (PS), the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS), and 
the Ambulance Service (AS), who were interviewed using the Critical Decision 
Method (CDM). As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, CDM is a form of Cognitive 
Task Analysis (CTA), which is useful for identifying the goal structures, knowledge 
requirements and the expertise that is required in order to successfully respond to a 
challenging incident in the decision maker’s work (Wong, 2003), and has been well 
utilised in NDM research that is interested in generating real-world findings 
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(Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006; Klein & Militello, 2004).Participants were 
identified as ‘command level’ as they were all qualified to fulfil a command role for 
their respective agencies in a real-life incident, meaning that they were ultimately 
responsible for decisions affiliated to both their own (intra) agency and when making 
joint decisions by coordinating with other (inter) agencies. For example, whether to 
request additional resources from other regions (intra-agency decision) or whether to 
commit emergency responders into a collapsed building (inter-agency). As command 
structures within each agency differ (e.g. different ranks and roles), participants were 
selected if they could fulfil the role of ‘tactical’ commander. This was because they 
were anticipated to have enough experience to recall a challenging incident in detail 
and so met the requirements of the CDM interview. Participants were recruited via 
opportunity sampling via email, which was sent to potential participants by work 
email. Emails included an information sheet explaining the details of the interview 
(Appendix Three) and participants were instructed to contact the researcher via email 
or telephone if they wished to take part. 
4.3.2 Procedure 
The majority of interviews (n=29) were conducted at the interviewee’s place of 
work with the remaining two taking place at the University of Liverpool. All 
interviews were conducted in a quiet location, with three people present: the 
interviewee and two researchers. The role of the primary researcher (the author to 
this thesis) was to lead the interview and ask the interviewee questions in line with 
the semi-structured interview protocol (Appendix One). The interview protocol, 
described in detail in Chapter 2, followed four CDM ‘sweeps’: (i) incident 
identification; (ii) timeline verification; (iii) deepening probes; and (iv) ‘what if?’ 
probes. Participants were asked to identify a ‘difficult decision’ that they had made in 
the past; and provided with a series of prompts to help identify an incident that both 
they and the interviewers felt was relevant to the purpose of the study. The incident 
had to be ‘especially challenging’ with ‘high consequences’ that would be ‘very 
difficult to reverse’. Although not all of the incidents were major incidents, they 
were all perceived to be highly challenging by the interviewee and associated with 
many of the eight characteristic features that Orasanu and Connelly (1993) identified 
as being characteristic of challenging decision making in the real-world. For 
example, a multi-car road traffic collision may not be classed as an official ‘major 
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incident’ but it does reflect an ill-structured problem; in an uncertain dynamic 
environment; with competing goals; feedback loops; time stress; high stakes; 
multiple players; and with inherent organisational goals and norms and associated 
demands. 
During the course of the interview, the secondary interviewer made copious 
notes on an observer form (Appendix One), which listed all the questions being 
asked by the primary researcher with space for notes. They also provided useful 
verbal prompts if the primary interview missed any key questions and were 
encouraged to ask additional questions at the end of the interview based on the notes 
they had recorded. Specifically, the secondary interviewer highlighted any additional 
information that emerged during the ‘timeline verification’ sweep of the interview, 
and took preliminary steps in analysis by noting for recurring themes or patterns. 
Following each interview, the primary and secondary interviewers reflected on the 
interview in detail, which helped to facilitate subsequent coding for this chapter.  
A potential weakness of the interview method is that the skills of the interviewer 
can develop over time and this may create variability in the responses provided by 
participants (Crandall, et al., 2006). Early interviews may be less effective due to a 
poor understanding of organisational-specific terminology or the interviewer’s 
interest may change in response to themes that emerge from the data. Furthermore, 
the interviewer must develop skills in ‘double attention’ early on in the process, 
being able to listen to and probe upon the answers provided by subjects whilst 
attending to other topics they wish to cover within the given time limitations 
(Wengraf, 2001). However, an important part in the methodological procedure for 
this thesis involved the development of measures to mitigate these effects; for 
example the primary researcher had previously worked with each agency on various 
collaborations prior to these interviews and thus had an established working 
knowledge of associated terminology (Hoffman, 1987). Furthermore, a flexible 
interview protocol can strengthen qualitative research, as theories can be developed 
and tested ‘in vivo’ during data collection (Lo, 2014), whilst maintaining scientific 
validity through the structure of an interview protocol to ensure deviations are not 
too wide (Crandall et al., 2006). The process of ‘self-monitoring’ during the data 
collection phase by reflecting on interviews can further the interviewer’s 
understanding of the true meaning of their research questions (Mueser & Nagel, 
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2009) and secondary interviewers can help verify and moderate deviations during 
this process.  
4.3.3 Materials 
The interview protocol consisted of an 8 page document that was used to both 
guide the interview and to make handwritten notes (Appendix One). Participants 
signed a consent form at the start of the interview to acknowledge their consent 
(Appendix Four). They also provided basic descriptive details on the front page of 
the interview protocol on sex, age, length in service and a brief description of main 
duties and responsibilities. Interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone and later 
anonymously transcribed by the primary researcher on Microsoft word with all 
specific details (e.g. names, locations) removed from the files prior to analysis. 
4.3.4 Data Analysis 
Transcripts were analysed using a ‘Grounded Theory’ (GT) approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1965). Chapter 2 describes this process in detail as a useful method for 
generating theory through the ‘bottom up’ inductive coding of qualitative data 
(Amsteus, 2014). GT was chosen over other qualitative analyses techniques, such as 
‘interpretative phenomenological analysis’, which seeks an understanding of how 
specific individuals, in specific contexts make sense of specific phenomena (Cohen, 
Mannion & Morrison, 2007). The focus of these interviews was to look at more 
general processing that moved beyond the process of sensemaking (Smith & 
Osborn, 2004). The CTA methodology encourages researchers to maintain a curious 
and open-minded attitude during data analysis to facilitate the discovery of meaning 
by linking cues and patterns within the data set (Crandall et al., 2006). Thus, GT 
aligned with the overall aim of data analysis: to generate a general theory of decision 
inertia by exploring the challenges to decision making for emergency responders.  
Preliminary analyses were conducted immediately following each interview, 
where the primary and secondary interviewers discussed and reviewed the notes that 
were taken during the interview. This was to develop an iterative understanding of 
the main ‘challenges’ that were identified by participants during the data collection 
process. Analyses continued during the transcription of the audio recorded 
interviews, as the primary interviewer kept annotated notes on key themes that arose 
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during this second round with the data. Once interviews were transcribed, then the 
researcher used a more structured GT process (see Chapter 2) that was performed 
using the computer program NVivo10: a computer program that facilitates the 
organisation of qualitative data. Each transcript was read in full and utterances of 
interest were line-by-line coded into ‘nodes’, which were then refined to reduce 
duplicates or semantically similar nodes. Each ‘node’ in NVivo represents a 
repository of semantically similar text that the researcher has highlighted to be 
electronically stored in a folder. A key advantage to using NVivo, in comparison to 
more traditional coding via hand, is that it allows the researcher to easily create, 
update and merge themes, facilitating greater interaction with the data (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013).The second sweep of coding focussed on the emergence of new codes 
along with highlighting any additional utterances from the text that may have been 
missed during the initial sweep. This process of refinement and further coding 
continued until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached; a point during GT analysis 
where no more conceptual insight can be reached from the data (Bloor & Wood, 
2006). The final step involved the organisation of remaining nodes under theoretical 
headings that were used to guide visual models of the data. For the purposes of this 
chapter, this refers to the interactive model displayed in Figure 4.1, which describes 
the interaction between approach goals, avoidance goals, behaviour and inaction. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Participants 
A total of n=31 command level, UK emergency response participants were 
interviewed. They were asked to recall a “difficult decision” that they had responded 
to in the past. Police Service (PS) interviewees (n=12) ranged in rank from 
Superintendent to Chief Superintendent; the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) 
interviewees (n=15) ranged from Station Manager to Chief Fire Officer; and the 
Ambulance Service (AS) interviewees (n=4) included Directors and Heads of service 
within the Trust. The sample was mainly male (n=30), and ranged from 37 to 54 
years old (M= 44 years, 7 months). All interviewees were qualified to command at 
‘tactical’ level (with many qualified at ‘strategic’ level too), and they each had a 
minimum of 15 years’ experience with a mean length of service of 24 years and 3 
months.  
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4.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews lasted a mean length of 1 hour, 39 minutes and 18 seconds. The 
summed total length of interviews was 51 hours, 9 minutes and 36 seconds, which 
was transcribed into 494,655 typed words across 31 interviews. The types of 
‘challenging incident’ identified by respondents could be themed under nine 
categories: public protests and rioting (n=5); large urban search and rescue disasters 
(e.g. building collapse; train derailments) (n=5); firearms and hostage negotiation 
incidents (n=4); gas/chemical leaks (n=4); large fires (n=3); multiple vehicle road 
traffic collisions (n=3); crowd management and crushing (n=3); terrorism (n=2); and 
flooding (n=2). Due to the sheer volume of data that was collected, the initial line by 
line coding produced over 800 nodes (albeit a large number of these were collapsed 
during initial refinement due to semantic duplication). These nodes were then 
analysed using GT in NVivo to identify the following emerging themes. 
4.4.3 Results summary: The interaction between approach goals, 
avoidance goals, behaviour and inaction during emergency response 
commanding 
It emerged that emergency commanders held two overarching goals: (i) ‘save 
life’, associated with approaching positive outcomes; and (ii) ‘prevent further harm’, 
associated with avoiding anticipated negative consequences. ‘Save life’ was linked 
to general behavioural approach goals (e.g. committing firefighters inside a building; 
instigating a treat and leave triage strategy for paramedic); whereas the goal to 
‘prevent further harm’ was associated with three avoidant behavioural goals to: (i) 
prevent harm to emergency responders; (ii) prevent escalating risk to the casualty; 
and (iii) prevent further disruption to normality. It emerged that the goal to ‘prevent 
further harm’ could derail action when it was associated to anticipated negative 
consequences. Anticipated negative consequences were associated to both short-term 
negative consequences, which were based upon negative outcomes associated to the 
three behavioural goals outlined above (emergency responder harm, further casualty 
harm, further disruption to normality) and long-term negative consequences, which 
were based upon negative consequences for: (i) themselves; (ii) their team; or (iii) 
their organisation. Crucially, anticipated negative consequences were not only linked 
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to anxiety about causing potential harm by commission (action), but were also 
associated with a fear of causing harm by omission (not taking action).  
Figure 4.1 describes the interaction between approach goals, avoidance goals, 
behaviour and inaction. Specifically, it describes three pathways that describe how 
approach or avoidance goals may relate to approach behaviour (i.e. green pathway), 
avoidant behaviour (i.e. blue pathway) or inaction (i.e. red pathway). In describing 
the model, it emerged that individuals firstly assessed their situation based on the 
features of the situation and individual differences. This then led to activation of 
functional goals that were based on their organisational responsibilities. A positive 
assessment of the situation was associated to ‘save life’ (approach) goals; a negative 
assessment of the situation was associated with ‘prevent further harm’ (avoidant) 
goals; and uncertainty about the situation led to goal conflict. Approach functional 
goals led to active approach behavioural goals and approach behaviour; avoidant 
functional goals led to active avoidant behavioural goals and associated approach or 
avoidant behaviour. Uncertainty however derailed choice. Indeed goal conflict arose 
when approach oriented individuals were uncertain about their available options to 
achieve approach goals; or when avoidant individuals were distracted by the 
anticipation of negative consequences. This led to passive avoidance and inaction. It 
is this final derailing pathway that reflects decision inertia. The data upon which this 
model was derived will now be explored in more detail. 
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Figure 4.1: A model to depict the interaction between approach goals, 
avoidance goals, behaviour and inaction during emergency response 
commanding 
 
4.4.4 Goal conflict: Approach ‘save life’ goals versus avoidant ‘prevent 
further harm’ goals 
The desire to ‘save life’ is a well cited goal for emergency responding. It was 
often referred to by all three agencies during the course of the interviews (Table 4.1). 
The goal to ‘save life’ was coded as an approach goal as it was associated with the 
desire to take action: “if I can do something to control and reduce the risk as much 
as I can to enable me to do that then I will do” (F14). Specifically, the desire to 
‘Save life’ appeared to be driven by feelings of time urgency and the desire to take 
fast action: “I’ve got to make the decision now. I’m going to do something now” 
(P9), in order to rapidly save or preserve the lives of the public: “you get a mass 
number of casualties in a short space of time if you don’t get treatment to them” 
(A1); “yeah the paramedics were like well she’s time critical. We haven’t really got 
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time to do the stabilisation or glass management you just have to get her out” (F14). 
Although all three agencies acknowledged ‘save life’ as a primary goal, they were 
often unclear about how to translate this functional goal into behavioural goals and 
action, referring to ‘save life’ in a redundant, rote repetitive, and at times even 
cynical, manner: “it’s like your objectives of what you’re trying to do – save life and 
blah blah blah” (A4); “it was our responsibility as a search and rescue as a fire and 
rescue service to take what’s the expression? A calculated risk to save what we 
consider to be a saveable life” (F10). This suggested that although ‘save life’ was an 
acknowledged strategic goal for all three services, the meaning of this “standard tag 
line” (A4) with regards to behaviour was less clear. This meant that action could 
derail as a result of behavioural option uncertainty (Figure 4.1).  
The ‘save life’ goal also appeared to derail action if the decision maker 
experienced goal conflict by trading it off against the competing avoidant goal to 
‘prevent further harm’. Both ‘save life’ and ‘prevent further harm’ goals were 
associated with responding to the emergency incident, yet whereas ‘save life’ was 
associated with approaching positive consequences through action, ‘prevent further 
harm’ was associated with avoiding negative consequences. Specifically, this related 
to three avoidant behavioural goals (tactical priorities) to: (i) avoid harming 
emergency responders; (ii) avoid causing further harm to casualties/victims; and (iii) 
avoid further disruption to normality (Table 4.1). The competition between 
approach-avoidance goals caused difficulties for decision makers due to anxiety 
about the potential negative consequences of action: “what you have to avoid is 
delaying making your decision about anything which then leads to somebody getting 
hurt so but by the same token you don’t want to kneejerk and rush into a decision 
that is not properly considered” (P10).  
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Table 4.1: Quotes reflecting the different types of approach and avoidance goals 
Functional 
Goal 
Behavioural Goal Quote 
Approach: 
Save Life 
Endogenous to 
incident (e.g. extricate 
casualties; put out 
fire) 
“We can’t just wait and say police haven’t been in 
when you can see people across the road who were 
injured and wanted or needed help” (A1) 
“You must look at what we do and why we do it and 
that’s to save life” (F9) 
“Put the door in basically and enter and save his life” 
(P9) 
Avoid: 
Prevent 
Further 
Harm 
Avoid harm to 
emergency responders 
“But it had to be reasonable because you’ve got to 
bear in mind maximise safety of the officers as well as 
a strategy” (P8) 
“You do think more about the responders but at the 
same time you try and balance that with the job that 
you’ve got to try and do” (A2); 
Avoid further harm to 
casualties / victims 
“I would prefer to be cautious and not risk any further 
injury by bringing him out in a way which I know to 
be a lot safer” (F2) 
Avoid further 
disruption to 
normality 
“That’s a main arterial route through the city so if 
you close that off too early you create quite a few 
problems for people who are just going about their 
business it was just a normal working day” (P10) 
 
4.4.5 Avoiding negative consequences: Trading off anxiety associated with 
anticipated long- and shot-term negative consequences 
Functional avoidance goals to ‘prevent further harm’ were associated with 
anticipating potential negative outcomes: “I’ll be quite frank there’s no incident that 
you deal with that is easy. And the reason is because as part of your training you 
have to look at what the outcomes you want are – what are the desirable and what 
will you actually tolerate” (P12). It emerged that negative consequences were 
anticipated to arise both in the short- and long-term, and that they contributed to 
anxiety associated to violating the goal to ‘prevent further harm’ (Figure 4.2). Short-
term (i.e. incident related) anticipated negative consequences were associated with 
the three behaviourally avoidant goals identified in Table 4.1. These included: (i) 
causing harm to emergency responders: “That was what was the risk to us and 
taking into its worst case scenario you know we could come under fire, our team 
could come under fire” (A1); (ii) causing further harm or injury to casualties: “at a 
minimum don’t make it worse and as best case scenario you actually make it better” 
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(F10); and (iii) creating further disruption to normality: “I think the danger was if 
we started saying the national front were coming then the local community might 
start rallying themselves to escalate as well” (P1); “So the longer it went on the 
more sort of like impact that was being felt in normal service” (A1).  
In terms of potential negative long-term consequences, it was further found that 
sources could be split into three themes associated with: (i) personal consequences; 
(ii) team consequences; and (iii) organisational consequences (Figure 4.2). 
Anticipated future personal consequences included anxiety relating to personal pride: 
“that does kind of go through your mind. Am I going to be professionally 
embarrassed by this?” (P11); criticism from colleagues: “You know you’ve got the 
gold commander looking down on you, you’ve got your bronze commander and your 
PSU commanders and all the staff looking up” (P3); the potential for personal legal 
fallout: “one decision by a police office can have years of people unpicking it in the 
clinical warm surroundings of an officer where everyone can study well why did you 
do this? Well what about this, what about that?” (P4), and personal accountability as 
a commander: “I think that’s the biggest worry because you can oh well I’ve done 
this loads of times but then that one time something goes wrong” (A3). Anticipated 
consequences associated with team outcomes were related to the legacy on inter-
agency relationships: “I think you’ve got to maintain relationships with people in the 
future and I just think that there’ll be other times when we will work together in a 
similar environment” (P7); intra-agency relationship: “it depends on being prepared 
to compromise your friendship to make sure the job gets done. So you know I think 
you’ve got to be to be honest if you’re going to be a commander you’ve got to be 
prepared to be unpopular – it goes with the territory really” (P11); and the welfare 
of team members: “It feels really mean as well going back to someone who’s had a 
really shit few hours dealing with something like that which is pretty traumatic and 
then saying you need to do this and you need to do that” (A4). Finally, anticipated 
organisational consequences included anxiety about a potentially negative public 
perception of one’s organisation: “we had to have a real sort of grown up 
conversation about not leaving the scene because how would that look? To the 
public” (F1); the reputation of organisation: “It was getting away from us and there 
was a reputational issue there around we effectively made world-wide news” (F13); 
relationships with the local community: “I’m in a no win situation because the local 
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community are just constantly why are you letting this happen? Why are you letting 
this happen?” (P1); and financial consequences for the organisation: “I recall it 
being 6 o clock and in my mind the big issue then was overtime because I had all 
these assets in that were changing shifts at 6 o clock and there was a massive 
overtime bill to consider but you put that to the back of your mind because you can’t 
really change your tactical plan based on the fact that you’re paying overtime” (F3).  
It emerged that the anticipation of consequences was associated to two 
contradictory sources of anxiety: (i) anxiety over causing harm through commission 
(i.e. taking action that causes harm): “I think sometimes we delay, we delay decisions 
because we are always all the time clouded by some of the consequences which are 
not really about public safety as such but about other things you know about what 
happens if it goes wrong?” (P10); and anxiety associated to causing harm through 
omission (i.e. not taking action and causing harm):“You’ve got to go well we’ve got 
to get into this building because you know if we don’t do this then the consequences 
are greater” (F1). Importantly, although anxiety associated to harm by omission 
could be expected to induce approach goals, it was associated the avoidant goal to 
‘prevent further harm’. As such, it resulted in active-avoidant behaviour driven by 
anxiety: “So I knew at that instance that I had one chance to get it set up exactly 
how I needed it or else the whole thing could you know collapse like a pack of cards 
really I guess is the best metaphor for it” (F10). Fundamentally, anticipated negative 
consequences appeared to derail decision making, as commanders were unable to 
judge the right time to take action: “you’re at the point of no return. You can’t then 
claw that back. You can’t raise it – you’ve reached the ultimate now so that’s it. You 
can’t go back on that” (P4). 
Interestingly, although respondents expressed negative affect and anxiety 
associated with harm by commission, respondents tended to reflect on their need to 
take action irrespective of anxiety due to their responsibility as a commander: “had I 
not taken that action at that time then you’d have had thousands and thousands of 
litres of ammonia leaked out into the surrounding area and the impact would’ve 
been devastating” (F8). This was further associated to confidence in their 
professional integrity: “you must look at what we do and why we do it and that’s to 
save life so it’s putting a provision in” (F9). It is possible that holding clear 
understanding of one’s roles, responsibilities and professionalism facilitated action. 
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Furthermore, this may be a result of the high level of expertise held in the sample; 
whereas novice commanders may struggle to cope with anxiety associated with 
avoidant functional goals leading to inertia or decision error. Commanders 
acknowledged this inability to cope with negative pressure as a potential reason for 
why novices may struggle: “But you get to the point where you’ve got to make a 
decision now. So you go with what you’ve got” (F5); “I’ve never been to an incident 
where I felt I’ve had enough information to do anything. There is never a situation 
where there’s absolutely no risk every really so wouldn’t you just you’ve got to have 
you’ve got to trust your own judgement I think really and a lot of that is about 
experience and a degree of self-preservation I suppose as well that you’re not going 
to be reckless” (P11). 
 
Figure 4.2: Anticipated short- and long-term negative consequences associated 
to emergency response 
4.4.6 Agency-specific goal conflict and inter-agency disagreement 
As the interview sample consisted of commanders from all three emergency 
services, it was also possible to explore for agency-specific differences in goal 
setting. It emerged that for PS commanders that conflict between approach ‘save 
life’ goals and avoidant ‘prevent further harm’ goals was especially challenging 
when they considered their agency-specific role to ‘prevent further disruption to 
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normality’. This appeared to be a result of their dual role to both respond to 
unanticipated emergencies whilst also being responsible for upholding and restoring 
a post-incident society of ‘normality’: “The key for us the police have got to get 
control. We’ve got to get control and we’ve got to take the risk away from the 
public” (P9); “the cop’s job is to create the environment that is safe for people to 
have a good time” (P2); “our role is safety, there’s emergency and there’s 
disorder” (P12); “So in the police you’re sort of stuck in the middle of all of that a 
little bit really” (P10). The awareness of this role conflict was associated with 
anxiety associated with taking premature action: “If I go in too early this is what’s 
going to happen? The balance of probability of what’s going to happen is this is 
going to happen. So when it does escalate is it because of me or is it escalated 
despite my efforts? And I didn’t want it to be because of me” (P4).  
Although other agencies acknowledged and empathised with the pressures on 
the PS to respond to emergency incidents whilst also being responsible for post-
incident normality: “The police have got that restore normality, keep law and order, 
keep a sense of wellbeing, they’ve got that public psyche in their mind as well” (F3), 
it still led to multi-agency tension when the PS were perceived to prioritise 
‘normality’ at the disproportionate cost of achieving ‘save life’ goals: “the police 
really wanted to deal with this and their way of dealing with things is to swiftly deal 
with it, bring normality and move on” (F3). The inter-agency conflict between ‘save 
life’ and ‘normality’ goals was most commonly discussed by members of the FRS: 
“If we come in and put a cordon in place a 250 m cordon, I’m not really interested, 
I’m not bothered how much chaos it causes, I need the cordon because I’m saving 
the people I need to look after” (F3). Once more, this appeared to be a product of the 
role of the FRS whose “priority is rescue saveable life” (F10), which conflicted 
with PS avoidant goals: “The police were concerned around the timescales sort of 
thing: how long until we can get the motorway open?” (F4). The competition 
between goals was associated with scepticism from the police that the fire service 
were disproportionately focussed on safety: “Well I was slightly sceptical because 
traditionally there was almost an unwritten – there was lots of anecdotal evidence to 
say that the fire service seemed to be, from a police perspective, we felt as though 
they were overly cautious when it comes to those sort of jobs” (P5), and further 
associated with defensive reactions by the fire service in response to police 
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perceptions: “They will complain about us saying we only go everywhere in twos 
and we come mob handed to everything” (F5); “I remember him saying I don’t want 
you turning up with the circus, that was the first thing” (F3). Thus, conflicting goals 
were associated with multi-agency tension and disagreements, distracting 
commanders from responding at the incident ground. 
Another example of inter-agency goal conflict was between the FRS and the AS 
concerning decisions on casualty extrication during road traffic collisions. It 
emerged that the AS tended to prioritise time critical ‘save life’ goals, desiring action 
as soon as possible: “we can’t just wait and say police haven’t been in when you can 
see people across the road who were injured and wanted or needed help.” (A1); 
however, although both agencies sought to ‘save life’, the speed of action that was 
desired by the AS led to multi-agency goal conflict with the FRS, who sought to take 
slower action to ‘prevent further harm goal’ in order to ‘enhance victim/patient 
safety’: “if there’s any chance that they’ve got a spinal injury we will take the roof. 
We will do gold standard” (F4). Conflict arose on whether to satisfice with fast 
action or to optimise to cautious safety, leading to disagreement between agencies: 
“we have different priorities however we’re both trying to do the same thing” (F4); 
“clearly everyone’s primary concern and primary emphasis is patient care but there 
can be some difference of opinion over what the best thing for that particular patient 
is” (F2). FRS commanders acknowledged that that time criticality can overtake 
safety in priorities in certain situations: “had it been time critical what we always 
have is a plan A and a plan B – the plan A is as quick as possible. The plan B is the 
best and safest for all concerned at getting them out” (F2), yet expressed frustration 
that other agencies were poorly informed of the practical constraints for conducting 
rapid extrication: “I was liaising with him saying well I know where you’re coming 
from with regards to casualty priority and obviously we’re casualty focussed as well 
but obviously we’ll get them out as quick as we can get them out. It’s not like we’re 
deliberately being slow it was just the nature” (F14). Once more, inter-agency 
conflict was underpinned by suspicion about the true motivations of other agencies’ 
demands: “I suppose anecdotally we’ve got this evidence around paramedics are put 
under pressure by the hospital consultants not to bring people in on the spine boards 
because that saps A&E resources” (F2). Fundamentally, it emerged that conflicts 
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between agencies appeared to be due to a poor understanding of one another’s 
capabilities, responsibilities and priorities.  
4.5 Discussion 
Qualitative interview data was collected from n=31 experienced emergency 
service commanders to explore how goals interacted with decision making 
behaviour. It was used to generate an interactive model to explain the relationship 
between approach goals, avoidance goals, behaviour and inaction (Figure 4.1). 
Specifically, commanders appeared to hold both approach oriented goals associated 
with taking positive action to ‘save life’ and avoidance ‘prevent further harm’ goals 
to try and stop escalation and further detriment at the emergency incident. These 
functional approach / avoidance goals were associated with distinct behavioural 
goals: ‘save life’ related to behavioural goals to take action at the scene (e.g. 
instigate treat and leave casualty triage policy); ‘prevent further harm’ goals were 
associated with three distinct avoidant behaviours to prevent: (i) ‘harm to emergency 
responders’, (ii) ‘further harm to victims’, and (iii) ‘further disruption to normality’. 
In unambiguous contexts, goals led to goal-relevant behaviour, whereby ‘approach’ 
led to ‘action’ and avoidance led to active-avoidance. However, if goal conflict arose 
as a result of ambiguity, then decision making was derailed inducing passive 
avoidance and inertia. Approach goals derailed if the commander was uncertain 
about their options; and avoidance goals were derailed when the commander was 
distracted by anticipated negative consequences. Fundamentally, anticipated 
negative consequences and ambiguity were associated with goal conflict, which 
induced passive avoidance and decision inertia. This model will now be discussed in 
further detail with reference to relevant literature by firstly describing the impact of 
decision inertia at the individual (psychological) level, followed by at the social 
(interpersonal) level (Orasanu & Liberman, 2011). 
4.5.1 Decision inertia at the individual (psychological) level 
The ‘save life’ strategic goal was a primary driver of command-level decision 
making. The goal to ‘save life’ is described in a number of government legislation 
and agency specific documents as ‘common objectives for responders are saving and 
protecting human life’ (p. 19, Home Office, 2013). Goals are important for decision 
making as they help individuals to visualise abstract or concrete aspirations in order 
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to guide their behaviour (Eder & Hommel, 2013). The goal to ‘save life’ was 
associated with approach motivation as commanders were energised to take action 
in order to make a positive impact on the situation (Elliot et al., 2006; 2013). A 
second strategic goal was to ‘prevent further harm’, which was associated with 
avoiding negative consequences (both short- and long-term). Importantly, avoidance 
motivation was not always detrimental to decision making as sometimes 
preventative actions were appropriate. For example, protecting the scene for criminal 
investigative proceedings or protecting emergency responders from harm. Yet 
avoidant goals derailed choice when commanders were inappropriately distracted by 
the anticipation of potential negative consequences, leading to goal conflict, passive 
avoidance and inaction (i.e. decision inertia). Indeed, the anticipation of potential 
negative consequences is associated to feelings of regret, which decreased the 
likelihood of action (Mourali, Pons & Hassay, 2011). It is thus possible that an overt 
focus on anticipated negative consequences may have a key impact on decision 
inertia. 
It also emerged that commanders’ decision making was derailed when they were 
uncertain about their situation assessment; which led to goal conflict between 
approach and avoidance. Indeed a lack of strategic direction in emergency incidents 
can degrade decision making, as individuals focus on redundant intra-agency 
information seeking over adaptive and collaborative action (Alison, Power, van den 
Heuvel, Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 2015). Furthermore, abstract or unclear goals 
can limit performance (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002; 2006). This means that if one 
is uncertain about their goals, then this may derail action. Interestingly, both ‘save 
life’ and ‘prevent harm’ goals are outlined in the JESIP guidance for emergency 
responding: ‘the over arching or primary aim of any response to an emergency [is] 
to save lives and reduce harm’ (p.3, JESIP Joint Doctrine, 2013). This guidance is 
thus somewhat contradictory by blurring two different types of goal. For example, 
action to ‘reduce harm’ through, for example, protecting wider public from harm, 
may inadvertently violate ‘save life’ goals by limiting the ability to act at the scene. 
This would suggest that the strategic goals provided by JESIP are abstract and vague 
which may limit performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). A preliminary 
recommendation from the current research is to separate these two strategic goals 
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within the guidance literature to more clearly delineate the cognitive processing of 
emergency response commanders. 
The anticipation of potential negative consequences was a key barrier to choice 
implementation. Commanders anticipated negative outcomes not only as a result of 
action (e.g. causing injury to emergency responders) but also as a result of inaction 
(e.g. incident escalating out of control). Research on moral choice has found that 
individuals irrationally perceive harm by commission (action) as more aversive than 
causing harm by omission (not taking action) as they feel more personally 
responsible for negative consequences as a result of their actions rather than 
inactions (Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002). The finding that commanders not only 
anticipated negative consequences from action but also due to inaction was 
unexpected. Why would commanders feel concerned about harm arising that they 
did not cause? This finding was further unusual when considering the context of 
emergency incident domain, as ‘omission bias’ (bias to not take action) tends to 
increase in high-risk situations (Bartels & Medin, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1995). It 
could be assumed that ‘omission bias’ would be prevalent during emergency 
incidents as they are inherently high-risk situations (Alison & Crego, 2007). Yet 
counterintuitively, it emerged that commanders expressed salient anxiety about the 
potential negative consequences of not taking action. This was associated to decision 
inertia as commanders traded off anxieties associated to causing harm by both action 
and inaction. This unique effect may be due to the role-relevant responsibilities of a 
commander to manage the emergency incident, which induced an inherent desire to 
be proactive. Indeed, omission bias is a product of anxiety due to personal 
responsibility and potential for blame for poor outcomes (Kordes-de Vaal, 1996); 
thus in organisational settings whereby an individual is responsible for taking action, 
anxiety may be associated to inaction as well. 
Although anxiety affiliated to harm arising via inaction was prevalent in the 
sample, commanders appeared to be aware of this guilt. At times it seemed to 
galvanise decision making as commanders felt inspired to take action. Indeed, 
anxiety affiliated to a temporary loss of control can increase approach behaviour as 
individuals feel motivated to regain control (Greenaway et al., 2015). This may be 
linked to confidence in one’s abilities and thus reflected in the experienced sample 
that was interviewed for this chapter. Domain specific expertise buffers against 
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cognitive biases as practitioners are able to bypass faulty reasoning and optimise 
outcomes (Braverman & Blumenthal-Barby, 2012) and a sense of ‘power’ over a 
situation can reduce the expectation for anticipated negative consequences leading to 
action (Mourali, et al., 2011). Commanders were positively motivated by anxiety as 
they were experienced and able to accurately and intuitively derive solutions to the 
decision problem (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Klein’s (1986) ‘recognition 
primed decision making model’ describes how experts hold accurate cognitive 
schemas that enable them to respond quickly and intuitively to challenging events 
due to their wealth of experience operating in their specialist domain. This contrasts 
to novice decision makers who risk using faulty heuristic processing and cognitive 
biases (Corr & McNaughton, 2012; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Kahneman, 2003). 
Indeed respondents in the current study described how decision making was 
challenging but that this did not necessarily prevent action. It is possible that 
inexperienced commanders who feel less control of the situation may be more at risk 
of goal conflict and inertia. Indeed, ‘fear’ is associated with submissive behaviour 
and inaction as a behavioural mechanism to protect oneself from potential harm 
(Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). It is possible that more novice commanders would feel 
less control over critical incidents, leading to increased uncertainty, goal conflict and 
inertia. This is a potential avenue for further research. 
4.5.2 Decision inertia at the social (interpersonal) level 
Decision inertia was a product of goal conflict between approach goals and the 
desire to avoid anticipated negative consequences. Not only did goal conflict arise at 
the individual level, but it also emerged at the inter-agency level due to differences 
in role-specific priorities and goals. This is important, as extreme environments 
require skills not only in personal psychological management of extremes, but in 
terms of ensuring interpersonal management of the extreme environment is achieved 
(Orasanu & Liberman, 2011). Decision making derailed when there was conflict 
between goal-setting at the intra-agency level and at the inter-agency level as 
commanders often felt that external agencies prioritised intra-agency goals over 
collective responsibilities (Kleingeld et al., 2011). Inter-agency tension arose when 
agencies failed to consider or misunderstood one another’s’ goals and motivations. 
In terms of the main goals of each agency, it appeared that the PS held a broad 
collection of approach and avoidance goals related both directly and indirectly to the 
107 
 
incident; the FRS focussed on approach goals to facilitate casualty management but 
also held salient avoidant goals to protect their responders from high-risk 
procedures; and the AS prioritised action to treat patients. This led to multi-agency 
tension, when approach and avoidance goals conflicted.  
For example, the FRS and AS shared approach goals to ‘save life’ and treat 
casualties, yet conflict arose as they differed in terms of their ‘prevent further harm’ 
goals. The FRS anticipated negative consequences associated to taking action by, for 
example, causing spinal injury to the patient when not following ‘gold standard’ 
procedures; whereas the AS anticipated negative consequences for not getting access 
to the patient in time. As such, the AS were motivated to ‘satisfice’ and select the 
first option to meet minimum thresholds, whereas the FRS were motivated to 
‘maximise’ outcomes by taking the safer (but slower) option (White & Hoffrage, 
2009). Differences in anticipated worst case scenarios thus induced inter-agency goal 
conflict over when to take action due to subtle differences in avoidance motivation. 
Indeed, the desire to maximise outcomes, or hold extremely high satisficing 
thresholds, is associated with more deliberative and slower decision making 
(Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007; White & Hoffrage, 2009), which contradicts the AS 
goal of fast action. It is possible that these effects further relate to the time pressures 
experienced by different agencies, which is linked to satisficing behaviour (Alison, 
Doran, Long, Power & Humphrey, 2013). As the role of the AS commander is 
specific to having access to patients, it is possible that they feel intense time pressure 
to rapidly treat and take them to hospital as a result of governmental demands to 
have ‘zero tolerance’ of ambulance delays (NHS Confederation, 2012). Thus 
differences in the perception of time pressure may interact with cognitive processing 
strategies as a result of motivations, inducing goal conflict at the inter-agency level.  
It also emerged that conflict between the PS and other agencies arose due to 
differences in temporal focus. The PS, as a function of their role, were not only 
motivated to ‘save life’ but further sought to ‘prevent further harm’ by establishing 
‘normality’; associated with a desire to avoid anticipated negative consequences 
relating to the local community in the future. This was, again, a unique function of 
their role as the PS are responsible for upholding and protecting society both at times 
of crisis and in peace. It appeared that a poor understanding about one another’s 
roles and responsibilities led to inter-agency tension, as commanders did not 
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understand how their own goals may negatively impact upon other agency goals 
(Mathieu et al., 2000). FRS commanders described frustration about the lack of 
understanding other agencies had with regards to the time it took to execute complex 
procedures at incidents. Indeed shared mental models are important for effective 
team processing (Mathieu et al., 2000), which not only relates to task-relevant 
information but must include awareness of one’s own and other’s roles in order to 
inform expectations on how the team will work. Mental models need to be relevant 
to team members (Banks & Millward, 2007), and can help contribute to overall 
organisational trust, which is an important factor in facilitating team processing (Lee, 
Bond, Russell, Test, Gonzales & Scarbrough, 2010). Thus, at an inter-agency level, 
an increased awareness of agencies’ roles and responsibilities is important to help 
commanders understand one another’s goals and facilitate more effective decision 
making and team work. 
4.5.3 Implications for findings 
Fundamentally, conflict between approach and avoidance goals derailed choice 
both at the psychological and inter-team levels. In order to reduce goal conflict, 
training to more clearly identify the nuanced differences in goals at emergency 
incidents may be useful. For example, it may be beneficial to more clearly 
distinguish between the strategic goals outlined by JESIP (2013) to ‘save life’ and 
‘reduce harm’. This could facilitate an understanding of the conditions under which 
each of these priorities is most relevant. Currently, they are discussed as a singular 
and relatively vague strategic goal (JESIP Joint Doctrine, 2013), which could impede 
decision making performance and increase decision inertia (Alison, et al., 2015; 
Locke & Latham, 2006). The delineation of goals through increased awareness 
training may facilitate this process by increasing an informed awareness of the 
rationale for decision making. Training to facilitate increased awareness of mental 
processes (e.g. meditation/emotion regulation training) not only facilitates the ability 
to implement choices, but has further positive effects on anxiety, rumination and 
general mindfulness (Kemeny, Foltz, Cavanagh et al., 2011). Anxiety associated to 
causing harm through action and inaction increased cognitive conflict; thus a greater 
awareness of one’s cognitive processing can reduce ‘rumination’ (i.e. the repetitive 
thinking associated with negative thoughts and failures; Martin & Tesser, 1996) and 
reduce the likelihood of decision inertia. 
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Cognitive awareness training may have further positive effects on decision 
making at the inter-agency level. Effective interdisciplinary teams tend to have 
shared vision, respect and understanding for one another’s roles (Nancarrow, Booth, 
Ariss, Smith, Enderby & Roots, 2013). Increasing understanding about one’s own 
goals and rationale could indirectly increase shared awareness at the team level. It is 
possible that inter-agency training that specifically focuses upon decision making 
and rationale, as opposed to more practical and procedural exercises to test skills, 
could facilitate a shared understanding. A greater understanding of roles may not 
only facilitate choice, but may further increase feelings of benevolence between 
agencies that could reduce anxiety and free up cognitive resources. For example, if 
the PS perceived other agencies as being aware and respecting the need to ‘prevent 
further disruption to normality’, then the salience of this goal may reduce as they 
anticipate trust and benevolence from other agencies to help them achieve this goal. 
Indeed perceived trustworthiness based upon benevolence is important in dynamic 
inter-team settings (Rusman, van Bruggen, Sloep & Koper, 2010).  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented inductive findings that were derived from qualitative 
interviews with commanders from the emergency services. It was interested in how 
goals interacted with decision making; specifically by focusing on how goal conflict 
may contribute to decision inertia. Two competing goals emerged: ‘save life’ – the 
desire to take fast action in order to approach positive outcomes; and ‘prevent 
further harm’ – the desire to avoid anticipated negative consequences. Anticipated 
negative consequences were counterintuitively associated to anxiety for causing 
harm by taking action, and also harm by not taking action. This was suggested to be 
a function of the roles and responsibilities of commanders to both ‘save life’ whilst 
further seeking to ‘reduce harm’. Anxiety was a product of anticipated negative 
consequences, which led to goal conflict and uncertainty that was attributed to 
passive avoidance and decision inertia. Fundamentally, commanders were distracted 
from taking positive ‘save life’ action when they were thinking about potential 
negative consequences that violated goals to ‘prevent further harm’. Goal conflict 
also arose at the inter-agency level as a result of poor role understanding and 
inconsistent goals. Recommendations for overcoming these effects relate to 
improving the awareness of commanders in terms of delineating different types of 
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goals, which may be achieved through training. Chapter 5 will further analyse the 
same data set, however with a focus on the impact of uncertainty on decision 
making. 
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Chapter 5: Using the endogenous / exogenous taxonomy of uncertainty to 
explore the situational and social challenges associated with emergency incident 
command and decision inertia 
5.1 Abstract 
This chapter describes how command challenges associated to uncertainty 
contributed to decision inertia in the emergency response environment. The Critical 
Decision Method (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006) was used to interview n=31 
commanders from the Police Service (n=12), the Fire and Rescue Service (n=15) and 
the Ambulance Service (n=4). In support of previous research on uncertainty in 
critical incident domains, it emerged that challenges could be themed into two 
overarching types of uncertainty: (i) endogenous complexities, based on the unique 
characteristics of the incident; or (ii) exogenous complexities, based on the features 
of the system being used to manage the incident (i.e. the team) (Alison, Power, van 
den Heuvel & Waring, 2014). Specifically, endogenous uncertainties included: (i) 
lacking, ambiguous or too much information; (ii) unreliable or unavailable resources; 
(iii) time pressure; (iv) social management (public and media); and (v) adapting to 
and coping with budget cuts and austerity. Exogenous uncertainties reflected: (i) 
communication problems regarding insufficient updating and miscommunication; 
(ii) poor role understanding, both in terms of own obligations and assumptions about 
other agencies’ responsibilities; (iii) trust issues associated with distrust, mistrust and 
the paradox of trust; and finally (iv) competitiveness within the command 
environment as a product of competing and conflicting goals. Recommendations to 
try and improve overall uncertainty by targeting exogenous challenges is suggested 
(Alison et al., 2015). 
5.2 Introduction 
The Police Service (PS), Fire and Rescue Service (FRS), and Ambulance Service 
(AS) are responsible for responding to a wide variety of emergency incidents. They 
can range from relatively low-key and low-impact incidents (e.g. trips and falls, shop 
lifting) to large-scale major disasters (e.g. earthquakes, terrorist attacks). The 
majority of decision making research that has explored the challenges to emergency 
responding has tended to focus on major disasters, acknowledging that although they 
may be rare, they can lead to potentially catastrophic consequences that can far 
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outlast the incident, thus making them noteworthy of research (Boin & ‘t Hart, 
2010). Yet, their rarity, the ability for researchers to gather data from such events is 
limited; instead studies have relied upon data collection from training exercises and 
simulations (e.g. Alison, Power, van den Heuvel, Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 
2015; Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010; Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins & Walker, 2011). 
Although research from training events can contribute to the understanding potential 
issues that may arise during emergency incidents (e.g. information and 
communication issues), they have less scope to provide insight into the personal and 
emotional experience of responders. Even when simulations are incredibly 
immersive (Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, Long, O’Hara & Crego, 2013) 
respondents are aware that the exercise is fictitious and thus the emotional impact of 
such events, especially with relation to the consideration of potentially aversive long-
term consequences (e.g. job loss), will be reduced. Simulations also tend to focus on 
large-scale disasters rather than complex incidents that are smaller in scale. Yet, as 
emerged during the course of the interviews for this chapter, commanders often 
perceived smaller incidents (e.g. road traffic collision) as more personally 
challenging than major disasters, especially in terms of testing their emotions. In 
fact, many respondents chose to discuss smaller-scale incidents over large-scale ones 
as they found them more challenging.  
This chapter will describe the key challenges associated with emergency 
responding, derived from the subjective experience of commanders. It is important to 
note that the findings are large and varied in scope, identifying numerous challenges 
of which many warrant further investigation. Yet this was beyond the scope of this 
PhD due to both time limitations and the aim to explore the general concept of 
decision inertia in complex emergency incidents. Thus, a brief discussion of all 
identified sources to uncertainty is included. Specifically, this chapter will: 
(i) Highlight the complex nature of emergency incidents 
(ii) Identify how teamwork can facilitate decision making: 
a. Describe the Input-Process-Output model and define ‘emergent 
states’ and outline the positive and negative impact of: 
i. Cognitive emergent states (e.g. role understanding) 
ii. Affective emergent states (e.g. trust) 
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(iii) Present the results of this chapter, which are categorised according to the 
endogenous / exogenous taxonomy 
(iv) Discuss implications for reducing uncertainty via interventions to target 
exogenous sources relating to teamwork 
5.2.1 The complex nature of the emergency incident 
Emergency incidents are complex. They are characterised by unknown and 
ambiguous information (Bharosa et al., 2010), involve high risk, high-stakes and 
time pressure (Chen, Sharman, Rao & Upadhyaya, 2008) and often cause cognitive 
overload and stress for the emergency responders involved (Paton & Flin, 1999). To 
add to this complexity, the need for joint coordination between different emergency 
response agencies is increasing (Janssen, Lee, Bharosa & Creswell, 2010). Cross-
agency working is not only required at major incidents (Salmon, et al., 2011) but is 
increasingly used at smaller scale incidents due to the increased desire (in the UK) 
for ‘interoperability’ (House, Power & Alison, 2014); defined as ‘the capability of 
organisations to exchange operational information and to use it to inform their 
decision-making’ (p. 12, NPIA, 2009). Interoperability involves both inter-agency 
working, where agencies work towards joint and collective goals, and multi-agency 
working, where agencies operate in parallel to one another (Charman, 2014). For 
example, in the event of a potential acetylene cylinder explosion, the FRS will be 
required to stabilise the cylinder, whilst the PS manage cordons and evacuation, and 
the AS are on stand-by in case of potential casualties. Each agency’s roles are 
distinct, yet they rely on one another to function effectively. Interoperability thus 
adds complexity to the emergency incident as it can increase confusion and 
uncertainty about roles and responsibilities within the inter-agency team (Curnin, 
Owen, Paton & Brooks, 2015) by blurring professional boundaries (Brown, 
Crawford & Darongkamas, 2000). 
A number of studies have taken a top-level approach to identify the key 
challenges associated with the emergency responding. Salmon et al (2011) analysed 
a multi-agency training exercise for the response to widespread flooding which 
involved the emergency services, the military and local/civilian authorities. They 
identified seven key barriers to multi-agency coordination relating to organisational 
problems (e.g. ambiguous command structure), poor information management, 
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inefficient communications, inadequate situation awareness, insufficient equipment, 
poor understanding of cultural differences; and limited inter-agency exposure 
through training. Similarly, Chen et al (2008) identified how uncertainty, time 
pressure, casualty risk, resource shortages, large-scale impact and damage, 
infrastructure disruption, multiple authorities, conflicts of interest and the demand 
for timely information can impede the response to emergencies. Taking a more 
reflective approach in reviewing post-mortem reports of large-scale disasters, Boin 
and ‘t Hart (2010) identified six ‘avoidable pathologies’ of disaster response relating 
to bad planning, an obsession with full information, communication breakdowns, 
overreliance on command and control, underestimating the usefulness of the media, 
and a lack of concern for post-incident consequences. Fundamentally, emergency 
incidents are inherently ambiguous and complex; it is the associated experience of 
uncertainty that makes decision making difficult. 
Endogenous uncertainties describe the characteristics of the emergency that are a 
product of and specific to the emergency event (e.g. time pressure, multiple 
casualties, limited resources). This makes them difficult to directly control as they 
are external to human manipulation (Alison et al., 2014). Exogenous uncertainties 
describe the characteristics of the operating system (e.g. emergency response team) 
who are responding to the emergency event, and are amenable to intervention 
through developments in technology, training and organisational practice that may 
facilitate efficient operating. This means that exogenous interventions may indirectly 
lessen the uncertainty associated with endogenous features of the incidents as 
decision makers are more able to cope with demands (Alison et al., 2014). For 
example, a coordinated team will respond more efficiently to an emergency incident, 
which can indirectly reduce endogenous uncertainty associated with complexity. 
Thus, this chapter will focus mainly on the exogenous challenges relating to team 
processing as they offer more scope for intervention. Furthermore, recent changes in 
the strategic direction of the UK emergency services mean an increased focus on 
‘interoperability’ through the ‘Joint Emergency Services Interoperability 
Programme’ (JESIP), which aims to increase the co-location, communication, 
coordination, joint understanding of risk and shared situational awareness between 
the blue lights services (JESIP Doctrine, 2013), in order to increase overall resilience 
against major disasters, such as the increased threat of globalised terrorism (Comfort 
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& Kapucu, 2006; Koblentz, 2011) and extreme weather events (e.g. flooding) as a 
result of climate change (Pollock, 2013). Thus the exploration of challenges to team 
processing at emergency incidents is a worthy topic of research. 
5.2.2 The importance of teamwork at emergency incidents 
Imagine a road traffic collision involving 3 cars on a busy motorway. One car 
has been flipped onto its roof and contains one male driver and one female 
passenger, both in their mid-twenties. The female passenger is trapped in her seat 
and screaming, whilst the male driver is unconscious and bleeding at the wheel. A 
second car involved in the incident has veered into a ditch, and contains an elderly 
lady who is immobilised by shock and a hysterical infant strapped into her car seat. 
A third car, the cause of the accident, contains an uninjured teenage male who had 
tried to flee the accident but crashed into the central reservation further up the 
motorway. The FRS are the first at scene with one pump (fire engine). The FRS 
watch manager (lead firefighter) radios their control room to request a senior 
commander and additional pumps, whilst firefighters begin to collect information 
from victims in the crash area (to relay to paramedic colleagues on arrival) and start 
to consider methods for casualty extrication (e.g. roof removal, door removal). 
Meanwhile, a two-person Ambulance team has arrived, who also request further 
assistance from their control room. The paramedics begin to prioritise patients at the 
scene using the P1 (critical), P2 (needing attention) and P3 (walking wounded) 
classification. The chief paramedic liaises with the watch manager from the FRS to 
prioritise casualties and establish casualty extrication needs (i.e., slower but safer or 
rapid but risker). During this time, a station manager (senior FRS representative) 
arrives and a handover procedure takes place from the watch manager. The PS are 
now also in attendance, who, following consultation with other agency 
representatives and discussion with the Highways Agency are closing the motorway 
and establishing traffic diversions. Registration number plate checks reveal that the 
teenage male’s vehicle is stolen, and so an investigative PS team have also been 
mobilised. Each agency has its own commander who is responsible for making 
decisions at the intra (within) team level, whilst also coordinating with other 
agencies at the inter-team level. For example, the initial FRS commander took an 
intra-agency decision to request additional resources and the PS commander has 
identified the accident as a potential crime scene. However they must also coordinate 
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with one another; as the FRS discuss inter-agency actions on patient prioritisation 
and casualty extrication with the AS; and the PS establish a compromise with other 
agencies to ‘save life’ whilst protecting a potential crime scene. Teamwork is thus 
essential. 
A team is defined as “two or more people who interact, dynamically, 
interpedently, and adaptively toward a common and valued goal/objective/mission, 
who have each been assigned to specific roles or functions to perform” (Salas, 
Dickinson, Convers & Tannenbaum, 1992; p. 4). Thus, in emergency response team 
settings, commanders not only consider their intra-team goals that align with their 
organisational responsibilities, but must further consider interactive inter-team goals. 
For example, as described in Chapter 4, a common inter-agency goal is to ‘save life’, 
which requires both intra- and inter-agency coordination of action (van den Heuvel, 
Alison & Crego, 2012). Teamwork is the process of working towards collective 
goals (Millward, Banks & Riga, 2010), which can be derailed when agencies hold 
inconsistent priorities or a poor understanding of one another’s roles.  
5.2.2.1 The Input-Process-Outcome model and importance of 
‘Emergent States’ 
The Input-Process-Outcome (I-P-O) framework describes how organisational 
teams transform task inputs into meaningful and goal-directed outcomes (Marks, 
Methieu & Zaccaro, 2001; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 
2000; Millward et al., 2010). Inputs are the conditions of the decision environment 
that exist prior to decision making (e.g. task, team, organisational or individual 
characteristics) and outcomes are the consequences of team-activity relating to 
performance quality, team longevity and the affective reactions of team members 
(Hackman, 1990). The psychologically interesting aspect of this framework is the 
‘process’ element; which refers to “members’ interdependent acts that convert 
inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal and behavioural activities directed 
toward organising taskwork to achieve collective goals” (Marks et al., 2001, p. 357). 
Team processing is effectively ‘teamwork’, with examples including strategy 
formulation, cooperation and communication (Mathieu et al., 2000). Team 
processing represents the way teams collectively process information in order to 
formulate and implement plans of action in line with their common goal (e.g. ‘save 
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life’). For example, a multi-agency team that communicates using non-specialist 
language will process information more effectively; whereas the use of intra-agency 
specific terminology will diminish inter-team understanding. 
A team’s ability to operate is dependent upon ‘emergent states’. Emergent states 
are “properties of the team that are typically dynamic in nature and vary as a 
function of team context, inputs, processes and outcomes” (p. 357, Marks et al., 
2001). They are the team-level cognitive, affective and motivational features that 
influence the effectiveness of teamwork (Millward et al., 2010). Examples of 
cognitive emergent states include the establishment of shared mental models 
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 1993) and an informed understanding of one 
another’s roles (Toegel, Kilduff & Anand, 2013); examples of affective emergent 
states include feelings of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) and 
empowerment (Mathieu, Gilson & Ruddy, 2006); and motivational emergent states 
are the cohesive motivational drives of team members towards collective goals 
(Bossuyt, Moors & De Houwer, 2014).  
Emergent states develop over time as an accumulation of multiple decision 
‘episodes’ and ‘sub episodes’ (Marks et al., 2001; Mathieu & Button, 1992). For 
example, the road traffic collision example represents a team decision ‘episode’, 
with sub-episodes including decisions on the best extrication method to use. A 
team’s experience across multiple decision episodes helps to inform their 
understanding of the team environment and can facilitate (or inhibit) their collective 
functioning (Hackman, 2002). Learning between episodes occurs during ‘transition 
phases’ (or ‘downtime’ from decision making) through interpersonal processes 
relating to ‘conflict management’ and ‘confidence building’ based upon what 
happened during the ‘action phase’ of the decision task (Marks et al., 2001). In other 
words, individual team (and sub-team) members learn about one another’s roles 
during multiple decision episodes, and it is these lessons and experience that inform 
the ‘emergent states’ and effectiveness of teamwork during subsequent decision 
episodes. Thus, emergent states are dynamic features of a team that can change over 
time, and may vary across decision tasks (Marks et al., 2001). The multi-agency 
team responding to a routine incident (e.g. house fire) may have a fairly accurate 
understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities, but when faced with a more 
novel incident (e.g. bridge collapse), then the understanding of one another’s roles 
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and responsibilities diminishes; leading to, for example, disagreements between over 
who takes primacy at scene. Likewise, a positive or negative experience with other 
individuals during a decision episode can increase or decrease the willingness for 
team members to cooperate at subsequent tasks (Peterson, Owens & Martorana, 
1999).  
Organisational teams are interconnected and interpersonal, and represent social 
groups that exist between decision making episodes (Marks, et al., 2001). Research 
on social ingroups and outgroups has identified how individuals can hold negative 
attitudes against an entire social outgroup, based on a single negative experience 
with one team member (Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010). For example, a 
confrontation between a police officer and firefighter may cause the individuals (and 
their colleagues) to hold negative attitudes against the entire social outgroup at 
subsequent incidents. This was found in research exploring ‘cultural interoperability’ 
in the emergency services due to historic and inherent organisational mistrust 
(Charman, 2014). Furthermore, if members of organisations feel that their role is 
threatened by other groups (e.g. due to mergers or streamlining), then the negative 
bias against outgroup members increases as individuals become more competitive 
(Terry & Callan, 1998). It is important therefore, that team-level emergent states are 
positive and resilient across incidents to ensure effective team processing. Two 
emergent states that will be explored in more detail are: (i) cognitive emergent states; 
and (ii) affective emergent states. 
5.2.2.2 Cognitive emergent states: Role understanding 
An example of a cognitive emergent state is a team’s ‘shared mental model’. 
Mental models are the cognitive schema in which individuals store descriptions, 
explanations and predictions about their knowledge of the world (Rouse & Morris, 
1986). They can include declarative knowledge (facts and figures); procedural 
knowledge (the steps required to perform a type of action); and strategic knowledge 
(overriding knowledge on application of rules) (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers & 
Stout, 2000). Mental models represent cognitive emergent states as they develop 
over time through repeated exposure within the team environment and stored at the 
cognitive level. For example, repeated exposure between PS, FRS and AS colleagues 
will help an understanding of roles and responsibilities and, importantly, how this 
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aligns with their own. Shared understandings facilitate teamwork and the 
achievement of collective goals as they help teams to coordinate their actions by 
reducing ambiguity. An important type of mental model when operating in multi-
team settings is knowledge about one’s own and other team members roles within 
the team network (Mathieu et al., 2000). For instance, teamwork at a road traffic 
collision would be facilitated by shared mental models on roles; that the PS will 
establish cordons, that the FRS will rescue casualties, and that the AS will treat 
patients following extrication. Shared role understanding helps individual team 
members to form accurate expectations about the behaviour of other team members 
(Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas & Volpe, 1995) which can facilitate teamwork 
and processing (e.g. relevant communication; Mathieu et al., 2001). 
When team members lack understanding about one another’s roles (i.e. limited 
or inaccurate awareness of others’ roles and responsibilities) then this can cause poor 
task outcomes associated with reduced or impeded information sharing (Weller, 
Janssen, Merry & Robinson, 2008). A poor understanding of organisational structure 
in multi-team settings, due to the increased number of sub-teams and a lack of 
superordinate direction, biases team processing towards inward intra-team tasks, 
over collective inter-agency goals (Alison, et al., 2015). Ambiguity reduces the 
willingness for team members to work collectively, causing them to focus on more 
certain knowledge associated with their own (intra-team) responsibilities. Poor role 
understanding can increase irrelevant communications (e.g., informing a strategic 
commander about detailed procedural operations), which degrades team performance 
as members become cognitively overloaded and distracted by non-goal related 
information (Banks & Millward, 2007). For example, a paramedic does not need to 
inform a firefighter about the intricate details of a patient’s injuries, they simply need 
to state how quickly a patient needs medical attention, which informs the 
firefighter’s decision on method for extrication (i.e. slower but safer or rapid but 
risky). Thus, the acquisition of shared (and relevant) mental models with reference to 
role understanding is important cognitive emergent state to facilitate team processing 
and overall effectiveness. 
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5.2.2.3 Affect emergent states: Trust 
In terms of affective emergent states, trust is an important factor in teamwork. 
Trust, in organisational settings, is the assumption by one individual / organisation 
that advice provided by another individual / organisation is reliable (Rotter, 1980). It 
is an important affective emergent state for emergency responding, as trust can 
expedite decision making in high-risk settings (Das & Teng, 2004). Indeed, high-risk 
decision making in a simulated hostage negotiation incident was influenced more by 
social emergent states such as trust, than endogenous features relating to the features 
of the emergency incident (Alison et al., 2014). Trust interacts with cognitive 
emergent states relating to role understanding, as a shared understanding of roles can 
be developed through regular contact with social others as a result of increased trust 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). The development of trust changes over time in response to 
the interpersonal experience of the team members: positive experiences facilitate 
trust in the future; whereas negative experiences limit or reduce trust. When team 
members identify with their team on an emotional / social level then they are more 
committed to their team and more likely to engage in self-regulating practices 
(Millward et al., 2010). Positive affective states encourage sustainability within a 
team (Ellemers, 2001) and are associated with an increase cooperation and 
commitment to collective goals (Bishop, Scott & Burroughs, 2000). It can also 
facilitate feelings of empowerment (Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk & Gibson, 2004) and 
psychological ownership (Edmondson, 1999) within teams, which can increase 
overall team effort (Mathieu, et al., 2006). Thus, trust is an important emergent state 
that facilitates collective action. 
Importantly, when exploring emergency response teams, it is important to 
acknowledge that individual team members will not always work with the same 
individuals from day to day. Different shift patterns and specific expertise within 
sub-branches of the emergency services make the team environment temporary. 
Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996) explored trust in temporary teams and found 
that, rather than trust being based on affective relationships, temporary organisations 
rely on ‘swift trust’; the belief that others are capable of providing relevant 
information regarding uncertainty, risk and vulnerability. This demonstrates the 
distinction between ‘cognitive trust’; which describes faith in another’s abilities to 
complete a task, and ‘affective trust’; the emotional faith one holds in another 
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(McAllister, 1995). Indeed, cognitive trust has been found to have a greater influence 
on decision making in teams than affective trust (Parayitam & Dooley, 2008). Faith 
in another’s abilities and competence can facilitate ‘swift trust’ in temporary or 
dynamic decision making teams in the absence of interpersonal relationships 
(Meyerson et al., 1996). Indeed, a commander does not need to know a member of 
their team on an interpersonal level to trust, but can instead rely on swift (cognitive) 
trust based on their role-related competencies. This was evidenced in research on 
temporary emergency response teams, which found swift trust and team 
effectiveness was facilitated by role clarification (Curnin, Owen, Paton, Trist & 
Parsons, 2015). Once more, it is thus important that teams have a clear understanding 
of each other’s roles, skills and competencies in order to facilitate swift trust in 
dynamic teams (Meyerson, et al., 1996).  
5.2.3 Summary 
This chapter has thus far outlined how emergency incidents are inherently 
complex. This may be due to both endogenous features of the critical incident and 
the exogenous characteristics of the response team, which both contribute to overall 
uncertainty (Alison et al., 2014). By focusing on exogenous team features that are 
more amenable to intervention, it appears that cognitive (mental models, role 
understanding) and affective emergent states (trust) can positively influence team 
processing effectiveness. Awareness of one’s own and others’ roles within a team 
(cognitive emergent state) facilitates ‘trust’ (Curnin et al., 2015) as team members 
engage in positive self-regulation practices (Millward et al., 2010), which increase 
commitment to collective goals (Bishop et al., 2000). An awareness of one another’s 
roles and responsibilities facilitates swift trust (Meyerson et al., 1996) as, for 
example, the FRS have faith in paramedics to provide accurate advice on how 
quickly they need to extricate a casualty, which will inform their own decision 
making on which method to use. Shared mental models help individuals to form 
accurate expectations about the behaviour of other team members (Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 1995), which creates shared collective affective states of empowerment 
(Kirkman et al., 2004) and psychological ownership (Edmondson, 1999); increasing 
overall team efforts. Thus this chapter sought to analyse interview data from 
experienced emergency commanders to explore how different types of uncertainty, 
relating to both endogenous and exogenous sources, may interact with decision 
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making. Although findings include both endogenous and exogenous challenges, this 
introductory discussion has hopefully helped highlight to the reader how many of the 
negative effects of these challenges, which contribute to decision inertia, can be 
limited via improved teamwork. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Procedure 
Chapter 4 provides a full discussion of the data collection procedure used for the 
interview data. In brief, commanders (n=31) from the PS (n=12), FRS (n=15), and 
AS (n=4) were interviewed using the Critical Decision Method (CDM); a form of 
Cognitive Task Analysis (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006). They were asked to 
recall a “difficult decision” that they had faced in past when responding to an 
incident that was “especially challenging” with “high consequences” that would be 
“very difficult to reverse” (Appendix One). Interviews were audio recorded and 
transcribed by the primary researcher, and had a mean length of 1 hour, 39 minutes 
and 18 seconds.  
5.3.2 Data Analysis 
Grounded Theory, which involves an inductive ‘bottom up’ process to interpret 
theory from the data, was used to analyse the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). The 
focus of analyses was on the main challenges to decision making that were identified 
by commanders as contributing to uncertainty, and derailing choice. Following 
analysis of the data, findings were split according to the endogenous / exogenous 
taxonomy of uncertainty, which was also derived from research within the 
emergency response domain (Alison et al., 2014). This split the causes of uncertainty 
into two general areas: (i) uncertainty due to characteristics of the emergency 
incident (endogenous); and (ii) uncertainty derived from the characteristics of the 
‘operating system’ (i.e. team) responding to the incident (exogenous). 
5.4 Results 
There were nine different sources of uncertainty that were described by 
commanders, five of which were eventually coded as endogenous sources, which 
related to uncertainty affiliated to: (i) information, (ii) resources, (iii) time 
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management, (iv) people management (i.e. public and media), and (v) budget cuts 
and austerity. The remaining four sources of uncertainty were coded as exogenous 
and referred to uncertainty associated with: (i) communication, (ii) role 
understanding, (iii) trust, and (iv) competition. Table 5.1 outlines each of these nine 
sources of uncertainty and the reasons for why they contributed to uncertainty. 
Type of 
uncertainty 
Source of 
uncertainty 
Reason for uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous  
Information  Lack of information 
 Too much information 
Resources  Lack of resources 
 Unreliable resources 
Time 
management  
 Time pressure 
 Administrative demands 
People 
management 
(public; media) 
 Public inside risk area 
 Public outside of risk area 
 Social media and potential criticism 
Budget cuts and 
austerity 
 Reduced capacity 
 Increased demands 
 Role instability 
 Emotional demands 
 
 
 
 
 
Exogenous  
Communication  Insufficient updating 
 Miscommunication 
 Inaccurate assumptions 
Role 
understanding 
 Erroneous assumptions on external agency capabilities 
 Poor understanding of own responsibilities 
 Operating in isolation 
Trust  Distrust abilities 
 Mistrust intention 
 Trust paradox 
Competition  Competition for command (intra-agency) 
 Competition for primacy (inter-agency) 
 Self-oriented personalities and egos 
 Desire to take action 
Table 5.1: The nine sources of uncertainty that were identified by emergency 
response commanders 
5.4.1 Endogenous challenges to emergency incident commanding 
5.4.1.1 Information 
Commanders described how unavailable or unknown information limited their 
ability to command the emergency: “the lack of information was quite – because 
well how many patients?” (A4); “that was probably the most challenging part of the 
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job the lack of solid information” (F3); “where it probably became difficult from the 
outset was you’ve got very, very limited intelligence really” (P3). Lack of 
information was a key inhibitor to decision making: “what we live and breathe on in 
this organisation is information and intelligence and without information we can’t 
make a decision” (P4), which was associated with uncertainty and deliberation: “I 
sort of mulled it over in my head I was like well I didn’t know what I was going to be 
greeted with” (F14). The lack of information was particularly problematic for 
commanders who were remote to the emergency incident and so had to rely on the 
information provided by other team members: “you’re making those decisions from 
a remote location and relying on information coming in from other people and 
assessment from other people” (P2); which was especially challenging for FRS 
commanders who rely heavily on visual information to perform their role: “It’s 
difficult to make command decisions remotely. I mean police are better at it because 
they will use verbal reports or effective use of CCTV or other visual images” (F7). 
Decision making was also challenged when there was too much information, as 
this increased difficulty in identifying relevant pieces of information: “you’re getting 
information from the police, you’re getting information from the local authority from 
the people, the company… So it’s a whole range of information – the key is to be 
able to sort out the bits that are relevant and then come up with a command 
structure so that you don’t get overwhelmed” (F10). When information was rich, 
dynamic and rapidly changing, commanders struggled to keep pace with the 
situation: “It was like trying to run up a sand dune – you keep sliding down because 
as soon as you get around a corner or a new scenario and you’ve got to deploy your 
resources. Then you move about 100 feet and you’ve got another one” (P1). 
Furthermore, excessive information induced trade-off difficulties between attending 
to new information and focusing on current tasks: “you’re really stuck because you 
can’t write and you can’t think at the same time” (A4). However, it appeared that 
commanders were self-aware of the potential negative outcomes associated with 
information overload and incorporated it into their decision process by relying on 
other team members to undertake information processing roles; this was most salient 
to the FRS when discussing limits of ‘spans of control’: “I could’ve potentially 
could’ve left the whole job with the group manager but it would’ve been right on the 
limits of spans of control” (F15). 
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5.4.1.2 Resources 
Commanders were also challenged at major incidents when resources (e.g. staff, 
equipment) were limited: “lack of resources. You know if I’d have turned up there, 
with our full turn out, my decisions would’ve been different” (F5). Resource 
limitations were exacerbated when incidents were novel or unique, requiring 
specialist assets: “maybe a difficult part of that was to ensure that we had the 
appropriate level of resources and also the appropriate level of trained resources” 
(A2), and expert knowledge: “it was technically it was a difficult situation because 
we only had very limited onsite expertise to try and resolve this” (F7). The reliability 
of resources when they were available further contributed to uncertainty, as 
commanders expressed cynicism over the technological capacity of seemingly basic 
tools such as mobile phones: “the biggest complaint we have post-incident is 
communications… Not so much individuals it’s the technology” (F11). 
Fundamentally, a lack of and/or unreliable resources increased uncertainty at the 
emergency incident as it limited the commanders’ abilities to make decisions and 
take action: “I was fast approaching information overload. Made worse by lack of 
resources” (F5). 
5.4.1.3 Time management 
Throughout all the emergency incidents discussed by commanders, the negative 
impact of time pressure was salient: “there was a constant flow and these decisions 
were coming thick and fast all the time. So talk about being under pressure. It was 
probably the most pressurised position that I have ever been in” (P4). Respondents 
described an inability to estimate the passage of time when placed under pressure, as 
time subjectively passed more quickly than it did in reality, exacerbating time 
pressure: “you could be like there 10 hours but it feels like 20 minutes because it’s 
just one decision after another (A3); “if you’re sitting for 15 or 20 minutes waiting 
for an update 15 or 20 minutes is a long time. If you’re on the incident, 15 or 20 
minutes will go like that *clicks fingers*” (F7). Perceived time pressured interacted 
with concerns on resource limitations, as commanders were worried about time 
delays associated to coordinating resources: “so I requested 10 ambulances as well. 
Obviously aware that they were going to take a while to come because of the 
distances they were going to be travelling” (F14). Commanders were anxious that 
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the rapidity of the incident ground exceeded the time it took them to make decisions 
and execute action, leading to feelings of helplessness: “when it’s going wrong 
there’s a certain period where you are helpless. You are helpless and whatever is 
going to be is going to be because you can’t catch it up quickly enough. What I mean 
by that is by the time you’ve made a decision about something the circumstances 
have changed. So by the time you say well actually right let’s try and put a cordon 
on them there. You try and get that out to the operational or bronze commander or 
via your own radio and it’s too late. Something else has happened somewhere else” 
(P3). Counterintuitively however, when time pressure as a result of a protracted 
incident over a number days, the lack of time pressure appeared to negatively 
interact with the desire to ‘save life’ and take action, as respondents struggled to 
know when to stop action: “what does the fire and rescue – what’s the kind of value 
that runs right through us is we pride ourselves – we think we do anyway – is that we 
‘can do’ and whatever the challenge is we’ll deal with it. And then to look at it in 
sort of the cold light of day and say we can’t do anything” (F10).  
From an organisational perspective, administrative demands to complete 
paperwork also interacted with time pressure, as commanders expressed frustration 
at having to document their actions whilst juggling the demands of the ongoing 
incident: “every patient that you have you’re supposed to have a patient report form 
and that’s the only thing with a major incident is the audit trail is never as good as it 
could be because everyone gets ahhh” (A4). Interestingly, PS commanders were less 
critical of the need to complete paperwork, and instead gained confidence from it: “I 
made copious notes on the log on my rationale so that people knew the best interests 
were at the hearts and there was a balance” (P8). They often relied on paperwork 
and documentation, such as the decision making model, to help them cope with 
rapidly moving and evolving incidents: “you keep going around this national 
decision making model looking at the intel, looking at the threat, looking at your 
powers particularly in the terms of legal and you continually reassess” (P3). 
However, both AS and FRS respondents described how the need to complete 
paperwork was impractical for their role: “I don’t think we’re in a position where we 
can do it at the scene – I think that’s negative for a fire officer to sit there making 
notes” (F3). Inconsistent estimates on time management also contributed to multi-
agency disagreements as agencies lacked an understanding of timelines for specific 
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actions of other agencies (e.g. extrication of casualties by FRS during road traffic 
collisions): “obviously we’ll get them out as quick as we can get them out. It’s not 
like we’re deliberately being slow it was just the nature of it” (F14).  
5.4.1.4 People management (public; media) 
Uncertainty was also related to the management of non-emergency service 
personnel at the incident scene (i.e. public and media). During the initial phases of 
response, respondents were keen to reduce uncertainty associated to the location and 
number of ‘victims’ to the emergency: “thinking about it there was this thing of like 
how do we know how many people we’ve got? Because there’s one dead on the 
embankment and there were bits of fires going off everywhere you know and it’s like 
how do you know there’s not more people?” (A4), as well as protecting the members 
of the wider public who are external to the incident: “very, very quickly the scene 
was congested there were all kinds of young people, family members were turning 
up” (F1).  
Management of the public was more difficult when individuals were 
uncooperative to the requests of the emergency services: “now there was some real 
reluctance of those residents to come out of that house but I managed to brief the 
police no you need to get them out” (F15). This issue was especially challenging for 
the PS, whose role required them to both manage cordons and protect the public 
from further harm at the incident ground: “when you’ve got lots of people in what 
becomes a confined space the fear that someone is going to get injured is fairly 
significant” (P10), whilst also ensuring normality was maintained as much as 
possible: “it was a Friday afternoon, which is probably quite important in terms of 
some of the logistical difficulties” (P5). PS respondents described proactive decision 
making to try and manage the public by predicting their behaviour using empathy: 
“when people can’t get where they want to be and they’re getting jostled and people 
are not used to being in crowds that’s an issue. People react differently to the way 
you might expect them to react” (P10). The PS were also uniquely challenged in 
dealing with members of the public who were actively hostile towards them: “it was 
the unknown and we didn’t know what type of hostility we were faced with” (P1). 
This created additional uncertainty as they were cognisant of the potential for 
negative reactions of the public to their actions: “if we start using legislation and 
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using it potentially incorrectly they know out there their rights which then causes us 
issues because if we do stuff we’re not allowed to because of misinterpretation and 
different views you’ve then got issues around the reputation of our organisations” 
(P7),underpinned by a feeling of responsibility to guide the behaviour of the public 
in a law abiding way: “you’ve got a group of people we don’t necessarily want to 
criminalise them but at the same token we want to get them out of the city centre 
before they cause themselves and/or others or get involved in disorder” (P12).  
In addition to uncertainties associated with the management of the public at 
emergency incidents, respondents also described how uncertainty was attributed to 
the management of social media: “with the media and the public perception these 
days we oft are more accountable for everything that we do than ever before” (P4), 
creating increased anxiety attached to public criticism: “I mean you can youtube it 
there’s hundreds of people with phones you know look at this look at what’s going 
on and all the rest and then you can see it from a fair way and it’s that sort of 
pressure” (F13). Social media increased feelings of exposure in commanders: 
“you’ve got the gaze of the local community, you’ve got the gaze of the people with 
their smart phones and you’ve got CCTV and the press there” (P1), which added a 
further layer of complexity decision making: “I accept that we shouldn’t really be 
worried about what press headlines read because that’s the least important …But 
you can see how those pressures around press and media finance and all the other 
things that come on and necessarily at the back of your head when you’re trying to 
make sort of decisions on what to do” (P10).  
From a positive perspective, commanders acknowledged that the media could 
facilitate information gathering: “best bit about whatever happens in a major 
incident is Sky News because in every control centre wherever you go you will find a 
telly and the telly is always set to sky news because that is the one thing you can 
guarantee the helicopters will be there” (A4), and the distribution of public 
information: “you rely on the media. Because it’s the whole thing about what our 
trying to get messages out to staff or trying to get messages out to Joe public is now 
put a message through the media” (A4). However, there was concern associated to 
misinformation via the media, which could make the situation worse: “local radio 
might’ve let some information out and then for all of a sudden for whatever reason 
hundreds of people turn up at accident and emergency” (F7). Interestingly, when 
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commanders discussed the media they tended to discuss abstract examples: “you 
always have to think about that photo opportunity when you’ve got an old woman 
shopping with the grandkids and you’ve got a police officer using his baton to repel 
someone” (P1), or associated with vicarious learning attached to famous media 
stories: “you know you look at Hillsborough – it’s left a sort of mark for 25 years 
hasn’t it? It hasn’t ended. It’s still going on. You know Dunblaine. You can think of 
all of those things – there’s always a legacy” (F1). Anxiety about the media was 
thus more closely related to imagined states, rather than personal experience. 
5.4.1.5 Budget Cuts and Austerity 
A final endogenous challenge that emerged from the data was the negative 
impact of austerity measures and government budget cuts: “I guess because of 
austerity none of us have been immune from that. You know we’ve all been 
challenged by austerity. You know in our own budgets being cut significantly” (F1). 
Budget cuts have reduced the number of available resources significantly: “massive 
implications around the availability of ambo and fire and obviously you’re aware 
that fire and ambo are reducing in their resources” (P6), which has increased 
pressure on commanders to resolve incidents quickly to free up resources as soon as 
possible: “I think the resource thing is going to be the greatest issue going forward 
because I think everyone look at it now and go well you want to try and bring the 
incident to a close straight away” (F1). Commanders described pressures to limit the 
financial expense of operations: “because of that *money sign with fingers* Because 
of the overtime. Or because you are tying a lot of resources up and they may be 
needed elsewhere. You are stripping resources from the brigade” (F3), and were 
frustrated at how organisational streamlining limited their ability to provide gold 
standard care as responders were required to work to a higher capacity: “so it’s 
about ‘where do you draw the line?’ And like whereas we’d always go the extra yard 
and I think in some cases we still do – but I think eventually you’ll go ‘well now 
that’s not, we’ve done our bit now and we’ll have to push it back” (F1) . Budget cuts 
were also blamed for creating a competitive environment between agencies 
(especially with non-blue light organisations), as there was competition to justify 
one’s role: “they were being threatened by big cuts so I supposes if someone else 
another organisation can come and do what you’re doing it maybe justifies the cuts 
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whereas if you say well I’m an expert in this and no one else can do this it protects 
you role and position and job ultimately” (F2). 
Respondents expressed concern over the ‘wellbeing’ of team members as a 
result of cuts: “you’ve got the initial people there for the stages but don’t forget 
those people need to get a break at some point throughout the day and have got to 
get replaced by somebody else” (P12), and reduced the overall morale of crews: 
“you shouldn’t bring politics onto the fire ground you know – and sometimes we see 
it with our own firefighters. Because if we’re dealing with a job and you’ve got like 6 
engines there or 10 engines there, it’s all ‘remember when we used to have X fire 
engines?’ (F1). Commanders commented at how emotionally challenging their jobs 
are: “I think in personal life you reflect on things and you think it’s a different job 
more than being a paramedic. You do see things that other people don’t see and 
come across a lot of incidents” (A3), yet organisational restraints limited the ability 
for team members to gain closure on the outcome of incidents: “a lot of the time the 
crews are sort of left wondering and I think it’s just nice to have that closure. I 
certainly know I personally feel a lot better knowing even if it’s bad news” (F14). 
More specifically related to the role of a commander, respondents expressed 
anxiety over the capacity of the blue lights services to cope under cuts due to their 
personal responsibility to cope with austerity: “I don’t know cutting the police 
service, cutting defence, cutting NHS budgets and all sorts – I guess it’s up to us as 
senior managers to make sure we plan and organise and structure things in such a 
way that you don’t compromise public safety even though you’ve got far less 
resources” (P5). Respondents felt that their organisations were in turmoil as 
individuals were having to uptake novel roles that were not in their original job 
description (e.g. paramedics under ballistic protection): “although we’d trained them 
in terms of HART to go into those types of environments were still in a volunteer 
basis because that’s not what they were originally employed to do” (A1). Budget 
cuts and austerity measures thus not only affected decision making at the incident 
ground, but contributed to general feelings of fear for the future of the blue lights 
services: “I don’t think austerity’s ended. I think we’re in this for another 4 years so 
you know I think it’s what happens in the future with our – where do we end up?” 
(F1). 
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5.4.2 Exogenous challenges to emergency incident commanding 
5.4.2.1 Communication 
In terms of exogenous challenges attributed to team processes, respondents 
described how communications were a prevalent source of uncertainty at emergency 
incidents: “the biggest complaint we have post-incident is communications” (F11); 
“that’ll come time and time again communications is the biggest bug bear. We never 
ever seem to get it right” (F5). Communication issues were affiliated to insufficient 
updating from other team members: “we rely on messages massively and 
communications and I think it’s a massive failing that we don’t use them because we 
should” (F4), which led to delays in decision making: “and that delay was to get 
that relevant advice off the relevant people” (P7). The failure to communicate 
information arose at intra-team levels as crews failed to communicate relevant 
information to their own commander: “better communications from the ground 
would’ve been useful” (P11), and at inter-team levels when other agency 
representatives were unavailable: “there was no one to liaise with from the other 
service at all to give me the information that I needed to make a decision” (F4); 
which was especially problematic when coordinating with non-blue lights agencies 
due to differences in working and organisational cultures: “and you know by this 
stage it was 9 or 10 o’clock at night so a lot of the key decision makers in the EA had 
gone home. So unlike the sort of blue light services where I know that if I need to 
speak to my chief fire officer at 2 o’clock in the morning I can get on the phone” 
(F12). Insufficient communication was associated with frustration, as efforts to 
gather information were made impossible: “people get frustrated because they’re not 
finding out all the information” (A4); “the most frustrating thing about that was the 
communications” (F5); “I just found it quite frustrating” (P5). It also led to feelings 
of vulnerability and helplessness as team members were perceived as unreliable: 
“I’m still relying on other people to give me information. I am not seeing all and 
doing all and – so that reliability sometimes it can put a bit of pressure on you” 
(F7). 
When information was shared, there were also challenges associated with 
miscommunication. Communications were sometimes ambiguous, and so 
commanders were uncertain about the meaning of messages: “the control manager 
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rang me and said we’ve got a major incident – no I think we’ve got a major 
incident” (A4), or conflicting, causing commanders to question the validity of 
information: “I just remember it sticks in my mind it was just the conflict of 
information… where’s that information coming from?” (F4). Miscommunication 
arose, not only when other team members were speaking to commanders, but also 
when commanders were providing information and instruction to other team 
members: “I’ll be honest with you at the time I thought I did give fairly clear 
guidance but clearly actions speak louder than words and the fact that it dragged on 
so long” (P5). Generally, poor communication of task relevant information induced 
uncertainty in the team network, creating inaccurate and conflicting assumptions: “it 
taught us a lesson afterwards that people were making decisions or trying to make 
decisions who didn’t understand what was going on” (A1), that derailed action: “but 
it was also delayed because we had contrary views. So he was thinking one thing 
and I’m thinking something else” (P7). This was exacerbated at the multi-agency 
level, due to poor understandings of one another’s language and terminology: “my 
example that would be if a simple firework through a front door. Now the police 
would call that – that’s a firework through the front door – I might call it an 
improvised explosive device which has got a completely different response” (F3). 
5.4.2.2 Role Understanding 
A poor understanding of one another’s roles was problematic for the command 
team. Commonly, commanders felt that other agencies were unaware of their own 
agencies’ capabilities: “the level of understanding around capability needs to 
improve… Capability awareness is a big one” (F2), and so opportunities to 
coordinate skills and expertise were missed: “well the police told us to wait but in 
reality the police don’t know what we’ve got and what we can do. That became 
apparent when I speaking to the police and the incident negotiators afterwards” 
(F9). A failure to fully understand one another’s roles induced unrealistic 
expectations from other agencies: “it’s easy to manage my own kind of teams and 
the direction they go and they do what they need to do, it’s less easy to manage 
people’s expectations who aren’t part of that” (F8), about what could feasibly be 
achieved at the incident: “the fire service were pushing for an evacuation almost 
before I got there. It was a very challenging area to evacuate” (P5). In response to 
poor role understanding, agencies appeared to operate in isolation, focussing on 
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agency-specific tasks: “it was that kind of everyone was working extremely hard but 
there wasn’t necessarily a plan in place. And the clear thing was around what we 
were doing was everyone was independently chasing the fire in their own way if you 
like” (F13), which risked duplication and contradictory efforts: “there’s people just 
freelancing in there and doing their own, because you’re actually working against 
each other in a road traffic collision, because if he’s saying go one way and he’s 
saying go the other then you’re pulling against each other you know?” (F4).  
Decision making was also derailed when individuals lacked an understanding of 
their own role: “I think probably the biggest barriers were the environment agency’s 
lack of understanding of their own powers.” (F12). Poor own role understanding was 
associated with the avoidance of responsibilities: “I briefed the health protection 
agency that’s not for me to – I can contribute to the public safety message but it’s 
not for me as a fire and rescue service commander to release the public safety 
message. That’s their responsibility” (F7). For example, it was often (wrongly) 
assumed that the police would take ultimately responsible for all incidents, and so 
commanders deferred their responsibilities to the police: “there’s a tendency from 
some commanders just to be led by the police” (A2), which in turn acted to frustrate 
police commanders: “it’s not our event. If you’ve got people causing behavioural 
issues in the cinema who do you speak to? You speak to the people running it. So 
again there’s boundaries in terms of yes we will assist you but actually it’s your 
problem” (P12). Role understanding was affiliated with domain specific experience 
that increased confidence in decision making authority: “I think unless you’ve seen 
quite a few major incidents you might hover about that decision making process” 
(A3), and reduced the tendency to acquiesce to social pressures: “it did teach me a 
thing about being how easy it would’ve been for somebody else on that day to have 
succumbed to the pressure to reduce the numbers” (A1). 
5.4.2.3 Trust 
A lack of previous experience with team members was associated with poor 
trust in the abilities of others to perform tasks: “they weren’t my firefighters so I 
didn’t know their skills and competencies” (F8). Likewise, commanders lacked 
confidence in the abilities of those who they knew, but had had a negative personal 
experience with: “I’d worked with him in the past but I got the impression that they 
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didn’t have at the time when by that afternoon they didn’t have as much dynamism 
and get up and go and knowledge as what I thought they had initially” (P5). 
Negative personal experiences created trust issues both during the incident: “I 
wasn’t particularly comfortable with the senior officer who was in charge. That sort 
of gets your hairs up anyway and you think well you know what anyway I might go 
along to that” (F4), and post-incident: “I don’t really know what it was but it was 
like they’d both had a mutual hatred for each other as a result of that incident. Both 
thought they were very rude or whatever it was so yeah. But these things happen in 
crisis don’t they I suppose? (P11).  
Interestingly, a complete distrust in another’s abilities did not derail decision 
making, as commanders acknowledged the inapplicability of the trustee’s skill set: 
“there’s a difference between trusting an individual and the expectation that that 
person at that level will be able to do what I’m asking of them” (F15). Commanders 
tried to assess their team and make use of their skills in the most appropriate way: “it 
might’ve seemed to be quite sexy to get involved in the crux of the incident you know 
to dress up in these the PPE stuff but there were individuals who were not trained to 
do that so it was made clear to those responders that their skills were required 
elsewhere” (A2). Instead, decision making was derailed by mistrust (i.e. uncertainty 
about whether to trust another): “if I don’t have that relationship you know I might 
be thinking about what he’s thinking about doing and is he really interested about 
what we’re doing and so all those things” (A2), as commanders were distracted by 
questioning the reliability of others rather than focussing on the emergency incident: 
“he was untested in terms of does he know about health and safety? Does he know 
about crowd dynamics?” (P2). Mistrust led to suspicion on potential ulterior motives 
of others: “well sort of quite interested really is to sort of you know, they wanted it to 
be you know a disaster ok? They wanted to be able to label it and they wanted to be 
able to give it to us” (F12), and was associated with the fear of being held to account 
for potentially wrong decisions, that were based on advice from (potentially) 
unreliable others: “and it was a bit blind leading the blind sometimes to be honest 
because you were only going from what you were being told” (A4). Mistrust and fear 
of accountability occurred at intra-agency levels: “on this occasion the book stopped 
with me. My bronze commanders weren’t in a position to actually take the decisions 
that I wanted them to take. One because I didn’t trust them” (P2), and was also 
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culturally ingrained at inter-agency levels: “A great deal of trust but not absolute. I 
mean they’re very well trained professional people so you know we work well with 
them and I respect what they do and what they say but I don’t think – you know it’s 
your I’m the decision maker – it’s my head on the line” (P8). 
Interestingly, a ‘trust paradox’ effect emerged, where too much trust in other 
team members contributed to uncertainty. Respondents were wary of over-
familiarisation, as their command decisions may be biased by the opinions of trusted 
others: “the danger is there you become too overfriendly or you become 
unconsciously change your decision making cycle because of someone else’s 
influence through personality” (P12). Commanders experienced negative affect and 
uncertainty if they disagreed with advice from trusted others: “I trusted him and I 
think he was an experienced officer and that made me a bit more concerned” (P10), 
increasing doubt in one’s own judgement: “because we got a good working 
relationship and because he knows what he’s talking about for me to give him an 
opposing view probably made it slightly more difficult for me because I’m having to 
think well hang on I trust his decisions” (P7). Respondents tried to avoid decisions 
that could cause interpersonal issues with trusted with others: “he sat on the fence 
and didn’t – he obviously wasn’t prepared to go up against his colleague and said he 
was comfortable with both” (F2), and less experienced commanders may especially 
struggle with these effects as they are unwilling to break trusted friendships: “it 
depends on being prepared to compromise your friendship to make sure the job gets 
done. So you know I think you’ve got to be to be honest if you’re going to be a 
commander you’ve got to be prepared to be unpopular – it goes with the territory 
really” (P11). 
5.4.2.4 Competition 
A final exogenous challenge that limited the ability of commanders to 
effectively respond to emergency incidents was competition within the command 
environment. At an intra-agency level, commanders described how they sometimes 
felt pressure from their superiors who competed for control: “they were ringing the 
control and trying to put pressure on the control manager to say right we’ll hand 
over to you and I was like no” (A4). Competition for control also occurred at inter-
agency levels: “someone will always take the lead. Generally unless someone’s got 
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significant objections to that whoever sometimes whoever shouts the loudest gets 
their own way – in my experience” (F2), especially when trading-off priorities: 
“biggest barriers initially, is that we all have different priorities” (F9). Competition 
was exacerbated by a lack of procedural guidance on inter-agency organisational 
structure: “patient care is always the responsibility of the ambulance service but the 
extrication is down to us and that can cause some debate at times around clearly 
everyone’s primary concern and primary emphasis is patient care but there can be 
some difference of opinion over what the best thing for that particular patient is” 
(F2), as each agency brings its own, sometimes conflicting, expertise: “there’s also 
conflict with the ambulance service about the best way to get people out of a vehicle: 
we think we know best and they think they know best. And it’s hard. It’s being going 
on for some time that one but we’re getting there” (F4). Indeed, budget cuts and 
austerity also contributed, as both blue lights and non-blue lights services sought to 
justify their importance for fear of closure: “upon reflection I understand that – they 
were losing their jobs and the government want to close all kinds of coastguard 
stations all around the UK so they were trying to be visible” (F1). 
Respondents also described how competitive personalities caused difficulties for 
decision making: “you can get a bit of a rub between personalities that command 
might break down as well” (P1), due to ‘masculine’ and dominant egos: “all very 
you know power based and lots of boys with their toys and not handing over when 
they should be handing over. And I get really frustrated” (A4), who were unwilling 
to share authority: “someone being possessive over this is mine, this is my 
jurisdiction and I don’t want you coming into it” (F2). Past experience relating to 
competitive personalities negatively impacted upon interpersonal relationships as 
others were perceived as having ulterior self-serving motives: “sometimes egos will 
want to be in charge of the juicy bits but they won’t necessarily want to be involved 
in some of the other bits and pieces” (A1), avoiding responsibility when there was 
potential for embarrassment or mistakes: “I think people who are overly ambitious 
probably shy away from some of the hard decisions” (P4).  
Interestingly, one of the most difficult aspects of commanding emergencies was 
when commanders had to compete with the desires of their team members to take 
action: “you know there’s always a willingness from any probably blue light 
responder ambulance inclusive that it’s their natural instinct that when I see a 
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patient to want to help that patient whereas in a lot of situations it’s not always the 
best thing for their own safety” (A2). Although commanders acknowledged that a 
proactive approach was useful, they felt that their role as a commander was to 
protect the safety and moderate the actions of emergency workers: “we can get in 
there, we can put it out. Can we get up there?’ It was dead keen for all the right 
reasons but perhaps too gung-ho” (F11). Commanders expressed anxiety about 
being unable to control team members and indicated goal-conflict between ‘save 
life’ (approach) goals and ‘prevent further harm’ (avoidance) goals, as explored in 
Chapter 4: “tempering the fact that we’ve got firefighters who are keen and trained 
and they actually think they’re in the business of life saving when actually you’ve got 
to sort of stop that and you, you know draw the line between there is no more life-
saving” (F1). Commanders had to compete with their crews due to their 
responsibility to protect them: “if you get away with it then great they’re heroes, if 
they don’t then they’re not coming home” (F11). 
5.5 Discussion 
The main challenges to emergency response decision making were themed 
under two categories to explain different types of uncertainty (Alison et al., 2014). 
Five endogenous challenges emerged, associated with: (i) information problems (too 
little or too much) (ii) resource limitations (a lack of or unreliable); (iii) time 
pressure; (iv) social management issues; and (v) budget cuts and austerity measures; 
and four exogenous challenges emerged, associated to team-processing issues 
regarding: (i) communication (insufficient or miscommunications); (ii) role 
understanding (both of own role and the role of others); (iii) trust (distrust, mistrust 
and trust paradox); and (iv) competition within the command environment (Figure 
5.1). It is important to acknowledge that the scope of results in this chapter is large, 
and covers a wide variety of elements that are worthy of further investigation. 
However, as this chapter was exploratory and fundamentally aimed to provide 
theoretical scope to further the concept of decision inertia in emergency incident 
settings, a wide discussion of all identified contributions to uncertainty was included. 
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Figure 5.1: The endogenous and exogenous sources of uncertainty experienced by commanders during emergency incident
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Although both endogenous and exogenous challenges made decision making 
more complex, the identification of exogenous challenges associated to the 
management of the emergency incident is more useful for interventions. For 
example, interventions to improve communication (exogenous challenge) will ease 
pressures associated with information problems (endogenous challenge). 
Furthermore, exogenous challenges have been identified as more problematic to 
decision making than endogenous issues (Alison et al., 2014). Thus, this discussion 
will now outline the implications of this chapter’s findings by firstly discussion 
endogenous implications followed by exogenous elements.  
5.5.1 Endogenous challenges 
This chapter has provided qualitative support to previous research that described 
how emergency incidents are made more complex due to ambiguous information 
(Bharosa et al., 2010), resource limitations (Miao, Banister & Tang, 2013) and time 
pressure (Chen et al., 2008). Commanders acknowledged how either too little or too 
much information could derail choice, which interacted with their reliance on team 
members. Indeed frustration arose both when there was too little information but also 
when there was too much. For example, FRS respondents often referred to their 
‘spans of control’, representing an awareness of the negative effects of cognitive 
overload. Boin and ‘t Hart (2010) outlined how an ‘obsession with full information’ 
was an ‘avoidable pathology’ that degraded emergency responding. The self-
awareness shown by respondents is encouraging as it highlights their willingness to 
take action with enough information as opposed to all the information. Furthermore, 
respondents acknowledged that more novice commanders may lack this skill. 
Experts are able to effectively adapt to complex environments by using adaptive 
decision making strategies with an awareness of limitations of their cognitive 
processing (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Thus, self-awareness of processing 
limitations may develop over time with expertise; allowing for faster decision 
making. A lack of awareness of processing limitations however appeared to degrade 
decision making, as commanders failed to implement choice; both when they sought 
more information and when they were cognitively overloaded. 
Commanders also described how decision making was challenged due to 
resource limitations, either because resources were unreliable (e.g. mobile phone 
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networks not working) or due unavailable, especially with reference to specialist 
assets (e.g. FRS’s ‘Search and Rescue Team’; AS’s ‘Hazardous Area Response 
Team (HART)’; PS’s ‘Armed Response Team’). Indeed when the reliability of 
technological resources drops below 70 per cent, then this can have negative 
consequences on decision making effectiveness (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). 
Unreliable resources derail decision making by increasing demands on cognitive 
capacity and increasing overall uncertainty on whether they should utilise potentially 
faulty systems. Furthermore, it emerged that resource limitations not only caused 
frustration in terms of accessing resources, but further increased pressure once a 
commander possessed resources associated to having to release resources for other 
potential incidents. Both resource limitations and time pressure negatively interact 
with decision making, and have been linked to poor coordination in emergency 
response management teams (Chen et al., 2008).  
Indeed, the experience of time pressure appears to be a resulting feature of many 
of the endogenous complexities associated with emergency responding, yet it 
remains a relatively under-researched research area in disaster management research 
(Janssen et al., 2010). What has been found is that increased time pressure appears to 
change the way individuals process decisions. For example, police officers who were 
placed under time pressure adapted to use time efficient satisficing strategies over 
more prolonged deliberation; thereby generating fewer hypotheses about an 
investigation (Alison, Doran, Long, Power & Humphrey, 2013). Furthermore, when 
emergency incident decisions lack time pressure with no defined deadline, then this 
can increase decision inertia in multi-agency teams as individual agencies focus on 
their own rather than inter-agency goals (Alison, et al., 2015). Findings suggest that 
time pressure in emergency incidents may thus usefully prompt action and timely 
decision making. However, as the majority of research within emergency settings to 
date has been conducted with experienced emergency responders (Alison et al., 
2013; 2015), there needs to be further investigation on the impact of time pressure on 
less experienced responders. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate how 
much time pressure may be useful before it degrades choice, as time-pressure 
appears to have a U-shaped effect on decision making by increasing performance 
prior to degrading it when levels get too high (Baer & Oldham, 2006). 
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This chapter also revealed two endogenous challenges that were more 
contextually specific to the current socio-political features of British society: (i) 
uncertainty relating to ‘people management’; and (ii) the impact of ‘budget cuts and 
austerity measures’. Both of these challenges reflect changes in the emergency 
responder role over recent years. Commanders described how it was increasingly 
difficult to manage the public during emergencies, as they felt under pressure from 
‘the gaze of the public’, with crowds often gathering at incidents to ‘film it on their 
smartphones’ and upload it onto ‘youtube’. Although social media can be 
advantageous in terms of creating dialogue between the emergency services and the 
public (e.g. location of public rest centres; Houston, Hawthorne, Perreault, et al., 
2015) it can also induce negative effects. For example, it was found during a 
simulated bioterrorism incident that the public tended to overestimate levels of risk 
communicated in social media messages from the emergency services and, as a 
result of their erroneous estimation of risk, became frustrated with the emergency 
services for not doing enough (Malet & Korbitz, 2015). Indeed, commanders in the 
current study expressed anxiety about the potential negative public perceptions that 
may arise due to social media, increasing concerns about accountability. 
Accountability in emergency settings can impede decision making, as a study found 
that when police officers felt strongly accountable for their actions in risky choice 
settings then they tended to focus on egocentric pro-self-goals over collective pro-
social-goals (Waring, Alison, Cunningham & Whitfield, 2013). It is possible 
therefore that public scrutiny may increase decision inertia, as commanders 
experience goal conflict between ‘save life’ approach goals and ‘prevent further 
harm’ goals affiliated to negative accountability. 
A further contemporary challenge that made decision making more difficult for 
emergency responders was the negative impact that budget cuts and austerity have 
had on the ability to respond to emergencies. To put these findings in context, the 
UK government have drastically cut the budgets for all three blue lights services 
over the past five years (McCartney, 2015), with a continuation of these cuts 
expected under the newly elected Conservative Government from 2015-2020. By the 
end of Parliament in May 2015, the average funding cut for each Fire and Rescue 
authority was 28%, with a further 10% of cuts planned for 2015/16 (Hammond & 
Taylor, 2014). A recent survey in London outlined how, despite a 10.9% increase in 
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emergency calls between April and September in 2013, the London Ambulance 
Service has experienced a 19% cut in funding, seen the closure of five A&E 
departments in the area and experienced a threefold increase in paramedics leaving 
the profession since 2011; an accumulation of pressures that have been used to 
explain the drastic reduction of ambulances meeting their ‘8 minute’ patient target 
rate, which reduced from 81% to 48% between March and December 2014 
(McCartney, 2015). Furthermore, in the four years leading up to April 2015, the 
Police have experienced a 23% cut in budgets across forces, which has led to a total 
loss of 17,000 front line police officers and an average loss to each force of 11% of 
police officers and up to 22% of policing staff and PCSOs (ACPO, 2015). It 
emerged from the data that, not only have these cuts altered the fundamental 
organisational structure of the emergency services, but that commanders are 
struggling to cope with the consequences of austerity. 
Cuts appeared to exacerbate other endogenous challenges, as commanders felt 
pressure to reduce and free up limited resources, to limit the financial expenditure of 
operations with regards to maintaining staff on overtime, and to limit the time spent 
at emergency incidents, which had a negative effect on the ability to provide ‘gold 
standard’ interactions with the public as they simply no longer had time. Austerity 
also had a negative impact on exogenous team processing, as agencies were more 
competitive with one another as they felt threatened by austerity and team members 
became frustrated with their need to do more with far less. Commanders expressed 
anxiety over the future, both for themselves and their organisation, and were 
concerned about team morale, especially when dealing with emotionally challenging 
emergency incidents where team members were overworked with little capacity for 
support networks to exist. Indeed a recent open letter by a Paramedic published by 
the Guardian newspaper described how cuts in funding have left staff overworked 
and lacking the emotional and psychological support that they need to operate in 
such a demanding and important job (Guardian, 2015). This is despite evidence that 
suggests ‘critical incident debriefs’ following emotionally challenging incidents are 
one of the most important requirements to facilitate effective work within hospital 
settings (Theophilos, Magyar & Babl, 2009), especially with regards to 
psychological and emotional issues (Ireland, Gilchrist & Maconochie, 2007). Budget 
cuts have reduced the opportunity to perform debriefs, whilst counterintuitively 
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increasing their need on an emotional level. The Police Federation have further 
launched an anti-austerity ‘#cutshaveconsequences’ campaign to highlight the 
negative impact of cuts, and the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA) have 
published a report outlining the damaging impact that austerity has had on the FRS 
(CFOA, 2012). The negative impact of budget cuts and austerity was one of the 
largest and most commonly discussed themes across all three blue lights services, 
and presented a massive challenge to emergency responding. 
5.5.2 Exogenous challenges 
Commanders discussed a number of challenging features of the incident that 
related to social and team processing. Poor communication was a key feature as 
decision making was made more difficult when team members failed to provide 
relevant information, at both intra- and inter-team levels. Importantly, poor 
communication is distinct from issues associated with information as it specifically 
refers to how information is shared throughout the team environment. Indeed, sub-
teams in multi-agency environments tend to focus on communicating information to 
facilitate intra-agency goals rather than wider-team goals (Bharosa et al., 2010), and 
inter-agency communication in multi-agency emergencies tends to reduce when 
decision complexity is increased, leading to decision inertia (Alison et al., 2015). 
The miscommunication of information was found to be an issue in the present study. 
Miscommunication was associated to inaccurate assumptions between team 
members as they either misinterpreted or did not understand communications with 
other team members. The risk of assumptions based on poor communication is 
especially problematic in strategic teams, as individuals are often reluctant to 
highlight uncertainty due to fear of negative reactions from others in the strategic 
team (Bang, 2012). The risk of miscommunication is increased in the emergency 
services as they use specialised terminology and agency-specific acronyms in their 
communications (Laakso, 2013); that may be specific to agencies, specialist teams 
within agencies and further regionally influenced across the country and abroad.  
Poor role understanding also created problems for emergency responders. 
Having an understanding of one’s own and others’ roles within both single- and 
multi-team environments is beneficial for team processing (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1995; Mathieu et al., 2001). Yet when role understanding is poor, then it has a 
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negative impact for team members who tend to reduce information sharing and 
communication (Weller et al., 2008). Poor role understanding in the present study 
was often related to inefficient team processing and frustration between team 
members. Indeed commanders expressed how other agencies were often unaware of 
the capabilities they could offer and this led to feelings of helplessness and a desire 
to operate in isolation. A poor understanding of other agency capabilities may 
diminish the opportunity for lateral thinking when faced with novel and 
unanticipated events; something that has been identified as useful for multi-agency 
coordination (Curnin et al., 2015). For example, a police commander taking primacy 
at the scene of a novel bridge collapse may not consider innovative solutions 
involving rescues from height as they are unaware of this FRS capability. 
Agencies were not only unaware of other agency roles and responsibilities, but 
they were also at times unaware of their own roles and responsibilities. This is 
problematic for decision making as a lack of confidence in one’s own capabilities is 
associated with ‘amotivation’ and an increase in avoidant goals (Lee, Sheldon & 
Turban, 2003). This was especially problematic when commanders were operating 
with non-blue lights responders (e.g. local authorities, environment agency). 
Commanders showed frustration that non-blue lights agencies tried to avoid their 
own responsibilities when there was a blue-lights presence. This appeared to be due 
to a cultural mismatch between organisations where, for example, non-blue lights 
authorities operated on a nine am to five pm rota and thus were reluctant or 
unavailable to operate outside of these hours. Indeed, a study exploring international 
(non-blue light) organisations responding to complex emergency incidents and 
disasters identified that inconsistent organisational structures created difficulties for 
coordination; specifically as non-blue lights authorities were characterised by 
centralised decision making structures, meaning that those ‘in the field’ had little 
decision making authority (Kruke & Olsen, 2012). This differs to the organisational 
structure of the emergency services, which often devolves a large proportion of 
decision making authority to those on the ground (e.g. tactical commanders). This is 
an area for potential future investigation, as there appears to be limited research 
exploring the understanding of non-blue lights authorities with regards to their roles 
during emergencies.  
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Related to poor role understanding was the issue of poor trust in emergency 
decision making. Teams in emergency environments are often temporary and rapidly 
formed. Temporary teams rely heavily on the formation of ‘swift trust’, which is 
contingent upon a clear understanding of roles (Curnin et al., 2015; Meyerson et al., 
1996). Cognitive trust in a team member’s abilities has a greater effect on task 
outcome than emotional trust based on interpersonal experience (Parayitam & 
Dooley, 2008). This pragmatic approach to trust related to an objective awareness of 
roles and abilities was highlighted by commanders when working with unknown 
others. Interestingly, distrust (i.e. opinoin that another cannot be relied upon) did not 
appear to derail choice; commanders acknowledged the other individual’s lack of 
skills and adapted their decision making in accordance to this (e.g. ask someone 
else). Instead, most negative effects arose from mistrust of another in their command 
team whereby they were uncertain about whether they could rely on another. Indeed 
the experiences of trust and perceived risk are suggested to be ‘mirror images’ to one 
another and closely tied with feelings of uncertainty (Das & Teng, 2004). Perceived 
risk increases when on is uncertain about whether they can trust another; whereas 
certain knowledge on the poor abilities of another can be adapted to. Similarly, with 
regards to the exogenous challenge of communication, it appeared that uncertain 
communications causes the greatest problems for decision makers. Indeed, 
uncertainty contributes to decision inertia, as individuals are distracted with 
weighing up the trustworthiness or reliability of information, rather than focussing 
on the objective outcomes of the emergency incident.  
A unique finding of this chapter that also relates to trust was what was termed 
the ‘trust paradox’. Commanders described how high levels of trust in other team 
members sometimes made decision making more challenging. This was because 
disagreements with trusted others led to anxiety and uncertainty over whether to trust 
one’s own judgement, or that of the trusted other. This appeared to be due to conflict 
with emotional trust (Parayitam & Dooley, 2008), as commanders had a trusted 
interpersonal relationship with the other team member. The conflict between holding 
emotional trust whilst doubting the abilities of a team member created uncertainty 
over whether they could be trust their advice. Thorgren and Wincent (2011) outlined 
how trusted inter-organisational relationships can have a negative effect of 
performances as firms develop rigidities leading to organisational inertia. High 
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levels of trust are associated with reduced social monitoring as team members have 
faith in others to perform their roles effectively (Mayer, Davis & Shoorman, 1995); 
often perceived as positive team processing (Marks et al., 2001). Yet this form of 
unquestioning trust when operating in emergency incident settings may be 
undesirable due to the inherent risk, complexity and potential for error (Alison & 
Crego, 2007; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993), which may instead benefit from social 
monitoring. Indeed, JESIP’s introduction of the ‘Joint Decision Model’ (an 
adaptation of the Police ‘National Decision-making Model’) encourages 
commanders to constantly review and reassess their available information during 
decision making within joint command team settings. It is possible that these 
recommendations could contribute to inertia, as trusted team members waste time 
democratically deliberating over whose advise or opinion is most valid rather than 
focussing on the emergency task.  
A final exogenous challenge to emergency incident response related to 
competition between agencies, which occurred at both intra- and inter-team levels. 
At the intra-team level, commanders described how they felt tension between their 
responsibility as a commander (to protect team members from harm) and the desires 
of their subordinate team members to take action to ‘save life’. For example, a 
paramedic commander described the conflict between the desire for his team 
members to treat patients, and his desire as a commander to ensure the paramedics 
themselves aren’t exposed to unnecessary risk. Mamhidir, Kihlgren and Sorlie 
(2007) surveyed the qualitative experience of strategic healthcare workers who 
described how, when faced with tough ethical decision, strategic responsibilities 
increased feelings of isolation and exposure from team members, making decision 
making more difficult. Strategic decision makers experienced conflicting and 
competing feelings between their professional and personal beliefs (Mamhidir et al., 
2007); which was echoed in the current findings as commanders empathised and 
supported their team’s desire to take action, yet were aware of their competing 
responsibility as a commander to prevent harm to emergency service workers. As 
described in Chapter 4, this is associated to goal conflict and decision inertia. 
Commanders also described intra-team competition for control with superiors in 
their own organisation. The UK emergency service command structure is 
hierarchical, whereby responsibility is passed up the command chain when an 
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incident escalates. This led to commanders sometimes feeling pressured to ‘hand 
over’ responsibilities to their bosses. Within-team competition can be beneficial to 
decision making as it encourages team members to work harder (Crawfard & 
LePine, 2012), yet the time criticality of emergency incidents may reduce these 
positive effects as there is little time for disagreement and discussion. He, Baruch 
and Lin (2014) distinguished between adaptive development competition that 
focusses on collective outcomes of the team, and team hypercompetition that refers 
to the desire of a team member to outperform other team members with little 
consideration for collective team goals. Team development competition was adaptive 
and associated with feelings of collectivism and team empowerment whereas 
hypercompetition created negative team processes (He et al., 2014). Thus, superiors 
who seek to take control may benefit from self-monitoring systems to identify why 
they believe they should take command – either due to motivations for team 
development or personal gain. Likewise, open discussion between commanders on 
the reasons for why an incident was ‘handed over’ may reduce any potential negative 
side effects associated with poor personal relationships. 
Competition for control was also experienced between agencies, especially when 
there was a lack of procedural guidance to identify who should take ‘primacy’ (main 
control of the incident). Poor role understanding (as a result of poor strategic 
direction) can cause agencies for focus on familiar intra-agency priorities over 
collective goals (Alison et al., 2015; Banks & Millward, 2007). Effective multi-team 
environments are characterised by coordinated action that transforms intra-agency 
goals into collaborative inter-team action (Marks, et al., 2001; Mathieu, et al., 2000; 
Millward et al., 2010), yet, as found in Chapter 4, although agencies may share 
common collective goals (i.e. ‘save life’) this can compete with intra-agency specific 
goals (e.g. ‘maintain normality’). It is possible that although agencies may 
understand other agencies’ roles during the critical incident, that they lack an 
understanding of additional pressures associated with their subtle role-specific 
responsibilities. Furthermore, when organisations engage in increase inter-agency 
work, then this can increase confusion and competition as professional boundaries 
become more blurred (Brown et al., 2000). This raises an important question with 
regards to the ethos of JESIP as although collaborative work can theoretically 
facilitate collective goals, it also has the potential to increase hypercompetition for 
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agency-specific goals. There is a risk that the professional boundaries between 
agencies may blur, inducing an increased focus on intra-agency goals (Alison et al., 
2015; He et al., 2014). This may further negatively interact with budget cuts and 
austerity measures as agencies compete with one another to justify their integral 
worth at emergencies as evidence to prevent further funding cuts. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified nine key challenges to command level decision 
making in emergency incident settings. It dichotomised findings in line with the 
endogenous-exogenous taxonomy (Alison et al., 2015), where endogenous 
challenges included: (i) a lack of, ambiguous or too much information; (ii) unreliable 
or unavailable resources; (iii) time pressure; (iv) people management; and (v) 
adapting to and coping with budget cuts and austerity; and exogenous challenges 
included: (i) communication problems regarding insufficient updating and 
miscommunication; (ii) poor role understanding of other agencies, both in terms of 
being unaware of their own obligations and holding erroneous and inaccurate 
assumptions about other agencies’ responsibilities; (iii) trust issues associated with 
distrust, mistrust and the paradox of trust; and finally (iv) competitiveness within the 
command environment as a product of competing and conflicting goals. Importantly, 
it emerged that both endogenous and exogenous features of the incident interacted 
with one another. Endogenous challenges associated with the emergency incident 
environment (i.e. time pressure) could negatively impact upon exogenous features 
(i.e. role understanding), increasing overall uncertainty. However, a key implication 
is that this interactive relationship may be usefully reversed to increase the resilience 
of exogenous features to reduce uncertainty associated with (uncontrollable) 
endogenous influences. Indeed, improvements in communication, role 
understanding, trust and reduced competitiveness could reduce the negative impact 
associated with endogenous features. Thus, it is important to identify endogenous 
and exogenous pressures in order to inform potential interventions.  
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Chapter 6: The influence of goal-setting on decision inertia: How inconsistent 
inter-agency goals and the inappropriate application of collective ‘approach’ 
goals can degrade decision making at emergency incidents 
6.1 Abstract 
This chapter sought to explore how self-reported goals interacted with decision 
making behaviour during a simulated multi-agency emergency incident. Specifically 
to identify: (i) whether inter-agency goals were consistent; and (ii) how different 
types of goals interacted with the time taken to make decisions. A total of n=50 
command-level decision makers from the Police Services (PS), Fire and Rescue 
Services (FRS) and Ambulance Service (AS) were split into n=13 multi-agency 
teams, ranging in size from three to five members. Each team participated in a 
simulated emergency incident about a ‘terrorist’ attack (using ‘Hydra’ technology; 
Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, Long, O’Hara & Crego, 2013). Teams 
received nine feeds (i.e. visual / textual / audio) of information about the incident, 
along with iterative and dynamic updates upon request. Data was collected using 
electronically time-stamped ‘decision logs’ and questionnaires following the 
exercise. It emerged that participants from different agencies prioritised different 
approach or avoidance goals: PS participants showed consistent goal conflict 
between approach and avoidance goals; FRS participants initially prioritised 
avoidance goals but then increased approach orientations; and the AS were 
consistently approach oriented. Yet, participants inaccurately perceived inter-agency 
goals to be consistent indicating that: (i) participants’ goals align with intra-agency, 
role-specific demands; and (ii) commanders are relatively unaware of the nuanced 
differences between their goals. At a multi-agency team level, it emerged that teams 
who predominantly held approach goals were significantly faster at decision logging 
early in the incident; yet became significantly slower later on in the incident. This is 
suggested to be due to functional inconsistency of the use of approach goals in 
complex extreme environments. Implications for the usefulness of approach goals 
during complex decision making are discussed. 
6.2 Introduction 
This thesis has so far provided a rich and detailed description of the challenges to 
decision making that were identified from qualitative interviews with emergency 
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response commanders. With regards to goal-directed choice, it has been identified 
how goal conflict can contribute to decision inertia due to competition between 
approach and avoidance goals. This was due to anticipated consequences associated 
with causing potential harm through both action and inaction. It was important to 
explore these effects in more controlled settings to triangulate the data. This chapter 
will: 
(i) Outline the literature on the positive and negative effects of goal-setting. 
(ii) Identify two hypotheses, derived from both the literature and qualitative 
findings: 
a. Hypothesis 1 (H1): Self-reported goals between agencies will be 
consistent. 
b. Hypothesis 2 (H2): Holding approach goals will increase decision 
making speed and reduce overall decision inertia. 
(iii) Present this chapter’s findings on the interaction between goals and 
decision making during an immersive simulated ‘terrorist’ multi-agency 
incident. 
(iv) Discuss the implications of findings with regards to recommendations to: 
a. Improve inter-agency awareness of role-specific goals. 
b. Ensure that ‘approach’ goals are appropriately used in extreme 
environments. 
6.2.1 Goal-directed choice 
Decision making in organisational settings is driven by goals (Yates, 2003). 
Goals act as motivational markers that direct human behaviour towards purposeful 
outcomes (Locke & Latham, 1990). When faced with a task, goals serve as the 
upper-level, overall strategic aim that the decision maker hopes to achieve. In order 
for goals to be effective, it is important that they are specific rather than abstract or 
vague (Locke & Latham, 1990) as a lack of clear team goals is associated with team 
processing failures (Hackman, 2002). Goals in emergency-response settings are 
outlined both at intra-agency levels (i.e. specific to each agency) and at inter-agency 
level, with the identification of collective goals to ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ 
(JESIP, 2013). Theoretically, the identification of these goals should facilitate 
decision making by providing a goal-directed purpose to emergency response 
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behaviour. However, as identified earlier in this thesis, goals may at times conflict 
with one another, inducing decision inertia. It is important to identify the different 
types of goals used by emergency responders in order to identify whether goal-
setting in its current form is adaptive to choice implementation.  
In terms of the psychological interaction between goal-setting and behaviour, 
Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour describes how the likelihood of 
achieving a given goal is related to an individual’s intentions. Intentions result from 
an individual’s perceived level of behavioural control over the situation, their 
positive or negative attitudes towards the goal-directed behaviour and the subjective 
norms relating to social pressure to perform certain behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). In 
emergency response settings, this would mean that commanders must feel in control 
of the situation, have a positive attitude towards taking action and feel support from 
other team members in order to hold high intentions to take action. However, as 
identified previously, goal consistency between team members was not always 
apparent. Furthermore, the complex nature of the emergency incident may decrease 
feelings of control over the situation (Chen et al., 2008). This could threaten the 
intentions of commanders to commit to goal-directed actions; thereby increasing the 
risk of decision inertia. 
It has been suggested goal intentions alone are not enough to induce behaviour. 
Individuals must also have clear implementation intentions to translate goal-directed 
ideals into behavioural action (Gollwitzer, 1993; 1999). Implementation intentions 
refer to the intended tactical behaviour an individual seeks to perform in response to 
situational characteristics (i.e. ‘if situation Y happens, I will do X’) and thus helps 
one to achieve their strategic goal. As identified in Chapter 4, uncertainty about 
options (i.e. implementation intentions) derailed choice in approach oriented 
commanders as they failed to understand how to translate goals into action. Having 
clear implementation intentions has a significant positive effect on goal attainment 
(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). For example, a paramedic may hold a strategic goal 
intention to ‘save life’, yet their implementation intentions can differ depending on 
the time criticality of the patient. If the casualty is in a critical condition, they may 
take more risky but faster actions; whereas when the patient is more stable, they are 
able to perform slower yet safer procedures. The possession of implementation 
intentions thus links to expertise, as experts possess a wealth of implementation 
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intentions to rapidly, and intuitively, perform a given (goal-directed) behaviour in 
response to a given stimulus (Klein, 1998). Thus, expert performance is based upon a 
culmination of clear goal intentions (e.g. save life) coupled with multiple goal-
relevant implementation intentions (i.e. tactics). This suggests that the identification 
of strategic goals is not enough to facilitate goal-directed behaviour. Commanders 
must also hold implementation intentions, which represent the tactical options to 
increase overall goal attainment. Indeed this may be problematic in the emergency 
response domain whereby incidents are often novel and ambiguous, as the ability to 
activate goal-relevant implementation intentions is reduced. 
6.2.2 The negative effects of poor goal-setting 
Although goal-setting can have a positive impact on decision making by 
focussing behaviour on strategic objectives, goals can also degrade decision making 
if they are misapplied. Indeed, ambiguous or abstract goals (e.g. ‘do your best) can 
decrease decision making performance (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002). This would 
suggest that approach goals, which are typically associated with achieving positive 
behaviour and action (Elliot, 2006), may degrade choice if they are ambiguous. This 
raises an important point on whether ‘save life’ goals facilitate emergency 
responding or not, depending on how ‘abstract’ they are perceived to be. Goals must 
avoid being too ‘easy’ and should offer some kind of challenge for action, as easy 
goals can negatively impede action as they are associated with minimal emotional 
intent to take effortful action (Locke & Latham, 2006). Alternatively, overtly specific 
goals can degrade choice if the problem environment is complex as decision makers 
experience cognitive overload and excessive stress (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997). 
Specific goals can also distract decision makers from alternative options leading to 
‘tunnel vision’, focussing only on goal-relevant information and excluding other 
important factors (Drach-Zahavy & Somech, 1999). Indeed, in complex situations 
emergency responders have been found to focus on intra- rather than inter-team 
goals, which increased decision inertia (Alison et al., 2015). This suggests that, 
although goal-setting can facilitate decision making (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2006), 
if goals are inappropriately used, either by being too abstract and simple or too 
specific and complex, then decision making performance degrades.  
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A further contextual element to decision making that may moderate the 
usefulness of goal setting is when decisions are made in team-based environments. 
Indeed, the Theory of Planned Behaviour outlines how subjective norms relating to 
social pressure to perform certain types of behaviour can influence a decision 
maker’s intention to achieve a goal (Azjen, 1991). Individuals may avoid taking 
action to progress towards goals if they feel that the rest of their team do not support 
and/or oppose the goal. Goal-setting in teams adds a further layer of complexity to 
the likelihood of goal accomplishment (Locke & Latham, 2006), not only due to the 
potential negative effect of conflicting inter-team goals, but due to the potential for 
disparity between one’s personal goals and the groups’ collective goals (Seijts 
&Latham, 2000). The desire to achieve a goal in organisational and team-based 
settings is associated with one’s perceived level of involvement with goal setting 
(Yearta, Maitlis & Briner, 1995). This means that team members must feel 
committed and supportive of goals.  Feelings of ‘psychological ownership’ 
(Edmondson, 1999) over goals can facilitate goal accomplishment and so individual 
team members must feel invested and involved in goal setting. This is relevant to 
decision making in emergency contexts, whereby commanders from multiple 
agencies must coordinate their intra-agency goals into collaborative inter-agency 
action (Marks et al., 2001; Mathieu et al., 2000; Millward et al., 2010). If team 
members do not feel committed to team goals, they will have smaller intentions to 
invest behavioural effort to achieve the goal (Azjen, 1991) and thus decision making 
derails. Indeed, a lack of commitment to collective goals may be especially 
problematic in complex decision domains where ‘hyper-competition’ between sub-
teams means that individuals favour intra-agency objectives (Brown et al., 2000; He 
et al., 2014). As competition between agencies was identified in this thesis to be a 
exogenous factor in decision making, it is important to explore the level of 
consistency between different agency’s goals and how this interacts with team 
processing. This chapter will therefore use the simulation to identify the different 
types of goals that were identified by commanders from different organisations, to 
examine their positive or negative effects on choice implementation. 
6.2.3 Summary 
Although goal-setting predominantly facilitates decision making, it appears that 
when operating in complex, team-based environments that goal-setting may be 
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misapplied. This is due to issues associated with cognitive, affective and social 
processing, which may reduce an individual’s intention to achieve a given goal. It 
has been identified in this thesis that when multiple goals conflict with one another, 
either psychologically or at the team-level, then this increases redundant deliberation 
and decision inertia. It is therefore important that goal-setting in emergency response 
environments is both appropriate and useful. Indeed, the JESIP ‘Joint Doctrine’ 
identifies two goals for emergency responders: to ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ 
(JESIP Joint Doctrine, 2013). It is important to explore: (i) if these goals are actually 
used by emergency commander’s according to their self-reported goals; and (ii) 
whether these goals are useful in terms of facilitating behaviour. This chapter sought 
to explore the relationship between self-reported goals and behaviour in a simulated 
multi-agency emergency environment. Specifically, it sought to identify evidence 
relating to two hypotheses: 
 H1: Self-reported goals between agencies will be consistent 
 H2: Holding approach goals will increase decision making speed and 
reduce overall decision inertia 
6.3 Method 
Data was collected from an Immersive Simulated Learning Environment (ISLE) 
to explore the real-time decision making of emergency responders operating in a 
simulated multi-agency environment (see Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, 
Long, O’Hara & Crego, 2013). The study was conducted using ‘Hydra’ software, a 
computer based ISLE where participants are provided with audio, video and textual 
information about an unfolding decision making event (i.e. emergency incident). 
Information is fed to participants in real-time and dynamically changes in relation to 
the decisions made by delegates. Delegates are asked to log their decisions in an 
electronic ‘decision log’, which is visible to the facilitators of the exercise in the 
control room, who may then adapt the flow of the unfolding incident accordingly. 
Although ‘Hydra’ is traditionally used for training decision making in complex and 
high-stakes environments, it was adapted in this study to facilitate data collection. 
Importantly, the simulation was designed in close collaboration with subject matter 
experts (SME) from each of the three blue lights agencies in order to provide training 
benefit to the delegates who participated. This was why a ‘Marauding Terrorist 
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Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) incident was used, as this complemented recent classroom 
training they had received on ‘joint decision making’ in line with the JESIP 
initiative. 
6.3.1 Participants 
A total of n=50 participants took part in the study, who were split into 13 multi-
agency groups. Participants were representatives from the Police Service (PS; n=17), 
Fire and Rescue Service (FRS; n=22) and Ambulance Service (AS; n=11) and were 
qualified incident commanders. The majority of participants were male (n=46) and 
aged between 41-50 years (n=37). All participants were experienced, with their 
length of service ranging from eight to 35 years, with a mean of 24.03 years. There 
were 13 groups, meaning that the simulation ran a total of 13 times, with between 
three and five participants in each group. The aim was to have at least one 
representative from each agency present during each simulation; however, 
occasionally representatives who had agreed to participate became unavailable last 
minute as they had to respond to an unanticipated real-life incident. Thus, at times, 
only two out of the three agencies had a representative present in the simulation. 
This is an acknowledged but anticipated limitation due to the nature of the 
participants’ job. When an agency representative was absent during the simulation, 
SMEs in the control room provided the group with information about decisions on 
behalf of the absent agency. Table 6.1 outlines the participant details for each group. 
Table 6.1: Number of participants from each agency and totals for each group 
Group Number of participants 
Police  Fire and Rescue Ambulance 
Service 
Total 
1 2 2 1 5 
2 1 1 1 3 
3 2 2 0 4 
4 1 2 1 4 
5 1 1 1 3 
6 1 2 1 4 
7 0 2 1 3 
8 2 2 1 5 
9 1 1 1 3 
10 2 2 1 5 
11 1 1 1 3 
12 2 2 1 5 
13 1 2 0 3 
Total 17 22 11 50 
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6.3.2 ISLEs for research: Hydra 
Hydra is an ISLE that has been used extensively to train practitioners in high-
stakes decision making in a variety of domains including major incident 
management, child protection and national security (Hydra Foundation, 2015). It is 
typically used as an organisational training tool, allowing ‘trainees’ to role play 
challenging decision making in an immersive and realistic, yet simulated and safe, 
environment. Hydra can train various skills, ranging from work-domain specific 
incidents (e.g. major incident response) to more general skills relating to 
organisational and team management (e.g. human resources issues). Importantly, not 
only can Hydra facilitate practitioner training, but it creates a data rich environment 
from which it is possible to conduct research (Alison, et al., 2013). For example, by 
analysing the data that is digitally recorded during the simulation (e.g. decision logs, 
audio recordings). Hydra has previously been used for research by collecting 
secondary data from training events. The study in this chapter was unique, using 
Hydra as a platform through which a simulation was developed in order to facilitate 
both research and training needs, designing the simulation from the ground-up 
through close collaboration with SMEs. As such, a brief overview of the use of 
simulations for research will be outlined below, grounded in examples using the 
Hydra system.  
6.3.2.1 Using Hydra as a simulation platform for NDM research 
Simulations offer a fruitful method for collecting NDM data in high fidelity 
environments, which also allow for experimental control. The general process when 
running a simulation involves two teams of people: (i) the delegates, who are 
participating in the simulation as decision makers; and (ii) the facilitators, who are 
located in an external control room and oversee the simulation. In the case of Hydra, 
delegates are placed inside a ‘syndicate room’ (Figure 6.1), where they receive 
audio, visual or textual information relating to the simulation. Hydra is a team-based 
simulation and so groups can be intra-agency (e.g. all PS) or multi-agency as was the 
case in this thesis (i.e. PS, FRS & AS). Unlike virtual reality simulations, which use 
headsets and haptic sensors to create visually immersive environments, Hydra 
delegates are provided with information via audio, video and textual messages that 
are transmitted over a large projected screen (Figure 6.1). The focus is on creating a 
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psychologically immersive decision making environment, rather than focussing on a 
visually immersive environment. Depending upon the nature of the exercise, 
delegates may also be provided with additional real-world tools in the syndicate 
room such as maps and laptop computers. Delegates interact with the simulation by 
using a computer, where they are able to access their ‘decision log’ (to log actions) 
and ‘communicator’ (to ask for further information/questions from the control 
room). A unique feature of Hydra is that facilitators in the control room can adapt the 
information they feed into the simulation depending upon the actions that have been 
logged by the delegates. For example, in hypothetical Police investigative scenario, 
one team may choose to interview a suspect whereas the other team (in a separate 
syndicate room) decides to wait and gather more intelligence. Facilitators can adapt 
information feeds according to this by, for example, sending a video feed of an 
interview with the suspect to the first team, and providing an update about the 
location of a second suspect to the second team. 
 
Figure 6.1: A typical Hydra ‘syndicate room’ 
The facilitator team in a Hydra simulation, which may include SMEs, trainers 
and researchers, are located in the ‘control room’ (Figure 6.2). This room contains a 
numerous computer screens that are used to monitor the behaviour in the syndicate 
room. As demonstrated in Figure 6.2, it is possible to run multiple syndicate rooms 
at once depending upon the objectives of the exercise. Facilitators have 
responsibility for ‘firing’ information into the syndicate room via the computer. 
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Generally, a ‘timeline’ is used to guide this process (Table 6.2), which roughly 
outlines the narrative order of injects, although this can change in response to the 
decisions made by the delegates. The live monitoring of delegates in the room, via 
CCTV and audio, helps improve the realism of the exercise, as information feeds can 
be prepared in advance of delegates submitting their decisions on the log and new 
challenges can be created ‘in vivo’ based on the team’s performance. For example, 
in the current study, the AS SME felt that AS delegates could be challenged more 
than they were. Thus, a new information feed was prepared ‘in vivo’ to ask the AS 
delegate about their ‘patient extrication method’ (i.e. how they were going to treat 
casualties). When delegates have completed their Hydra simulation, a ‘debrief’ is 
usually held. This is when SMEs dissect the decision making of the delegates in an 
open, informal setting.  
 
Figure 6.2: A typical Hydra ‘control room’ 
6.3.3 Procedure 
As the researcher for this thesis helped to design the simulation used for data 
collection, a detailed description of the collaborative procedure that was used to 
design, develop and run the simulation for this thesis will now be outlined. 
Specifically, this process involved five steps: (i) identifying objectives for the 
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exercise; (ii) designing the timeline; (iii) recording and building the scenario; (iv) 
recruiting participants; and (v) running the simulation. 
6.3.3.1 Step one: Identifying key objectives 
During the initial design of a simulation to be used for training and / or research 
it is important to identify key objectives to help guide the process. As mentioned 
previously, data for this chapter was gathered from a Hydra simulation that was 
uniquely designed to meet both research and training needs. This was a result of the 
mutually agreed knowledge-exchange arrangement between the University of 
Liverpool and the local emergency service authorities. Specifically, the emergency 
services will allow for research and data to be collected during their training in 
exchange for feedback and help in designing scenarios for their training exercises. 
For this study, research goals were to explore command-level decision making in a 
multi-agency team environment where it would be possible to unpack choices via the 
use of decision logs and post-simulation questionnaires. It was important to try and 
replicate the incident across groups in order to allow for comparison of effects 
between groups and so the timeline required a linear structure, albeit with the 
potential for additional information when required. Training goals were to create a 
real-world simulation to ground previous classroom training on the JESIP 
interoperability programme. Commanders from all three agencies had recently 
attended a one day training course (which was run on different days over a number 
of months) that aimed to align command decision making with the government’s 
JESIP initiative. Furthermore, there were ongoing discussions, external to this study, 
about running a live play multi-agency exercise of a ‘Marauding Terrorism Fire 
Arms’ (MTFA) incident (a moving terrorist attacking civilians with a firearm) and so 
the simulation offered a cost-effective platform to trial elements of the exercise. The 
MTFA scenario further fit the training requirements of JESIP, as there is no clear 
authority (or agency ‘primacy’) with regards to many of the decisions that would 
need to be made (e.g. whether to commit staff into risk area). 
6.3.3.2 Step two: Designing a scenario timeline 
Once key objectives and the scenario topic had been agreed upon, it is possible 
to start building the timeline for the exercise. This process involved a series of 
emails and face to face meetings between SMEs and the researcher to discuss 
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different ideas on how the incident may unfold. The researcher drew up an initial 
timeline that was sent to the SMEs. It described an MTFA incident involving three 
gunmen who had opened fire at a busy, city centre national railway station at peak 
hours (i.e. 8am). Additional details and injects of information were added to this 
initial timeline during brainstorming and then piloted in slow-time with external 
SMEs. The SME comments helped to provide clarity to the incident prior to the 
formal recording of audio materials.  
The scenario timeline for this study is outlined in Table 6.2. Two key injects 
were inserted to challenge decision making. Firstly, the ‘zoning task’ (inject 2) asked 
commanders to make a joint decision on where to place the ‘hot’, ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ 
zones. This is a procedure used by the emergency services for identifying risk during 
an ongoing incident. For a terrorist incident, the ‘hot’ zone is the area in which the 
gunmen are operating and the only emergency service responders allowed in this 
zone are trained, armed-response-team police officers. The ‘warm’ zone is the area 
that the gunmen have either already been or have the potential to (re)enter, where 
only specialist trained emergency workers from the three services may operate due to 
the inherent risk. This means that staff numbers are limited and civilians within the 
warm zone must be evacuated immediately in order to receive treatment. Finally, the 
cold zone is the area outside the incident where there is little or no risk for the 
gunmen to appear. As such casualty triage centres are usually located here. Inject 2 
asked delegates to make a joint decision on how to identify these zones in order to 
enable effective and safe working strategies for their teams, as would be expected in 
a real-life incident. 
The second key inject in the scenario was the ‘non-specialist staff at RVP’ 
decision (inject 7). By this point of the exercise, resources were depleted (especially 
due to an additional fire inside the train station) and civilians were still bleeding and 
dying on the concourse (which by now should have been re-zoned as a ‘warm’ zone 
as the terrorists had moved to the underground). Delegates had to decide whether to 
break protocol and allow non-specialist staff (who had lifesaving skills but lacked 
specialist training and appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for firearms) 
to operate on a voluntary basis in the area to help with casualty rescue and treatment; 
or whether to refuse them access this area in order to protect emergency workers and 
continue to operate with stretched resources whilst casualties worsened and fatalities 
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grew. As this was a ‘wicked problem’ with no right or wrong answer, the delegates 
received an angry message from the FRS Chief whatever their decision (inject 8a/b). 
This was to then prompt them to justify their decision and reflect on their rationale at 
the end of the simulation. 
Table 6.2. Simulation timeline 
Inject  Title Message 
source 
Details 
1 Initial callout 
message  
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Multiple 999 calls being received. Reports 
of 3 men on Station platform who have 
opened fire with automatic weapons at 
civilians on platform. Rush hour trains. 
2 Zoning task Communicator 
(TEXTUAL) 
Delegates told they are now at the RVP. 
They have been provided with maps and 
must decide upon hot/warm/cold zones and 
place their FCP. 
3 Civilian 
message 
Civilian – live 
message 
(AUDIO) 
Frantic message from a civilian who was 
inside the station. Informs of a large 
number of casualties bleeding out and that 
shooters are still firing at civilians. 
4 Casualty 
update 
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Multiple 999 calls being received. Same as 
civilian information – people bleeding and 
dying and gunmen still firing. 
5 Shooters to 
underground 
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Report from Firearms Officers that 
shooters have moved down into the 
underground local lines of the train station. 
6 Fire inside 
station 
 
Control centre 
– Phone 
call(AUDIO) 
Reports that a fire has started in a bar 
inside the train station with persons 
trapped. Fire resources are stretched. 
7 Non-
specialist 
staff at RVP 
Firefighter – 
Radio message 
(AUDIO) 
Addition staff from FRS and AS arrived at 
RVP. They are not trained to work in 
firearms incident but are volunteering to 
commit. Delegates must decide whether to 
use them or not. 
8a Angry chief – 
Commit 
FRS Chief – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
If decide to commit – FRS Chief rings 
demanding to know why non-specialist 
staff have been committed into the risk 
area. 
8b Angry chief – 
Not 
committed 
FRS Chief – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
If decide to not commit – FRS Chief rings 
demanding to know why non-specialist 
staff have been committed to the risk area. 
9 TCG update Police officer – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
A situational update message must be sent 
to the strategic multi-agency team 
Note: RVP = Rendezvous Point; FCP = Forward Command Point; TCG=Tactical 
Coordinating Group 
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6.3.3.3 Step three: Recording and building a simulation 
Once a timeline had been developed, it was possible to begin building the 
simulation by collecting materials and coding in the Hydra computer system. The 
simulation materials for this study were collected by the primary researcher and 
predominantly involved audio feeds (see Table 6.2). A script was produced, with 
assistance from SMEs, that was given to ‘actors’ who were encouraged to use the 
script as a guide and to add any additional terminology if they saw fit (Appendix 
Five). Whenever possible, audio recordings of people who may be involved in a real-
world incident were used. For example, the control room messages were recorded 
with a real-life control room operator and the ‘FRS Chief’ recording was the voice of 
the actual Chief of the FRS in the region where the study was conducted. Audio clips 
were edited using ‘Audacity’ software to cut the clips to size and overlay sound 
effects (e.g. traffic noise; sirens). SMEs listened to the final clips and adjustments 
were made according to their recommendations (e.g. traffic noise too loud). Audio 
clips were then coded into Hydra and a slow-time pilot exercise was conducted to 
test the simulation. A key learning point that emerged from the pilot exercise was to 
ensure a ‘loggist’ was present in the simulation room with the delegates to operate 
the ‘decision log’ and ‘communicator’. This was because the team member who 
acted as ‘loggist’ in the pilot exercise felt distracted by logging duties and thus didn’t 
engage with the exercise. Postgraduate students acted as the ‘loggist’ during the 
study, who passively logged decisions on the system whenever requested to by the 
delegates. It was made clear to delegates that they must instruct their ‘loggist’ on 
what to type in a verbatim format. 
6.3.3.4 Step four: Recruiting participants 
Participants were recruited by the SMEs who were involved in the project. In 
order to align with the requirements of this thesis, and due to the command-level that 
the simulation training was designed, SMEs recruited ‘command level’ decision 
makers. SMEs distributed emails via their internal communications teams, which 
contained the information sheet outlining the details of the study (Appendix Six). 
The information letter outlined the general aims of the simulation and detailed both 
training and research goals. This aligned with the ethical approval that was granted 
by the University of Liverpool’s Ethics Committee. Individuals who agreed to 
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participate were allocated a date and time slot to attend the University of Liverpool 
and participate in the simulation.  
6.3.3.5 Step five: Conducting the simulation 
Simulations took place in the Hydra Suite located at the Centre for Critical and 
Major Incident Psychology at the University of Liverpool. Participants were 
provided with limited information about the specifics of the exercise in order to 
increase realism of an unanticipated major incident. On arrival, delegates were 
introduced to one another, the SME team, the research team and their loggist. 
Importantly, it was made clear that the loggist would only type when instructed to 
ensure that the team were responsible for proactively logging their own decisions. 
They were also given a short tutorial on how to use the Hydra system and provided 
with the opportunity to ask questions. They were asked whether they still wished to 
participate in the exercise and given the opportunity to leave. Ethical approval was 
provided when they signed the ethical consent forms that were provided (Appendix 
Four). 
The beginning of the exercise began by seating delegates in a room external to 
the Hydra suite. They were then provided with a piece of paper, which outlined 
preliminary agency-specific information on the incident and resource mobilisation 
(Appendix Seven). They were asked to think about the information and to imagine 
that they were ‘en route’ to the incident with an ETA of 5 minutes. Participants were 
left alone in the room whilst the ‘facilitator team’ made their way to the control 
room. The facilitator team consisted of one SME from each agency and two 
researchers: (i) the primary researcher; and (ii) an additional researcher who assisted 
with exercise control. After five minutes, participants were moved into the syndicate 
room and received their initial inject (Table 6.2).  
The syndicate room contained spare paper and three maps of the railway station: 
one close up of the station concourse; one of the station and immediate surrounding 
area; and another aerial view of the station and wider surrounding area (Figure 6.3). 
The exercise was monitored by the SMEs, who advised when the next inject should 
be provided (i.e. when they felt that the group had effectively responded by asking 
questions and logging decisions). Variability in this process was reduced by using 
the same SMEs across all 13 exercises. SMEs also helped to answer agency-specific 
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questions by, for example, providing local information on where the British 
Transport Police headquarters was located in the region that the exercise took place. 
On finishing the simulation, participants went back into the plenary room and 
completed a questionnaire (Appendix Nine). The SMEs then led an informal debrief 
with participants, which focussed on their training objectives (i.e. joint decision 
making and JESIP).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Maps provided to participants in simulation 
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6.3.4 Materials 
6.3.4.1 Decision Log 
Delegates were asked to log their decisions on the electronic decision log. The 
decision log had two boxes in which to type information: (i) one for their ‘decision’; 
and (ii) the second for their ‘rationale’. Logs were used to identify the time it took 
for teams to respond to a decision task. Specifically, the two key decisions identified 
by the SMEs (i.e. zoning decision; non-specialist staff at RVP decision) were used to 
measure the time lag between the provision of the decision task (i.e. to make a 
decision on zoning and log it on the computer) and the time the team logged their 
choice (e.g. zones are x, y, z). 
6.3.4.2 Questionnaire 
Participants completed a questionnaire at the end of the simulation, which took a 
variety of measures relating to the exercise. For the purposes of this chapter, 
participants were asked to identify their top three goals during the simulation. They 
were also asked whether they perceived goals to be consistent between different 
agencies. Furthermore, two questions were included to ‘validate’ the realism of the 
simulation using a ranking scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Participants’ mean score for ‘realism’ fell in the ‘agree’ range (M=5.90, SD=.99) 
with no significant differences between agencies, F(2,49)=.610, p=.548.  
Participants’ mean score for feelings of ‘high-risk’ fell within the range of ‘agree’ to 
‘strongly agree’ (M=6.14, SD=1.06) with no significant differences between 
agencies, F(2,49)=1.946, p=.154. This indicated that participants found the 
simulation high-risk (as per the requirements of the exercise) and realistic. Data was 
analysed using SPSS 21. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Summary 
The two hypotheses and findings are outlined in Table 6.3. Generally, evidence 
was found to support the approach-avoidance distinction identified in Chapter 4; 
goals were either approach goals to make a positive impact on the situation or 
avoidance goals to prevent negative consequences from arising. However, results did 
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not support H1 as inter-agency goals were not consistent: PS participants expressed 
equal amounts of both approach and avoidance goals, FRS participants initially 
prioritised avoidance goals and then shifted in favour of approach goals, and AS 
participants consistently favoured approach goals. It is suggested that these goals 
reflect intra-agency focus. The PS are focussed both on the incident (approach) and 
post-incident demands (avoidance of further harm); the FRS initially showed 
avoidance goals as they sought to protect emergency responders from fire-specific 
high risk operations, however once safety was established they switched to pro-
approach goals; and the AS held consistently high approach goals as their role is 
specific to patient treatment.  
In terms of H2, it was found that when a team was characterised by approach 
goals (as the majority of team members held approach goals), they logged faster 
decisions early on in the incident (i.e. zoning task); however approach teams were 
found to be slower at decision making later in the incident (i.e. non-specialist staff). 
This is an interesting avenue for further research on how choice context interacts 
with goal relevance; approach goals may facilitate decision making during the early 
stages of a problem but become maladaptive during complex decision making later 
into the incident when faced with multiple competing tasks. The overwhelming 
desire to achieve a positive impact on the incident may distract decision makers, as 
they seek to optimise mutual and competing task demands.  
Table 6.3: Summary table of findings for H1 and H2 
Hypothesis Found 
H1: Self-reported goals 
between agencies will be 
consistent 
Goals were inconsistent between agencies. They 
appeared to align with role-specific responsibilities: 
the PS participants goals were generally split 
between approach and avoidance; the FRS were 
firstly avoidance oriented and then shifted to 
approach; and the AS were consistently approach 
oriented. Importantly, commanders (wrongly) 
perceived inter-agency goals to be consistent. 
H2: Holding approach goals 
will increase decision making 
speed and reduce overall 
decision inertia 
Approach goals were associated to faster decision 
making at the initial stages of the incident (i.e. 
zoning task); but were associated with slower 
decision making during more complex choices 
further on into the incident (i.e. non-specialist staff). 
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6.4.2 H1: Self-reported goals between agencies will be consistent  
6.4.2.1 Main goals 
Participants were asked to “List in order your main three goals from the 
scenario (from most important)” in an open text box. Six different goals were 
identified by participants via inductive coding. They were:  
i) Save life/treat patients 
ii) Protect emergency responders from harm 
iii) Establish shared situational awareness/joint working 
iv) Protect the public from further harm 
v) Locate/neutralise threat 
vi) Prepare for post-incident demands 
As depicted in Figure 6.4, the most prevalent goal overall was to ‘save life/treat 
patients’ (27.2%), followed by ‘protect emergency responders from harm’ (22.1%), 
‘establish shared situational awareness/joint working’ (21.3%), ‘protect the public 
from further harm’ (16.2%), ‘locate/neutralise threat (8.8%) and ‘prepare for post-
incident demands’ (4.4%). PS participants’ most commonly cited goal overall was to 
‘locate/neutralise threat’ (22.3%), followed by ‘protect the public from further harm’ 
(20.5%), ‘protect emergency responders from harm’ (20.5%),  ‘save life/treat 
patients’ (13.6%), ‘established shared situational awareness/joint working’ (11.3%) 
and ‘prepare for post-incident demands’ (6.8%). For the FRS participants, ‘save 
life/treat patients’ was the most common goal (29.0%), followed by ‘protect 
emergency responders from harm’ (25.8%), ‘establish shared situational 
awareness/joint working’ (24.2%), ‘protect the public from further harm’ (16.1%) 
and ‘prepare for post-incident demands’ (4.8%). Likewise, ‘save life/treat patients’ 
was the most common goal for AS participants (43.3%), followed by ‘establish 
shared situational awareness/joint working’ (30.0%), ‘protect emergency responders 
from harm’ (16.6%) and ‘protect the public from further harm’ (10%). 
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Figure 6.4: The prevalence of different goal types overall (within groups) and for each individual agency (between groups) 
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Chapter 4 identified that the motivational goals of emergency response 
commanders tended to be either: (i) ‘approach’ oriented, with the aim to make a 
positive impact on the situation; or (ii) ‘avoidance’ oriented, with the aim to prevent 
a negative impact on the situation. Support for these findings was found in this study 
as the six identified goals were deductively coded using this distinction (Table 6.4). 
There was a relatively even split between the prevalence of approach and avoidance 
goals overall, as 57% of goals were approach oriented compared to 43% coded as 
avoidant. Participants were asked to specify the order of importance of their goals 
from ‘most important’ to ‘second most important’ to ‘third most important’. 
Although the prevalence of approach goals increased across these three measures, 
from 53% (most important) to 57% (second most important) and 62% (third most 
important), a McNemar’s repeated measures chi-square test found that the shift in 
goal orientation was not significant, p=.541. 
Table 6.4: The ‘approach’ or ‘avoidance’ classification of each of the six goals 
Goal orientation Original goal 
Approach goal Save life/treat patients 
Establish shared situational awareness/joint working 
Locate/neutralist threat 
Avoidance goal Protect emergency responders from harm 
Protect the public from further harm 
Prepare for post-incident demands 
 
6.4.2.2 Intra-agency differences in approach / avoidance goals 
Data was explored to see if there were any differences between agencies in 
terms of their goal orientations. Overall, 52.2% of PS participants’ goals were 
approach oriented along with 53.2% of FRS participants’ and 73.3% of AS 
participants’ goals. This suggested that whereas both the PS and FRS participants 
had fairly even proportions of approach to avoidance goals, AS participants were 
predominantly approach oriented. A Pearson’s chi-square test found a significant 
interaction between agency membership and overall goal orientation, χ2(2)=6.236, 
p=.04, with a large effect size (Pallant, 2010), Cramer’s V=.364. Odds ratios 
indicated that AS participants were 11.58 and 9.90 times more likely to express 
approach goals overall than PS participants and FRS participants, respectively. FRS 
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participants were also 1.18 times more likely to express approach goals than PS 
participants. There was also a significant interaction between agency membership 
and goal orientation for what participants identified to be their ‘most important’ goal, 
χ2(2)=7.42, p=.024, which had a large effect size, Cramer’s V=.406. Once more, AS 
participants were 14.63 and 9 times more likely to prioritise approach goals than 
FRS and PS participants, respectively. However, this time, PS participants were 1.62 
times more likely to prioritise approach goals than FRS participants. Interestingly, 
when participants were asked to rate on a Likert scale whether they believed multi-
agency were inconsistent, their mean score rested between ‘disagree’ and ‘somewhat 
disagree’ (M=2.31, SD=1.21), indicating that they believed inter-agency goals were 
relatively consistent. A one way ANOVA found that there were no significant 
differences between agencies in this opinion, F(2,46)=.357, p=.702. Thus, although 
self-reported goals suggest that agencies’ goals implicitly differed, it appeared at the 
explicit level that participants were unaware of these nuanced differences.  
Data was also explored to see how goal prioritisation changed in order of 
importance for each agency (Figure 6.5). PS participants’ goals remained relatively 
unchanged, showing a steady split between approach and avoidance goals; FRS 
participants’ goals became increasingly approach oriented over time, as only 38.1% 
of FRS participants identified approach goals as their most important goal, compared 
to 70% of participants as their third most important goal; and AS participants 
consistently favoured approach over avoidance goals. This provides support for 
qualitative findings in Chapter 4, which identified how goals appeared to differ 
between agencies as a function of agency-specific responsibilities. Specifically, the 
PS are responsible for considering both ‘save life’ (approach) goals and ‘prevent 
further harm’ (avoidance) goals as they are responsible for both critical incident and 
post-incident management of the public; the FRS prioritised ‘save life’ but also 
placed a great deal of emphasis on ‘preventing further harm’ due to the inherent risk 
associated to their capabilities, which may explain why their goal orientations adjust 
over time from avoidant (or protective) to approach; and the AS, whose primary role 
is to treat patients, held consistently approach oriented goals as their main purpose 
during emergencies is to access and treat patients. 
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Figure 6.5: Percentage of participants within each agency who identified 
‘approach’ goals as their most important, second most important and third 
most important goals 
6.4.3 H2: Holding approach goals will increase decision making speed and 
reduce overall decision inertia  
The time taken to log decisions was measured at two key decision points: (i) 
identification of hot/warm/cold zones; and (ii) the decision on whether to commit 
additional non-specialist staff to the risk area or not (Table 6.2). These two decisions 
were identified by SMEs to be challenging for participants as they were non-time 
bounded choices that were ambiguous, high-stakes and required agreement from all 
three agencies. Time was digitally recorded on decision logs and time in minutes 
calculated from presentation of the decision task to the point in time that a relevant 
decision was logged. SMEs helped to identify the point of time in which a relevant 
decision had been logged (and thus time stamped).  
The overall total time that it took teams to complete the exercise ranged from 66 
to 90 minutes in total, with a mean exercise length of 78.61 minutes. For the zoning 
task, time ranged from 6 to 21 minutes, with a mean length of 13.07 minutes; for the 
non-specialist staff task, time ranged from 2 to 36 minutes, with a mean average 
length of 7.61 minutes. Mann Whitney U-tests found no relationship between goal 
orientation and time taken to log decisions overall, U=247.50, p=.582, for the zoning 
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decision, U=260.50, p=.788, or the non-specialist staff decision, U=238.00, p=.450. 
However, it was suspected that this was due to a methodological issue, as approach-
avoidance orientations were coded at the individual level, whereas time of decision 
was coded at the team level; thus participants would have a collective team-level 
dependent variable (i.e. decision time), but individual approach or avoidance goals. 
In order to address this, data was re-coded at the team level using a majority rule (i.e. 
if the majority of team members were approach oriented then all participants within 
that team were coded as having team approach goals). To provide more explanatory 
power to findings, the time taken by teams was split into a dichotomous variable 
based upon a median split to measure those teams that were faster or slower at 
decision making. 
A Pearson’s chi-square found that, across the incident as a whole, team goal 
orientation did not interact with the time taken to complete the exercise, χ2=.105, 
df=1, p=.746, phi=.098; holding predominantly approach (or avoidance) goals 
overall did not lead to faster (or slower) decision making. Yet there was found to be 
a significant interaction between time taken to complete the scenario and a team-
level goal orientations for participants’ most important goal, χ2=4.425, df=1, p=.035, 
phi=-.351. Specifically, approach-oriented teams were 4.891 times more likely to be 
slower at decision making across the incident as a whole. This appeared to be due to 
significant delays for the ‘non-specialist staff’ decision, χ2=14.089, df=1, p<.001, 
phi=-.593, as approach teams were 25.71 times more likely to be slower at making 
this decision than those who were avoidance oriented. For the zoning task however, 
the opposite effect was found, as approach teams were 3.92 times more likely to 
make faster decisions, albeit following Yates’ continuity correction for 2x2 chi-
square analyses, this effect no longer fell within significance, χ2=3.485, df=1, 
p=.062. It is suggested that these differences may be due to the timing of these 
decisions, whereby approach goals facilitate action during the initial stages of the 
incident but can inhibit action later into the incident when maximising strategies to 
achieve the most positive outcome are more difficult to achieve due to the 
increasingly information rich and complex environment. Unfortunately, as data on 
goal orientations was collected at the end of the incident, it was not possible to test 
for specific differences in goal orientations at the time of each decision. This is an 
acknowledged limitation in the design of this study design and further research could 
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take ‘in vivo’ measurements by asking participants to explicitly identify their goals 
whenever they log a decision.  
6.5 Discussion 
This chapter outlined two hypotheses relating to the interaction between goals 
and decision making in multi-agency emergency response environments (Table 6.3). 
Against H1, it was found that goals between agencies were inconsistent. Although 
explicit measures indicated that participants perceived inter-agency goals to be 
aligned, implicit coding of their self-reported goals suggested that they differed as a 
result of their agency-specific roles. PS commanders reported both approach and 
avoidance goals relatively evenly, relating to their need to both respond to the 
incident and protect against further negative effects post-incident; FRS commanders 
initially prioritised avoidance goals and then shifted towards approach goals, relating 
to their need to take initial steps to mitigate risk prior to commencing their complex 
procedures to rescue victims; and AS commanders were consistently approach 
oriented, relating to their role to take proactive steps to treat patients at the scene. H2 
predicted that approach goals would make decision making faster. Although it was 
found that during the initial stages of the incident that approach oriented teams made 
faster decisions, this effect reversed later into the incident and they became slower at 
decision making. It is suggested that the unexpected negative impacts relating to 
approach goals are due to the functional mismatch between the desire to make a 
positive impact on the situation when operating in complex and time-pressured 
environments with competing task demands. Each of these findings will be discussed 
in detail below. 
6.5.1 H1: Self-reported goals between agencies will be consistent  
The UK government’s JESIP initiative is a national programme that seeks to 
increase the frequency and effectiveness of interoperability and joint working in the 
emergency services. It is based on the premise that the emergency services share two 
common goals when responding to a multi-agency emergency to ‘save life’ and 
‘reduce harm’ (JESIP Doctrine, 2013). Theoretically, if agencies hold clear common 
goal intentions, then this should enable the achievement of collective objectives 
(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Shared goals in multi-team emergency response 
settings are useful for translating intra-agency specific goals into collaborative inter-
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agency action (Marks et al., 2001; Mathieu et al., 2000; Millward et al., 2010). 
According to the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Azjen, 1991), goal accomplishment 
is dependent upon an individuals’ intention to achieve their goal. Strong goal 
intentions are a result of perceived control over the situation, positive attitudes 
towards the behaviour and, importantly, perceive favourable social attitudes in the 
decision making setting. It has also been identifies that setting specific goals, over 
abstract goals, can facilitate action by orienting individuals towards clearly defined 
objectives (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002). In the absence of strategic goals, multi-
team systems fail as individuals focus on intra-team goals over more collective joint 
objectives, which increase decision inertia (Alison, et al. 2015). Commanders 
operating in social and multi-agency team environments should benefit from the 
identification of ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ goals; they should serve to orient 
behaviour around collective, mutually beneficial and clear objectives.  
However, results from both this study and previous qualitative analyses suggest 
that commanders do not necessarily share common goals. PS commanders expressed 
goal conflict between approach and avoidance goals, the AS held consistently high 
approach goals, whereas the FRS shifted their goal orientation from initial avoidance 
to later approach. It is suggested that this may be a result of differences in their 
specific roles at an emergency incident. The PS not only hold responsibility for 
responding to the emergency by taking approach actions to ‘save life’, but they are 
also responsible for preventing further harm arising and ensuring that normality is 
returned to as quickly as possible. It is suggested that this explains their relative split 
between approach and avoidance goals, as they experience goal conflict between 
whether they should focus making a positive impact on the situation through action 
versus the desire to prevent further harm arising by limiting action. The AS has 
responsibility for treating patients, which may explain their consistently high desire 
to approach and take action. As their role at an emergency incident is highly 
specialised to gaining access, treating and transporting patients to hospital, they do 
not have any further responsibilities relating to the prevention of harm. As such, they 
showed consistently high approach goals. For the FRS commanders, it is suggested 
that their shift in goals from avoidance to approach is once more reflective of their 
role. Indeed the FRS has responsibility for accessing and rescuing patients 
(approach) but this often requires a great deal of technical skills and risk to their own 
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staff. Thus this initial priorities are to establish safe working practices in order to 
ensure a safe and resilient approach, but once this is established they then focus on 
their role-specific requirements to access and rescue casualties. 
Interestingly, when participants were asked about their goal consistency, they all 
agreed that goals were consistent across the multi-agency team. This is 
counterintuitive to the evidence presented above, which suggests that teams did not 
share collective goals. It is possible that this may be due to the relatively abstract 
nature of the JESIP (2013) goals to ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’, creating ambiguity 
and inconsistent assumptions between agencies. Indeed, abstract and poorly defined 
goals can induce poor team coordination (Hackman, 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990). 
Poor team coordination can reduce the likelihood of action and goal accomplishment 
(Marks et al., 2001; Alison et al., 2015). There appears to be an inherent 
misunderstanding between agencies about strategic objectives; inducing erroneous 
assumptions that agencies are working towards the same outcomes although they 
interpret this goal in very different ways. Even if commanders express ‘save life’ as 
a common strategic goal intention, it appears that their goals are somewhat 
inconsistent at the more behavioural implementation intention level as they prioritise 
different acts. Commanders may share common goal intentions (i.e. to ‘save life’) 
yet disparate and somewhat contradictory implementation intentions (Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). Alternatively, findings may be related to differences between 
implicit and explicit goals. Research has suggested that there is a distinction between 
implicit, unconscious and emotional motives and more explicit, cognitive and 
rational goals (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999). Individuals may explicitly state  one 
goal, but implicitly orient towards another. It is possible that this disconnect between 
implicit and explicit processing may offer an explanation for why commanders 
explicitly perceive goals to be aligned despite the evidenced implicit differences in 
the qualitative coding of self-report measures. 
6.5.1.1 Implications for H1 
It is possible that in order to make goals more consistent between emergency 
responders, that training to align differences between explicit and implicit goals 
would help. It has been suggested that training to enhance goal imagery (i.e. the 
mental representation of pursuit and attainment of a goal) can facilitate implicit and 
 
 
176 
 
explicit goal alignment (Schultheiss &Brunstein, 1999). Indeed, a recommendation 
provided by a commander in the qualitative interviews suggested that visually 
displaying goals by stating, and updating, on a white-board can help visually clarify 
cross-agency goals during an incident. Chapter 4 outlined how commanders often 
felt frustrated with other agencies for not understanding their capabilities or 
assuming inaccurate facts about their roles and responsibilities. It is possible that 
interventions to educate commanders about role-specific differences in behavioural 
goals may reduce these negative social effects, thereby increasing collective 
intentions towards strategic goals. 
Alternatively, rather than seeking to align goals between emergency response 
agencies, it may be more useful to focus efforts on developing a more effective 
distributed team network. Despite the desire of JESIP to create more ‘interoperable’ 
emergency services in the UK, it is possible that the current conceptualisation of 
interoperability in order to develop joint decision making practices is inconsistent 
with the inherent complexity associated with emergency incidents (House, Power & 
Alison, 2013). Complexity instead requires expertise in the discrete areas for each 
agency, and thus joint decision making may impede agency-specific action. A 
decentralised approach to emergency responding whereby the PS, FRS and AS have 
clearly delineated roles and responsibilities may be more adaptive. This raises 
important questions about the strategic objectives of JESIP and their relevance to 
real-world responding. It is recommended that increased multi-agency understanding 
and working is beneficial to emergency responding, however it must be taught in a 
manner that respects and enshrines the nuanced differences between each specific 
response agency. 
6.5.2 H2: Holding approach goals will increase decision making speed and 
reduce overall decision inertia  
Research has generally suggested that holding approach goals is adaptive for 
decision making and action. It is associated with positive affect and the desire to 
move towards a positive stimulus (Bossuyt et al., 2014; Elliot, 2006). Alternatively, 
avoidance goals are linked with the desire to avoid failure associated with negative 
affect, anxiety and depleted self-regulatory resources (Oertig, Schuler, Brandstatter, 
Rosekes & Elliot, 2013; Elliot, 2006). Indeed the positive or negative valence of 
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emotions can have a large impact on decision making. It has been suggested that 
emotions are key for motivating decision making and driving it alongside cognitive 
goals (Damiso, 1991). The negative affect associated with avoidance motivations 
may thus act as a negative marker on the decision making process. As such, it would 
be reasonable to assume that approach motivation, in comparison to avoidance, 
would have a positive impact on decision making in emergency response settings and 
that this may lead to more timely action. Furthermore, time-pressure appears to have 
a greater performance-degrading effect on individuals who hold avoidance goals 
(Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad & De Dreu, 2013). It was expected that the time pressured 
and complex nature of the emergency response environment would thus negatively 
interact with avoidance goals and delay decision making.  
Interestingly, findings from this study were inconsistent with predictions. As 
expected, approach motivations were associated with faster decision making in the 
early ‘zoning’ task. They appeared to galvanise emergency teams to take positive 
action by logging rapid decisions. However, unexpectedly, it was subsequently 
found that teams characterised by approach goals made slower decisions during the 
later ‘non-specialist staff’ decision. This contradictory effect may be a result of task 
complexity. It is possible that the initial ‘zoning’ task was easier as it was presented 
very early on in the incident with few competing tasks; whereas the ‘non-specialist 
staff’ choice was much later into the incident (inject seven) whereby additional 
complexity and other tasks competed for attention. It is suggested that approach 
motivations galvanised rapid action earlier on in the incident as there were fewer 
competing tasks to respond to, whereas it degraded choice at the second major task 
as there were multiple competing task demands. For example, commanders also had 
to respond to an ongoing fire (inject 6), manage information on the location of 
shooters (inject 5) and deal with the time-criticality of victims’ health status (inject 
4).  
6.5.2.1 Implications for H2 
In support of the complexity hypothesis, research on exam performance in 
schools has indicated how approach goals are positively related to exam 
performance, but that their positive impact on performance is mediated by the 
perceived difficult of the exam (Darnon, Butera, Mugny & Hulleman, 2009). This 
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suggests that approach goals facilitate performance but only because they are 
associated with perceived ease. As discussed, abstract or unclear goals degrade 
performance (Hackman, 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990). Thus, even when 
commanders were motivated to take positive action, perhaps a lack of tactical goal 
clarity (i.e. implementation intentions) and competition between mutual approach 
goals reduced action likelihood. It may also be related to perceived time pressure at 
the incident, which may have increased over time. Time pressure has been found to 
have a U-shaped impact on performance, whereby both extreme small amounts and 
large amounts disrupt performance (Baer & Oldham, 2006). Emergency incidents are 
inherently time pressured (Chen et al., 2008) yet the experience of time pressure may 
fluctuate over the course of the emergency event. Time pressure earlier on in the 
incident may reflect more optimal levels, but this then increases and exceeds 
acceptable thresholds later on. This is an interesting avenue for further research via 
the more explicit monitoring of perceived time pressure over the simulation as a 
whole. 
The unexpected finding on the interaction between goal orientations and decision 
timeliness thus offers an interesting and fruitful avenue for further research. It is 
theorised that the contextual functionality of goals may offer an explanation. Namely 
that when choices become overly time pressured and complex, that approach goals 
become maladaptive as individuals struggle to trade-off multiple competing sub-
goals and tasks. A limitation with the present study was that approach / avoidance 
goals were coded at the end of the simulation and thus it is not possible to explicitly 
identify participants’ specific goals at the point of decision making. Furthermore, 
there were no explicit measures of time pressure or perceived decision complexity 
during the simulation. It would be useful to further extend this study by asking 
participants to fill in a short Likert-scale log at prescribed time points throughout the 
incident in order to monitor how goals, perceived complexity, time pressure and 
decision timeliness interact. The implications of such research would help extend the 
psychological understanding of the functional relevance of approach and avoidance 
goals, and further provide a basis to develop training in the emergency services that 
identifies when and under what circumstances different goals are most appropriate 
for facilitating action. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to explore the relationship between self-reported goals and 
behaviour in a simulated multi-agency emergency environment. It emerged that, 
although respondents perceived their goals to be similar, analyses of goals at the 
intra-agency level revealed differences in orientation tendencies: the PS were split 
between approach and avoidance goals; the FRS showed initial avoidance followed 
by mainly approach goals; whereas the AS were consistently approach oriented. It is 
suggested this reflects the roles of each agency, as the PS have responsibilities for 
both the incident (approach) and post-incident (avoidance) demands; the FRS often 
undertake actions that are highly specialist and may risk emergency responder safety 
(avoid) but then, once they have established safety precautions are able to focus on 
rescuing civilians (approach); and the AS’ main role is to provide treatment to 
patients (approach). At the team-level, it emerged that approach motivations were 
beneficial for decision making earlier on in the incident, but induced significant 
decision delays later in the incident. In explaining this effect, it is suggested that 
approach goals became maladaptive to decision making as the incident progressed, 
becoming more complex with multiple competing tasks that induced goal conflict. 
Thus, it is important when developing interventions and training for emergency 
service practitioners to: (i) develop a nuanced understanding of agency-specific roles 
and responsibilities and how that interacts with implementation intentions; and (ii) 
that there is a greater focus on the functional relevance of approach goals when 
operating in complex task environments.  
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Chapter 7: When cognitive flexibility impedes choice: how different cognitive 
processing styles interact with the experience of outcome, task and retrospective 
uncertainty  
7.1 Abstract 
This chapter investigates how individual differences in cognitive processing 
interact with decision making during a simulated terrorist incident (see Chapter 6). It 
extends previous findings within this thesis, which identified how the experience of 
uncertainty was associated to decision inertia. A total of n=50 commanders from the 
emergency services completed a multi-agency simulated exercise of a terrorist 
incident. They were split into n=13 multi-agency teams, each participating in the 
same simulation. Questionnaire data was collected at the end of the simulation, 
which used ranking scales on a number of items that explained why their decisions 
may have been delayed. They also completed two scales to measure individual 
differences in ‘Need for Closure’ (NFC) (Kruglanski, Wester & Klem, 1993) and 
Cognitive Flexibility (CF) (Denis & Vander Wal, 2010). This was to see whether 
individual differences in cognitive processing moderated the experience of 
uncertainty. A Principle Components Analysis reduced the questionnaire data and 
identified three types of uncertainty: (i) task uncertainty; (ii) outcome uncertainty; 
and (iii) retrospective uncertainty. Of these, outcome uncertainty was the most 
prevalent for all participants and for all agencies. It also emerged that individual 
differences in cognitive processing styles interacted with the experience of 
uncertainty. Those who scored high on the ‘control’ subscale for CF, which reflects 
trait flexibility in decision making due to a tendency to perceive control over 
difficult situations, had significantly lower scores on task and retrospective 
uncertainty. Interestingly, those who scored high on the CF ‘alternatives’ subscale, 
who tend to consider multiple explanations and solutions to difficult problems, had 
much higher scores on outcome uncertainty. This suggests that CF with regards to 
the consideration of alternatives may impede choice when operating in complex 
environments whereby fast decision making is necessary. 
7.2 Introduction 
This chapter explores how: (i) uncertainty interacts with decision making in 
emergency incident contexts; and (ii) how individual differences in cognitive 
 
 
181 
 
processing styles may moderate the experience of uncertainty. This is to extend upon 
previous qualitative findings that outlined a number of different factors that 
contributed to uncertainty in emergency incident contexts. Thus, this chapter will: 
(i) Describe how uncertainty can negatively interact with decision 
making in extreme environments 
(ii) Introduce the literature on how individual differences in cognitive 
processing styles may moderate the experience of uncertainty, 
specifically focusing on: 
a. Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) (Kruglanski et al. 2993) 
b. Cognitive Flexibility (Denis & Vander Wal, 2010) 
(iii) Describe results from questionnaire data collected from an immersive 
‘terrorist’ simulation with the emergency services 
(iv) Discuss implications for findings with regards to the relevant 
application of cognitive processing styles in complex, time-pressured 
environments 
7.2.1 Uncertainty in extreme environments 
Uncertainty is pervasive in emergency response domains. To recap what has 
been previously outlined in this thesis, emergencies are high-stakes, high-
consequence and highly ambiguous events (Alison & Crego, 2007), characterised by 
missing and conflicting information (Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010) and exacerbated 
by time pressure (Chen, Sharman, Rao & Upadhyaya, 2008). They reflect extreme 
environments, which place large demands on the physical, psychological and 
interpersonal skills of the decision maker (Orasanu & Lierberman, 2011), which can 
lead to cognitive overload and stress for the decision makers involved (Paton & Flin, 
1999). The inherent characteristics of emergencies make decision making more 
difficult as the high stress associated with such extremes exceeds the cognitive 
capacity of individuals to both self-regulate their decision making according to goal-
relevant information, whilst attempting to manage stress (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 
1997). The setting of goals in complex emergency domains can help to orient 
decision making around specific objectives (Locke & Latham, 2006), but when 
inappropriately used can degrade choice due to associated goal conflict.  
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Not only are emergency incidents characterised by ambient (i.e. relating to the 
inhospitable environment) and task (i.e. relating to human activity) extremes, but 
they are further threatened by social extremes (i.e. relating to life-threatening 
reliance on others in team) (Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011). Problem solving in teams 
is contingent upon effective communications, which share information, direct actions 
and reflect thoughts on the problem task (Orasanu, 1994). Teams must communicate 
in continual and iterative cycles to develop shared knowledge that informs action 
(Hutchins & Kendall, 2011). It is therefore paramount when teams operate in 
extreme environments that they are able to effectively manage the experience of 
uncertainty that may impede group performance (Fiore, Rosen & Salas, 2011). 
Fundamentally, emergency incidents reflect extreme and uncertain team 
environments, which may contribute to decision inertia. 
7.2.2 Coping with uncertainty in extreme environments 
Due to the negative impact of uncertainty on decision making, coupled with its 
inherent prevalence in extreme decision making settings, a great deal of research has 
attempted to identify strategies to try and reduce the experience of uncertainty. For 
example, the development of expertise in organisational settings can help to reduce 
uncertainty by providing decision makers with recognition-primed responses that 
facilitate intuitive action (Klein, 1998; Jenkins, Stanton, Salmon, Walker & Rafferty, 
2010). Experienced decision makers have been found to develop adaptive heuristic 
and cognitive processing shortcuts based upon expert and accurate intuition that has 
been learnt through repeated exposure in the task environment, developing into 
adaptive expertise and innovative thinking (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986; Klein, 1998). 
For example, experienced police officers used specific cognitive shortcuts that 
helped them manage uncertainty, such as ‘reflection-in-action’ (i.e. reflecting on 
their choices whilst iteratively updating their situation assessment), which increased 
their ability to cope with uncertainty (van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2014).  
However, rather than focus on the well-researched topic of expertise, this chapter 
was interested in exploring how individual differences associated to the tendency to 
use different cognitive processing styles interacted with the experience of 
uncertainty. The sample of commanders used in this study were well experienced 
and thus variability in expertise was limited; and further because it would be 
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interesting to explore for variability within the expert sample to identify which 
experts experience the least uncertainty, and what cognitive processing strategy they 
tend to use. Thus this chapter will now focus on how individual differences in 
cognitive processing can moderate the experience of uncertainty. 
7.2.3 Individual differences in cognitive processing 
Research on decision making under uncertainty has identified how individuals 
generally cope with uncertainty by limiting their systematic evaluation of the choice 
environment. Decision makers cope with complexity by adapting their cognitive 
processing style in response to the specific demands of the task environment. For 
example, in information-sparse and time-pressured incidents, individuals can limit 
uncertainty by taking decisive satisficing tactics to select, not the best, but a good 
enough option. This is linked to ‘attribute-based processing’, where decision makers 
evaluate their choice by only focussing on the most important attributes of each 
option to quickly identify an option that meets minimal thresholds (Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2007; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). Alternatively, if time pressure 
is low, individuals may be able to more systematically reduce uncertainty via close 
evaluation of options. This is associated to ‘alternative-based processing’, where 
decision makers evaluate all options in full in order to maximise outcomes and 
identify if any options are good enough (Parker & Schrift, 2011; Payne et al., 1993). 
Thus, in order to cope with uncertainty, the decision maker must adjust their 
cognitive processing in line with the most adaptive strategy for the choice 
environment.  
Research suggests that individuals differ in terms of their innate preferences to 
utilise various cognitive processing strategies. These individual differences interact 
with the experience of uncertainty due to differences in cognitive processing styles 
(Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011). For example, those who score highly on ‘constructive 
thinking’, which refers to the ability to adapt to situations with minimal stress by, for 
example, perceiving difficult situations as ‘challenging’ rather than ‘threatening’ 
(Epstein, 1998), are better able to cope with complex environments (Drach-Zahavy 
& Somech, 1999). Constructive thinking enables individuals to manage their 
cognitive goals as they are able to adapt better adapt to the emotional demands of the 
problem environment. Although uncertainty is pervasive and detrimental to decision 
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making in extreme environments, its negative effects on choice outcome are not 
inevitable. It is important that research seeks to unpack the main causes of 
uncertainty in the emergency response domain in order to develop and test 
interventions to help commanders cope with and reduce uncertainty. This thesis 
focussed on two individual difference measures related to cognitive processing: (i) 
Need for Closure (NFC) (Kruglanski et al., 1993); and (ii) Cognitive Flexibility (CF) 
(Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). It was anticipated that different scores on these 
individual difference would moderate the experience of uncertainty. 
7.2.3.1 Need for Closure  
The ‘Need for closure’ (NFC) scale measures the trait desire to achieve rapid 
closure to decision problems as a result of “the desire for a definite answer on some 
topic, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1989, p.14). 
Those who score high on NFC tend to limit their cognitive processing in order to 
achieve rapid closure to decision tasks. They are able to cope with uncertainty by 
using highly selective search patterns to make fast decisions. Indeed, research on 
consumer decision making has linked NFC with increased attribute-based cognitive 
processing and reduced information search (Choi, Koo, Choi & Auh, 2008); those 
who score high on NFC appear to chronically limit their information search patterns. 
Thus, it is anticipated that those who score high on NFC would experience less 
uncertainty. 
Individuals who score highly on NFC tend to be characterised by five aspects: (i) 
a desire for order and structure; (ii) discomfort through ambiguity; (iii) decisiveness; 
(iv) predictability; and (v) close-mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Those 
high on NFC tend to favour familiar over new options when faced with a choice 
(Mannetti, Pierro & Kruglanski, 2007), which can make them subject to primacy 
effects (Webster & Kurglanski, 1994).  Thus, although NFC may reduce the 
experience of uncertainty and increase decisiveness, it does not necessarily mean that 
decisions are more accurate. However, evidence has also suggested that those high 
on NFC only utilise these techniques when appropriate. NFC may actually act as an 
adaptive motivational mechanism that individuals use to appropriately manage 
uncertainty. For example, NFC was found to mediate the relationship between 
chronic behavioural inhibition system activation (linked to chronic anxiety) and 
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information search patterns (Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, Jasko & Kossowska, 2014). 
This means that people with chronic anxiety cope with uncertainty as they have 
developed adaptive NFC processing styles. It has further been suggested that, rather 
than NFC leading to poor decision outcomes due to a biased desire to satisfice, that 
it reflects a functional desire to reach conclusions; increasing information search if it 
will lead to faster closure when appropriate (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993). It 
is anticipated that NFC will be associated to lower levels of uncertainty, as 
individuals suppress their experience of uncertainty by making rapid choices. 
7.2.3.2 Cognitive Flexibility 
Another trait cognitive processing style that may explain deviations in the ability 
to cope with uncertainty is ‘Cognitive Flexibility’ (CF), defined as “the ability to 
switch cognitive sets to adapt to changing environmental stimuli” (p.242, Dennis & 
Vander Wal, 2010). CF is associated with increased dynamic thought processing 
(Martin & Anderson, 1998) and the ability to think adaptively under stress (Dennis 
& Vander Wal, 2010). It is linked to a self-awareness of alternatives when 
processing a choice, the willingness to adapt to changing circumstances and self-
efficacy that one has the ability to be flexible (Martin & Anderson, 1998). 
Specifically, it can be measured along two sub-scales: (i) CF-control is associated 
with a tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable; and (ii) CF-
alternatives is linked to the ability to perceive multiple explanations and solutions to 
difficult problems (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Thus, those high on CF must not 
only possess flexibility in their evaluation and processing of a situation, but also 
perceive control and self-efficacy over the situation to take action. The ability to 
think flexibility, coupled with perceived control, may therefore suggest that those 
who score highly on CF experience less uncertainty. 
CF is linked to emotional intelligence (constructive thinking) as both of these 
measures describe the ability of an individual to adapt to situational requirements 
(Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012). Those high on CF tend to have more behavioural ‘scripts’ 
when faced with a complex task, which increases their options and flexible approach 
(Martin & Anderson, 1998). Indeed this may link to adaptive expertise, which 
reflects the ability to create novel solutions to problems (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986; 
Hatano & Oura, 2003) as those high on CF are motivated to adapt their behaviour in 
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response to the situation (Martin & Anderson, 1998). Adaptive expertise builds upon 
routine expertise by enabling novel and flexible decision making (Schwartz, 
Bransford & Sears, 2005) due to the possession of: (i) domain skills; (ii) 
metacognitive skills; and (iii) innovative skills (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). CF is thus 
linked to adaptive expertise as individuals are able to perceive new solutions and 
approach problems in dynamic ways (Carbonell, Stalmeijer, Konings, Segers & van 
Merrienboer, 2014). Furthermore, CF is also linked to the ability to replace 
maladaptive thoughts with more adaptive thinking (Denni & Vander Wal, 2010). 
This means that individuals high on CF may be more optimistic and adaptive when 
processing complex environments, and thus better able to cope with uncertainty. 
Fundamentally, CF appears to be a positive cognitive processing style that facilitates 
the ability to cope with uncertainty. It is anticipated that those high on CF will thus 
experience less uncertainty. 
7.2.4 Summary and aims 
This chapter sought to investigate how emergency response commanders coped 
with uncertainty during a simulated terrorist incident. Questionnaire data was 
collected at the end of the simulation, which asked commanders to score their 
experience of uncertainty using a Likert-scale against items that were derived from 
the literature. It used these measures to further investigate the relationship between 
the experience of uncertainty and individual differences in cognitive processing 
styles relating to: (i) NFC (Kruglanski, et al., 1993); and CF (Denis & Wander Val, 
2010). The following two hypotheses were derived: 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Items in the questionnaire will reveal different types 
of uncertainty 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Those who score high on NFC and CF will 
experience lower levels of uncertainty 
7.3 Method 
Data for this chapter was collected from a simulated ‘Marauding Terrorist 
Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) incident (see Chapter 6 for full details). It involved n=50 
command level decision makers from the three blue lights services (PS n=17; FRS 
n=22; AS n=11) who were split into 13 multi-agency teams. Each team comprised of 
 
 
187 
 
between three and five members (see Table 6.1) who were each provided the same 
simulation (see Table 6.2 for timeline). 
7.3.1 Procedure 
Chapter 6 describes the procedure for designing and developing the simulation in 
more detail. In brief, the simulation was designed in collaboration between the 
researcher and a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) from the emergency 
services. It sought to both test and train multi-agency joint decision making in an 
immersive simulated environment. Participants were recruited using opportunity 
sampling via email, which was coordinated by the SMEs from each agency. 
Participants who were interested in participating were provided with a date and time 
to arrive at the University of Liverpool and participate in the study. On the day of 
their simulation, they arrived at the ‘Hydra’ simulation lab at the University of 
Liverpool and were placed inside a plenary room. In here they met with other 
commanders who would be participating in their simulation and introduced to their 
‘loggist’ who was responsible for operating the computer system during the 
simulation. They were then given a short tutorial on how to use the Hydra system 
and the opportunity to ask questions. The exercise began by giving the participant an 
information sheet that contained agency-specific details (e.g. initial resource 
availability) about the unfolding incident (Appendix seven). They were told to 
envision that they were ‘en route’ to the incident with an ETA of five minutes and to 
think about their initial priorities. After five minutes had passed, participants were 
taken to the syndicate room where they were told to imagine they had arrived at the 
scene in a multi-agency group and the simulation timeline began via audio injects. A 
full description of this procedure is outlined in Chapter 6. 
7.3.2 Materials 
Data for this chapter was collected from a questionnaire that participants 
completed at the end of the simulation (Appendix ten). Two elements from this 
questionnaire were analysed (using SPSS 21) for this chapter: (i) experience of 
uncertainty; and (ii) individual differences in NFC and CF. 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
7.3.2.1 Questionnaire: measuring the experience of uncertainty 
Uncertainty was measured by asking participants to rate their agreement with 
nine items derived from the literature that may explain why an individual delayed 
their choice. They used a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The nine items are outlined in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Nine items to measure experienced uncertainty 
 
7.3.2.2 Questionnaire: Need for Closure and Cognitive Flexibility 
Two individual differences scales were included in the questionnaire to measure 
differences in cognitive processing styles. Specifically, participants completed the 42 
item ‘Need for Cognitive Closure Scale’ (Kruglanski et al., 1993) and the 20 item 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI; Denis & Wander Val, 2010). The CFI is sub-
dived into two sub-scales: (i) CFI-control, which consists of seven items that 
measure “the tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable” (p.248, Denis 
& Wander Val, 2010); and (ii) CFI-alternatives, which consists of 13 items defined 
as “the ability to perceive multiple alternative explanations for life occurrences and 
human behaviour and the ability to generate multiple alternative solutions to 
difficult situations” (p.248, Denis & Wander Val, 2010). 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Summary 
Table 7.2 summarises the findings with regards to the two hypotheses of this 
chapter. Support was found for H3 as three distinct types of uncertainty emerged. A 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to reduce questionnaire items into 
STATEMENT: 
I was constantly trying to find an optimal solution to the problem 
I wanted to wait and see what happened 
I wanted to gather more information 
I felt that I missed an earlier better opportunity to take action 
I was concerned about wasting previously invested resources 
There were too many options to pick between 
I decided to focus on easier tasks first 
There were not enough options to pick between 
Goals between agencies were inconsistent 
 
 
189 
 
meaningful components. The experience of uncertainty could be themed into three 
different types: (i) outcome uncertainty; (ii) task uncertainty; and (iii) retrospective 
uncertainty. Overall, participants experienced significantly more outcome 
uncertainty than task or retrospective uncertainty. Support was also found for H4 as 
individual differences in cognitive processing styles interacted with the experience of 
different types of uncertainty. Although global scores on NFC and CFI were not 
significantly related to uncertainty, the two sub-scales of the CFI were. Specifically, 
CFI-control (tendency to perceive control over difficult situations) was negatively 
correlated to task and retrospective uncertainty; whereas CFI-alternatives (tendency 
to consider multiple explanations and solutions to complex tasks) was positively 
correlated to outcome uncertainty. Interestingly, this suggests that high trait CF with 
regards to the consideration of alternatives may negatively impact decision making 
by increasing uncertainty relating to anticipated consequences. Implications with 
regards to the functionality of cognitive processing styles when operating in extreme 
environments are discussed. 
Table 7.2: Summary table of research question findings 
Hypotheses Results 
H3: Items in the questionnaire will 
reveal different types of 
uncertainty 
There were three types of uncertainty: (i) 
outcome uncertainty; (ii) task uncertainty; and 
(iii) retrospective uncertainty. Of these, 
participants experienced significantly more 
outcome uncertainty. 
H4: Those who score high on NFC 
and CF will experience lower 
levels of uncertainty 
Individual differences in NFC were not related 
to any differences in the experience of 
uncertainty. At the global level, individual 
differences in CF were not related to any 
differences in the experience of uncertainty; 
however the CFI-control subscale was 
negatively related to both task and 
retrospective uncertainty; whereas the CFI-
alternatives subscale was positively related to 
outcome uncertainty. 
 
7.4.2 H3 Results: Items in the questionnaire will reveal different types of 
uncertainty 
The questionnaire contained nine items to explore different reasons for why 
participants may have delayed their choice (Table 7.1). A paired-samples Friedman 
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test was performed to see whether there were any differences in how participants 
scored rated these items. There was found to be a significant difference in 
participants’ scores on these nine items, χ2=218.031, p<.001, however post-hoc 
analyses were at high risk of a Type 1 error due the high number of items being 
compared (n=9). A Bonferroni correction to reduce the risk of a Type 1 error was 
unfeasible as it would result in a highly selective alpha level of p<.005. The 
Bonferroni correction states that to reduce the risk of a Type 1 error that the alpha 
level should be divided by the number of measures included (i.e. p<0.05/9=.005). 
This would have resulted in a highly selective alpha level, which could strip the data 
of meaning. 
In order to address this problem, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was 
used to reduce the data into meaningful components. PCA was selected over Factor 
Analysis as it is specified as useful for reducing the data without prior theoretical 
assumptions about the data. Although the sample size responding to the 
questionnaire was relatively small (n=50), it was adequate to run a PCA on the nine 
item scale. The minimum threshold for participant numbers when conducting a PCA 
is five times the number of items on the scale (i.e. n=45) (O’Rourke, Psych & 
Hatcher, 2013). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .601, just exceeding the 
recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant; thus it was possible to factorise the correlation matrix using a PCA.  
The initial PCA revealed four factors that had eigenvalues >1, explaining a total 
of 72.41% of variance; 29.82%, 17.88%, 13.34% and 11.36% of variance 
respectively. Analysis of the screeplot indicated a break after the third component 
and so a three component model was retained and input into a subsequent forced 
three-factor PCA. As outlined in Table 7.3, all items had good to excellent loadings 
onto each component using the guidelines provided by Comrey and Lee (1992): >.71 
is excellent; .63-.70 is very good; .55-.62 is good; .45-.54 is fair; <.44 is poor. 
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Table 7.3: Pattern and structure coefficients of the final three factor model 
from the PCA 
Item:  
 
Pattern coefficients Structure coefficients Communa
lities 1 
(task 
uncertaint
y) 
2 
(outcom
e 
uncertai
nty) 
3 
(retrosp
ective 
uncertai
nty) 
1 
(task 
uncertai
nty) 
2 
(outcom
e 
uncertai
nty) 
3 
(retros
pectiv
e 
uncert
ainty) 
I decided to 
focus on easier 
tasks first 
.864   .857 .114 .185 .736 
There were too 
many options 
to pick 
between 
.780 -.165  .736   .575 
There were not 
enough 
options to pick 
between 
.658 .171  .696 .268 .217 .516 
I wanted to 
gather more 
information 
 .785 -.248 .143 .790 -.203 .682 
I wanted to 
wait and see 
what happened 
-.171 .664  .260 .651 .353 .544 
I was 
constantly 
trying to find 
an optimal 
solution to the 
problem 
 .628 .311  .637  .433 
Goals between 
agencies were 
inconsistent 
-.191 -.222 .866  -.223 .814 .758 
I was 
concerned 
about wasting 
previously 
invested 
resources 
.216 .389 .636 .423 .440 .699 .707 
I felt that I 
missed an 
earlier better 
opportunity to 
take action 
.411  .517 .531  .614 .534 
Note: loadings highlighted in bold 
The three-component solution explained a total of 61.02% of variance, with 
Component 1 contributing to 29.82% of variance, Component 2 contributing to 
17.82% of variance and Component 3 contributing to 13.34% of variance. In order to 
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interpret results, an oblique rotation method (using Oblimin rotation) was used as 
this allowed for both independence (orthogonal) and correlation of factors, as 
recommended by Russell (2002). This rotation indicated strong loadings onto all 
three components, with substantial independence between items (Table 7.3). Each 
component was renamed in order to provide semantic meaning to the cluster of 
variables (Table 7.4), which were: (i) task uncertainty; (ii) outcome uncertainty; and 
(iii) retrospective uncertainty. There were found to be weak positive correlations 
between factors 1 and 2 (r=.145), factors 1 and 3 (r=.237), and factors 2 and 3 
(r=.031). 
Table 7.4: Task uncertainty, outcome uncertainty and retrospective uncertainty 
items 
New Item – “I delayed my 
decision because…” 
Original Item – “I delayed my decision 
because…” 
I was uncertain about the task I 
was dealing with (task 
uncertainty) 
I decided to focus on easier tasks first 
There were too many options to pick between 
There were not enough options to pick between 
I anticipated possible solutions 
that may arise in the future 
(outcome uncertainty) 
I wanted to gather more information 
I wanted to wait and see what happened 
I was constantly trying to find an optimal 
solution to the problem 
I was distracted by past poor 
decision processing associated to 
impeded knowledge and past 
action (retrospective uncertainty) 
Goals between agencies were inconsistent 
I was concerned about wasting previously 
invested resources 
I felt that I missed an earlier better opportunity 
to take action 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to see whether there 
were differences in the experience of these three types of uncertainty. A significant 
main effect was found, Wilks’ Lambda=.162, F(2,47)=116.576, p<.001, with a large 
effect size r=.838. Post-hoc analyses indicated that this effect was significant across 
all three components, as outcome uncertainty (M=13.98; SD=2.79) was scored 
significantly higher than task uncertainty (M=6.40; SD=2.50), p<.001 and 
retrospective uncertainty (M=7.66; SD=3.08), p<.001; and retrospective uncertainty 
scored significantly higher than task uncertainty, p=.029. There were no significant 
differences between agencies in terms of their reasons for delay for task uncertainty, 
χ2=2.41, p=.299, outcome uncertainty, F=1.29, p=.283, or retrospective uncertainty, 
χ2=.590, p=.745. All three agencies scored outcome uncertainty significantly higher 
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than both retrospective and task uncertainty (Figure 7.1). This interaction was 
significant for the PS (F(2,16)=55.460, p<.001 with a large effect size r=.776), the 
FRS (F(2,18)=42.626, p<.001 with a large effect size r=.703), and the AS 
F(2,10)=37.282, p<.001 with a large effect size r=.789).  
 
Figure 7.1: Participants’ mean scores for task, outcome and retrospective 
uncertainty, split according to agency membership 
As with Study 1, as the dependent variable of ‘time’ taken to log decisions was at 
the team level, the interaction between uncertainty and time taken to log decisions 
was explored at the team level using a majority rule (i.e. a majority rule was used to 
code teams as high/low on task/outcome/retrospective uncertainty). Pearson’s chi-
square analyses found that there were no significant associations between task 
uncertainty (χ2=.915, p=.339; χ2=1.216, p=.270; χ2=.151, p=.698), outcome 
uncertainty (χ2=1.733, p=.188; χ2=.686, p=.407; χ2=.451, p=.502) or retrospective 
uncertainty (χ2=.420, p=.517; χ2=.192, p=.661; χ2=.032, p=.857) and delays in 
overall decision making, the zoning task decision, or for the non-specialist staff 
decision, respectively. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Task Uncertainty Outcome Uncertainty Retrospective
Uncertainty
M
ea
n
 s
co
re
 f
o
r 
d
el
a
y
 r
e
a
so
n
 
Average scores for each agency for each cause of delay 
Police
Fire and Rescue
Ambulance
 
 
194 
 
7.4.3 H4: Those who score high on NFC and CF will experience lower 
levels of uncertainty 
Participants also completed measures for differences in cognitive processing 
styles relating to the Need for Closure (NFC) scale and the Cognitive Flexibility 
Inventory (CFI). A Pearson’s correlation found that NFC was not significantly 
correlated to task uncertainty, rho(47)=.112, p=.455, outcome uncertainty, 
r(47)=.024, p=.871, or retrospective uncertainty, rho(47)=.015, p=.919. CFI scores 
were also not correlated with task, rho(47)=-.062, p=.679, outcome, r(47)=.277, 
p=.059 or retrospective uncertainty, rho(47)=-.038, p=.798. However, the 
‘alternatives’ and ‘control’ subscales of the CFI were significantly correlated. The 
‘alternatives’ subscale of the CFI (which measures how many alternatives 
individuals tend to consider when faced with difficult choices) was positively 
correlated with outcome uncertainty, r(47)=.329, p=.024, and explained 10.8% of 
variance. In other words, those who tend to consider multiple alternatives when 
decision making showed increased uncertainty associated with outcomes. The 
‘control’ subscale (which measures how much control individuals tend to perceive 
over difficult situations) was negatively correlated with both task uncertainty, 
rho(47)=-.382, p=.008 (explained variance =14.5%), and retrospective uncertainty, 
r(47)=-.345, p=.017 (explained variance = 11.90%). In other words, individuals who 
tend to feel that they lack control over difficult situations had higher task and 
retrospective uncertainty. This suggests that control was associated to reduced 
uncertainty (about tasks and the past), whereas the tendency to consider multiple 
alternatives was associated with increased uncertainty (about the future). This was 
further supported by a self-report item which measured whether participated believed 
they had delayed their decision making, as those with low (below median) scores for 
CFI-control were 9.48 times more likely to think they delayed their choices, 
χ2=3.945, p=.047, phi=.345. Furthermore, those with high (above median) on CFI-
alternatives were 1.29 times more likely to feel they delayed their choice, however 
these effects did not reach statistical significance, χ2=.119, p=.730, phi=-.051. 
7.5 Discussion 
This chapter sought to explore the relationship between the experience of 
uncertainty and cognitive processing styles. Questionnaire data was used to explore 
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the different reasons for why participants may have delayed their decision making. A 
PCA revealed three types of uncertainty: (i) task uncertainty (concerning the 
characteristics of the task); (ii) outcome uncertainty (concerning anticipated potential 
future consequences); and (iii) retrospective uncertainty (concerning knowledge on 
roles and choices made in the past choices). Of these, outcome uncertainty was the 
highest scoring type of uncertainty. Different types of uncertainty were also related 
to individual differences in cognitive processing styles. Although no significant 
effects were found for NFC, the two sub-scales of the CFI had significant and 
opposing effects. High scores on the ‘control’ subscale was associated to lower (task; 
retrospective) uncertainty, whereas high scores on the ‘alternatives’ subscale was 
associated to higher (outcome) uncertainty. It is suggested that the time pressured 
nature of the emergency incident meant that the consideration of multiple 
alternatives was not useful; thus those high on CFI-alternatives anticipated more 
potential consequences leading to increased outcome uncertainty. Implications 
relating to the usefulness of different cognitive processing styles when operating in 
extreme environments will now discussed. 
7.5.1 H3 Discussion: Items in the questionnaire will reveal different types 
of uncertainty 
It is acknowledged in the psychological literature that uncertainty in extreme 
environments is both prevalent and detrimental to action (Alison & Crego, 2007; 
Chen et al., 2008; van den Heuvel et al., 2014). The very nature of extreme 
environments places huge demands on the physical, psychological and interpersonal 
skills of decision makers (Orasanu & Liberman, 2011), which increases both stress 
and cognitive load (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997; Paton & Flin, 1999). In addition, 
the response to emergency incidents is inherently led by teams, whereby emergency 
response commanders must not only operate at their own intra-team level but further 
coordinate with other agencies. This can add further uncertainty to the decision 
making environment when teams fail to effectively coordinate information and 
iteratively update their collective group processing (Hutchins & Kendall, 2011; 
Orasanu, 1994). As such, this study sought to unpack the experience of uncertainty 
during a simulated terrorist incident in order to explore whether there were any 
differences in the types of uncertainty. This could help to usefully identify whether 
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specific types of uncertainty may be more salient and thus especially detrimental to 
action. 
It has been found that uncertainty in complex environments can be derived from 
endogenous sources, relating to task complexities, and exogenous sources, relating to 
the system being used to respond to the problem (Alison et al., 2014). The findings 
of this chapter differ in scope, as they categorise the experience of three different 
types of uncertainty rather than the source. In other words, endogenous or exogenous 
sources contribute to the experience of the different types of uncertainty. It was 
found that uncertainty could be separated into three types: (i) task uncertainty; (ii) 
outcome uncertainty; and (iii) retrospective uncertainty. These three types of 
uncertainty reflect uncertainty about three different aspects of the incident: one 
relating to the past (retrospective uncertainty); one relating to the present (task 
uncertainty); and one relating to the future (outcome uncertainty). It is suggested that 
all three types of uncertainty may be derived from both endogenous and exogenous 
sources. For example, ‘budget cuts and austerity measures’ were a salient 
endogenous source of uncertainty identified in Chapter 5, which appeared to increase 
task uncertainty in the present (e.g. unsure of availability of limited resources), 
outcome uncertainty about the future (e.g. unsure whether they can justify financial 
cost of response post-incident) and retrospective uncertainty about the past (e.g. 
unsure of who is responsible for which task following streamlining of organisation). 
This suggests that uncertainty is not merely an experience, but can be related to the 
past (retrospective), present (task) and the future (outcome). The relationship 
between experienced uncertainty and temporal focus offers an exciting possibility for 
future research. 
Of the three types of uncertainty that were identified, it emerged that outcome 
uncertainty scored most highly across all participants from all three agencies. It is 
suggested that this is due to the detrimental impact of negative anticipatory thinking. 
When used appropriately, anticipatory thinking can benefit decision making as 
experts are able to ‘pattern match’ to anticipated future outcomes, ‘track trajectories’ 
by thinking ahead of the curve, and see ‘connections’ between current events and 
future states (Klein, Snowden & Lock Pin, 2011). Indeed, positive anticipatory 
thinking can facilitate goal-directed choice (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997) as decision 
makers are able to envision how their actions may align with the achievement of 
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tactical and strategic goals. The visualisation of goals via mental imagery can 
improve task performance (Schultheiss &Brunstein, 1999). However, if anticipated 
outcomes are associated with negative outcomes, it is suggested that this cognitive 
process to visualise the future may become maladaptive. Indeed, anticipated negative 
consequences relating to both harm via action and harm via inaction were a key 
cause to maladaptive thinking identified in Chapter 4. Furthermore, research in 
emergency response domains has identified how the anticipation of potential 
negative outcomes relating to being held to account for poor decisions can reduce 
task performance; shifting focus away from task demands and towards more self-
protective priorities (Waring, Alison, Cunningham & Whitfield, 2013). When 
individuals fear negative evaluation from others then ambiguity aversion increases 
(Curley, Yates & Abrams, 1986; Ellsberg, 1961); the anticipation of negative 
evaluation makes decision makers more risk averse in their decision making. 
However, if the fear of negative evaluation is removed, then performance improves 
(Trautmann, Vieider & Wakker, 2008). Thus, in linking these findings with previous 
data chapters in this thesis, it is possible that the competitive command team 
environment (as identified in Chapter 5) may negatively interact with social 
processing, increasing concerns on accountability and associated outcome 
uncertainty.  
7.5.1.1 Implications for H3 
Thus, a key implication of data, both from this chapter and general thesis, is the 
maladaptive impact of negative anticipatory thinking. This will be discussed in more 
detail in the ‘General Discussion’ (Chapter 8) to this thesis. It emerged in this study 
that ‘outcome uncertainty’ was the most prevalent type of uncertainty as experienced 
by commanders. This is somewhat contradictory to the current research on 
emergency response decision making, which highlights the salient negative impact 
of uncertainty about the current task and past decisions/knowledge (Chen et al., 
2008). The added focus on the salient impact of anticipated negative outcomes is a 
fruitful avenue for further research. Furthermore, it may be possible to extend the 
findings on the three different types of uncertainty that were identified (i.e. task, 
outcome, retrospective). Specifically, research to explore how uncertainty and 
temporal focus interact with decision making is an interesting area for further 
research.  
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A limitation of the study is that there were only 50 participants involved and the 
questionnaire used to identify these three types of uncertainty only consisted of nine 
items. Future research could explore the model of temporal uncertainty by 
monitoring responses from a larger sample. It may also be useful to use these 
preliminary results to develop a more theoretically grounded psychometric scale that 
could be used to measure the experience of uncertainty during decision making more 
closely. In the present study, uncertainty was measured holistically at the end of the 
simulation. The development of a short psychometric scale could be useful for 
measuring the experience, and associated fluctuations, in uncertainty across the 
lifespan of a decision making/problem solving event. This is an exciting prospect for 
further research on a temporal model of uncertainty. It would also be interesting to 
see whether a temporal model of uncertainty extends beyond the domain of 
emergency incidents, or whether it is specific to time-pressured and high-stakes 
environments. 
7.5.2 H4: Those who score high on NFC and CF will experience lower 
levels of uncertainty 
H4 predicted that those who score high on NFC and CF would experience less 
uncertainty. This is because both of these measures are associated with adaptive and 
flexible cognitive processing under uncertainty (Kruglanski, et al., 1993; Dennis & 
Vander Wal, 2010). NFC is a cognitive processing trait whereby decision makers 
chronically limit their information processing in order to achieve rapid closure to 
decision tasks (Kruglanski, 1989; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). It was anticipated 
that NFC would be an adaptive motivational mechanism that individuals use in order 
to cope with uncertainty. They would limit information search patterns in order to 
suppress uncertainty and increase decisiveness (Czernatowicz-Kukuczka et al., 2014; 
Kruglanski et al., 1993). It was thus hypothesised that those high on NFC would 
experience lower levels of uncertainty as they functionally suppress uncertainty and 
have greater confidence in their choices.  
However, findings from the current study found no relationship between NFC 
and experienced uncertainty. This is counterintuitive to the general characteristics 
associated with NFC, as individuals tend to use attribute-search patterns that are 
adaptive for satisficing to minimum thresholds in complex decision environments 
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(Choi et al., 2008). In explaining this effect, it is possible that the sample used for 
this study (i.e. commanders) may all hold generally high scores on NFC as they are 
required to be decisive to succeed in a command role. Thus a lack of variability 
compared to the general population may have diluted findings. Furthermore, it is 
possible that, although those high on NFC are generally more decisive, that does not 
mean that they experience lower levels of uncertainty. Indeed, it has been found that 
those high on NFC will actually increase information search if tasks are complex 
making quick cognitive closure unlikely (Jasko, Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, 
Kossowska & Czarna, 2015). This means that those high on NFC will only reduce 
information processing if it aligns with the functional goal of closure (Kossowska & 
Bar-Tal, 2013); but when tasks are complex and uncertainty is high then they no 
longer adapt. It is therefore possible that NFC may be unrelated to uncertainty as it 
simply reflects a functional preference when decision making (i.e. quick closure), 
regardless of whether one is uncertain or not. 
The second cognitive processing measure that this study explored was CF 
(Denis & Wander, 2013). CF is defined as the tendency to be flexible and adaptive in 
decision making (Martin & Anderson, 1998) and is generally perceived to be a 
positive cognitive processing trait that enables decision makers to think adaptively 
under stress (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). It is associated with self-awareness of 
alternatives, a willingness to adapt to changing circumstances and self-efficacy in 
one’s ability to make flexible choices (Martin & Anderson, 1998). As such, it was 
expected that CF would be associated with a reduced uncertainty as individuals have 
confidence in their ability to control the situation by taking adaptive steps. Although 
overall scores on the CFI were unrelated to uncertainty, it appeared that the two 
subscales interacted with the experience of uncertainty. Interestingly however, it was 
found that the ‘control’ and ‘alternatives’ subscales of the CFI (Dennis & Vander 
Wal, 2010) had opposite effects.  
Specifically, high scores on the ‘control’ subscale, which is associated to self-
efficacy and perceived control over the ability to adapt to difficult situations, was 
associated with low scores on both task and retrospective uncertainty. This could be 
expected as individuals who feel in control of difficult situations would presumably 
experience less uncertainty about task requirements and past choices. Indeed, CF has 
been associated with constructive thinking (emotional intelligence), with individuals 
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perceiving difficult decision tasks as ‘challenging’ rather than a ‘threat’ (Drach-
Zahavy & Somech, 1999; Epstein, 1998). This positive mental attitude when faced 
with difficult and ambiguous tasks has been used to explain why CF can increase 
one’s ability to adapt to situational demands (Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012). Arguably, 
those with high scores on CFI-control may experience lower task and retrospective 
uncertainty as they perceive ambiguity as challenging and manageable rather than 
threatening and derailing.  
It also emerged that the ‘alternatives’ subscale of the CFI had a significant 
relationship with uncertainty, however that it was associated to increased outcome 
uncertainty. This is somewhat contradictory to the general perspective that CF is 
associated with positive affect and adaptive behaviour (Martin & Anderson, 1998) as 
it suggests that CF may increase uncertainty. CF has been linked to an increase in 
behavioural ‘scripts’ when faced with complex tasks (Martin & Anderson, 1998), 
which would suggest that individuals hold a level of expertise that may facilitate 
positive anticipatory thinking about outcomes (Klein et al., 2011). Yet the results of 
this study suggest the opposite; that those who tend to consider multiple alternatives 
anticipated negative outcomes.  
In explaining the negative interaction between CFI-alternatives and outcome 
uncertainty, it is important to consider whether the types of alternatives that 
commanders consider when operating in complex emergency environments are 
positive or negative. It is possible that the consideration of alternative solutions and 
explanations may increase uncertainty as individuals fear being held to account for 
poor decision outcomes (Curley et al., 1986; Trautmann et al., 2008; Waring et al., 
2013). This may relate to the specific role of the decision makers who were involved 
in this study as commanders have salient responsibilities for decision outcomes. 
Rather than high scores on CFI-alternatives being associated to positive solutions, 
perhaps the sheer ambiguity of the task coupled with the responsibility and 
accountability of a commander led to increased uncertainty. Generally, CF is 
associated with positive affect leading to adaptive choice, especially when 
individuals are approach oriented (Liu & Wang, 2014). It is possible that when faced 
with potentially aversive and negative outcomes, as is characteristic to the high-
stakes emergency response environment (Chen et al., 2008), that CF associated with 
alternatives induces negative affect leading to increased outcome uncertainty. 
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Indeed, the vast majority of studies on CF tend to treat the measure as a holistic 
concept whereby perceived control and the consideration of alternatives are adaptive 
to decision making (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). However, it is possible that high 
scores on both these subscales may not always benefit choice depending upon the 
context of the choice environment. The consideration of multiple alternatives when 
operating in a high-stakes, complex and stressful environments may negatively 
impact choice leading to increased outcome uncertainty. 
7.5.2.1 Implications for H4 
Implications for the findings on individual differences in cognitive processing 
relate to the importance of decision context. CF was paradoxically both a help and a 
hindrance to decision making, with ‘control’ associated to reduced uncertainty and 
‘alternatives’ associated to increased uncertainty. In order to explore why these 
contradictory effects arose, it would be interesting to see whether these findings hold 
in different decision making contexts. For example, it is possible that high scores on 
CFI-alternatives may be more useful in situations of low time-pressure and 
complexity. Indeed the consideration of alternatives in these settings may increase 
confidence in one’s choice by maximising outcomes; thus reducing outcome 
uncertainty. It would be interesting to see how CF scores interact with the 
characteristics of the decision problem. 
Furthermore, this study measured differences in cognitive processing styles 
based upon trait individual differences. This was because the more implicit 
monitoring of cognitive processing styles to compare, for example, alternative- and 
attribute-based processing was unfeasible as such studies tend to use eye-gaze or 
mouse clicking trajectories on computers to identify how participants gathered 
information and compared options (e.g. Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). This was not 
possible in the current study, as participants had to generate solutions (rather than 
pick between options) and importantly because the purpose of the simulation was to 
reflect real-world choices and thus eye-tracking was unrealistic. Future studies could 
better extrapolate the relationship between cognitive processing styles and the 
experience of uncertainty by asking participants to log their decision and then list 
alternative options that they considered. This could be used as a measure of cognitive 
processing; whereby multiple alternative options suggests they were trying to 
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‘maximise’ outcomes whereas fewer alternatives indicates a ‘satisficing’ technique. 
This would offer a measure of adaptive cognitive processing that could be compared 
to the experience of uncertainty. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to test the relationship between uncertainty and cognitive 
processing styles in extreme environments, using questionnaire data following an 
immersive MTFA simulation exercise. A PCA identified three types of uncertainty 
associated to: (i) the task; (ii) outcomes; and (iii) past information/decisions. Of 
these, outcome uncertainty was the most prevalent. Individual differences in 
cognitive processing styles were associated with different experiences of uncertainty; 
CF associated with feelings of control was associated to lower scores on task and 
retrospective uncertainty, whereas CF associated with the consideration of multiple 
alternatives was associated to increased outcome uncertainty. It is suggested that this 
is due to a functional mismatch between the (usually adaptive) process of 
considering multiple alternatives and the characteristics of the emergency. In 
situations of time-pressure and complexity the consideration of alternatives may 
negatively interact with choice, leading to increased anticipated negative outcomes.  
As will be discussed in the general discussion (Chapter 8), the implications of these 
findings relate to the need to ensure that emergency service training emphasises the 
contextual relevance of cognitive flexibility with relation to the time demands. It is 
suggested that an increased awareness of the complex and/or time pressured nature 
of the decision task may facilitate decision making, as commanders can explicitly 
adapt their cognitive processing style to respond to time pressure. This may offer a 
fruitful way to reduce anticipated negative consequences, as commanders can 
rationalise the choices by acknowledging their need to satisfice to time pressure. 
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Chapter 8: General discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to make a novel contribution to psychology by 
extending upon the limited research on the psychology of inaction; specifically 
focussing on extreme decision making in emergency service contexts. It took a 
mixed methods approach, using both qualitative methods (to explore the experiences 
of practitioners when faced with challenging incidents) and quantitative methods (to 
test theoretical models). The central contribution of this thesis was to: (i) highlight 
the conceptual importance of research on stimulus and non-response; and (ii) 
identify some the causes of decision inertia in emergency response team settings. 
There were two key findings. Firstly, that the relationship between stimulus and non-
response appears to be mediated by anticipated negative consequences; decision 
makers fail to take action because they were distracted by the anticipation of 
negative consequences linked to both action / approach and inaction / avoidance 
behaviour. Secondly, with regards to decision making in extreme environments, it 
appeared that certain cognitive processing styles (i.e. approach goals, cognitive 
flexibility) that are usually perceived to be adaptive were incompatible with the 
context of the emergency incident (i.e. time pressure, complexity); decision makers 
failed to take action as they did not adapt their cognitive processing in line with the 
time-pressured nature of extreme environments. This chapter will discuss these 
findings by: 
(i) Outlining the conceptual importance of psychological research on 
decision inertia. 
(ii) Discussing the two central findings in detail along with their implications, 
with regards to: 
a. The mediating impact of anticipated negative consequences. 
b. How some (usually adaptive) cognitive processing styles are 
inappropriate in the context of extreme environments. 
(iii) Identify the methodological strengths and weaknesses and 
recommendations for future research. 
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8.2 The conceptual importance of psychological research on decision inertia 
This thesis began by highlighting an important, real-world issue with conceptual 
importance to psychology. It described a number of examples of how decision 
making at emergency incidents is often characterised by decision delays or failures 
to act. The Boxing Day Tsunami (2004), the Haiti Earthquake (2010) and the 
recurring flooding disasters in the UK over recent years all provide exemplars for 
how failures to act have drastic negative consequences (Campbell et al., 2008; 
Grunewald et al., 2010; National Audit Office, 2006; PEDU, 2012). This thesis 
explored why action sometimes fails by first identifying the psychological concept of 
‘decision inertia’: the cognitive process of continual, yet fundamentally redundant, 
deliberation on a choice for no positive gain. Chapter 3 described how decision 
inertia is conceptually distinct from the concept of ‘decision avoidance’, whereby 
decision makers intend to avoid making a choice, and ‘implementation failure’, 
when a choice is made but fails to progress to behavioural execution due to 
breakdowns in coordination. Decision inertia is associated with strong intentions to 
take action, but action is prevented by the competing desire to also avoid potential 
negative consequences. The anticipation of negative consequences mediates the 
relationship between stimulus and non-response as individuals fail to act as they try 
to trade-off competing aversive outcomes. 
Psychological research has developed expertise in understanding the linkage 
between the environment, behaviour and human cognition by experimenting on and 
observing the relationship between stimulus and response. There are a variety of 
paradigms in the decision making research domain that explore the conditions under 
which individuals make certain choices. For example, research on heuristics and 
biases has identified stimuli associated with irrational choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1979) and NDM research has explored the factors associated to choice 
implementation ‘in the wild’ (Gore, Banks, Millward & Kyraikidou, 2006; 
McAndrew & Gore, 2015). Yet there has been relatively limited attention paid to the 
relationship between stimulus and non-response. Despite this, failures to make 
decisions are prevalent in human psychology as outlined in the real-world examples 
above. It is hoped that by highlighting the conceptual importance of the psychology 
of non-behaviour, that this could spark a fruitful and methodologically intriguing 
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avenue for further research, not only in the domain of decision making but with 
reference to the whole spectrum of human behaviour. 
8.2.1 A summary of findings on the contributing factors to decision inertia 
As the concept of inertia is relatively novel, an important first step to this thesis 
was to survey the available literature relating to the issue. A ‘critical interpretive 
synthesis’ method was used to survey the literature, as it specifically seeks to explore 
new and novel concepts by synthesising qualitative and quantitative literature whilst 
interpreting findings through a theoretical lens (Dixon-woods et al., 2005; 2006; 
Flemming, 2009). The result of this was a ‘taxonomy of action failure’, which 
identified how action may fail as a result of decision inertia, decision avoidance or 
implementation failure. It further proposed six theoretical causes to inaction: (i) task 
ambiguity; (ii) social ambiguity; (iii) inexperience in the decision domain; (iv) 
negative affect; (v) indecisive personalities; and (vi) avoidant goals and motivation. 
This taxonomy provided the context against which subsequent data chapters for this 
thesis were based. Table 8.1 outline thesis findings relate with these theorised 
causes: Chapter 4 found support of the negative effects of social ambiguity, negative 
affect and avoidant goals; Chapter 5 explored the influence of task ambiguity and 
social ambiguity; Chapter 6 identified how task ambiguity, social ambiguity and 
avoidant goals interact with inertia; and Chapter 7 unpacked the negative effects of 
task ambiguity, social ambiguity, indecisive personalities and avoidant goals. The 
one aspect that this thesis did not explore was the influence of experience / expertise 
on inaction. This was because the individuals involved in the research were all 
experienced commanders (in order to facilitate the desire for metacognitive 
descriptions of decision making) and thus a comparison to novice decision makers 
was not possible.  
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Table 8.1: Findings from each chapter with reference to the causes to 
uncertainty 
Cause of 
inaction 
C4: Qualitative 
goals and 
motivations 
C5: 
Qualitative 
uncertainty 
C6: Simulation 
goals and 
motivations 
C7: Simulation 
uncertainty 
Task 
ambiguity 
- Information; 
resources; time 
pressure; social 
management; 
budget cuts 
Complexity of 
incident made 
approach goals 
maladaptive 
Complexity of 
incident induced 
task uncertainty 
Social 
ambiguity 
Inconsistent 
goals between 
agencies 
Communication
s; role 
understanding; 
trust; 
competition 
Inconsistent 
goals between 
agencies 
Poor role 
understanding 
related to 
retrospective 
uncertainty 
Inexperience 
in decision 
domain 
- - - - 
Negative 
affect 
Negative affect 
due to 
anticipated 
negative 
consequences 
- - - 
Indecisive 
personalities 
- - - Low control 
associated ot 
increased task 
and retrospective 
uncertainty; 
Cognitive 
flexibility can 
increase outcome 
uncertainty 
Avoidant 
goals and 
motivation 
Conflict between 
approach and 
avoidance goals 
- Avoidance goals 
delayed early 
choice 
X 
 
In terms of the specific negative effects of each of these causes, it emerged from 
the research of this thesis that task ambiguity was related to inaction due to issues 
with information, resources, time pressure, social management and budget cuts. 
Specifically, it derailed choice as added complexity increased task uncertainty and 
further reduced the functionality of approach goals. Social ambiguity was related to 
inaction due to issues with communication, role understanding, trust and 
competition. It appeared to derail choice as goals between agencies were inconsistent 
and poorly understood relating to retrospective uncertainty. Negative affect was a 
further contributing factor to inaction, as the desire to avoid potentially negative 
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outcomes was associated to anxiety. Indecisive personalities also interacted with 
inaction, as low scores on perceived control were associated with increased task and 
retrospective uncertainty; whereas high scores on cognitive flexibility-alternatives 
increased outcome uncertainty. Finally, it emerged that avoidance goals were 
associated with inaction and delayed choice, especially when being traded off against 
approach oriented intentions. As will now be discussed, it is suggested that the 
anticipation of negative consequences mediates the relationship between these 
causes to inaction and non-behaviour. A further important finding was that the 
context of the emergency incident had unusual effects on the functionality on goal 
orientations and cognitive processing styles and thus is an important moderator of 
the these effects. Each will now be discussed in more detail. 
8.3 Two main findings 
8.3.1 The mediating impact of anticipated negative consequences 
The four data chapters to this thesis produced two main findings. The first of 
these related to the salient influence that the anticipation of negative consequences 
had on the ability to make decisions. It emerged that the relationship between 
stimulus and non-response was mediated by redundant deliberation in the attempt to 
trade-off negative anticipated consequences. It is well acknowledged that uncertainty 
can derail choice implementation in emergency incidents and extreme environments 
(van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). The results of this thesis contribute to the 
understanding of why uncertainty may derail choice. Specifically, the anticipation of 
potential negative consequences was related to anxiety about violating approach and 
avoidance goals. For example, should I take action to ‘save life’ even if it may 
potentially violate ‘prevent harm’ goals by risking emergency responder safety; or 
should I take action to ‘prevent harm’ by taking cautious actions even if this may 
slow down action and thus violate ‘save life’? Indeed, not only was this goal conflict 
affiliated to forward thinking apparent in qualitative data chapters, but it also 
emerged that ‘outcome uncertainty’ was the most prevalent all types of uncertainty 
during the simulation. Figure 8.1 (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) provides a visual 
depiction of the anticipated negative consequences that participants from the 
emergency services described. It identifies how the anticipation of both short-term 
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(incident related) and long-term (post-incident) negative consequences derailed 
action and was associated to anxiety about causing harm via action and inaction.  
 
Figure 8.1: Anticipated negative consequences associated with decision inertia 
Anticipated negative emotions, such as regret, can impede decision making as 
individuals focus on avoiding potential negative outcomes in place of rational 
decision outcomes (Brooks, 2011; Kumar, 2004; Mourali, Pons & Hassay, 2011; 
Ritov & Baron, 1995; Tyocinski, Pitmann & Tuttle, 1995). Interestingly, it was 
found that anticipated negative outcomes were not only associated to causing harm 
by making a poor decision, but were also related to causing harm by failing to take 
any action at all. This links to previous research that has suggested there are two 
types of anticipated regret; one attached to regret from taking action (commission) 
and one linked to fear of regret following inaction (omission) (Sevdalis, Harvey & 
Yip, 2006). The distinction between these two types of regret has been used to 
explain the concept of ‘inaction inertia’, when individuals fail to take action after 
missing a previous better opportunity (e.g. missing out on a ‘sale’ price) 
(Tykocinski, Pittman & Tuttle, 1995). It is suggested that individuals fail to take 
action after a missed opportunity as they fear regret associated to negative 
counterfactual thinking about the previously missed opportunity (Sevdalis et al., 
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2006). When operating in complex emergency domains whereby the situation 
changes rapidly, it is possible that missed opportunities to previously act may 
contribute to decision inertia.  
In addition to regret, the anticipation of future blame and guilt can interfere with 
decision making, especially when operating in social/organisational settings whereby 
one needs to justify their choice (Eyre et al., 2008; Baron, 1992). Individuals fail to 
take action as they anticipate potential negative accountability in the future. A fear of 
accountability may explain why commanders sometimes fail to make decisions, as 
they trade-off potential negative consequences associated to future accountability. 
The requirement to justify one’s actions to the team, superiors and the wider public 
as a part of the role of a commander thus impedes decision making. Indeed, 
accountability has been associated with an increased desire for self-preservation in 
police decision making contexts (Waring et al., 2012). Furthermore, in high-level 
healthcare decision making, managers struggle to make ethical choices due to 
feelings of isolation and exposure linked to accountability (Mamhidir, Kihlgren & 
Sorlie, 2007). The anticipation of negative consequences associated with 
accountability may thus reflect a salient explanation for decision inertia. 
Not only do anticipated negative consequences interfere with decision making at 
the explicit level, but they are further linked to implicit cognitive biases such as 
omission bias. Omission bias describes how individuals’ decision making is biased 
as they will consistently favour options that involve no action or no change when 
faced with potential negative outcomes (Ritov & Baron, 1995). This is because harm 
due to omission (inaction) is (irrationally) perceived to be less averse than the 
potential for harm through commission (action) (Anderson, 2003). It is possible that 
omission bias may play a role in explaining decision inertia. Decision makers 
perceive less harm from omission than they do from commission and so favour 
inaction over action. Omission bias has been used to explain why some parents 
irrationally opt out from vaccinating their children, as even though the child is 
statistically safer having been vaccinated against a deadly disease, parents anticipate 
the (minimal) chance of negative side-effects as more aversive (Asch, Baron, 
Hershey et al., 1994; Bond & Nolan, 2011; DiBonaventura & Chapman, 2008). 
Furthermore, when faced with life-or-death moral choices, which are typical to 
emergency incidents, individuals tend to favour deontological protected values 
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which avoid causing harm through action (i.e. ‘do not kill’) even when this violates 
wider strategic goals (Bartels & Medin, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1999). For example, 
when faced with the decision on whether to take action to risk one life in order to 
save many, individuals consistently refuse to take action even though it is the most 
rational choice. Fundamentally, in risky decision making environments where 
individuals anticipate regret, they tend to be biased towards options that, irrespective 
of normative standards, allow them to avoid taking action. This may help to explain 
the psychological reasons for why commanders struggled to commit to action when 
operating in inherently high risk emergency contexts; due to the salient aversive 
outcomes associated with action. 
Crucially, although concepts such as omission bias and inaction inertia are well-
studied phenomena that relate to inaction, these concepts do not necessarily relate to 
decision inertia. Many of the decision problems outlined above do not describe inert 
choice or redundant cognitive processing, but reflect active choices to ‘not take 
action’. What was found in the research described in this thesis was that, rather than 
commanders choosing to not take action, they instead experienced cognitive conflict 
associated with the redundant deliberation on whether they ‘do or don’t’ act. It is 
possible that this is a product of their organisational responsibilities and role to take 
action in order to ‘save life’. Commanders within the emergency services rarely have 
the luxury to ‘do nothing’ as their core responsibility and purpose is to take action to 
resolve the emergency incident. Indeed, when individuals’ anticipate that negative 
consequences may arise following inaction then this can induce an action bias, 
making decision makers more likely to act in order to avoid anticipated negative 
consequences for not acting (Tanner, 2009; Wroe, Turner & Salkoyskis, 2004). 
Furthermore, in moral life-or-death choices, when utilitarian values such as ‘save 
life’ are made salient to decision makers (over deontological ‘do not kill’ values), 
then individuals are more likely to favour the normative utilitarian option (i.e. take 
action that may harm a few to save many) (Broeders, van den Bos, Muller & Ham, 
2011). These studies would suggest that when the anticipation of negative 
consequences is linked to inaction, then this may act to galvanise behavioural action. 
A unique aspect of this research therefore relates to the finding that action failed 
despite the motivation of commanders to take action. Motivation is the energy that 
directs behaviour in line with emotions (feelings) and cognitions (goals) (Elliot, 
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2006). Commanders’ primary approach goal was to ‘save life’ by taking positive 
action in order to benefit the emergency incident (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
According to the literature, it could be assumed that holding approach goals to ‘save 
life’ should de-bias cognitive processing associated with omission bias and galvanise 
action (Broeders, et al., 2011; Tanner, 2009; Wroe, et al., 2004). Indeed, data from 
the qualitative interviews suggested that commanders anticipated negative 
consequences for not acting, which supports this hypothesis. Yet, crucially, it was 
found that commanders not only anticipated salient negative consequences for 
violating ‘save life’ goals, but they further anticipated negative consequences linked 
to ‘prevent further harm’ goals. Unlike previous research, which has suggested that 
individuals are biased in favour of deontological or inactive goals (Bartels & Medin, 
2007; Ritov & Baron, 1999), commanders experienced salient goal conflict due to 
their inability to trade-off competing and contradictory goals. Commanders held both 
approach goals to make a positive impact on the situation, along with avoidance 
goals to avoid taking action that may be of detriment to the emergency incident 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Indeed, commanders have organisational 
responsibilities to both ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ (JESIP, 2013); conflict arose 
when actions to ‘save life’ could inadvertently increase harm through, for example, 
causing harm to emergency respondents. It was this core goal conflict that derailed 
action, as commanders struggled to trade off competing anticipated negative 
consequences affiliated to both action and inaction. 
8.3.1.1 Research implications for the mediating impact of anticipated 
negative consequences on decision inertia 
The anticipation of negative consequences thus appeared to mediate the 
relationship between the causes of uncertainty and the failure to take action. 
Importantly, commanders, as a function of their role in the emergency services, not 
only anticipated potential negative consequences from taking action but also for not 
taking action, which induced redundant deliberation and inertia. These findings have 
important implications for research to more explicitly test this relationship. As this 
thesis took an NDM approach, using qualitative methods to explore the experience 
of expert commanders from real-world data, the potential to utilise more stringent 
statistical tools was limited. A strength of this method is the ability to discover novel 
concepts; for example, the discovery that anticipated negative consequences appear 
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to mediate the relationship between uncertainty and decision inertia is evidence of 
this methodological power. However, once theoretical hypotheses have emerged, it 
would be remittent of scientific research to not further test falsifiable conclusions 
(Popper, 2005). Chapter 7 identified that ‘outcome uncertainty’ was the most 
prevalent type of uncertainty experienced by commanders during the scenario, which 
links to anticipated negative consequences. Although the questionnaire scale that 
was developed in this thesis had three items to measure the latent variable of 
‘outcome uncertainty’, further research could extend this scale. A validated scale 
would be useful for ‘in vivo’ tests to measure fluctuations in anticipated negative 
consequences across a decision making task. This could usefully identify when 
outcome uncertainty is most salient, in order to develop targeted training and/or 
interventions to reduce it. 
A second implication for research on the negative impact of anticipated 
consequences relates to neurobiological research. It emerged that conflict between 
anticipated negative consequences were associated to competition between approach 
and avoidance goals (Bossuyt, Moors & De Houwer, 2014). As the concept of 
approach / avoidance motivation was derived from neurobiological research (Elliot, 
2006; Gray, 1990; Gray & McNaughton, 2000), it is suggested that there may also be 
a neurobiological basis to decision inertia. Indeed, approach-avoidance conflict was 
associated with activation in the septo-hippocampul area of the brain; with approach 
goals associated with activation the Behavioural Approach System (BAS) and 
avoidance goals associated with activation in the Behavioural Inhibition System 
(BIS) (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). It would be interesting to conduct studies on 
decision inertia that monitor activation in the septo-hippocampul region of the brain 
when faced with high-stakes choices. It is possible that the experience of decision 
inertia may similarly activate the BIS and BAS areas of the brain. Furthermore, as it 
has been found that individual differences can arise in terms of BIS / BAS sensitivity 
(Carver & White, 1994), there may be individual differences in susceptibility to 
inertia. Research combing inertia and neurobiology could also provide a greater 
understanding of emotional processing in extreme environments. Indeed, 
neurobiological research embraces the role of emotions as a salient marker to guide 
the decision process (Damasio, 1994’ Gray & McNaughton, 2000); whereas 
organisational research and training tends to focus more on cognitive strategies and 
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rationalisations that may enable choice. Research on the neurobiological basis of 
inertia might promote research interest on the emotional basis of decision making in 
high-stakes organisations such as the emergency services. 
8.3.1.2 Practical implications for the mediating impact of anticipated 
negative consequences on decision inertia 
There are also a number of practical implications for the emergency services that 
can be derived from these results. Commanders expressed salient feelings of 
‘responsibility as a commander’ and a ‘professional integrity’, which seemed to 
exacerbate their fear of negative anticipated consequences, both with regards to 
personal and organisational accountability. They felt responsible for having a 
positive impact on the emergency, yet positive affirmations were sometimes lost in 
the fear of failure. It has been found that, although egocentric goals in multi-team 
settings degrade performance (Kleingeld, Mierlo & Arends, 2011), that complexity 
in the decision environment can increase one’s focus on intra- rather than inter-
agency goals (Alison, Power, et al., 2015). Furthermore, a fear of accountability can 
increase actions that are oriented around self-preservation (Waring et al., 2014) with 
inter-agency work tending to be less effective if there is a strong intra-agency 
occupational culture (Charman, 2012). This means that anxiety about potential 
negative outcomes may threaten the aim of JESIP to establish joint working (JESIP, 
2013); the inherent risk associated with emergency incidents encourages within-
organisation self-preservation. This raises an important question as to whether a truly 
interoperable emergency service is possible. 
Chapter 6 identified how, despite commanders stating that goals were aligned 
between agencies, that in reality they were very different. Their self-reported goals 
were closely linked to agency-specific responsibilities; yet they assumed all team 
members were working towards the same goals as themselves. This creates concerns 
over the practical relevance of ‘joint’ working with regards to whether it is possible 
or desirable. Rather than a focus on joint work, perhaps it would be more appropriate 
to develop training that facilitates an understanding of the inter-team network, 
enshrining a decentralised approach to operations over a centralised desire for 
collective choice (House, Power & Alison, 2013). This could reduce the desire to 
protect oneself and one’s organisation, as it designates autonomy to each agency. 
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That is not to say that actions should be counter-intuitive to one another, but a clear 
delineation of each agency’s expertise may facilitate work towards common goals, 
whilst reducing a desire to protect one’s own agency from inter-team competition. 
The aim of JESIP to improve inter-agency role clarity can benefit inter-agency 
working by increasing awareness of each other’s’ specific capabilities within the 
wider-team system (Charman, 2012). Thus, rather than focus on joint decision 
making, which may inadvertently increase competition and egocentric actions, it 
may be more useful to develop a shared understanding of agency-specific roles; 
which could in turn reduce the anxiety associated to anticipated negative 
consequences related to inertia. It is recommended, rather than strive towards joint 
decision making, that future training in multi-agency settings should focus on 
developing a decentralised and metacognitive team network whereby there is a clear 
understanding of specific roles and expertise (Klein & Militello, 2004). This would 
help to reduce anticipated negative consequences associated with accountability and 
competition and facilitate cohesive action. 
8.3.2 How some (usually adaptive) cognitive processing styles are 
inappropriate in the context of extreme environments 
The second major finding from this thesis related to the importance of context 
when exploring the data. It was found that certain cognitive processing styles, which 
are usually perceived to facilitate decision making (i.e. approach goals; cognitive 
flexibility), negatively interacted with choice implementation. Generally, approach 
goals have a positive effect on choice implementation as they are associated to 
positive affect and the intention and motivation to take action by moving towards 
positive stimuli (Carver & White, 1994; Elliot, 2006). Similarly, ‘cognitive 
flexibility’ (CF), defined as “the ability to switch cognitive sets to adapt to changing 
environmental stimuli” (p.242, Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010) is associated with 
flexible cognitive processing patterns (Martin & Anderson, 1998) and the ability to 
think adaptively under stress (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Both CF and approach 
motivations thus enable resilient decision making, allowing individuals to manage 
the stress and negative affect that is inherently associated with emergency response 
domains. It could therefore be assumed that holding approach goals and scoring high 
for CF would reduce the risk of decision inertia.  
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Yet evidence derived from this thesis uncovered an unexpected relationship 
between cognitive processing styles and their decision making outputs. Although 
teams who were predominantly approach motivated made faster decisions initially 
(i.e. during the zoning decision task), they were significantly slower at decision 
making later on in the incident (i.e. during the ‘non-specialist staff) decision. 
Furthermore, although CF associated with perceived control over difficult situations 
was associated to lower experiences of task and retrospective uncertainty, CF 
associated to the consideration of multiple alternatives increased outcome 
uncertainty. It is suggested that the reason for these unexpected and somewhat 
contradictory findings is due to the context of the emergency incident environment. 
Indeed, when incident complexity increases as a result of multiple task demands then 
approach goals are no longer functionally appropriate; commanders struggle to 
prioritise goals due to their overwhelming desire to maximise outcomes. Similarly, 
CF relating to the generation of multiple alternatives may be useful when operating 
in non-time pressured environments, yet when decisions are required rapidly it can 
impede choice as the consideration of multiple alternatives increases redundant 
deliberation and overall uncertainty about the future. 
The influence of choice context on decision making has been well explored in 
the psychological literature. In emergency incidents, the environment is often 
described as being high-risk, high-stakes and time pressured (Chen et al., 2008). This 
impedes decision making performance by inducing cognitive overload and stress 
(Paton & Flin, 1999). As endogenous uncertainties are inherent to almost all decision 
making in extreme environments (Alison et al., 2014), it is important to try and find 
ways to overcome their effects. The development of expertise in the decision 
domain, following repeated opportunities to ‘learn’ within the decision environment, 
enables experts to make rapid decision based on little perceptual information (Klein, 
1998). Experts are able to expedite the decision process through the automatic 
generation of the most appropriate option (Klein et al., 1995), which enables them to 
‘leap’ or ‘shunt’ along the decision making process, thereby sidestepping more 
analytic evaluation of complex information (Salmon et al., 2010). Experience in the 
decision domain increases resilience against uncertainty when faced with novel 
situations, as experts utilise accurate heuristic processing mechanisms (such as 
‘reflection-in-action’) in order to cope with uncertainty (van den Heuvel et al., 
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2014). Furthermore, the development of ‘adaptive expertise’ enables experienced 
individuals in specialised domains to generate novel solutions to complex problems 
(Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). Fundamentally, decision making under uncertainty is 
enabled by using adaptive and relevant cognitive processing. 
However, despite the ability to reduce uncertainty via the development of 
expertise, the very nature of emergency incidents means that commanders face a 
variety of different types of emergency that each present their own nuanced set of 
challenges. Commanders from different geographic regions across the UK will have 
different skill sets depending upon, for example, whether they live near water, in 
remote areas or urban areas. As the ability for commanders to develop expertise 
across a range of difference specialisms is both unfeasible and not necessarily useful, 
it is thus important to focus on building expertise in adaptive decision making skills 
that may be applied across incidents. Specifically, commanders may benefit from 
training to identify how different features of the environment (e.g. time pressure) 
require different cognitive processing strategies and decision rules. For example, 
approach goals may be useful for initial and relatively straight forward tasking (e.g. 
zoning task): the commanders had received initial basic information about the 
incident with their main task focussed on zoning. Yet when multiple task demands 
compete for attention, then approach goals are no longer useful: by the time ‘non-
specialist responders’ had arrived and offered their assistance, commanders were 
also responding to an escalating fire, mobile terrorists in a new location, and a vast 
number of casualties who were critically injured. This meant that approach goals 
were no longer functionally adaptive as a result of the dynamic change in number of 
competing priorities. Approach motivations were in fact maladaptive when operating 
in contexts with mutual salient and competing goals (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993) 
due to increased cognitive overload and goal conflict, which is possibly linked to 
activation in the septo-hippocampus (Gray, 1990; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
Thus, although the desire to achieve positive outcomes provided a useful cognitive 
strategy in the early stages of the incident, it is important to more fully understand 
the conditions under which approach goals can paradoxically reduce action 
likelihood. 
In explaining the possible reasons for why certain cognitive processing styles 
may be inappropriate in extreme environments, it is possibly due to the association 
 
 
217 
 
between approach goals and ‘maximising’ outcomes. The desire to ‘maximise’ one’s 
outcomes is associated with highly selective ‘alternative-based’ cognitive 
processing, which aims to identify if any options are good enough (Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2007). This contrasts to ‘satisficing’, which is associated to attribute-
based evaluation using minimum thresholds to establish which option is good 
enough (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). Likewise, it is possible that high scores on 
CF-alternatives is associated to ‘maximising’ as individuals consider multiple 
options. Maximising strategies are most appropriate when decisions are non-time 
bounded and/or have the potential to be deferred; whereas satisficing is useful in 
time pressured domains (Parker & Schrift, 2011). Indeed, when placed under time 
pressure, it was found that police officers expertly adapted their processing styles to 
use satisficing techniques, yet this effect was moderated by individual differences in 
trait ‘time urgency’ (Alison, Doran et al., 2013). In other words, individuals who had 
a trait tendency to perceive time to pass more slowly did not adjust to time pressure 
by satisficing. It is possible that the findings of Chapter 7, which linked CFI-
alternatives with high outcome uncertainty, may be similarly explained; that scores 
on CFI-alternatives moderate the ability for individuals to adapt to the choice 
context. Those with high CFI-alternative scores chronically maximise decision 
making and thus are less likely to adapt to time pressure. This offers a fruitful and 
exciting avenue for further research on the relationship between choice context, 
cognitive processing tendencies and choice implementation. 
8.3.2.1 Research implications for the interaction between cognitive 
processing styles and the context of extreme environments 
The finding that approach goals and CF were not only related to adaptive 
decision making but also related to negative choice outcomes under certain 
conditions was an unexpected finding. It is suggested that this is due to the 
functional mismatch between these cognitive processing styles and the context of 
extreme environments, whereby high-stakes, time-pressured environments with 
multiple competing tasks (Militello, et al., 2015) remove and reverse the usual 
functional benefits of approach goals and CF. These goals and cognitive processing 
styles may be useful, but only when they are functionally compatible with the 
demands of the decision task. An important first implication to these findings is to 
investigate conclusions more explicitly. A limitation with the current data is that 
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results emerged somewhat unexpectedly and so explicit testing of these effects was 
not incorporated into the study design (e.g. in questionnaires). Furthermore, due to 
the requirements for the simulation to facilitate both research and training needs, ‘in 
vivo’ measurements of goals and uncertainty were not possible as it would have 
reduced the immersive quality of the exercise. The current study relied on post-
simulation measures of goals and uncertainty. Future research could develop these 
findings by using ‘in vivo’ measurements on goal orientations and experienced 
uncertainty to see how they fluctuate over the course of the incident and relate to 
decision timeliness. For example, the same exercise could be run again, but when 
asking participants to ‘log’ their decisions also ask them to fill in a short 
questionnaire to identify their top goals and scores on the three uncertainty scales 
outlined in Chapter 7. 
It would also be interesting to explore the relationship between individual 
differences and the ability to adapt to the situation. Although NFC had no significant 
effects in the current study, it has been previously found that NFC is linked to high 
sensitivity to the characteristics of the choice context (Jasko, Czernatowicz-
Kukuczka, Kossowska & Czarna, 2015). Those high on NFC will adapt their 
behaviour in order to facilitate the functional goal of closure by either increasing or 
decreasing information search depending on whichever strategy will achieve closure 
the fastest (e.g. increase search in novel contexts as no prior knowledge to base a fast 
decision on). It is possible that, unlike NFC, those high on CFI-alternatives may be 
chronically oriented towards the consideration of multiple alternatives, regardless of 
whether it is useful for choice implementation in complex contexts. For example, are 
those who score high on CF-alternatives less able to adapt to time pressure as they 
continue to generate multiple hypotheses? Furthermore, how does this interact at a 
team level? It was not possible to manipulate the characteristics of team members in 
the current study to, for example, compare teams where all members scored high on 
CF-alternatives versus low on CF-alternatives, as they were a specialised sample 
who was only available on an opportunity basis. Perhaps, as this concept may be 
linked to more general psychology rather than the psychology of emergency services 
specifically, it would be possible to extend this to more general group processing 
whereby it would be possible to manipulate team characteristics using participants 
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from the general population. There is further scope to investigate these effects at the 
individual level. 
8.3.2.2 Practical implications for the interaction between cognitive 
processing styles and the context of extreme environments 
In terms of the practical relevance of findings, there are implications for training. 
Indeed, the usefulness of different decision making styles (i.e. goals, cognitive 
processing) appears to be moderated by the choice context. It is important that 
training on decision making in emergency settings acknowledges these effects. For 
instance, approach goals to maximise outcomes may be useful in relatively routine 
incidents, yet could degrade choice implementation in novel or highly time pressured 
incidents. It is important that commanders are aware of how the characteristics of the 
environment may interfere with certain processing styles. Indeed, research on police 
decision making suggested that experienced police officers were able to intuitively 
adapt their decision making to the choice environment, by ‘satisficing’ when placed 
under time pressure (Alison, Doran et al., 2013). However, it is important that an 
awareness of these factors is incorporated into training to increase awareness and 
further expedite the learning process when developing expertise. Indeed, although 
the emergency services undergo a great deal of training at a practical level, training 
on the psychological process of decision making is less advanced. An important 
recommendation of these findings is to extend decision making training in order to 
reduce decision inertia and improve overall response. 
In order to make commanders more sensitive to the emergency incident 
environment, it is possible that training on the use of the ‘Introspect model’ may be 
beneficial. The ‘Introspect model’ is a framework to help guide the debriefing 
process after emergency incidents, whereby commanders work through their debrief 
in a structured manner in order to develop self-reflective knowledge and 
metacognition about the situation (Lamb, Davies, Bowley & Williams, 2014). The 
‘Introspect model’ has been successfully used in UK Fire and Rescue settings and 
can facilitate decision making by translating a commander’s unconscious 
competence into conscious awareness (Lamb et al., 2014). This would help to make 
commanders more aware of their intuitive adaptation to extreme environments (e.g. 
by satisficing to time pressure), which will help them to more easily recognise these 
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cues in future incidents. It is also possible that commanders may be trained to 
become more sensitive to the characteristics of the decision environment. Stress 
exposure training (Driskell & Johnston, 1998) can help commanders to identify 
‘stressful’ factors in the choice environment and adapt their behaviour. This could 
usefully supplement training using the ‘Introspect model’ (Lamb et al., 2014) by 
training commander’s skills on perceptual abilities for sensemaking in extreme 
environments. Training using both the ‘Introspect model’ (Lamb et al., 2014) and 
stress exposure training (Driskell & Johnson, 1998) offers a fruitful way to educate 
commanders on how to adapt their decision making in complex settings. This could 
help them to recognise when they need to shift their processing towards more 
‘satisficing’ techniques. 
8.4 Methodological lessons and future direction 
The final section of this discussion will explore the strengths and weakness of the 
chosen methodology for this thesis, and how this interacts with directions for future 
research. In terms of strengths, findings have high ecological validity to the domain 
of command-level decision making in the emergency services. By taking an NDM 
approach, the conclusions outlined throughout this thesis and highlighted in this 
discussion chapter can claim to have relevance to real-world choice. Data was 
initially collected by interviewing experts on their own personal experiences, 
utilising the CDM interview protocol to unpack metacognitive expertise on the main 
challenges to decision making (Crandall et al., 2006; Wong, 2003). This allowed for 
rigorous, sincere and credible conclusions to be drawn (Tracy, 2010), which is 
especially beneficial when conducting exploratory data that seeks to unpack 
knowledge on novel or underexplored concepts (i.e. decision inertia). Similarly, prior 
to data collection, a novel approach to reviewing the literature was conducted using 
the ‘critical interpretive synthesis’ process (Dixon-woods et al., 2005; 2006; 
Flemming, 2009). Once more, this methodology, although less well utilised than the 
likes of systematic literature reviews that utilise strict and limiting search criteria, is 
appropriate for the exploration of data in order to generate theoretical insights and 
emergent themes. Thus, a strength to the conclusions drawn from this thesis is their 
solid grounding to the data. 
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Yet, the methodological strengths of qualitative research are paradoxically an 
inherent weakness. Qualitative methods are often perceived as less scientific than 
more statistical procedures (Malterud, 2001) and there is a risk that the voluminous 
data that is produced from techniques such as interviews can overwhelm the 
researcher when trying to make sense of their findings (Liamputtong, 2009). Indeed, 
a limitation to the findings of this thesis is that data analyses were conducted by the 
author without the checks of ‘inter-rater reliability’ to ensure that similar conclusions 
would be derived by other researchers. One practical reason for this was related to 
the size of the data set: over 494,000 words were produced from the interview 
transcripts and so, due to the timeframe and the lack of availability of additional 
researchers, inter-rater reliability checks were not possible. However, a second 
interviewer was present during the interview process who helped to monitor the 
neutrality of interviews and reduce variability. Furthermore, the criticism levelled at 
qualitative data for being ‘unscientific’ is often associated to the lack of explicit and 
coherent guidance on how to utilise qualitative procedures (Malterud, 2001). This 
was overcome in this thesis by following guidelines specifically outlined for 
conducting critical interpretive syntheses (see Dixon-woods et al., 2005; 2006; 
Flemming, 2009); using the CDM protocol (see Crandall et al., 2006) and analysing 
the data with grounded theory (see Glaser & Strauss, 1965). Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, as this thesis took an exploratory approach to investigate problem 
solving in the real-world, then this required the researcher to immerse themselves in 
the data to provide an informed perspective on the incredibly complex world of 
emergency responding. The preliminary work involved in attending training events 
and conversing with the emergency services in an informal manner thus strengthens 
conclusions by developing a ‘quasi-expert’ status to provide scientific yet informed 
conclusions (Pfadenhauer, 2009). Thus, although the exploratory and qualitative 
basis of conclusions may reflect a weakness to research, for the purposes of this 
thesis, it was an integral and required first step to generating an informed 
understanding of the concept of decision inertia in emergency response settings. 
A further strength to this thesis was the supplemental testing of conclusions in 
more controlled settings. Chapters 6 and 7 describe data that was collected during an 
immersive simulation using the ‘Hydra’ system. Immersive simulated learning 
environments, such as Hydra, offer a unique platform for NDM research, by 
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facilitating practitioner-academic relationships and the opportunity to both train 
decision makers (practitioner goal) whilst offering a unique way to collect near-real-
world data (Alison et al., 2013). As outlined in Chapter 2, not only is this beneficial 
in providing the opportunity to collect data in settings that are otherwise rarely 
accessible (i.e. major incidents) but, when conducted well, can provide a fruitful 
basis for future collaborative research to extend upon findings (Rosenbaum, 2010). 
For example, the success of the early CDM interviews facilitated positive 
engagement with practitioners for further collaboration during the simulations. 
However, collecting data in practitioner-research built simulations can also be a 
limitation. When the goals of a project are diverse, in that they seek to address both 
training and research, the ability to maintain goal focus during data collection is 
threatened (Seider et al., 2007). Furthermore, an important assumption when 
working with data collected from simulations is that they are credible with high 
fidelity to ensure that recorded behaviour is reflective of real-world patterns (Klein 
& Woods, 1993). When simulations seek to be highly immersive then it is important 
that this does not come at the cost of collecting scientific data. Indeed, Chapter 6 
outlines the process that was used to overcome these limitations in more detail by, 
for example, close collaboration with subject matter experts and explicit 
identification of research and training goals. Yet these factors remain to be an 
acknowledged, yet hopefully addressed, methodological limitation. 
A final methodological point when reflecting on the conclusions of this thesis 
relates to the generalizability to findings outside the domain of emergency service 
decision making. As identified earlier, the concept of ‘decision inertia’ was 
developed when reflecting on the numerous real-world examples of failures to take 
action following major emergencies (e.g. Haiti earthquake, Boxing Day tsunami). It 
was advanced over a number of years during various research projects that worked 
directly with the emergency services (for an example, see Alison et al., 2015). Thus, 
an important question to ask is whether decision inertia is specific to the domain of 
emergency responding or does it have wider application? Are the key characteristics 
of an emergency incident, as high-stakes, time pressured, complex and dynamic 
(Alison & Crego, 2007; Chen et al., 2008) unique features to this decision domain? 
Does decision inertia exist in organisational settings whereby decision making is, 
critical, but relatively slow-time over a period of days, weeks or months? Or is it a 
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more widespread psychological phenomenon that individuals may experience when 
faced with life-changing choices? For example, one may not be inert over a low-
level decision on whether to go to the shops or not; yet may continually and 
redundantly deliberate over the decision on whether to have a child or not, albeit not 
at the same level of constant deliberation due to the lack of time limitations. Thus, a 
limitation to this study relates to the generalisation of findings outside the domain of 
emergency responding. This is an acknowledged limitation, but an equally exciting 
possibility for further research on this new and novel concept. 
8.5 Final conclusion 
This thesis sought to explore the novel concept of decision inertia in the domain 
of the emergency services. It took an NDM approach to research, using mixed 
methods to explore the problem using interviews with experienced commanders, and 
to test conclusions in a simulated environment. There were two main findings that 
were derived from this research. Firstly, anticipated negative consequences seemed 
to mediate the relationship between stimulus and non-response; commanders failed 
to take action as they traded-off competing anticipated negative outcomes. Secondly, 
at a more practical level, it was found that the complex nature of emergency 
incidents (e.g. time pressure, competing tasks) may limit the usefulness of certain 
cognitive processing strategies (i.e. approach goals; cognitive flexibility). The 
implications of these findings are twofold. In terms of psychological research, this 
thesis has highlighted the importance of exploring the relationship between stimulus 
and non-response which can inspire further investigation. In terms of practical 
recommendations to the emergency services, it is recommended that an increased 
focus on decision making training to make commanders more sensitive to the 
complex choice setting would be useful in order to facilitate adaptive cognitive 
processing. Overall, the central aim of this thesis was to engender psychological 
enquiry so that we can more fully understand not only why people make decisions, 
but importantly why, at times, actions can fail. 
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Appendix One: Interview protocol and forms used for the CDM Interviews 
Multi-agency commander interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Details 
Sex:    Male   Female 
Age:       Years 
Job Title:            
Years in Current Role:      Years     Months 
Total Length of Service:      Years      Months 
Main duties and Responsibilities: 
           
           
           
           
           
           
        
Date  
Start Time  
Finish Time  
Agency  
Participant Identifying Code  
Consent form signed  
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Introduction 
In this interview I will ask you about your experience as a command level decision maker in 
the Fire/Ambulance/Police service. In a minute I will outline the type of experience that I am 
interested in hearing about. Once we have picked an experience, we will work together in 
drawing up a timeline of this decision. I will then ask you some specific questions about the 
event to help me understand it in more detail and to support you in recalling your 
experience. Please take as much time as you need to respond and feel free to use the pen 
and paper provided to reflect or sketch something at any time during the interview. 
You are made aware that if you disclose to me anything that could be considered as 
dangerous practice from a real-life incident then I am obliged to pass this information on. 
Otherwise, any information that you do provide will be treated with the strictest confidence 
with all identifiable information about the incident and yourself removed from the final 
write-up of the report. 
 
INCIDENT SELECTION POSSIBLE INCIDENTS 
Initial probe: 
Tell me about a time when you acted in a 
multi-agency environment.  
 
 
 
Please try and think of an incident that you 
found: 
 Especially challenging 
 Joint decision making was difficult 
 
 
 
The type of decision should have: 
 High consequences 
 Once made would be very difficult to 
reverse 
 Took a long time to make 
 
 
 
Further probes: 
 About whether or not to commit to a 
certain action, tactic or strategy 
 It is a ‘do or don’t act’ decision 
 
 
 
Example decision: 
The decision to declare a major incident or 
not, or the decision to change your current 
course of action or not. 
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INCIDENT RECALL 
INSTRUCTION  This (selected event) sounds interesting. Could you please tell recount it in 
more detail from beginning to end? 
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INCIDENT RETELLING 
INSTRUCTION: 
Now I will read back your account. Please check the details as I do so to make sure that I’ve 
got it right and feel free to jump in and correct me or add in details that come to mind 
when I retell it. 
Corrections Added details 
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DECISION POINT IDENTIFICATION 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Now I’d like to go through the event again and this time we will create a timeline of the 
important parts of the event that led up to your difficult decision. This can include things that 
happened, what you saw, the decisions or judgements you made previously and the actions 
you took. 
OSA = Observation/ Situation Assessment                           D = Decision                                          A 
= Action 
TIME EVENT OSA, D, A 
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DEEPENING 
INSTRUCTIONS: Now I want to go through the incident again but this time we want to look at it in a 
little bit more detail. I’m going to guide you with some questions 
PROBE TOPIC PROBE 
Decision 
barriers/ 
Decision 
blocking/ 
Decision making 
In your opinion what were the biggest barriers to your decision making on that day? 
What prevented interoperability? 
Was there any point when you found it difficult to process the information 
available? 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
How long did it take to reach the decision? 
 
Cues/ 
Information/ 
Information 
integration/ 
Guidance 
What were you looking at when you formulated your decision? 
How did you know that you needed to make the decision?  
How did you know when to make the decision? 
What information did you use in making your decision? 
How and where did you get this information? Who from? 
Did you seek more information or guidance from someone at this point? 
How did you know to trust the information/guidance you received? 
What was the most important piece of information that you used to formulate the 
decision? 
What did you do with this information? 
Did you use all the information available to you when formulating the decision? 
 
Situation 
awareness/ 
assessment/ 
Options 
If you had to describe the situation to someone else at this point, how would you 
summarize the situation? 
Was there any additional information that you would have liked to assist in the 
formulation of the decision? 
What other courses of action did you consider? 
 
Basis of choice/ 
Standard 
scenarios/ 
Experience/ 
Standard 
operating 
procedures/ 
decision making 
Why did you select/reject this course of action? 
What made you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the 
incident? 
Where you following any standard rules or operating procedures? 
Does this case fit with a standard or typical scenario? 
Had you been trained to deal with this type of event? 
What specific training or experience helped you make this choice? 
Do you think that you could develop any rules which could assist another person to 
make the same decision successfully? 
 
Goals/ priorities What were your specific goals (objectives) at this time? 
What was the most important priority for you at this point in time? 
 
Expectancy/ 
Mental 
Modelling 
Did you imagine the possible consequences of your decision? What were they? 
Did you imagine how events may unfold because of your choice? 
Did you create a picture in your head? 
Were you expecting to have to make this type of decision during the incident? 
 
Influence of 
uncertainty 
At any stage, were you uncertain about either the reliability or the relevance of the 
information that you had available? 
At any stage, were you uncertain about the appropriateness of the decision? 
 
Analogy/general
ization 
Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
Were you at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which a similar decision 
was made? 
Were you at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which a different 
decision was made? 
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“WHAT IF?” PROBES 
INSTRUCTIONS: Now I want to go through the incident one more time, but this time I want to 
ask you some hypothetical questions 
PROBE 
TOPIC 
PROBE 
Errors How might a novice have behaved differently? 
What mistakes/errors are likely at this point? 
 
Concept
ual 
model/ 
Hypothe
ticals 
Can you describe a situation in which your decision would have turned out 
differently? 
Describe the nature of these situations and the characteristics that would have 
changed the outcome of your decision. 
If a key feature of the situation had been different, what difference would it have 
made in your decision? 
 
 
Aiding If the decision was not the best, what training, knowledge or information could have 
helped? 
 
EVENT 
(OSA/D
/A) 
PROBE RESPONSE 
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CLOSE OF INTERVEIW 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Thank you for talking to us today. Is there anything you would finally like to add? 
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Appendix Two: Critical Interpretive Synthesis Results Table 
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Appraisal and Extraction (within study) Iterative synthesis  
Reference Aim/Topic Method Results Second order constructs  Synthetic Constructs 
SEARCH TERMS: ‘Decision avoidance’ OR ‘Decision inertia’ 
Anderson, C.J. (2003). The Psychology of 
doing nothing: forms of decision 
avoidance result from reason and 
emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 
139-167. 
Rational-
emotional 
model of 
decision 
avoidance 
Qualitative – 
literature review 
- 4 types of decision avoidance: choice deferral; status quo bias; omission bias; inaction 
inertia 
- Decision avoidance is caused by rational antecedents and anticipatory and experienced 
emotions which have NO direct effect but accumulate to cause avoidance 
- Choice deferral 
- Status quo bias 
- Omission bias 
- Inaction inertia 
- Emotions 
Task ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision Avoidance 
Carmona, S., Iyer, G., & Reckers, P.M.J. 
(2011).  The impact of strategy 
communications, incentives and national 
culture on scorecare implementation. 
Advances in Accounting, incorporating 
Advances in International Accounting, 27, 
62-74. 
Decision 
avoidance and 
competing 
options 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(financial DM) 
 
- Cultural factors influence avoidance 
- Individualist (vs collectivist) cultures more prone to avoid decision as they focus on 
short-term financial gains over bigger picture  
- Visual decision aids reduced avoidance and increased focus on long-term goals 
- Cultural differences  
- Visual decision aids 
- Temporal goal 
conflict 
Individual differences 
Goal conflict 
Decision inertia 
Kumar, P. (2004). The effects of social 
comparison on inaction inertia. 
Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 95, 175-185. 
Inaction inertia 
(II) in social 
groups 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- II associated with relationship with social referent 
- Relationship with referent influences action = increased regret if dislike referent and 
they took the offer 
- II increased when close physical proximity to referent 
- Inaction inertia 
- Social comparison 
- Regret 
- Physical proximity 
Social ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Mamhidir, A.G., Kihlgren, M., & Sorlie, 
V. (2007). Ethical challenges related to 
elder care. High-level decision-makers’ 
experiences. BMC Medical Ethics, 8 (3), 
1-10. 
Healthcare 
ethical decision 
making 
Qualitative – Semi-
structured 
interviews (high 
level healthcare 
workers) 
- Ethical decision making more difficult as feel: exposed; alone; uncertain; lack of 
confirmation; at risk of being a scapegoat; hard to avoid decision; divided feelings 
(personal versus professional morals) 
- Negative Emotions 
- Uncertainty 
- Accountability 
- Personal/professional 
moral conflict 
 
Social ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision inertia 
Thomas, A., Buboltz, W.C., Teague, S., 
Seemann, E.A. (2011).  The 
Multidimensionality of the Desirability of 
Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979). 
Individual Differences Research, 9 (3), 
173-182. 
Desirability of 
Control Scale 
(DOCS)  
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
 
- DOCS is a multidimensional construct that unpicks: leadership; decision avoidance; 
destiny control 
- DOCS suggest individual differences in these three constructs and so may be based on 
personality factors 
- Desire for control 
- Personality 
differences 
Individual differences 
Decision avoidance 
White, C.M., H. S., Hoffrafe, U., Reisen, 
N., & Woike, J.K. (2011). Are groups 
more likely to defer choice than their 
members? Judgement and Decision 
Making, 6 (3), 239-251. 
Decision 
avoidance in 
groups 
Quantitative – 
reanalysed previous 
data (job candidate 
selection) 
- Choice deferral more likely in group settings (42%) than individual (12%) 
- Possibly because: easier to defend omission; omission is hard to criticise (as has no 
attributes); prefer omission over (suboptimal) commission; only agreeable option as 
cannot come to collective choice; no one loses and so more favourable to the group 
- Implications on organisational decision making: 
o Some decisions (rapid) should be made by individual 
o Group decision making is at risk of delay 
- Choice deferral 
- Social loafing 
- Command Structure 
Social ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
“Implementation failure” AND “Decision making” 
Taleai, M., & Mansourian, A. (2008). 
Using Delphi-AHP Method to Survey 
Major Factors causing urban plan 
Implementation 
failure in urban 
planning 
Qualitative (Delphi 
method) and 
Quantitative 
- Identified ten factors which caused implementation failure 
- Main four were: Lack of information; Poor organisational structure; Poor multi-agency 
interoperability; Ignorance of practical application  
- Implementation 
failure 
- Organisational 
Task ambiguity 
Social ambiguity 
Implementation failure 
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implementation failure. Journal of 
Applied Sciences, 8(15), 2746-2751. 
(Analytic Hierarchy 
Process) 
structure 
- Uncertainty 
 
Decker, P., Durand, R., Mayfield, C.O., 
McCormack, C., Skinner, D., & Perdue, 
G. (2012). Predicting implementation 
failure in organization change. Journal of 
Organizational Culture, Communications 
and Conflict, 16(2), 39-59. 
Implementation 
failure in 
organisations 
Qualitative – 
literature review 
- Identified 60 critical failures associated with implementation failure 
- There were 6 superordinate categories relating to implementation failure due to 
differences in: decision making; risk analysis; organisational culture; organisational 
alignment; readiness to change; and change management. 
- Implementation 
failure 
- Organisational 
structure 
- Uncertainty 
Social ambiguity 
Implementation failure 
“Choice Deferral” 
Chen, M., Ma, X., & Pethtel, O. (2011). 
Age differences in trade-off decisions: 
older adults prefer choice deferral. 
Psychology and Ageing, 26 (2), 269-273. 
Choice deferral 
and age 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Choice deferral in older adults was more likely and acted to reduce negative emotions  
- Choice deferral in younger adults only if will maximise outcomes  
- Choice deferral 
- Age difference 
- Emotion 
- Maximising 
Individual differences 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Dhar, R. (1997). Context and task effects 
on choice deferral. Marketing Letters, 
8(1), 119-130. 
Literature 
review on 
consumer 
decision making 
Qualitative – 
literature review 
(consumer DM) 
- 2 key factors which increase choice deferral: option attractiveness (equally attractive); 
choice difficulty (small difference; highly valued) 
- Choice deferral further increased by task context relating to: decision strategies 
(weighing pros and cons; simultaneous presentation of options); time pressure (low time 
pressure) 
- Low time pressure also = ‘action deferral’ (implementation failure) as fail to execute 
action 
- Choice deferral 
- Option attractiveness 
- Weighing pros and 
cons 
- Time Pressure 
- Implementation 
failure 
Task  ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
Implementation Failure 
Huber, J. (1995). Special Session 
Summary: The antecedents and 
consequences of choice deferral. 
Advances in Consumer Research, 22,  
Literature 
review on 
consumer 
decision making 
Qualitative – 
literature review on 
4 studies (consumer 
DM)            
- Contrasting findings due to difficulties in decision avoidance research as: difficult to 
differentiate between deferral and ‘no’ decision; choice deferral is influenced by 
external factors to options (e.g. income, risk attitude) 
- Choice deferral 
- External distractions 
Decision avoidance 
Kopylov, I. (2009). Choice deferral and 
ambiguity aversion. Theoretical 
Economics, 4, 199-225. 
Uncertainty and 
rational 
decision making 
Quantitative – 
theoretical 
economics 
- Uncertain choice = defer due to ambiguity aversion 
- Will only select uncertain choice if it is greater than alternative option 
 
- Choice deferral 
- Uncertainty 
- Rational choice 
Task  ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Kozup, J.C., & Creyer, E.H. (2006). 
Boundary conditions of the impact of 
hypervigilant coping style on the 
subjective decision-making experience. 
Psychology & Marketing, 23(11), 905-
925. 
Time pressure 
and individual 
differences 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Time pressure degraded DM as more difficult and increased deferral 
- Coping styles (e.g. hypervigilant) had no effect on DM 
- Choice deferral 
- Time Pressure 
- Coping style 
Task  ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
Mourali, M., Pons, F., Hassay, D. (2011). 
Power and deferral: the role of anticipated 
regret. American Marketing Association, 
Summer 2011, 147-148. 
Choice deferral, 
power and 
anticipated 
regret  
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Anticipated regret increases or decreases action depending if attached to omission or 
commission regrets 
- High sense of power = lower choice deferral and anticipated regret 
- If make regret salient then power no longer protects 
- Choice deferral 
- Power 
- Anticipated regret 
- Omission/ 
Commission bias 
Individual differences 
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Novemsky, N., Dhar, R., Schwarz, N., & 
Simonson, I. (2007). Preference fluency 
in choice. Journal of Marketing Research, 
Preference 
fluency on 
consumer DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Preference fluency (subjective choice difficulty) influences DM 
- Subjectively more difficult choice = increased choice deferral and more likely to opt for 
compromise option 
- Choice deferral 
- Preference fluency 
- Difficulty 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
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347-356. - Compromise 
Parker, J.R., & Schrift, R.Y. (2011). 
Rejectable choice sets: how seemingly 
irrelevant no-choice options affect 
consumer decision processes. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 840-845. 
Choice deferral 
and consumer 
DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- The ‘no choice’ option increases: alternative-based processing (evaluate each option 
individually); focus on enriched (subjectively meaningful) attributes; focus on 
minimum threshold (is it good enough?) 
- Choice deferral 
- Alternative-based 
processing 
- Enriched attributes 
- Maximising 
Goal conflict  
Decision inertia 
Patalano, A.L., & Wengrovitz, S.M. 
(2007). Indecisiveness and response to 
risk in deciding when to decide. Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 405-
424. 
Decisive 
personalities 
and risky DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
college choice) 
- Decisive  = adapt behaviour in response to risk [when risky to defer] (risky = make 
decision; no risk = defer) 
- Indecisive = always defer (even if risky) 
- Decisive individuals = seek dominant option (which is best?) 
- Indecisive individuals = use minimum threshold (any good enough?) 
- Choice deferral 
- Trait decisiveness 
- Attribute-based 
processing 
- Alternative-based 
processing 
- Satisficing  
- Maximising 
Individual differences 
Goal conflict  
Decision inertia 
Roswarski, T.E., & Murray, M.D. (2006). 
Supervision of students may protect 
academic physicians from cognitive bias: 
A studt of decision making and multiple 
treatment alternatives in medicine. 
Medical Decision Making, 26, 154-161. 
Professional 
experience and 
choice deferral 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
medical decision 
making – 
practitioners) 
- More treatment options = more likely to defer choice 
- Experience supervising students = no more likely to defer choice with more options 
- Due to experience (explicit and implicit knowledge as supervisors) 
- Choice deferral 
- Option number 
- Experience 
- Implicit knowledge 
- Explicit knowledge 
Task  ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
van den Heuvel, C., Alison, L., & Crego, 
J. (2012). How uncertainty and 
accountability can derail strategic ‘save 
life’ decisions in counter-terrorism 
simulations: a descriptive model of choice 
deferral and omission bias. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 25, 165-
187. 
Decision 
avoidance and 
team 
uncertainty 
Qualitative – live 
transcripts (hostage 
negotiation training) 
- Teams avoided choice by: implementation failure; or deferring choice 
- Three processing reason for avoidance due to maladaptive: ambient processing 
(uncertainty); cognitive processing (accountability); organisational (blame culture, lack 
of policy) 
- Choice deferral 
- Implementation 
failure 
- Uncertainty 
- Accountability 
- Organisational 
constraints 
Task ambiguity 
Social  ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
Implementation failure 
van den Ven, N., Gilovich, T., & 
Zeelenberg, M. (2010). Delay, doubt and 
decision: how delaying a choice reduces 
the appeal of (descriptively) normative 
options. Psychological Science, 21(4), 
568-573. 
Choice deferral 
and doubt 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
voting) 
- Choice deferral = decrease preference for normative option in the future 
- Choice deferral leads to increased doubt over normative option and thus alters future 
preferences 
- Choice deferral 
- Normative options 
- Doubt 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
White, C.M., & Hoffrage, U. (2009). 
Testing the tyranny of too much choice 
against the allure of more choice. 
Psychology & Marketting, 26(3), 280-
298. 
Choice deferral 
and option 
numbers 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Choice deferral occurs due to: maximising strategy (want the best); not met minimum 
threshold (none are good enough) 
- If maximising and increase options = increased choice deferral (tyranny of too much 
choice) 
- If minimum theshold and increase options = decrease choice deferral by satisficing 
- Choice deferral 
- Number of options 
- Satisficing 
- Maximising 
Task ambiguity 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
“Sunk Cost Effect” AND “Decision Making” 
Beeler, J.D., & Hunton, J.E. (1997). The 
influence of compensation method and 
Sunk-cost effect 
and 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
- Sunk cost increases if told being held to account as individuals: reduce information 
search; increase search for retrospective info; escalated commitment 
- Sunk-cost  
- Escalate commitment 
Social  ambiguity 
Anticipated emotions  
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disclosure level on information search 
strategy and escalation of commitment. 
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 
10, 77-91. 
accountability (hypothetical 
investment DM) 
- Sunk-cost associated with: cognitive dissonance; self-justification; accountability - Cognitive dissonance 
- Accountability 
Decision avoidance 
Bornstein, B.H., Emler, C.A., & 
Chapman, G.B. (1999). Rationality in 
medical treatment decisions: is there a 
sunk-cost effect? Social Science & 
Medicine, 49, 215-222. 
Sunk-cost and 
medical DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
medical DM – 
physicians)  
- Little sunk-cost effect for medical treatment choices (unless personally responsible for 
original choice) 
- Related to domain-specific expertise as did show sunk-cost in non-medical choices 
- Sunk-cost 
- Expertise 
Social  ambiguity 
Experience 
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
 
Braverman, J.A., & Blumenthal-Barby, 
J.S. (2012). Social Science & Medicine, 
75, 186-192. 
Sunk-cost and 
medical DM 
Quantitative –  
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
medical DM – 
physicians) 
- Little sunk-cost effect for medical treatment choices 
- If personally responsible = more likely to discontinue (reverse sunk-cost) and 
overcompensate 
- Those who did show sunk-cost (continue with inferior option) showed unrealistic 
optimism to option 
- Sunk-cost 
- Expertise 
Social  ambiguity 
Experience  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Coleman, M.D. (2010). Sunk cost and 
commitment to medical treatment. 
Current Psychology, 29, 121-134. 
Sunk-cost and 
medical DM 
Quantitative –  
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
medical DM – 
patient) 
- Compared monetary, effort and time investments 
- Monetary: no sunk-cost if prior investment is much larger than expected return (i.e. cut 
losses if aware made a massive error and no chance of gaining anything back from it) 
- Effort: sunk-cost effect no matter how big past investment (due to cognitive dissonance) 
- Time: no effects 
- Sunk-cost  
- Sunk-effort 
- Sunk-time 
- Cognitive dissonance 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Coleman, M.D. (2010). Sunk-cost, 
emotion and commitment to education. 
Current Psychology, 29, 346-356. 
Sunk-cost and 
educational DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
educational DM)  
- Anger = increased sunk-cost and escalation of commitment  
- Fear = no effect on sunk-cost effect 
- Possible explanation = anger increases optimism in inferior option 
- Sunk-cost  
- Anger 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Karlsson, N., Juliusson, A., Grankvist, G., 
Garling, T. (2002). Impact of decision 
goal on escalation. Acta Psychologica, 
111, 309-322. 
Sunk-cost and 
approach-
avoidance goals 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
business and 
personal DM) 
- Approach goal (max gains) = increased sunk-cost in business decisions 
- Avoid goal (minimise loss) = increased sunk-cost in personal decisions 
- Inconclusive results 
- Sunk-cost  
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Kwak, J., &  Park, J. (2012). Effects of a 
regulatory match in sunk-cost effects: a 
mediating role of anticipated regret. 
Marketing Letters, 23, 209-222. 
Sunk-cost and 
approach-
avoidance goals 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(financial DM) 
- Sunk-cost effect reduced if approach-avoidance conflict between desired outcome 
(approach/gain) and regulatory focus (avoid/loss) 
- This appears to be due to anticipated regret associated with failing to take action 
- Sunk-cost  
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Anticipated regret 
Goal conflict  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Laing, G.K. (2010). Impact of cognitive 
biases on decision making by financial 
planners: sunk cost, framing and problem 
space. International Journal of Economics 
and Finance, 2(1), 11-22. 
Sunk-cost and 
framing effects 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(financial DM) 
- Sunk-cost (increased investment) is predicted more by size of past investment 
(larger=greater sunk-cost) than it is by the framing of possible positive or negative 
outcomes 
- If responsible for past decisions = increased sunk-cost 
- Sunk-cost  
- Anticipated outcome 
- Responsibility 
Goal conflict 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Navarro, A.D., & Fantino, E. (2009). The 
sunk-time effect: an exploration. Journal 
of Behavioural Decision Making, 22, 252-
270. 
Sunk-cost, 
sunk-time and 
responsibility 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(puzzle solving) 
- Sunk-time effect (temporal sunk-cost) increased when: increased previous time 
invested; individual (as opposed to group) task; increased previous effort invested; 
feelings of personal responsibility 
- Sunk-time 
- Sunk-effort 
- Responsibility 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Otto, R. (2010). Three attempts to Behavioural Quantitative – - No evidence found for sunk-effort effects - Sunk-effort  Experienced emotions  
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replicate the behavioural sunk-cist effect: 
a note on Cunha and Caldieraro (2009). 
Cognitive Science, 34, 1379-1383. 
Investment 
Sunk Cost 
effect (BISC)  
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Questions robustness of sunk-investment effects for ‘behavioural’ factors Decision avoidance 
Schott, J.P., Scherer, L.D., & Lambert, 
A.J. (2011). Casualties of war and sunk 
costs: Implications for attitude change and 
persuasion. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47, 1134-1145. 
Sunk-cost and 
war attitude 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(attitudes to war) 
- Sunk-cost effect in attitudes to war (i.e. increase in casualties – continue or withdraw) if 
primed towards ‘don’t waste’ 
- Control = withdraw 
- Sunk-cost  
- Priming 
- Don’t waste heuristic 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Smith, C.M., Tindale, S.R., & Steiner, L. 
(1998). Investment decisions by 
individuals and groups in ‘sunk cost’ 
situations: potential impact of shared 
representations. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, 1 (2), 175-189. 
Sunk-cost and 
social groups 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(financial DM) 
- Sunk-cost exists in BOTH individuals and group DM 
- Personal investment (own money) = increased sunk-cost 
- Not responsible for first decision = reduce sunk-cost 
- Sunk cost bias 
- Personal investment 
- Responsibility 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Stanovich, K.E., & West, R.F. (2008). On 
the relative independent of thinking biases 
and cognitive ability. Personality 
Processes and Individual Differences, 
94(4), 672-695. 
Cognitive 
biases and 
cognitive ability 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(problem solving) 
- Cognitive ability (intelligence) did NOT protect against cognitive biases 
- Cognitive bias is reduced by: appropriate mindware  (information on 
rules/procedures/strategies to complete task); deductive reasoning ability (can detect 
when to override heuristic processing) (i.e. expertise) 
- BUT – if task requires ‘cognitive decoupling’ (i.e. can generate new solutions whilst 
detecting need to override heuristic processing) then cognitive ability facilitates 
overcoming biases 
- Cognitive bias 
- Cognitive ability 
- Mindware  
- Expertise 
Individual differences 
Experience  
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Yen, C., & Lin, C. (2012). The effects of 
mortality salience on escalation of 
commitment. International Journal of 
Psychology, 47(1), 51-57. 
Sunk-cost, 
mortality 
salience and 
military 
decision making  
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(hypothetical 
military scenario – 
practitioners) 
- Sunk-cost increase when mortality is salient 
- Based on ‘Terror Management Theory’: self-justification to create a cultural worldview 
(society has a meaning); reduces cognitive dissonance to give world order, meaning, 
permanence 
 
- Sunk-cost 
- Mortality Salience 
- Cognitive dissonance 
- Terror Management 
Theory 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Zeelenberg, M., & van Dijk, E. (1997). A 
reverse sunk cost effect in risky decision 
making: sometimes we have too much 
invested to gamble. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 18, 677-691. 
Behavioural 
sunk-cost and 
risky DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(gamble DM) 
- Sunk-cost and behavioural sunk-cost effect reduced if approach oriented (i.e. gains) 
- Feedback increases risk averse behaviour 
- Sunk-cost 
- Behavioural sunk 
cost 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Feedback 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
“Omission bias” AND “decision making” 
Aberegg, S.K., Haponik, E.F., & Terry, 
P.B. (2005). Omission bias and decision 
making in pulmonary and critical care 
medicine. Chest, 128(3), 1497-1505. 
Omission and 
status quo bias 
in medical DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(medical DM – 
physician) 
- Both omission bias and status quo bias in medical experts (i.e. select suboptimal option 
if involves no action) 
- Possibly due to ‘do no harm’ bias in medics 
- Omission bias 
- Status quo bias 
- Expertise 
- Protected values 
Experience  
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
 
Anderson, C.J. (2005). Alternative 
perspectives on omission bias. In C.R. 
Sunstein “Moral Heuristics”, Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences, 28, 531-573. 
Alternative 
view of 
omission bias 
Qualitative – 
opinion piece on 
moral heuristic 
decision making 
- Omission bias (in moral decision making) may not exist outside the lab because real-life 
has too many confounding variables 
- We don’t understand what omission bias is, what causes it, what debiases it and what its 
implications are 
- Omission bias 
- Moral heuristics 
 
Decision avoidance 
Asch, D.A., Baron, J., Hershey, J.C., Omission bias Quantitative – - Non-vaccination behaviour related to omission bias (perceived more harm from - Omission bias Social  ambiguity 
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Kunreuther, H., Meszaros, J., Ritov, I., & 
Spranca, M. (1994). Medical decision 
making, 14, 118-123. 
and parental 
vaccination 
decisions 
empirical study 
(parental 
vaccination DM) 
vaccinating than not vaccinating)  
- Can possibly reverse by framing question about ‘self’ rather than ‘child’ i.e. would you 
‘risk’ vaccinating yourself? 
- Negative 
consequences 
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Baron, J. (1992). The effect of normative 
beliefs on anticipated emotions. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 
63(2), 320-330. 
Omission bias, 
normative 
beliefs and 
anticipated 
emotions 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM; 
financial DM) 
- Omission bias is reduced (along with anticipated negative emotions) if present a 
‘normative argument’ (rational argument) 
- BUT if personally hold a non-normative belief (i.e. actually believe it rather than 
irrationally anchored to it), then normative belief can change behaviour (i.e. reverse 
omission bias) but still experience anticipated negative emotions (e.g. ok I will do it but 
I still feel guilty) 
- Omission bias 
- Anticipated emotions 
- Normative beliefs 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Baron, J., Bazerman, M.H., & Shonk, K. 
(2006). Enlarging the societal pie through 
wise legislation. A psychological 
perspective. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 1(2), 123-132. 
Cognitive 
biases and 
political DM 
Qualitative – 
theoretical piece on 
cognitive biases and 
political DM 
- Political DM is biased by ‘fixed pie’ approach – idea that there are finite resources and 
so focus on wins/losses rather than wider new gains 
- Poor political DM caused by: fixed pie approach; omission and status quo bias; 
parochialism (sacrifice self-interest for group e.g. strike); nationalism; dysfunctional 
competition; focus on ST over LT 
- Politicians need to consider utility theory to overcome 
- Omission bias 
- Status quo bias 
- Parochialism 
- Temporal focus 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Bartels, D.M., & Medin, D.L. (2007). Are 
morally motivated decision makers 
insensitive to the consequences of their 
choices? Psychological Science, 18(1), 
24-28. 
Moral decision 
making and 
anticipated 
consequences 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM)  
- Focus on whether should act then holding protected values makes individuals less 
focussed on consequences of choice (low loss threshold) 
- Focus on consequences of choice then holding protected values makes individuals more 
focussed on consequences of choice (high loss threshold) 
- Protected values have different effects depending on type of cog trade-off 
- Moral DM 
- Protected values 
- Loss thresholds 
Experienced emotions  
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Benniss, W.M., Medin, D.L., & Bartels, 
D.M. (2010). The costs and benefits of 
calculation and moral rules. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 5(2), 187-202. 
Moral rules and 
DM 
Qualitative – 
discussion on use of 
moral rules in DM 
- Rational DM in real world is unrealistic 
- Using moral rules (rather than cost-benefit) is a more useful strategy for DM as: cost-
benefit insensitive to some decision domains (e.g. social); moral decisions are high 
consequence, low probability so lack expertise so better to use moral rules over difficult 
cost-benefit; some acts may seem irrational but have long-term gains (e.g. self-sacrifice) 
- Moral rules 
- Cost-benefit analysis 
- Social learning 
Experienced emotions  
Bond, L., & Nolan, T. (2011). Making 
sense of perceptions of risk of diseases 
and vaccinations: a qualitative study 
combining models of health beliefs, 
decision making and risk perception. 
Public Health, 11, 1-14. 
Risk, 
uncertainty and 
parental 
vaccination DM 
Mixed methods – 
survey (parental 
vaccination DM) 
- Perceived risk associated with: dread; unfamiliarity; uncontrollability  
- Individuals coped with uncertainty through: optimistic control (it won’t affect me); 
omission bias (more harm from vaccinating) 
- Action increased if anticipated unfamiliar risk (negative consq of inaction) 
- Action decreased if anticipated uncontrollable risk (vaccine side effects) 
- Risk  
- Uncertainty 
- Omission bias 
- Lack of control 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Brooks, M.E. (2011). Management 
indecision. Management Decision, 49(5), 
683-693. 
Failures to act 
in management 
DM 
Qualitative – 
theoretical model 
- Failures to act caused by: Decision context (option quality [justification]; option 
similarity; number of options); Trait indecisiveness; Systematic biases (status quo; 
omission bias) 
- These effects depend upon (and moderated by) subjectivity 
- Failures to act occur via: Fail to make a choice; Postpone choice 
- Recommendations to reduce inaction: evaluate options independently; incentivise 
decisiveness; make loss due to delay salient 
- Failures to act 
- Decision context 
- Personality 
- Omission bias 
- Subjectivity 
- Choice deferral 
- Decision inertia 
Task ambiguity 
Social  ambiguity 
Decision inertia 
Decision avoidance 
Broeders, R., van den Bos, K., Muller, 
P.A., & Ham, J. (2011). Should I save or 
should I not kill? How people solve moral 
dilemmas depends on which rule is most 
Moral rules and 
DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM) 
- Omission bias reduced if make approach goals more salient 
- Utilitarian choice (save life) can be primed through situational cues (e.g. visuals; 
subliminal images) to increase rational action (e.g. push man off bridge to kill one and 
save many) 
- Moral heuristics 
- Omission bias 
- Utilitarian rules (save 
life) 
Task ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
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accessible. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47, 923-934. 
Brown, K.F., Kroll, S.J., Hudson, M.J., 
Ramsay, M., Green, J., Vincent, C.A., 
Fraser, G., & Sevdalis, N. (2010). 
Omission bias and vaccine rejection by 
parents of healthy children: implications 
for the influenza A/H1N1 vaccination 
programme. Vaccine, 4181-4185. 
Omission bias 
and parental 
vaccination DM 
Quantitative – 
online survey 
- Omission bias occurred when parents rated the vaccination side-effects to be more: 
severe; probable; and longer duration 
- Omission bias 
- Negative 
consequences 
Anticipated emotions 
Decision avoidance 
Connolly, T., & Reb, J. (2003). Omission 
bias in vaccination decisions: Where’s the 
omission? Where’s the bias? 
Organisational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes, 91, 186-202. 
Omission bias 
in parental 
vaccination DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(parental 
vaccination DM) 
- Decision not to vaccinate is NOT due to omission bias (i.e. general preference to avoid 
action)  but due to rational weights on associated and anticipated regret 
- If provide balanced information on vaccination and disease risks then parents opted to 
vaccinate  
- Omission bias 
- Anticipated regret 
Anticipated emotions  
Rational decision 
Crotty, S.K., & Thompson, L. (2009). 
When your heart isn’t smart: how 
different types of regret change decisions 
and profits. International Journal of 
Conflict Management, 20(4), 315-339. 
Omission bias 
and rational-
emotional regret 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision games) 
- Regrets of the ‘heart’ (emotional) were associated with: lost opportunities, emotions; 
and life maxim (lessons learnt) 
- Thinking about regrets of ‘heart’ = compromised behaviour (bargaining; sharing) 
leading to less profit in decision games 
- Recommend economic DM should actively focus on regrets of head rather than heart as 
better economic outcomes 
- Experienced Regret 
- Rational-Emotional 
Experienced emotions  
Decision inertia 
Dekay, M.L., Patino-Echeverri, D., & 
Fischbeck, P.S. (2009). Better safe than 
sorry: Precautionary reasoning and 
implied dominance in risky decisions. 
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 
22, 338-361. 
Precautionary 
reasoning in 
high risk 
decisions 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(binary decision 
problems) 
- Individuals favour precautionary reasoning when faced with high-stakes binary decision 
problems (e.g. close airport due to thunderstorm or not?) 
- Individuals were more favourable of taking unnecessary action (false positive action) 
than not taking unnecessary action (true negative) 
- Precautionary reasoning was greatest in risk-averse individuals who generated worst 
case scenario first during decision process 
- Omission bias 
- Precautionary 
reasoning 
Goal conflict  
Decision inertia 
DiBonaventura, M., & Chapman, G.B. 
(2008). Do decision biases predict bad 
decisions? Omission bias, naturalness 
bias, and influenza vaccination. Medical 
Decision Making, 28, 532-539. 
Omission bias 
in parental 
vaccination DM 
Quantitative – 
survey data (real life 
parental vaccination 
DM) 
- Omission bias was associated with real-world vaccination decisions 
- Also found a ‘naturalness bias’ (preference towards natural products) to be associated 
(suggest ‘other’ influences play a role in real world) 
- Omission bias 
 
Decision avoidance 
Kordes-de Vaal, J.H. (1996). Intention 
and the omission bias: Omissions 
perceived as nondecisions. Acta 
Psychologica, 93, 161-172. 
Omission bias 
and perceived 
causality 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision problems) 
- Omission bias occurs because (in comparison to causing harm by commission) 
individuals feel less responsible for potential negative outcomes 
- Associated with perception of low causality (I didn’t take action that caused them) and 
low intention (I didn’t intend for that to happen) 
- Omission bias 
- Responsibility 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Polman, E. (2012). Self-other decision 
making and loss aversion. Organisational 
Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes, 119, 141-150. 
Loss aversion 
and deciding for 
others 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision problems) 
- When deciding for others individuals show less loss aversion 
- Loss aversion is reduced due to: construal level; approach-avoidance focus; preference 
for information seeking; preference for omission bias; feelings of power 
- Loss aversion 
- Social DM 
- Construal level 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Omission bias 
- Power 
Social  ambiguity 
Goal conflict  
Decision inertia 
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Powell, N.L., Derbyshire, S.W.G., & 
Guttentag, R. (2012). Biases in children’s 
and adults’ moral judgements. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 113, 
186-193. 
Moral decision 
making and age 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM) 
- For both adults and children, harm was more negatively when it was: due to action 
(omission bias); involved physical contact; it was intended 
- Whereas adults could use utilitarian reasoning (i.e. greater good), children always see 
harm as negative (and thus not due to omission bias) 
- Moral heuristics 
- Omission bias 
- Physical proximity 
- Intuitive reasoning 
Experienced emotions  
Goal conflict 
Decision avoidance 
Ritov, I. (2006). The effect of time on 
pleasure with chosen outcomes. Journal 
of Behavioural Decision Making, 19, 177-
190. 
Choice 
satisfaction and 
temporality 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision scenario) 
- Satisfaction with choice tends to decrease over time as individuals engage in 
counterfactual thinking and experience regret for rejected options 
- Counterfactual 
thinking 
- Regret 
- Temporal focus 
Goal conflict  
Experienced emotions  
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1995). Outcome 
Knowledge, regret and omission bias. 
Organisational Behavioura and Human 
Decision Processes, 64(2), 119-127. 
Omission bias, 
regret and 
outcome 
certainty 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision scenarios) 
- Individuals are less risk taking when they anticipate potential for regret and so will try 
and avoid decisions if they know they will get certain outcome knowledge (i.e. 
feedback on how good/bad their choice was) 
- Anticipated regret reduces if uncertain outcome knowledge (won’t find out if choice 
was good or bad) 
- Omission bias 
- Anticipated regret 
- Outcome knowledge 
Anticipated emotions  
Rogers, T., & Bazerman, M. H. (2008). 
Future lock-in: Future implementation 
increases selection of ‘should’ choices. 
Organisational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes, 106, 1-20. 
Moral DM and 
temporal focus 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision scenarios) 
- Individuals opt for more deliberative ‘should’ options (over more affective ‘want’ 
choices) when the decision is to be implemented in the distant future (‘future lock in’) 
- ‘Should self’ operates at a higher construal level (rational superordinate) than ‘want 
self’ which is more concrete with short-term outcome focus 
- Moral DM 
- Temporal focus 
- Rational-emotional 
processing 
Goal conflict  
Experienced emotions  
Tanner, C. (2009). To act or not to act: 
nonconsequentialism in environmental 
decision-making. Ethics and Behaviour, 
19(6), 479-495. 
Omission bias 
and protected 
values (moral 
DM) 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM) 
- Protected values when making moral decisions (e.g. environmental change) were found 
to: increase action; reduce trade-off; deontological focus; position of moral universalism 
- Omission bias 
- Protected values 
Experienced emotions  
Tanner, C., & Medin, D.L. (2004). 
Protected values: no omission bias and no 
framing effects. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 11(1), 185-191. 
Omission bias 
and protected 
values (moral 
DM) 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(moral DM) 
- Protected values when making moral decisions (e.g. environmental change) led to 
increased action (moral obligation to act) 
- Protected values protected against cognitive biases (e.g. framing) 
- Omission bias 
- Protected values 
Experienced emotions  
Wroe, A.L., Turner, N., & Salkovskis, 
P.M. (2004). Understanding and 
predicting parental decisions about early 
childhood immunisations. Health 
Psychology, 23(1), 33-41. 
Omission bias 
and parental 
vaccination DM 
Quantitative – 
survey of expectant 
mothers 
- Most expectant mothers were in favour of action (not omission bias) 
- Associated with: perceive disease as more harmful; anticipated regret and responsibility 
for harm via omission 
- Omission bias 
- Anticipated regret 
- Responsibility 
 
Anticipated emotions  
Rational decision 
Yen, H.R., & Chuang, S.C. (2008). The 
effect of incidental affect on preference 
for the status quo. Journal of the 
Academic Marketing Science, 36, 522-
537. 
Status quo bias 
and affect 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Positive affect increased desire to maintain status quo and increased omission bias 
- Positive emotions led to increased feelings of certainty (mediator role) in current status 
that motivated desire to maintain status quo and omission bias 
- Status quo 
- Emotion 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W.W., 
Manstead, A.S.R., & van der Pligt, J. 
(2000). On bad decisions and 
disconfirmed expectancies: the 
psychology of regret and disappointment. 
Regret and 
Disappointment 
Qualitative – 
literature review on 
regret and 
disappointment in 
DM 
- Need to combine behavioural DM and emotion theories to understand DM 
- Regret caused by responsibility and results in: blame oneself; overly focus on regretted 
option; reparative action to change/undo situation 
- Anticipated regret induces: increased info search; elaborate DM; reduces post-
decisional feedback 
- Regret 
- Disappointment 
- Anticipated emotion 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
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Cognition and Emotion, 14(4), 521-541. - Disappointment is caused by unexpected adverse outcomes and results in: 
powerlessness; inaction as feel out of control 
- Anticipated disappointment induces: reduced expectations on outcome 
Zeelenberg, M., van der Pligt, J., & de 
Vries, N.K. (2000). Attributions of 
responsibility and affective reactions to 
decision outcomes. Acta Psychologica, 
104, 303-315. 
Responsibility 
and affect in 
DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision problems) 
- Immediate affective reactions are experienced more strongly following action (over 
inaction) due to perceived responsibility (actor effect) 
- Differs to post-decisional affect that may change over time (e.g. affect from action 
decreases whereas affect from inaction increases) 
- Action effect 
- Responsibility 
- Temporality 
Experienced emotions  
Zikmund-Fisher, B.J., Sarr, B., Fagerlin, 
A., & Ubel, P.A. (2006). A matter of 
perspective: choosing for others differs 
from choosing for yourself in making 
treatment decisions. Journal of General 
International Medicine, 21, 618-622. 
Omission bias 
and social DM 
Quantitative -  
empirical study 
(medical DM – for 
social others) 
- Omission bias in medical DM was reduced if individuals were told to consider 
themselves in the role of the physician (more rational) 
- Omission bias was associated with increased emotions 
- Omission bias 
- Emotion 
- Social role 
Social  ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
“inaction inertia” 
Arkes, H.R., Kung, Y., & Hutzel, L. 
(2002). Regret, valuation, and inaction 
inertia. Organisational behaviour and 
human decision processes, 87(2), 371-
385. 
Inaction inertia 
and regret 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Experienced regret (associated with past loss) induces inaction inertia rather than 
anticipated regret associated with future counterfactuals  
- Inaction inertia occurs as individuals devalue second option 
- Inaction inertia 
- Regret 
- Devaluation 
 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Dholakia, U.M., Gopinath, M., & 
Bagozzi, R.P. (2005). The role of desires 
in sequential impulsive choices. 
Organisational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes, 98, 179-194. 
Sequential 
impulsive 
choices 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision problems) 
- Evidence of a Sequential Mitigation Effect – people are less impulsive in DM if they 
have already been impulsive in previous choice 
- An individual’s chronic sensitivity to outcomes moderates this effect (positive outcome 
sensitivity = maintain impulsivity; negative outcome sensitivity = reduce impulsivity a 
lot) 
- Impulsivity Individual differences 
Experienced emotions 
Decision avoidance 
Patrick, V.N., Lancellotti, M., & Demello, 
G. (2009). Coping with non-purchase: 
managing the stress of inaction regret. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology 
Inaction inertia 
and regret 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Inaction inertia and the desire to reduce cognitive dissonance are coping mechanisms 
used to deal with regret 
- If missed opportunity is perceived as goal relevant and irreversible then this increases 
behavioural intent towards action as individuals cope by seeking out future 
opportunities to act 
- Inaction inertia 
- Regret 
- Coping mechanism 
- Reversibility 
Task ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Patrick, V.N., Lancellotti, M., & 
Hagtvedt, H. (2009). Getting a second 
chance: the role of imagery in the 
influence of inaction regret on 
behavioural intent. Journal of the 
academy of marketing science, 37, 181-
190. 
Inaction inertia 
and preference 
fluency 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- When second opportunity is no worse than missed opportunity then motivated to take it 
(no inaction inertia) 
- More likely to take it than those who had not missed previous opportunity due to mental 
imagery associated with regret (regret=imagery=action) 
- If prevented mental imagery (e.g. increase cognitive load) then behavioural intent 
reduced 
- Inaction inertia 
- Regret 
- Mental Imagery 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Sevdalis, N., Harvey, N., & Yip, M. 
(2006). Regret triggers inaction inertia – 
but which regret and how? British Journal 
of Social Psychology, 45, 839-853. 
Inaction inertia, 
regret and 
devaluation 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Inaction inertia is specifically explained by regret (devaluation is more general to 
decision making) 
- Anticipated regret led to inaction inertia when there is a large difference in 
attractiveness between first and second 
- Experienced regret led to inaction inertia when there is a small difference in 
- Inaction inertia 
- Anticipated regret 
- Experienced regret 
- Valuation 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
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attractiveness between first and second 
Shani, Y., Tykocinski, O.E., Zeelenberg, 
M. (2008). When ignorance is not bliss: 
how feelings of discomfort promote the 
search for negative information. Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 29, 643-653. 
Negative affect, 
outcome 
certainty and 
information 
search 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(gambling DM) 
- Individuals engage in post-event information search to reduce regret and negative 
emotions 
- Individuals seek definite knowledge to reduce negative emotion associated with 
ignorance – also to uncover possible aversive info 
- Uncovering bad news from search is more positive than uncertainty as would rather 
have definite bad news that uncertain knowledge 
- Post-event 
information search 
- Emotion 
- Ambiguity aversion 
Experienced emotions  
Tykocinski, O., & Israel, R. (2006). 
Inaction inertia in the stock market. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
34(6), 1166-1175. 
Inaction inertia 
and financial 
DM 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(financial DM) 
- If missed opportunity has large difference = increased inaction inertia and spent less 
time searching for information 
- Suggests reduced information search as trying to reduce experienced regret 
- Inaction inertia 
- Information search 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Tykocinski, O.E., & Ortmann, A. (2011). 
The lingering effects of our past 
experiences: the sunk-cost fallacy and the 
inaction-inertia effect. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 59, 
653-664. 
Sunk-cost and 
Inaction Inertia 
Qualitative – lit 
review on sunk-
costs and inaction 
inertia 
- The assumption that using past decisions to inform future choice is irrational is flawed 
(e.g. sunk-cost increase action; inaction inertia decrease action) 
- BUT using past choice may actually be very rational in the real-world (e.g. avoid blame 
from past investments in organisations can help facilitate social identities in groups) 
- Is it possible to ignore the past in real world? If not then why waste research studying it 
as ‘irrational’ behaviour? 
- Inaction inertia 
- Sunk costs 
- Real-world DM 
General exogenous factors 
Rational decision 
Tykocinski, O.E., & Pittman, T.S. (1998). 
The consequences of doing nothing: 
inaction inertia as avoidance of 
anticipated counterfactual regret. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 
(3), 607-616. 
Inaction inertia 
and regret 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Inaction inertia increased with greater difference between first and second opportunities 
- Inaction inertia was reduced however if regret was unavoidable; costs of avoidance 
were increased; or regret made redundant 
- Inaction inertia is explained by regret  
- Inaction inertia 
- Anticipated regret 
- Experienced regret 
- Counterfactual 
thinking 
Experienced emotions  
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Tyocinksi, O.E., Pitmann, T.S., & Tuttle, 
E.E. (1995). Inaction inetia: foregoing 
future benefits as a result of an initial 
failure to act. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 68(5), 793-803. 
Inaction inertia Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision problems) 
- First major study on inaction inertia (how missing a slightly more attractive opportunity 
reduces likelihood of acting at second opportunity) 
- Inaction inertia due to large (v small/medium) differences in attractiveness 
- Motivated by loss aversion associated with anticipated regret as inaction inertia 
removed if new opportunity framed as a gain 
- Inaction inertia 
- Loss aversion 
- Regret 
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2005). 
On the psychology of ‘if only’: regret and 
the comparison between factual and 
counterfactual outcomes. Organisational 
behaviour and human decision processes, 
97, 152-160. 
Inaction inertia 
and 
counterfactual 
thinking 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(gambling DM) 
- When individuals can’t compare missed and current options then this reduces overall 
experiences of regret 
- Can reduce comparisons by creating uncertainty about missed opportunity; or if they 
were incomparable (e.g. sofa v chair) 
- Those high on ‘need to compare’ experienced high regret even when options were 
incomparable 
- Regret 
- Counterfactual 
- Compatibility  
Individual differences 
Experienced emotions  
Van Harreveld, F., van der Pligt, J., & 
Nordgren, L. (2008). The relativity of bad 
decisions: social comparison as a means 
to alleviate regret. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 47, 105-117. 
Regret and 
social 
comparison 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(gambling DM) 
- Regret decreases if find out social others did worse 
- Irreversible Task = Increase social comparison information to try and reduce regret 
(psychological coping) 
- Second chance at task = increase task-related information search to reduce anticipated 
regret at second chance (behavioural coping) 
- Need to avoid focussing on irreversibility to avoid biases 
- Regret 
- Social comparison 
- Reversibility 
Task ambiguity 
Social  ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & van 
Dijk, E. (2007). Decoupling the past from 
Inaction inertia 
and decoupling 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
- Decoupling past and present opportunities reduces inaction inertia as individuals use 
different mental accounts and so don’t compare 
- Inaction inertia 
- Decoupling 
Task  ambiguity 
Goal conflict  
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the present attenuates inaction inertia. 
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 
20, 65-79. 
(consumer DM) - Inaction inertia decreased (through decoupling) when: missed opportunity was 
ambiguous; psychological distance between past and present opportunities; 
incomparability between past and current 
- Possibly due to role of reduced regret (but not tested) 
- Regret Experienced emotions 
Decision avoidance 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & van 
Dijk, E. (2008). Multiple options in the 
past and the present: the impact on 
inaction inertia, Journal of Behavioural 
Decision Making, 21, 519-531. 
Inaction inertia 
and multiple 
options 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Multiple missed opportunities = increased inaction inertia  
- Multiple new options = reduced inaction inertia (as no longer use missed opportunity as 
reference point) 
- Inaction inertia may be redundant in real-life as most choices are characterised by 
having multiple options available 
- Inaction inertia 
- Multiple options 
Task  ambiguity 
Decision avoidance 
Rational choice 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & van 
Dijk, E. (2009). Dealing with missed 
opportunities: Action vs state orientation 
moderates inaction inertia. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 808-
815. 
Inaction inertia 
and personality 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Both state- and action-oriented individuals experience regret following missed 
opportunity by only state-oriented let I influence their DM 
- Increased inaction inertia in state-orientated individuals (fixate on negative emotions; 
ruminate on past) but temporal segregation of first and second opportunities reduces this 
effect 
- Inaction inertia 
- Personality 
- Regret 
Individual differences 
Experienced emotions  
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Wong, K.F.E., Yik, M., & Kwong, J.Y.Y. 
(2006). Understanding the emotional 
apects of escalation of commitment: the 
role of negative affect. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 91(2), 282-297. 
Escalation of 
commitment 
and negative 
affect 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(organisational DM) 
- Individuals try and cope with negative affect (trait or transient) by reducing 
commitment when one was personally responsible for previous bad decision (i.e. 
reverse of sunk-cost effect as reduced commitment) 
- If not responsible for previous decision then negative affect had no influence on DM 
- Sunk-cost 
- Emotion 
- Coping mechanism 
Experienced emotions  
Rational decision 
Zeelenberg, M., Nijstad, B.A., van Putten, 
M., van Dijk, E. (2006). Inaction inertia, 
regret and valuation: a closer look. 
Organisational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes, 101, 89-104. 
Inaction inertia, 
regret and 
devaluation 
Quantitative -  
empirical study 
(consumer DM) 
- Inaction inertia was NOT caused by regret – influential factors on regret did not 
influence inaction inertia and vice versa 
- Instead it appeared individuals devalued second option after missing first 
- Regret is NOT a causal factor of inaction inertia but devaluation is a mediating 
causational factor in inaction inertia – regret may be a by-product of devaluation (i.e. 
devalue option and so would regret taking it) 
- Inaction inertia 
- Devaluation 
- Regret 
 
Experienced emotions 
“Grey literature” – Book chapters, reference chaining, unpublished work 
Alison, L., Doran, B., Long, M.L., Power, 
N., & Humphrey, A. (2013). The effects 
of subjective time pressure and individual 
differences on hypotheses generation and 
action prioritization in police 
investigations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 19(1), 83-93. 
Time pressure 
and hypothesis 
generation 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(police DM) 
- Time pressure reduced hypotheses generation as people felt subjectively pressured by 
time 
- Those who did not subjectively perceive time pressure did not alter their hypotheses 
generation 
- Time pressure also increased action prioritization  
- Time pressure 
- Hypotheses 
generation 
Individual differences 
Alison, L., Power, N., van den Heuvel, C., 
& Waring, S. (2015). A taxonomy of 
endogenous and exogenous uncertainty in 
high-risk, high-impact contexts. Journal 
of Applied Psychology. Online first.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038591 
Taxonomy of 
uncertainty in 
high-risk 
contexts 
Mixed methods – 
quantitative and 
qualitative analyses 
of hostage 
negotiation training 
- Uncertainty in high-stakes contexts can be categorised as endogenous (derived from 
problem environment) or exogenous (derived from operating system responding to 
incident) 
- Most uncertainty derived from exogenous sources (75%) and was associated with poor 
role understanding and trust within team 
- Endogenous 
uncertainty 
- Exogenous 
uncertainty 
- Trust 
- Role understanding 
Task ambiguity 
Social ambiguity 
 
Alison, L., Power, N., van den Heuvel, C., 
Humann, M., Palasinksi, M., & Crego, J. 
Decision inertia 
in emergency 
Mixed methods – 
quantitative and 
- Communication between agencies decreased and focus on within-agency information 
seeking increased when decision problems characterised by 3 barriers: non-time 
- Decision inertia 
- Time pressure 
Task ambiguity 
Social ambiguity 
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(2015). Decision inertia: deciding 
between least worst outcomes in 
emergency responses to disasters. Journal 
of Occupational and Organisational 
Psychology. 
response qualitative analyses 
of multi-agency, 
emergency response 
hydra simulation 
bounded; multiple agencies (3+); lack of superordinate direction - Multi-agency 
- Strategic goals 
Campbell, D., Jones, S., & Brindle, D. 
(2008). 50 injuries, 60 visits – failures that 
led to the death of Baby P. The Guardian. 
Available via  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2008
/nov/12/baby-p-child-protection-haringey 
[Accessed 3rd January 2015] 
Review on 
failures in Baby 
P social care 
investigation 
Qualitative – news 
story on social care 
failures in Baby P 
Case 
- Social care workers and child protection authorities blamed for missing signs of Baby 
P’s abuse following tens of visits to the toddler’s home 
- N/A Decision inertia 
Corr, P.J. (2013). Approach and 
Avoidance Behaviour: Multiple systems 
and their interactsion. Emotion Review, 
5(3), 285-290. 
Outlines three 
types of 
approach-
avoidance 
motivation 
Qualitative – 
literature review 
summary 
- Two major avoidance systems: active avoidance related to pure avoidance away from 
aversive stimuli; passive avoidance due to behavioural inhibition caused by goal 
conflict 
- Activation of either system dependent on proximal-distal factors of threat (i.e. nearby = 
active avoidance; far away = passive avoidance) 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Proximal-distal 
factors 
Goal conflict  
 
Corr, P.J., & McNaughton, N. (2012). 
Neuroscience and approach/avoidance 
personality traits: A two stage (valuation-
motivation) approach. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioural Reviews, 36, 2339-2354. 
Approach-
avoidance 
motivation and 
loss aversion 
Qualitative – 
theoretical review 
on interaction 
between motivation, 
valuation and loss 
aversion 
- Valuation of options (e.g. loss aversion) is distinct from motivation 
- Valuations act to reinforce behaviour associated with approach-avoidance motivation 
towards/away from a positive/negative stimulus 
- Distinct systems manage active avoidance (FFS) compared to passive avoidance that 
represents goal conflict and the BIS due to approach-avoidance conflicting goals 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Passive/active 
avoidance 
- Loss aversion 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Decision inertia 
Corr, P.J., DeYoung, C.G., & 
McNaughton, N. (2013). Motivation and 
personality: A Neuropsychological 
perspective. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 7/3, 158-175. 
Different 
avoidance 
motivations and 
personality 
Qualitative – 
Discussion on 
neuropsychological 
research on 
approach-avoidance 
motivation and 
personality 
- 2 approach systems: one associated to actions for award seeking and other to behaviour 
related to reward receiving- BAS 
- 2 avoidance systems: passive avoidance (behavioural inhibition due to goal conflict - 
BIS); active avoidance (panic and desire to escape - FFS) 
- Motivations product of stimuli or based on personality 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Passive/active 
avoidance 
- Personality 
Individual differences 
Goal conflict  
Decision avoidance 
Decision inertia 
Elliot, A.J. (2006). The hierarchical model 
of approach-avoidance motivation. 
Motivations and Emotion, 30, 111-116. 
Approach-
avoidance 
motivation 
Qualitative – 
theoretical model of 
approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Approach motivation is the energization of behaviour towards a positive stimulus 
Avoidance motivation is the energization of behaviour away from a negative stimulus 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
Goal conflict  
Elliot, A.D., Eder, A.B., & Harmon-
Jones, E. (2013). Approach-avoidance 
motivation and emotion: convergence and 
divergence. Emotion Review, 5(3), 308-
311. 
Approach-
avoidance 
motivation and 
emotion 
Qualitative – 
summary on special 
journal issue on 
approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Approach-avoidance research is central to understanding emotion 
- Need cross-talk between different disciplines to understand emotion and approach-
avoidance motivation 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Emotion 
Goal conflict  
Eyre, M., Alison, L., Crego, J., & Mclean 
C. (2008). Decision inertia: the impact of 
organisations on critical incident decision-
Decision inertia 
and critical 
incident DM 
Qualitative – 
literature review and 
simulated exercise 
- Decision inertia associated with: responsibility; accountability; distrust in team; blame 
culture; high value attributes; organisational policies; preference stability; costs of 
action and change 
- Decision inertia 
- Accountability 
- Trust 
Task ambiguity 
Social  ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
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making. In L.J. Alison & J. Crego, 
Policing Critical Incidents: Leadership 
and Critical Incident Management. 
Devon, UK: Willan Publishing. 
data - Experienced emotions include: fear, regret 
- Anticipated emotions include: anticipated organisational reaction; anticipated regret; 
anticipated blame; selection difficulty 
- Decision avoidance occurs via status quo; omission; deferral 
- Organisational 
- Emotions 
- Omission bias 
- Choice deferral 
Anticipated emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Decision inertia 
Gray, J.A. (1990). Brain systems that 
mediate both emotion and cognition. 
Cognition and Emotion, 4(3), 269-288. 
Neurological 
basis of 
approach-
avoidance 
motivation 
Qualitative – 
neurobiological 
theory of approach-
avoidance 
motivation 
- 3 brain systems interact with motivation that act to link emotion and cognition 
- Behavioural approach system (BAS) = approach motivation 
- Fight/Flight system (FFS) and Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) = avoidance 
motivation 
- Approach-avoidance 
motivation 
- Neurobiology 
- Emotion 
Goal conflict  
Experienced emotions  
Grünewald, F., Binder, A., & Georges, Y. 
(2010). Inter-agency real time evaluation 
in Haiti: Three months after the 
earthquake. URD and GPPI. 
 
Emergency aid 
following Haiti 
Earthquake 
Qualitative – report 
on emergency 
response 
- Weak humanitarian leadership and lack of ownership delayed humanitarian response to 
disaster 
- Emergency hospitals and personnel had limited resources which delayed response 
- N/A Decision inertia 
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & 
Price, T.F. (2013). What is approach 
motivation? Emotion Review, 5(3), 291-
295. 
Approach 
motivation 
Qualitative – 
literature review 
- Approach motivation literature generally associates approach with positive affective 
states 
- But this paper suggests it can also be evoked by negative stimuli; that approach may be 
experienced as a negative state; and that stimuli are unnecessary to evoke motivation as 
motivation may be a trait 
- Approach motivation 
- Negative stimuli 
- Personality 
Individual differences 
Experienced emotions  
Goal conflict 
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded 
rationality: psychology for behavioural 
economics. The American Economic 
Review, 93(5), 1449-1475. 
Review of 
Nobel prize 
winning work 
of Kahneman 
Qualitative – 
overview of 
Kahneman’s work 
- Explains bounded rationality as explained and its influence on decision making and 
behavioural economics i.e. human behaviour is bounded by environmental constraints 
in the environment  
- Biased decision 
making 
Task ambiguity 
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. Conditions 
for intuitive expertise: a failure to 
disagree. American Psychologist, 64 (6), 
515-526. 
Review on 
intuitive 
expertise 
Qualitative – 
discussion paper 
- Heuristics and biases and NDM research often seen as conflicting approaches 
- Both agree that intuition is based on predictability of decision making environment and 
subjective experience is unreliable indicator of decision accuracy 
- NDM 
- Heuristics 
- Intuitive expertise 
Experience 
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic Decision 
Making. Human Factors, 50(3), 456-460. 
Review of 
NDM 
Qualitative – review 
of NDM 
- NDM is study of decisions in real world settings that emphasises role of experience and 
effective decision making 
- Recognition primed decision making is an example that describes how experts use 
recognisable patterns learnt through domain specific experience in decision domain to 
make effective choices 
- NDM 
- Recognition primed 
DM 
Experience 
Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-
Cirocco, A. (1986). Rapid 
decision making on the fireground. In 
Proceedings of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society 30th 
Annual Meeting (Vol. 1, pp. 
576–580). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
RPD and fire 
fighter DM 
Qualitative – 
interviews with fire 
service 
- Experienced fire commanders only generated one option when responding to 
emergency 
- Could draw from a repertoire of stored options but expertise meant they selected first 
option that came to them which they rapidly evaluate through mental simulation to see 
if it would work 
- Recognition primed 
DM 
- Mental simulation 
Experience 
Klein, G., Snowdon, D., & Pin, C.L. 
(2007). Anticipator Thinking.  Asilomar 
Conference Grounds, Pacific Grove, CA.: 
Anticipatory 
thinking 
Qualitative – 
discussion on 
anticipatory thinking 
- Anticipatory thinking is a critical macro cognitive function of individuals and teams to 
help people prepare for future 
- There are 3 types of anticipator thinking: pattern matching; trajectory tracking and 
- Anticipatory thinking Anticipated emotions 
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NDM8 - the Eighth International 
Conference on Naturalistic Decision 
Making. 
conditional thinking on implications 
McKee, S. (2011). Age of Opportunity. 
Transforming the lives of older people in 
poverty. UK: The Centre for Social 
Justice. 
 
Review of 
government 
action on later 
life policies 
Qualitative – report 
on political DM 
- Argues that government fails to take action on important ethical issues when they are 
not seen as important to the political agenda 
- N/A Decision inertia 
National Audit Office / Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office. (2005). Joint 
findings on lessons to be learned from the 
handling of the response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami. Retrieved from 
http://www.nao.org.uk/report/consular-
services-to-british-nationals/  
 
Emergency aid 
following 
Boxing Day 
Tsunami in 
2004 
Qualitative – report 
on emergency 
response 
- There were delays in medical response following Tsunami 
- Delays in informing relatives of those reported missing about fate of loved ones causing 
great distress to many families 
- N/A Decision inertia 
Patrick, J. (2011). Evaluation Insights 
Haiti Earthquake Response Emerging 
Evaluation Lessons. Evaluation Insights, 
1, 1-13.  
 
Emergency aid 
following Haiti 
Earthquake 
Qualitative – report 
on emergency 
response 
- Novel information communication was used in response (e.g. social media) but there 
were serious delays in collating and sharing this information between agencies – due to 
poor information prioritisation 
- N/A Decision inertia 
PEDU. (2012). Review of Response to 
Flooding on 27th and 28th June 2012. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.drdni.gov.uk/pedu-review-
flood-response-june-2012.pdf  
 
Emergency 
response to UK 
flooding 
Qualitative – report 
on emergency 
response 
- Flooding in June 2012 had a delayed response due to uncertainty about roles and 
responsibilities and who should take primacy 
- N/A Decision inertia 
Roskes, M., Elliot, A.J., Nijstad, B.A., & 
De Dreu, C.K.W. (2013). Time pressure 
undermines performance under avoidance 
than approach motivation. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(6), 
803-813. 
Time pressure 
on motivation 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision games) 
- Both trait and state avoidance motivation was degraded by time pressure 
- Time pressure had a more adverse effect on performance when avoidance motivation 
rather than approach motivated 
- Did not appear to be due to activation of FFS suggesting effects not due to increased 
stress 
- Avoidance motivations should be avoided in time pressured events 
- Time pressure 
- Avoidance 
motivation 
Task  ambiguity 
Goal conflict  
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Sligte, D.J., de Dreu, C.K.W., & Nijstad, 
B.A. (2011). Power, stability of power, 
and creativity. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47, 891-897. 
Avoidant 
thinking and 
creativity 
Quantitative – 
empirical study 
(decision game) 
- Positions of power can influence cognitive processing and motivation 
- Avoidance motivations are associated with poor creativity and inflexible thinking 
- When power hierarchies are unstable in social groups, having a low power status can 
protect against negative effects 
- Power 
- Avoidance 
motivation 
- Creative thinking 
Social  ambiguity 
Experienced emotions  
Decision avoidance 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). 
Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-
1131. 
Heuristics and 
biases 
Qualitative – 
discussion on 
heuristics and biases 
- Discussion paper on different types of cognitive biases and heuristic rules including: 
representativeness; availability; and adjustment and anchoring. 
- Heuristics and biases Task ambiguity 
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Appendix Three: Critical Decision Method Information Sheet 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Using the Critical Decision Method to explore the experience of joint command level decision making during 
critical and major incidents 
What is the research about? 
We are interested in the experience of command level decision makers who have had to make important joint 
decisions during critical and major incidents. 
What do I have to do? 
A researcher and an assistant will conduct an interview with you (1.5-2 hours max) about your decision making. 
You will be asked to recall a time when you were faced with a challenging joint decision at a command level 
position. It can be from a real-life incident or during a training exercise. It should be a decision which, now on 
reflection, you believe could have been made sooner.  
What are you measuring? 
Interviews will be recorded via Dictaphone and then anonymously transcribed. We will use them to pick out key 
themes that help us to understand your experience of joint command level decision making. 
Am I being tested? 
No – you are NOT being tested. All information you provide will be made completely anonymous. All electronic 
data will be stored on a secure, password protected computer. 
Will my data be passed on to my superiors? 
No – all data is anonymous. The researchers will NOT pass on any personal information to your organisation or 
any external party. The data gathered is for research purposes only. 
It is important to highlight however that if you disclose to the researcher something which could be considered as 
dangerous behaviour at work, either by yourself or another, then the researcher will be obliged to pass this 
information on to the research supervisor who may forward this information on to a relevant body. 
Do I have to take part? 
No – your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are also free to withdraw from the research 
at any time should you decide that you no longer wish to take part. 
Will I benefit from taking part? 
Yes - Research will help us to understand how the emergency services make challenging joint decisions at 
command level. It will be used to help commanders make more robust and confident decisions in complex 
environments. The experience of the interview is often found to be enjoyable as it allows you the time and space 
to really think about and reflect on your own decision making in a trusted and informal environment. 
I still have more questions before I agree to take part… 
If you have any further queries about taking part in this research or questions about the aims of the research in 
general, please do not hesitate to contact the researchers. You can contact Professor Laurence Alison or Miss 
Nicola Power. If you would like to make a complaint about the research at any point, then please contact 
Laurence Alison in the first instance, followed by the ethics committee at ethics@liv.ac.uk. 
Email: l.j.alison@liverpool.ac.uk  Phone: 07966963597 
 Email: nicola.power@liverpool.ac.uk Phone: 07791344327 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you would like to take part in this research then 
please contact Nicola Power at the email address above to arrange an interview 
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Appendix Four: Consent Form 
 
          
Participant Name                                               Date                   Signature 
 
       
     Researcher                                                         Date                   Signature 
 
The contact details of the project supervisor are: 
[Professor Laurence Alison; Department of Psychological Sciences; Eleanor Rathbone Building, 
Bedford Street South, University of Liverpool; l.j.alison@liverpool.ac.uk; 07966963597]  
The contact details of the student researcher are: 
[Nicola Power; Department of Psychological Sciences; Eleanor Rathbone Building, Bedford Street 
South, University of Liverpool; Nicola.power@liverpool.ac.uk; 07791344327]  
  
Title of Research 
Project: 
Decision Inertia Interviews; Simulation  
 
 
Please 
initial box 
Researcher(s): Laurence Alison; Nicola Power 
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.   
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my rights being affected.    
3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act,  I can at any time ask for access 
to the information I provide and I can also request the destruction of that 
information if I wish. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study.    
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Appendix Five: Script for audio injects used in MTFA simulation 
INJECT 1: Phone calls to 999. Reports of 3 men acting suspiciously on the station platform. 
Security approached to ask them what they were doing. Men have opened fire with 
automatic weapons on civilians at random on the platform. 
MACC (audio): Calls received 3 men have opened fire on civilians at Lime Street Station… 
Caller said weapons looked to be automatic… mass casualties… women, men and children 
killed and injured… men still active in area… police and ambulance en route…information 
that shooters are located near platforms 7,8 and 9…RVP for this incident declared as 
Smithdown Lane. 
INJECT 2: Participants are now at the RVP. Informed that the Police are actively engaged 
with shooters. They have been provided with mapping information of hot/warm/cold and 
RVP from the police. They must decide where to place FCP (forward command point). 
No Audio 
INJECT 3: A civilian who escaped from inside the station runs up to the participants. He is 
frantic and informs that there are a large number of casualties bleeding out in the hot zone. 
Shooters are still in the area and fire arms team are in the hot zone.  
Civilian: Hey hey you help me, quick help! You’ve got to get in there and help those people – 
they’re dying in there!! There’s kids in there and everything – those blokes just don’t give a 
shit they’re shooting everyone. I know there’s… there’s some people near where I was… and 
they’re hiding… they’re by starbucks no nero er ahhh what’s it called?!… the woman 
anyway you’ve got to go… is bleeding and there’s bodies everywhere… you’ve got to help! 
INJECT 4:MACC radio through to provide casualty updates  
MACC (audio): Information received from Police silver… victims calling from inside station 
need immediate medical assistance… shooters still in the area… people still alive but 
bleeding heavily… 
INJECT 5: Phone call from Police Silver to confirm that shooters have escaped and are being 
pursued by fire arms team (in underground?). Hot zone now declared a warm zone and so 
casualty evacuation may begin. 
Police Silver (audio): Hi I’m Merseyside Police Force Incident Manager  and I’m calling 
through to confirm that the armed men have now left the immediate vicinity of Lime Street 
Station… erm our firearms team have not apprehended the offenders as of yet but are in 
pursuit in the Merseyrail underground… the Wirral line. I’ll be back in touch with more 
information as soon as I have it but, well yeah Lime Street platforms are now Warm not 
Hot… but as offenders are in pursuit the Police will not be able to assist with evac and 
packing… I’ll be back in touch soon. 
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INJECT 6: Radio from MACC to say reports of fire in station pub where saveable life is 
trapped. Radio message from crew manager to confirm this. A fire has started in the 
elevated pub in Lime Street Station with persons trapped. Fire service resources are 
committed to the casualty response at present. 
MACC: Update Lime Street Station shooters… reports of a fire from inside ‘Coopers’ pub bar 
inside station… bar located above M&S and Burger King… people trapped inside… smoke 
and flames reported from outside… people shouting for help… 
INJECT 7: Additional staff from both Fire and Ambulance arrived at RVP. They do not have 
the protective ballistic gear which is needed to enter the warm zone. They are volunteering 
to enter the warm zone without protective gear. 
RVP – Station Manager (audio): There’s additional resources here at the RVP who are 
willing to help… fire fighters and ambulance… they’ve heard the messages and want to be 
deployed from the FCP… what are the orders from the FCP? They don’t have any ballistic 
gear or protection for going in… your HART team and specialist fire fighters are already in 
there… what do you want to do?.  
INJECT 8A: If committed volunteers at Inject 6 = Chief on phone demanding to know why 
you’ve allowed them to enter. 
Chief Fire Officer (audio): Am I hearing this right?? You sent volunteers into the station with 
no ballistics?! What the hell were you thinking? Where’s your risk? Save saveable life – 
don’t put our guys into danger without protection – do you know where the shooters are? 
Did the police say it was a cold zone? What the hell is going on? 
INJECT 8B: If did not commit volunteers at Inject 6 = Chief on the phone demanding to 
know why you did NOT allow them to enter. 
Chief Fire Officer (audio): Am I hearing this right?? You’ve stopped our guys helping deal 
with casualties?! What the hell were you thinking? Where’s your risk? Save saveable life! 
You’ve got people dying in there and we’ve got staff willing and able to help! What the hell 
is going on? 
INJECT 9: A Gold meeting has been called for 11:00. Fire silver liaison needs a situation 
update to give to gold. 
Fire Silver Liaison (audio): Hi it’s station manager Thompson – I’m your fire silver liaison 
today and need to get an update asap… there’s been a Gold SCG called and we need a joint 
situational update… what’s your brief? 
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Appendix Six: Information sheet for Hydra simulation 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Developing and Understanding Emergency Service Decision Making through Simulation 
Based Training Events 
What is the research? 
You have been asked to take part in research looking at how the emergency services make 
decisions when responding to emergency incidents.  
What will I have to do? 
You have been asked to take part in a simulation based training event. As with the previous 
training events you have experienced, you will be asked to treat the event as if it was a real 
incident and respond as you would do in the real world.  
What are you measuring? 
All data gathered during the training event will be about decision making. Measures will 
include a questionnaire to measure individual differences in decision making style; decision 
logs taken during incident response; a questionnaire following the incident asking you about 
your reasons for your decision making; and audio recording. 
Am I being tested? 
No – you are NOT being tested. All information you provide will be made completely 
anonymous. Questionnaires will be coded with a participant number to ensure 
confidentiality. Video or audio recordings during the live event or interviews will be 
transcribed and made anonymous. Hard copies will be kept solely by the researcher in a 
locked safe and access will NOT be given to any other parties.  
Will my data be passed on to my superiors? 
No – all information will be kept completely anonymous. The researchers will NOT pass on 
any personal information to your organization or any external party. The data gathered is for 
research purposes only. 
Do I have to take part? 
No – your participation is completely voluntary. You are also free to withdraw from the 
research at any time should you decide that you no longer wish to take part. 
Will I benefit from taking part? 
Yes – the research is designed to work alongside your standard training. Not only is the 
simulated training designed to be fun, challenging and immersive, but it has also been 
developed with assistance from your training coordinators to make sure that it is realistic and 
beneficial to your learning. 
How will the research be used? 
Research will be used to assist in understanding how emergency services make decisions in 
the real world. It will be used to help improve emergency services decision making to allow 
responders to make more robust and confident decisions in challenging environments. 
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Appendix Seven: Information form provided to each agency at start of 
simulation 
Task - Police 
 It is Wednesday 8th October 2014. Time is 0800. Weather is now. 
 You are at your office.  
 Control have received reports of 3 men who have opened fire with automatic 
weapons at Lime Street Station. 
 You have been mobilised to the RVP at Smithdown Lane where you will be co-
located with your colleagues from the fire and police services 
 You are the on scene incident commander for the police service 
 Resources: You have 4 ARVs en route with an additional 4 ARVs being recalled 
from training. 
 You have an ETA of 5 minutes. Take this time to think about your initial priorities 
and objectives. 
 
Task – Fire and Rescue Service 
 
 It is Wednesday 8th October 2014. Time is 0800. Weather is now. 
 You are at your office.  
 Control have received reports of 3 men who have opened fire with automatic 
weapons at Lime Street Station. 
 You have been mobilised to the RVP at Smithdown Lane where you will be co-
located with your colleagues from the police and ambulance services 
 You are the on scene incident commander for the fire and rescue service. 
 Resources: You have 10 fire and rescue personnel en route from the Search and 
Rescue Team 
 You have an ETA of 5 minutes. Take this time to think about your initial priorities 
and objectives. 
Task - Ambulance 
 
 It is Wednesday 1st October 2014. Time is 0800. Weather is now. 
 You are at your office.  
 Control have received reports of 3 men who have opened fire with automatic 
weapons at Lime Street Station. 
 You have been mobilised to the RVP at Smithdown Lane where you will be co-
located with your colleagues from the fire and police services 
 You are the on scene incident commander for the ambulance service. 
 Resources: You have 6 ambulance personnel en route and an additional 6 being 
recalled from training 
 You have an ETA of 5 minutes. Take this time to think about your initial priorities 
and objectives. 
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Appendix Eight: Questionnaire given to participants at the end of the 
simulation 
Section A 
Please provide the following information about yourself by placing an ‘X’ in the appropriate box or 
write your answer in the space provided. 
 
Are you male or female?     Male   Female 
 
What is your age (in years)? 
<20  21-25  26-30  31-35  36-40  41-45 
  
46-50  51-55  56+ 
 
Which agency do you work for?         
  
 
What is job title?            
 
How long have you held this role?      Years    Months 
  
How long have you been in your job in total?    Years    
Months 
 
Did you already know anyone in your decision making team because you had met or worked with 
them before? Place an ‘X’ in the box that represents their agency. 
  Police  Fire and Rescue  Ambulance 
 
Section B 
Think about your general decision making. Please score your level of agreement with the following 
statements using the following scale: 
Strongly disagree (1)         Strongly 
agree (6) 
Statement Score 
(1-6) 
I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success 
 
 
Even after I’ve made up my mind about something I am always eager to consider a  
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different opinion 
I don’t like situations that are uncertain 
 
 
I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways 
 
 
I like to have friends who are unpredictable 
 
 
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament 
 
 
When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to 
expect 
 
I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life 
 
 
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes  
I hate to change my plans at the last minute 
 
 
I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it 
 
 
When I go shopping I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I want 
 
 
When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly 
 
 
When I am confused about an important issue I feel very upset 
 
 
I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment 
 
 
I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently 
 
 
I would describe myself as indecisive 
 
 
I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment 
 
 
I enjoy the uncertainty of going to a new situation without knowing what might happen  
My personal space is usually messy and disorganised 
 
 
In most social conflicts I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong 
 
 
I tend to struggle with most decisions 
 
 
I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important 
characteristics of a good student 
 
When considering most conflict situations I can usually see how both sides could be 
right 
 
I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions 
 
 
I prefer to socialise with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them 
 
 
I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements 
 
When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible 
 
I like to know what people are thinking all the time 
 
 
I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things 
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It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind 
 
 
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more 
 
 
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life 
 
 
I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own 
 
 
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place 
 
 
I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me 
 
 
When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it’s confusing  
I always see many possible solutions to problems I face 
 
 
I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty 
 
 
I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view 
 
 
I dislike unpredictable situations 
 
 
I dislike the routine aspects of my work 
 
 
Section B2 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Statement Score 
I am good at “sizing up” situations 
 
 
I have a hard time making decisions when faced with difficult situations 
 
 
I consider multiple options before making a decision 
 
 
When I encounter difficult situations, I feel like I am losing control 
 
 
I like to look at difficult situations from many different angles 
 
 
I seek additional information not immediately available before attributing causes to 
behaviour 
 
When encountering difficult situations, I become so stressed that I cannot think of a 
way to resolve the situation 
 
I try to think about things from another person’s point of view 
 
 
I find it troublesome that there are so many different ways to deal with difficult 
situations 
 
I am good at putting myself in others’ shoes 
 
 
When I encounter difficult situations, I just don’t know what to do 
 
 
 293 
 
 
It is important to look at difficult situations from many angles 
 
 
When in difficult situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to 
behave 
 
I often look at a situation from different viewpoints 
 
 
I am capable of overcoming the difficulties in life that I face 
 
 
I consider all the available facts and information when attributing causes to 
behaviour 
 
I feel I have no power to change things in difficult situations 
 
 
When I encounter difficult situations, I stop and try to think of several ways to 
resolve it 
 
I can think of more than one way to resolve a difficult situation I’m confronted with 
 
 
I consider multiple options before responding to difficult situations  
 
Section C 
Section C1: 
Indicate the degree to which you agree with each statement by using the following scale: 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Statement Score 
(1-5) 
One should be very cautious with strangers 
 
 
Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge 
 
 
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do 
 
 
These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you 
 
 
Most salespeople are honest in describing their products 
 
 
Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their speciality 
 
 
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly 
 
 
Most adults are competent at their jobs 
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Section C2:  
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. Think specifically about the individuals that you have just worked with and provide a 
score for each agency. If you were the only representative from your own agency please leave that 
column blank. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Statement Police Fire Ambulance 
I trust ... because they share the same interests as me 
 
   
I trust ... because they share my expectations and goals of the 
project 
   
I don’t trust … because they have a different communication 
style from me 
   
… work values are not very similar to mine 
 
   
In their job … seems to work efficiently 
 
   
I have full confidence in the skills of … 
 
   
… does not perform their tasks with skill 
 
   
I cannot rely on the task-related skills of … 
 
   
Even if I didn’t ask … to share knowledge with me I feel 
certain that they would 
   
I feel that … keeps information from me 
 
   
… does not pass information or ideas on that can be helpful to 
you or the team 
   
… timely shares any relevant information 
 
   
If I share my problems with … they will respond constructively 
and caringly 
   
… does not keep my interests in mind when making decisions    
… cares about the well-being of others 
 
   
… is primarily interested in their own welfare 
 
   
If I give … confidential information they keep it confidential 
 
   
… does not tell others about things if I ask that they be kept 
secret 
   
I lack confidence in the overall discretion of …. 
 
   
… talks too much about sensitive information that I give them 
 
   
Even in hard working circumstances I can count on … to 
follow through on work commitments 
   
In the face of difficulties I can count on … to solve problems 
and meet work commitments in time 
   
In difficult working circumstances … fails to follow through on    
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work commitments 
When encountering problems … lacks the courage to 
constructively start working on them 
   
I can rely on … not to make my work more difficult by careless 
work 
   
I feel that … tries to get out of their work commitments 
 
   
… would go on with their work even if nobody checked it 
 
   
… readily denies responsibility for problems incurred by their 
mistakes 
   
Section D 
Section D1:  
Please think about the scenario you have just completed and score each statement: 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Statement: Score 
The narrative of the incident felt realistic to me 
 
 
Decision making was high risk  
I am confident in the actions that I took 
 
 
I felt that my understanding of the situation throughout the incident was accurate  
I found decision making to be complex  
I was uncertain about my potential options  
I felt time pressured  
I was confused about my roles and responsibilities  
I was worried about being held to account for my decisions  
I was worried about being blamed for wrong decisions  
I was worried about regretting my decisions in the future  
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Section D2: 
Please answer the following questions by placing an ‘X’ in the relevant box or writing your answer in 
the space provided.  
Please list in order your main three goals during the scenario (from most important)? 
1        
2        
3 
What decision did you find most difficult to make? Why? 
 
 
 
Do you believe that this decision could have been made more quickly than it was? 
YES    NO   
Why? Why not? 
 
 
 
 
When making this choice, did you experience any of the following? Please use the scale below. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Statement Score 
I was constantly trying to find an optimal solution to the problem  
I wanted to wait and see what happened  
I wanted to gather more information  
I felt that I missed an earlier better opportunity to take action  
I was concerned about wasting previously invested resources  
There were too many options to pick between  
I decided to focus on easier tasks first  
There were not enough options to pick between  
Goals between agencies were inconsistent  
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
  
 
